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A.BSTRACr
While there have been a number of' studies of foreign exchange
risk management in UK Multinational Companies (MNCs), the
management of economic exposure has received very little
attention. The aim of' this study was to describe the management
of economic exposure (and its relationship to transaction
exposure) in UK MNCs.
A random sample of twenty MNCs was selected, and archival data
relevant to foreign exchange risk management were gathered.
Finance personnel In both the HQ and the Irish subsidiaries of'
the twenty companies were Interviewed.
The results of the study with respect to transaction exposure
were similar to previous studies. However, data collected at a
subsidiary level revealed that the degree of centralisation may
be underestimated by HQ treasurers, since divisional personnel
may influence the practices in foreign subsidiaries. The degree
of' centralisation was explained by the presence of transaction
costs in foreign exchange markets, and a relationship between
centralisation and netting opportunities was detected. The in—
house bank was highlighted as a mechanism for realising
transaction cost savings without decreasing operating unit
autonomy.
x
An examination of' the economic exposures of' the sample companies
revealed that economic exposure might be classified into four
subsets:
1) Sticky Price Exposure (of which transaction exposure is
a subset)
2) Traded Good Exposure (which arises from the tradability
of the MNC's products and factors of production)
3) Parallel Import Exposure
11) The Macroeconomic and Seotoral Consequences of' Exchange
Rate Qanges
The managerial response to economic exposure was also examined.
The majority of corporate treasurers were only involved in
transaction exposures and, with a few exceptions, the response to
economic exposure was operational rather than financial.
Political and promotional tactics were used extensively to manage
economic exposure in the short-run. The creation of' barriers
to entry (and the resultant decrease in the tradability of the
firm's products) was a popular medium-run strategy. The author
also found that only some of' the sample MNCs had significant
economic exposures.
Finally, a decision support model was developed in order to
operationalise the measurement of economic exposure, and the
evaluation of exposure management alternatives.
xi
2APTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Multinational Companies (MNCs) may be differentiated from the
domestic firm by virtue of the fact that they operate in a number
of national jurisdictions, 	 One of the key economic
characteristics of different national jurisdictions is the
existence of different national currencies. 	 The aim of this
thesis is to document the effects of fluctuating currencies on
UK MNCs and to document how UK MNCs manage foreign exchange risk.
In this chapter the rationale for the study is examined and the
remaining chapters of the thesis are summarised. 	 Finally, the
contribution to knowledge of this thesis is. examined.
I: Rationale and Objectives of the Study
Foreign exchange risk management has received considerable
attention in both the international financial management and the
international accounting literature.	 Moreover, foreign
exchange risk management is of considerable practical concern and
in recent years, the profession of treasurer has emerged in the
UK.	 However, despite both the attention which foreign exchange
risk management has received in both academic and practical
circles, there has been very little field research done on the
practice of foreign exchange risk management. 	 This study is
based upon the premise that a more intimate knowledge of the
practice of foreign exchange risk management will facilitate the
development of improved techniques for the management of foreign
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exchange risk. While there have been surveys of foreign
exchange risk management in the past, both in the UK and
elsewhere, the surveys have been limited to the examination of
the EQ treasurer's involvement in the management of a subset of
foreign exchange risk (transaction exposure). The objective of
this study is to examine how UK MNCs manage foreign exchange risk
(both economic and transaction exposure) at both a subsidiary and
a EQ level. Moreover, it is hoped that this analysis will lead
to suggestions as to how foreign exchange risk management may be
improved in practice.
In the following section, the remaining chapters are summarised
and the extent to which these objectives have been met is
examined in the final section of this chapter.
II: SLnmary of the Reain1ng (bapters
The first issue tackled in this thesis Is the possibility that
foreign exchange risk management as a problem may be irrelevant.
There is a case for suggesting that foreign exchange risk
management should not concern managers. 	 Dufey and Srinivasulu
[1981 ] summarlse the argument in the following way.
"Foreign exchange risk does not exist; even if it exists, it
need not be hedged; even if it is to be hedged,
corporations need not hedge it."
This statement forms the subject matter of chapters two to four.
The existence of foreign exchange risk is discussed in chapter
two. The theory of international parity is critically
examined, and empirical studies of the parity relationships are
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surveyed. The conclusion of chapter two is that there are
potent empirical and theoretical reasons which support the
existence of foreign exchange risk.
Having established the existence of foreign exchange risk, the
effects of foreign exchange risk on the cash flows of the MNC are
examined, and the prior literature in this area is reviewed in
chapter three. It is shown that exposure will be firm
specific, and that apart from the effects of exchange rate
changes on contractual commitments (transaction exposure), the
costs, prices and volumes of the MNC may be affected by exchange
rate changes. Having determined how the MNC may be exposed to
exchange rate changes, the measurement of exposure is examined,
and it is pointed out that it is likely that there will be
considerable difficulties attached to the measurement of exposure
to foreign exchange risk, and that it is extremely unlikely that
financial statements will reflect the effects of changes in
exchange rates on the cash flows of the firm.
If MNCs are exposed to foreign exchange risk, then should it be
managed, and if so, how? 	 Some answers to this question are
sought in chapter four. The normative case for the management
of foreign exchange risk is similar to the arguments against the
dividend and debt irrelevancy propositions in domestic finance.
It is argued that there will be considerable informational and
capital market barriers to 'homemade hedging' and that there is a
normative case for the management of foreign exchange risk.
Some of the techniques, both financial and operational, which
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have been suggested for the management of foreign exchange risk
are then surveyed. It is argued that there may be
organisational constraints on the management of foreign exchange
risk, since there will be a case for centralising it, and that it
is quite possible that the locus of foreign exchange risk
management may be distributed between the HQ and the subsidiary.
Moreover, it is argued that the management of transaction
exposure is more likely to be centralised than the management of
economic exposure, due to transaction cost and measurement
considerations.
The prior literature and the theoretical reasoning in chapter
four lead to the rationale for this study, that transaction
exposure is only a subset of foreign exchange risk and that the
management of foreign exchange risk is likely to be distributed
throughout the MNC. In order to demonstrate the uniqueness of
this rationale as a guide to field research in foreign exchange
risk management, some prior empirical studies of foreign exchange
risk management are surveyed in chapter five. A research design
is then proposed which consists of an examination of foreign
exchange risk management at both the HQ and the Irish
subsidiaries of UK MNCs. The research methods suggested consist
of a combination of interview and archival data, and it is argued
that a relatively unstructured approach to data collection is
most appropiate to the problems being considered in this thesis.
Chapters six to nine concentrate on the results of the field
study.	 The role of the HQ treasurer in the management of
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transaction exposure is summarised in chapter six. It is noted
that many UK companies allow their foreign subsidiaries
considerable autonomy in the management of transaction exposure
and that a significant proportion of UK MNCs do not centralise
their UK transaction exposures.	 Moreover, these results are
shown to be consistent with the results of earlier UK studies.
The emergence of' the internal bank as a mechanism for
facilitating the centralisation of transaction exposure is also
described, and it is argued that transaction cost considerations
may be the main force behind the centralisation of transaction
exposure. Moreover, it is suggested that it is quite possible
that the future may be characterised by the increased
decentralisation of the management of transaction exposure rather
than increased centralisation.
The role of the HQ treasurer in the management of' economic
exposure is examined in chapter seven. It is shown that the HQ
treasurer has very little involvement in the management of
economic exposure and that there were only isolated examples of'
HQ treasury involvement in the use of financial instruments for
the protection of' economic exposure.	 However, it was found
that the advent of foreign currency options had led to some
alterations in both foreign exchange risk management policies and
the role of' the HQ treasurer.	 Indeed, the availability of'
foreign currency options may lead to an increased central
treasury role in the management of economic exposure.
The management of foreign exchange risk in the Irish subsidiaries
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of UK MNCs is summarised in chapter eight. 	 It is shown that the
management of transaction exposure is constrained by the
existence of' exchange controls but that operating and financial
personnel were quite involved with one another in foreign
exchange risk management decisions. Moreover, while the
treasurer's perceived role in the management of transaction
exposure at a subsidiary level was consistent with the results
obtained at the subsidiary level, examples were found of HQ
divisional staff attempting to influence the foreign exchange
risk management policies of' the foreign subsidiaries. The
economic exposure of the Irish subsidiaries is also described and
the management tactics used to overcome economic exposure are
also summarised. In order to classify the subsidiaries, the
tradability of the subsidiaries' products and factors is used as
a basis for classification.
The economic exposure of the UK MNCs as a whole is examined in
chapter nine. It is shown that a substantial number of UK MNCs
have economic exposures, only to the extent that there is a time
lag between a change in the costs of a MNC and its subsequent
reflection in product prices. Moreover, transaction exposure
may act as a proxy for this particular form of' economic exposure.
However, it is also shown that some UK MNCs have significant
economic exposures and the tactics which may be used to manage
economic exposure are summarised, using a six-fold classification
of economic exposure.
A decision support model is developed in chapter ten which may be
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used to measure the exposure of both the subsidiary and the MNC
as a whole. It is also demonstrated how the effects of
alternative policies on the exposure of the MNC may be
evaluated.	 Finally, the conclusions of the study, and some
suggestions for future research are presented in chapter eleven.
III: Contribution to Knowledge
This thesis represents a contribution to knowledge In so far as
It provides a description of the management of foreign exchange
risk (Including economic exposure) at both a HQ and a subsidiary
level.	 The main limitation of the study is that only the Irish
subsidiaries of UK MNCs were examined. 	 Moreover, the results
of the study should lead to an improvement in the practice of
foreign exchange risk management for two reasons. 	 Firstly, a
complete catalogue of alternative tactics which may be used to
manage foreign exchange risk are presented, based upon observed
management practices. Secondly, a decision support model Is
developed which permits managers to evaluate the effects of
alternative tactics and strategies on the MNC's foreign exchange
risk profile.
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CHAPTER 2
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK: DOES IT EXIST?
"There is no sphere of human thought in which it is easier
to show superficial cleverness and the appearance of
superior wisdom than in discussing questions of currency
and exchange."
Sir Winston urchill
House of Commons: 28-9-199
In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that there may be
circumstances under which foreign exchange risk does not exist.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the conditions under
which foreign exchange risk is unlikely to exist in order to
highlight the conditions which would lead to the existence of
foreign exchange risk. The traditional theory of international
parity receives considerable attention in international financial
management textbooks and constitutes a series of sufficient
conditions for the non existence of exchange risk. In the
following paragraphs, the traditional theory of international
parity is critically examined from both a theoretical and an
empirical perspective.	 One of the most interesting aspects of
this discussion is the manner in which the traditional theory
seemed to be accepted in both theoretical terms, and from an
empirical point of view, until the end of the last decade.
Since then however, the evidence against the traditional theory,
both theoretical and empirical, leads this author to conclude
that the traditional theory is unlikely to hold, and that it is
reasonable to assume that foreign exchange risk does exist.
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The traditional theory is discussed in the first section of this
chapter, along with the assumptions which are sufficient to
derive the theory. The empirical evidence supporting and
refuting the relationships postulated by the traditional theory
is then evaluated.	 An attempt is then made to synthesize both
recent theoretical and empirical research, to demonstrate that
exchange risk does exist.	 Finally, the conclusions and the
implications of the review are examined.
I:The Traditional Theory
The 'traditional' theory of international parity, is based upon
the work of Fisher, Keynes and Cassel early in the twentieth
century. Giddy t1976a, 1977) resuscitated these theories and
they are now standard material in the international financial
management textbooks (e.g. Eiteman and Stonehill [1983), Shapiro
[1982]; Feiger and Jacquillat [1981] is a notable exception).
Eaker [1977] has suggested that the role of this model, rather
than being seen as representative of the world, should be seen as
a benchmark to signal profit making opportunities. This is a
reasonable justification if deviations are the exception rather
than the rule. However, the evidence suggests that deviations
from parity relationships are the rule, and this in turn
questions the usefulness of international parity as a benchmark.
The following paragraphs provide an exposition of international
parity similar to that of Giddy [1976a] and a set of sufficient
conditions for international parity to hold.	 Finally, an
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attempt is made to discuss the a priori implications of the
relaxation of' these conditions.
The predictions of the Giddy [1976a] model, which in turn was
based upon the work of Aliber [1976a] and Aliber and Stickney
[1975], are threefold.	 Firstly, it is predicted that the
expected exchange rate change will equal the forward premium or
discount.	 This relationship is known as the unbiased forward
rate effect.	 The second prediction is known as the
International Fisher effect which predicts that the expected
exchange rate change will equal the difference in interest rates
between the two countries.	 Finally, the third relationship is
known as the purchasing power parity theorem and predicts that
the expected change in the exchange rate will equal the
difference between the anticipated inflation rate in the two
countries.
These three relationships may be deduced using the Fisher effect
as a starting point (Fisher [1907]), which states (ignoring the
cross product and using logarithms) that the nominal rate of
interest (Rn) reflects the real rate of interest (Rr) plus
anticipated inflation (P):
R Rr+P
	
(1)
Assuming only two countries in the world, and using the
superscript "* to denote one country and no superscript to
denote the other country, we can also say that this relationship
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will hold in the second country.
The unbiased forward rate theory states that the forward rate
(F0) equals the expected future spot rate (s 1 ). By implication,
the expected change in the spot rate equals the forward premium
or discount.
Letting S0 represent the current spot rate, we can say:
Si
	 (2)
51S0F0S0	 (3)
Because of opportunities for covered interest arbitrage, the
expected terminal value of investing in a foreign currency
denominated bond and a forward exchange contract equals that of
making an investment in home currency in a similar bond.
Hnn'FO S O	 (1)
The main justification for this is that if the condition did not
hold, traders could earn more than the risk free return for
undertaking a risk free transaction.
The International Fisher Effect predicts that the expected change
in the exchange rate equals the expected interest rate
differential between two countries:
a
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Rn_Rn*S1_So	 (14 a)
From equation (1) , we know that:
*	 * *
Rn Rr+P : R	 r +P
Subtracting,
Rn•••Rn*=Rr+P_Rr*_P*	 (5)
Since it is a unified capital market, the real rates of interest
in both countries must be equal.
RrRr'	(5a)
Furthermore the left hand sides of both equations (14) and (5) are
identical , so:
F_So=Rr+P_Rr'_P
(6)
Then, using either the forward rate equation (3) or alternatively
the interest rate theory of exchange rate expectations ('ta),
S i _So=P_P *	(7)
This is purchasing power parity (PPP) which in ex ante terms
states that the expected rate of change of the exchange rate
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equals the expected inflation differential.
In terms of equations, there are a number of ways to reach the
same conclusion; the system is overdetermined. In all, there are
six possible relationships which underly international parity:
1. International Fisher Effect (eq.Ia)
2. Purchasing Power Theory (eq.7)
3. Covered Interest Arbitrage (eq.J4)
1L	 Unbiased Forward Rate (eq.2)
5. Fisher Effect and worldwide real interest rate (eqs. 1,5a)
6. Covered Commodity Arbitrage (eq.6)
The latter relationship has not, as far as this author is aware,
been discussed In the literature before or tested. For example,
Elteman and Stonehill [1983] dismiss It by arguing that since the
other five relationships hold, it will also hold. Roll [1979]
discusses cross border commodity speculation as a mechanism for
purchasing power parity deviations and may be construed as being
In a similar vein. In principle, It would consist of selling a
commodity forward In one currency, buying It forward in a second
currency and using a forward contract to pay for it.
The interesting feature of these six relationships is that they
are Interdependent and empirical results are to some extent
analagous to the degrees of freedom problem in statistics. If
one relationship can be falsified, then at least one other must
also be falsifiable. 	 Figure 2.1 Illustrates the interaction of
these relationships and the degrees of freedom problem.
Qiapter 2: Page 13
3	 5
8... S0 <-..> F0 .. S0 <> R n Rn' <>
1	 6
I 1 I _______ I _______ I
I	 I
2
I	 I
fig. 2.1
Giddy E1976a] while presenting the traditional theory as "An
Integrated Theory of Exchange Rate Equilibrium", only succeeds in
providing a description of exchange rate equilibrium, and
manifestly fails to describe the underlying assumptions. Solnik
[19781 has suggested four assumptions which are sufficient to
derive these relationships. They are:
Al	 Financial markets are perfect and frictionless. There are
no transactions costs, government controls or taxes.
A2	 Goods markets are perfect and frictionless. International
shipment Is free, instantaneous and costless. 	 This also
implies the law of one price.
A3	 There is only one consumption good, which is common to
everyone.
A1	 The future Is known with certainty.
Essentially, the assumptions lead to a general equilibrium
setting.	 Unfortunately, the monetisation of such a setting, in
particular with a quantity theory formulation as in Cassel
[1916a] poses problems since excess demands for goods are
homogeneous of degree zero in money prices while the excess
demand for money Is homogenous of degree one in money prices.
Patinkin [1956] overcame this problem by incorporating real money
balances in the system.
However, there is still a basic paradox in the model since within
such a world it is difficult to find a rationale for the
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existence of money, or for that matter, foreign currency.
Keynes [1937], argued that:
"Our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a
barometer of the degree of distrust of our own calculations
and conventions concerning the future..."
This line of reasoning has also been pursued more recently by
dower [1965] and Leijonhufvud [1968].
	
The implication of this
discussion is that the existence of a store of value will arise
only when assumption A1 is relaxed, since consumers will no
longer be perfectly informed about present and future exchange
opportunities, this in turn may lead to the non clearance of
other markets and the violation of assumptions one and two.
Rather than formally derive the parity relationships, the
remainder of this section shall analyse the consequences of
relaxing these assumptions. 	 Firstly, it is necessary to specify
which relationships are contingent on particular assumptions.
Al	 => Interest rate parity (IRPT)
Al + A14	 => The unbiased forward rate (UBF)
Al + P2 + A3
	
> Purchasing power parity theory (PPPT)
Al + P2 + A14	 => The Fisher effect (FE)
Al + P2 + A3 + A1 > The international Fisher effect (IFE)
Al + P2 + A3 + A1 :> Covered commodity arbitrage (CCA)
LI: Relaxing the Ass.inptIon of Perfect FInancial Markets
This possibility has not been analysed to any great extent in the
literature.
	
On a priori grounds, it seems reasonable to argue
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that imperfections may hinder all the relationships.
Unfortunately, obtaining determinate solutions in the presence of
transaction costs, or segmented international financial markets,
is not amenable to many of the analytical techniques in financial
economics. Deardorff [1981] has examined the effect of
transaction costs on IRPT and we will return to his analysis in
the section on the tests of IRPT.
1.11: Relaxing the Assiiiption of Perfect Goods Markets
Again, this assumption has not received much attention in the
literature. Grauer et al. [1976] did examine the case of ad
valorem imperfections, but otherwise, empirical evidence against
the law of one price has been invoked against this assumption
rather than a priori arguments. It is however worth noting,
that a number of macroeconomic models and the exposition of Adler
and Lehmann [1983] assume that goods markets are 'stickier' or
more inefficient than financial markets.	 This issue will be
dealt with more fully in section III.
1.111: Relaxing the Assiinption of a Single Good
This assumption has received widespread attention in the
literature, and Adler and Dumas [1983] suggest it as the basis of
international finance. The difficulties with relaxing this
assumption arise from the problem of constructing an index to
represent the consumption of many goods 'as if' they were only
one good in order to produce a'well behaved' measure of price
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change in the form of an index.	 Burstein [1963, p12], suggests
the following scenario to indicate the difficulties in
constructing price indexes.
	
Burstein [1963] considers the case
where there are three types of individual in the world:
j )	 Mohommedans who love proteins, are allergic to cotton and
live in countries without highways.
ii) Hindus, allergic to horses, living in a country with good
roads and a warm climate.
iii) Vegetarian seventh day adventists who are allergic to wool.
Such a world with heterogeneous consumption tastes leads Burstein
[1963 p13] to conclude that:
"It is abundantly clear that alternative sets of prices
cannot be ordinarily considered independently of the tastes
and habits of the persons involved when one ranks
purchasing powers of morley."
Apart from habits and tastes, and of varying consumption
opportunity sets, there is also the issue of homotheticity.
Samuelson and Swamy [197 1 , p592], refer to this as a 'Santa Claus
hypothesis', since it is invoked to overcome difficult analytical
problems.	 It implies that (Samuelson et al. [197 1 , p568)):
"Each dollar of income be spent in the same way by rich or
poor...otherwise, a price change in luxuries could affect
only the price index of the rich."
More formally, it. amounts to assuming unitary income and
technological elasticities.	 The analytical implication of
homothetic preferences is that the bundle of consumption goods in
the index may be treated as if it were only a single consumption
good, with individual goods consumed in constant proportions.
Stulz [1981) and Breeden [1979) suggest techniques to overcome
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these problems, however such solutions require both a marginal
and an average index. The assumption of a single consumption
good may therefore be replaced by the assumption of identical
worldwide homothetic preferences. If it is not the case,
deviations from PPP, IFE and CCA will be observed.
Solriik [197 14] and Adler and Dumas [1983] use the assuniption of
identical homothetic preferences within countries but non
identical preferences between countries as a characterization of
the asset pricing problem in an international context. The main
implication of this characterization is that investors in
different countries, if they are interested in real rather than
nominal returns, will use different price indexes to deflate
asset returns and this leads to obvious complications with the
normal separation theorems of asset pricing theory. It should
also be pointed out that, models which attempt to describe asset
pricing in a domestic setting under inflation (e.g. Friend,
Landskroner and Losq [1976]) are also relevant to this particular
formulation of the international asset pricing problem.
I.iv: Relaxing the Certainty Asstmiption
This scenario will invalidate the Fisher effect, the
international Fisher effect, the unbiased forward rate and
covered commodity arbitrage. The first three difficulties are
illustrated by Grauer et al. [1976], using fluctuating inflation
rates as a form of uncertainty. Essentially, they use a model
which is identical to a domestic economy, with the addition of
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some extra nominally riskiess securities, which permit bets to be
taken on the outcome of a number of uncertain inflation rates.
Assuming risk averse investors, there will be risk premia based
on these monetary factors.	 However, investors in different
geographical locations will prices assets identically.
lv: Relaxing both the Certainty Assumption and the Perfect Goods
Markets Assumption
Roll and Solriik [1977], suggest an asset pricing model where
exchange risk arises from imperfections in goods markets.
	 In
such a setting commodity prices are uncertain and PPP will be
derived in terms of expected prices. 	 Uncertain transaction
costs, Import and export taxes and other imperfections will lead
to random fluctuations in the price of' the good, and hence, the
presence of' risk premia.
lvi: Many Goods in an Uncertain World with Hoiiothetic National
Preferences.
Solnik [197 1 ] examines this possibility. 	 Unlike the Grauer et
al. [1976] monetary uncertainty, Solnik assumes that the monetary
authorities maintain the inflation rate constant. 	 This leads to
the random fluctuation of exchange rates with the relative value
of national consumption baskets. Exchange risk arises because
of uncertain changes in the real value of the national
consumption basket.
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I.vil: A Conclusion?
The foregoing analysis suggests that there may be strong reasons
for questioning the pre-eminence of the theory of international
parity on a priori grounds, since it is not robust to relaxations
of the sufficient conditions posited by Solnik [1978].
	
Both the
empirical tests of the assumptions and the predictions of the
traditional theory are reviewed in the next section.
II:The Evidence
This section examines empirical tests of the assumptions and
predictions of the theory of international parity.
	 The section
falls into three parts. 	 Firstly, there is a discussion of some
methodological problems associated with many of the studies
cited.	 Secondly there is an examination of tests of the
assumptions of the theory and finally a summary of some tests of
the predictions of the theory.
II.A: Methodological Issues
The main issues relating to the research methods and designs used
in empirical studies of the international parity relationships
are the time period studied, the countries and markets studied,
the comparability of the studies, the ex post nature of the data
used, the design of statistical hypothesis tests, and the assumed
distribution of exchange rate changes.	 The main reason for
discussing these issues is to highlight the difficulties in
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interpreting the tests of international parity.
The international parity relationships are postulated to hold
under freely floating exchange rates. Unfortunately, freely
floating exchange rates are a relatively recent phenomenon and
fixed exchange rates or dirty floats have been dominant during
this century.	 The only other periods when exchange rates
floated in the twentieth century were in the period from 191 14 to
the mid 1920's and in Canada in the mid fifties. Apart from
these two periods, floating rates have only been in existence
since 1973, and this in turn leads to relatively small numbers of
observations of exchange rate changes until comparatively
recently.	 Moreover, even in the most recent period, government
intervention in foreign exchange markets has been considerable
(cf. Aliber [1978]).
	
The net result is that until recently,
there has been Insufficient modern data. Furthermore, the
external validity of tests carried out on data which is now sixty
years old, given the changes in the world economy, may be
questioned.
Secondly, many of the studies have been carried out by American
researchers using exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar. The
dollar may be unrepresentative of other world currencies given
Its use as an international medium of exchange. In addition,
many of the studies have focused only on the currencies of
developed countries, and some research studies which have been
carried out using more comprehensive data, suggest that
developing countries may systematically differ from developed
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countries.	 A notable exception to this tendency is the study of
black markets in foreign exchange.
Thirdly, there is virtually no duplication or replication of
studies and in most cases, studies are incomparable, since they
use both different data sets and different statistical
techniques.	 It is therefore difficult to know why researchers
have obtained different results to prior researchers.
The fourth issue arising from these studies is that they may be
criticised as invalid tests of the theory of international
parity.	 The theory is stated in an expectational form, and in
order to test the theory, expectations of financial variables
rather than realised financial variables should be used. 	 For
example, earlier tests of the unbiased forward rate used the
realised spot rate as a proxy for the expected future spot rate.
More recent studies have attempted to adjust this formulation for
expectational errors.	 Recent studies have also made use oe the
Livingstone data on inflationary expectations, as a proxy for
expected inflation.
The tests also pose some statistical problems since many of the
tests involve the use of an ambiguous unspecified alternative
hypothesis.
	
For example, studies of exchange market eff'icency
fail to specify the nature of the alternative of inefficiency,
while tests of the unbiased forward rate may fail to specify the
nature of the bias. This may to some extent be due to the lack
of a coherent theory to specify such variables, which in turn
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leads to the question of the power' of tests, in which, due to the
lack of' a coherent theory, it is difficult to control for other
variables.	 Moreover, the studies examined below are replete
with joint hypothesis problems. For example, tests of the
unbiased forward rate may involve a joint hypothesis of no bias
and a model of expectation formation, while Levich [1978a] points
out that efficient market tests involve a test of both market
efficiency and a hypothetical structure of "normal" equilibrium
returns. It should also be pointed out that many of the tests
of purchasing power parity, and to a lesser extent the unbiased
forward rate, use single equation models. Bilson [198k] argues
that a single regression between a security and a dependent
variable would never be considered because of noise, while this
approach is used throughout the foreign exchange literature.
Finally, the distribution of exchange rate changes represents one
of the most fascinating puzzles in the international financial
management literature. If exchange rate changes are distributed
non normally, then there are likely to be considerable problems
in the interpretation of research results which use parametric
statistical techniques.	 Moreover, portfolio theoretic
approaches to foreign exchange risk will need to involve
restrictive assumptions about individual utility (i.e. parabolic
utility) in order that the covariance matrix may be interpreted.
It is therefore important to know the distribution of exchange
rate changes since it will affect the analytical and statistical
techniques used, as well as form a basis for the development of
theories of exchange rate determination which explain the
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observed distribution.
However, the studies of the distribution of exchange rate changes
are not without their own problems; in particular, demonstrating
that a sequence of observed random variables is stable and non-
normal is hazardous unless both random and chronological
ordarings of the variable are used [Granger 1975].
	
Westerfield
[1977] has tested for normality and maintains that exchange rate
changes can be modelled as non normal Pareto Levy distributions.
However, the study used only chronological orderings of exchange
rate changes to establish the value of the characteristic
exponent. Vinso and Rogaiski [1978] supported the results of
Westerfield [1977] and found that a Pareto-Levy distribution
produced a reasonable fit.
MacFarland et al.[1982] attempted to overcome the deficiencies of
Westerfield's[1977] study by testing both chronological and
random sequences. They also studied a later time period
(January 1975 to July 1979) and found that the distribution had a
characteristic exponent which increased as the sample size of the
observations increased. Burt et al. [1977] and Dooley and
Shafer [1976] have also produced results which support this
evidence.
Calderon-Rossell et al.[1982] found that distributions were
different for different currencies and concluded that the
distribution of exchange rates was non unique and suggested that
central bank policies and underlying economic forces may explain
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this observation.	 However, they did not attempt to test this
hypothesis.	 They also expressed "serious doubts" about
empirical studies which relied on normality as an
assumption [op.cit.p 109].
	
MacFarland et al. [1982] produced
evidence of trading day effects. 	 They suggest using daily data
with 'extreme caution' and that:
"standard deviations calculated from sample observations
should be used with caution in assessing the extent of risk
associated with holding foreign exchange."
[op. cit.p713]
As yet, there has only been one study of minute by minute
exchange rate changes.	 Wasserfallen et al. [1985] examined the
Swiss Franc - Dollar exchange rate and found that the
distributions were non normal.	 They concluded [op. cit., p.65]:
"On the whole it appears that the process generating returns
on the foreign exchange market changes in several important
dimensions from one day to the next. Not even adjacent
days form an exception to this rule as the results
demonstrate. Assuming the existence of one specific
distribution over long periods of time as it is done in
examinations of daily, weekly and monthly data, does not
seem to be an appropiate procedure."
This finding would suggests that the distribution of exchange
rate changes is both non normal and unstable.
	
Moreover, by
examining instantaneous changes, it would seem that models of
international asset pricing assume an overly simplified
stochastic process.
On a less pessimistic note, the Farber et al.[1977] study
suggests that the return from holding a foreign currency deposit
may not deviate as much from normality as the distribution of
foreign exchange rate changes. 	 On balance, it would seem that
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the ex post distribution of exchange rate changes is non normal.
Should this also be the case for the ex ante distribution, then
it will have implications for many areas in international
financial management. The MacFarland et al. [1982] results may
be explained using a combined diffusion and jump process.
However, if the processes are unstable, even relatively
complicated models of portfolio selection such as that of' Kouri
[1976] which incorporates both a jump (Poisson) and a diffusion
process are likely to be over stylised versions of reality.
One might conclude by pointing out that there are limitations to
empirical examinations of the international parity relationships,
and that the results are difficult to interpret. It should be
borne in mind that until the end of the last decade, researchers
believed that empirical evidence confirmed the traditional theory
of international parity.	 In the following section, it will be
shown that empirical evidence would lead one to reject the
traditional theory.	 Given that a change in beliefs has occurred
once, there is no reason why beliefs may change again and that
the theory of international parity will once again come into
vogue when tests are refined and modified. 	 Finally, the
discussion illustrates the difficulty of testing the theory of
international parity, since the conditions necessary for the
theory to hold have never been stated.
II.B: Testing the Ass iiptiona of the Traditional Theory
In the first section of this chapter, it was pointed out that
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Solriik [1978] had suggested four assumptions which represented
sufficient conditions for the theory of International parity to
hold.	 Solnik [1978] points out that if there are perfect
frictionless commodity and financial markets, there is only one
consumption good and the future is known with certainty, then the
theory of International parity would hold. 	 In this part, the
Issue of whether these conditions are likely to be met in
practice is examined.
II.B.i: fl AssumptIon	 Perfect Goods Markets
If goods markets are perfect and frictionless, then one would
imagine that the law of' one price would hold.	 Studies by
Crouhy-Veyrac et al. [1982], Isard [1977], Katseli-Papaefstratiou
[1979] and Richardson [1978] would indicate that In practice the
law of one price Is violated, and this author could not locate a
study which suggested that the law of' one price holds. 	 Indeed,
Isard [1977, p9I2] concluded that:
"In reality, the law of one price is flagrantly and
systematically violated."
It is however possible that the law of' one price fails to hold
due to different tastes, or transaction costs in goods markets.
The Richardson [1978] study Is particularly interesting in this
regard, since he based his conclusions on US and Canadian data.
One would expect that barriers to arbitrage would be relatively
low between these two countries, however Richardson found that
commodity arbitrage could not be detected for the majority of
commodity classes, and that the law of one price was violated.
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Therefore, it would seem that there are substantial imperfections
in international goods markets.
II.B.ii: flu. Assuiwtion	 Homothetic Preferences
In order to examine whether preferences are homothetic, one could
examine purchasing power parity deviations, in order to
disaggregate the deviation into a portion which is attributable
to deviations from the law of one price and the portion which is
attributable to differences in national consumption baskets.
Kravis et al. E1975] and Kravis and Lipsey [1978 examined
deviations from purchasing power parity using both individual
national index weightings and a unitary weighting system. They
found that a significant proportion of the purchasing power
parity deviation could be explained by heterogeneous natonal
weightings. This finding would lead to the conclusion that
national consumption baskets do differ, and that the assumption
of homothetic consumption preferences, at a global level, is
unacceptable. They also examined the importance of deviations
from the law of one price as an explanation of purchasing power
parity deviations and concluded that the deviations were due to
both the invalidity of the law of one price and the existence of
heterogeneous international consumption preferences. 	 Roll
[1979] also acknowledged the importance of differing national
consumption bundles, but argues that purchasing power parity
deviations arose from government imposed distortions.
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II.B.iii: I1i. AssumDtion	 Perfect Financial Mprket
There are a variety of types of tests of the degree of perfection
of international financial markets. 	 In this section, three
types of test will be examined.	 Firstly, one could examine the
extent to which the law of one price holds in financial markets.
'Ihe amount of research in this area is quite limited.	 Maldonado
and Saunders [1983] found that the law of one price held for
securities which were traded on both the New York and London
Stock Exchanges.	 Secondly, one could examine the extent to
which foreign exchange markets were informationally efficient,
and finally, one could examine the extent of world capital market
segmentation.	 The latter two types of test are examined in the
following paragraphs.
II.B.iii.1: Ifl. Informational Efficiency 1. Forei gn Exchange
Markets
Tests of the informational efficiency of foreign exchange markets
are of considerable Importance.	 Firstly, if one found that
foreign exchange markets were not informationally efficient, then
it is unlikely that foreign exchange markets are efficient in
other respects.	 Secondly, If foreign exchange markets are
Informationally efficient, then MNCs operating in foreign
exchange markets are unlikely to earn abnormal returns unless
they have a comparative forecasting advantage. 	 Thirdly, some
modern theories of' exchange rate determination assume that
foreign exchange markets are informationally efficient.
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Despite the importance of informational efficiency in
international financial management, Kohlhagen [1978a, p3l] points
out:
"It seems that the basis for this literature - namely, what
is conclusive evidence of an efficient foreign exchange
market, has not been very well developed."
The first step in the development of a concept of efficiency is
to define informational efficiency. Beaver [1981], in the
context of efficiency in securities markets, has suggested the
following definition:
"The market is efficient with respect to some information
system (n) if and only if the prices of the securities are
the same as they would be in an otherwise identical economy
(with the same configuration of preferences and endowments
and information systems), except that every individual has
access to "n" as well."
At first glance, one would expect that this definition might be
equally applicable to foreign exchange markets, however there are
two important differences between foreign exchange markets and
security markets which may pose problems for the definition.
Firstly, governments intervene in foreign exchange markets.
This may in turn render the foreign exchange market a non zero
sum game. Taylor [1980] maintains that the foreign exchange
losses of the five largest central banks in the world exceeded
ten billion dollars between 1973 and 1979.
	
Aliber [1976a] has
produced similar evidence.
Secondly, it is difficult to define an information system within
the foreign exchange market.	 Unlike securities markets, one
cannot readily define the universe of publicly available
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information, given that there is no analogue to statutory
financial reporting in foreign exchange markets. Moreover,
'strong' forms of efficiency (Fama [1970]) are unlikely, given
the informational advantages of' central banks.
Two types of information system have been examined in the
literature.	 The first type of information system is the use of'
past price data.	 Such a system is similar to the 'weak form'
partition suggested by Fama C1970].	 However, it is impossible
to establish that one cannot earn abnormal returns using past
price data, since there are an infinite number of' ways of
combining past data. Weak form efficiency cannot be
unambiguously established unless all possible models
Incorporating past price data are tested.
The second type of information system which has been examined is
the ability of commercially available forecasting services to
produce 'superior' forecasts. 	 These may be .based on past price
trends, judgement or econometric models. Apart from forecasts
based upon past price trends, this form of test may be seen as
analagous to tests of semi-strong efficiency in securities
markets.	 The two types of test are examined in the following
paragraphs.
fl.B.iii.2: 'Weak Form Efficiency
Studies of weak form efficiency closely parallel the methods used
in the 'Random Walk' literature.
	
Poole [1967] studied ten time
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series of flexible exchange rates and found that they could be
approximated by a martingale. 	 He did however detect significant
serial dependencies, particularly for the Canadian dollar and
therefore he rejected the random walk hypothesis. This evidence
presumes a stationary distribution of returns, which may not be
the case.
Apart from studies which test a random walk hypothesis, other
studies have been carried out which use runs tests, spectral
analysis and filter rules.
Grubel [1965,1966] found that the ue of simple filter rules in
the forward exchange market would have yielded significant
profits in the late fifties. Dooley and Shafer [1976] carried
out similar tests in the floating period from March 1973 to
September 1975 for nine currencies. They maintained that It was
possible to trade profitably using simple filter rules.
Cornell and Dietrich [1978] used the same time period as Dooley
and Shafer [1976] and claimed that the foreign exchange markets
were at least weakly efficient and that the rate of' return on
spot contracts approximated the distribution of common stock and
commodity futures contracts. They also maintained that the
profits from filter rules and rules based on runs tests were not
enormous and that they might only be sufficient to compensate
for filter search costs and risk.
Upson [1972] used spectral analysis for the ninety day forward
dollar using weekly observations from 1961-1967 . He maintained
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that there were three different cycles of varying lengths in
operatiOn.
	 This would suggest the existence of profit making
opportunities.
Mclnjsh et a]..[1982] used a runs test to overcome the
deficiencies of serial correlation tests which assume normality.
They examined nineteen international money market instruments and
found that inefficiencies could only be detected in four
instruments.
Wasserfallen et al. [1985] using data on instantaneous exchange
rate changes found that there were cases of significant
autocorrelations, particularly in periods of less than five
minutes. However the serial correlations were unstable, and
they argue that it was unlikely that excess profits could be
earned.
Giddy and Dufey [1975) examined data for four currencies in the
periods 1919-1926 and 1971-1971L They attempted to test for
'memory' in spot prices and concluded that:
"For short periods, one is able to detect a low degree
of market Inefficiency in the foreign exchange market.
But the longer the forecasting horizon, the more evident is
the inaccuracy of the time series forecasting of exchange
rate changes."
They tested five alternative models using different trading
rules.	 They found that the best predictor was the current spot
rate adjusted for interest rate differentials.
A more recent study by Cosset [1982) tested for bias in the
a
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Eurocurrency markets. He found that the forward rate was a
biased but non optimal predictor of future interest rates. He
found no support for the existence of a systematic risk premium
and found no serial correlation in the error terms. He therefore
concluded that it confirmed a 'weak market efficiency' (ef. Fama
1970). He also found that for five out of the seven currencies
tested, the forward rate was superior to either autoregressive
models or martingale models, but that ARIMA time series models
were superior to the forward rate. 	 This conclusion had one
caveat however, the data used to construct the ARIMA model were
based on the whole sample period and might therefore contain an
information set that was unavailable to the market ex ante.
One might safely conclude that the poor performance of models
tested by academics using time series of exchange rates is
consistent with weak form efficiency. 	 However, it is possible
that currency forecasters may have access to superior models
which incorporate past price data. Fortunately, there has been
some research dealing with the success of forecasting services
which use technical analysis and chartist techniques. It
should be pointed out that these tests do not adjust for the
costs of acquiring information and are therefore ambiguous (cf.
Grossman and Stlglitz [1976]).
Technical analysis consists of using past trends in prices to
extrapolate future trends in prices. If technical analysts
provided their forecasts for nothing and users succeeded in
earning abnormal returns, then one might conclude that weak form
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efficiency does not hold. 	 Rosenberg [1981] pointed out that:
"Few forecasting tools have been received so
enthusiastically by the market and scorned so completely by
academics as technical analysis."
Rosenberg [1982] has argued that technical analysis may be useful
given that exchange rates overshoot.	 However, he does not
define overshooting, and overshooting in Dornbusch [1976] is
entirely consistent with weak market efficiency. 	 Technical
analysis is not.
Goodman [1979] attempted to evaluate the performance of technical
analysts and found that they were superior to econometric models
at forecasting. He tested both chartist and momentum models
against econometric models for six leading currencies over three
years for three and six month forecasting horizons. However,
he assumed that one could act on the information from the
technical forecast upon receipt of the forecast, whereas users
of econometric services could not act until the end of the month.
Goodman [1978,1980,1981,1982] and Goodman and Jaycobs [1983] have
done annual surveys evaluating technical analysis against one
econometric forecasting service.	 The results are however based
on the returns from "selective" hedging based on two services
agreeing on the likely exchange rate movement.	 It might
therefore be reasonable to suggest that his results are weighted
against the econometric service outperforming the technical
service.	 Moreover, subscribing to a number of forecasting
services in order to obtain a consensus forecast is likely to be
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relatively costly.
II.B.iii.: Semi-Strong Tests .1 Market Efficiency.
Unlike securities markets, there is no required information
disclosure in foreign exchange markets.	 This in turn implies
that it is more difficult to define publicly available
information.	 One possible information set albeit a costly one
(cf. Ensor and Antl [1982]), is the use of a forecasting service
which uses economic data to produce forecasts. Unfortunately,
some of the services tested are also 'judgemental', and returns
from the use of such services may include monopoly returns to
expert skills or access to non public information.
One approach to examining the role of publicly available economic
information set is the use of discriminant analysis.
Murenbee].d [1975] and Folks and Stansell [1975] have published
papers maintaining this method is successful in fixed rate
systems.	 These models are of interest since they may alert one
to potentially important variables, given their inductive nature.
However, Foster [1978] has referred to such exercises as "fishing
expeditions" in the context of bankruptcy models.
Folks and Stansell [1975] used devaluations in 1963 11 and 1967-8
to obtain weights and then tested the model on 1971-2 data.
They attempted to predict a devaluation of more than five per
cent for fifty-one countries and had a success rate of eighty-six
per cent.	 They found that the growth of reserves ratio, the
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rate of change of the consumer price index,	 the ratio of
imports to exports and the ratio of debt service costs to
reserves were significant variables. 	 Furthermore, they found
both the rate of money supply growth and the marginal propensity
to import were insignificant.
Murenbeeld (1975) produced a similar model, to predict both the
direction and timing of an exchange rate change. He found a
different set of variables to be significant. They included
wholesale price inflation, unemployment, the ratio of reserves
to imports, the rate of change of reserves, the rate of growth
of the money supply and the budget defict as a percentage of
gross national product. The model had a success rate of seventy
eight per cent until 1971, after which it failed to perform as
successfully.
It would seem that forecasting exchange rates under fixed rate
regimes is possible, whereas the models are less successful under
floating exchange rate regimes. The papers suggest that in
situations of pegged currencies, or fixed parity regimes,
abnormal profits may be possible.	 However, the costs of
developing and using the models may be less than the returns
earned; this possibility has not been tested empirically.
Apart from studies which construct models incorporating
publicly available information, another approach is to test the
ability of forecasting services to produce superior forecasts.
The approach is not without its limitations, which might include:
Qiapter 2: Page 37
1. The measurement of success is not entirely clearcut... For
example, Mm [1980] has pointed out that measures of success
such as the mean absolute forecast error and the mean
squared forecast error may not be of interest to the users
of forecast services. 	 One might in the first instance
measure success as a correct forecast of the direction of an
exchange rate change. Then one might focus on predicting
the amount and timing of the change.
2. It is necessary to obtain the co-operation of forecasting
services, in order to test their forecasting ability. It
Is quite possible that there may be a systematic difference
in the forecasting abilities of co-operating services.
3. The costs of the forecasting services are Ignored.
Moreover, there could be cost differences between
forecasting services.
1L Spivey and Wrobleski [1979] point out that correlations
between the forecast errors of econometric models, renders
the ranking of the performance of forecasting services
ambiguous.
A number of authors including King [1979] and Prefontalne [1980]
have studied the performance of the forecast services. 	 The
most prolific researcher in this area however is flichard Levich,
and It Is to his work that we now turn.
Initially, Levlch [1980] found that the forecasting services'
performance had a mean squared forecast error greater than the
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forward rate.	 Interestingly, he also found that judgemental
forecast services were superior for periods of less than one
year whereas econometric services were superior for periods of
more than one year. 	 Using a composite approach, Levich [1981a]
found that for one month forecasts, the services had a seventy
two percent success rate, and for two month forecasts they had a
sixty nine per cent success rate.	 Further work, led Levich
[1981b] to conclude that there was a possibility that the
services "exhibited expertise". 	 However, a later study in
Levich [1982c] suggested that the result for 1981 may have been
misconceived.	 In the final study, Levich [1983b, pI 7] concluded
that:
"The nagging possibility is that foreign exchange
relationships may evolve more quickly than many forecasters
can comprehend or make judgements."
Given that a single forecasting service is unlikely to be
successful, an alternative approach has been suggested in the
literature.	 Bilson [1981] argues that using only one
forecasting service is analagous to holding only one share in
one's portfolio.	 He therefore suggests an approach to the use
of forecasts based on Markowitz [1952].
	
The essence of the
approach is using the error terms of different forecasting
services to attach a series of weights to individual forecasting
services based on their past performance and then use a
"composite forecast" for making decisions.
	
The approach has
been tested by Levich [1981] and Bilson [1981]. They both report
considerable success using this approach. 	 The only difficulty
with the approach is that the 'one share in one's portfolio'
analogy may be misleading, since one must pay for a forecasting
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service, whereas one hopes to earn a return on a share. 	 Neither
Bilson [1981] nor Levich [1981] take account of the increased
costs of subscribing to all forecast services.
On the other hand, the composite approach may be a more
appropriate test of market efficiency, since one would expect
that the composite forecast should be reflected in exchange rate
expectations if the market is efficient in an informational
sense.	 This argument is similar to that of Figlewski [1978] and
Figlewski and Urich [1983].
The informational efficiency of the foreign exchange market is to
some extent still a debatable Issue. 	 Certainly, compared to
tests of stock market efficiency, the results have not been as
clear cut.	 Moreover, two recent studies are somewhat
disturbing.	 Bilson [198 11] used purchasing power parities to
devise profitable trading strategies. 	 Unfortunately, it is
Impossible to determine whether the profits are due to an
Inefficiency or a risk premium.	 The profits were uncorrelated
with the Standard and Poor 500, so if the profits arise from a
risk premium, it is difficult to establish the source of the risk
premium.	 Sweeney [1986] using daily data since 1973 devised
profitable trading strategies based upon filter rules. 	 If the
risk premium were constant over time, profits could not be
explained.	 He suggests that the results could arise from
speculative bubbles, government intervention or the lack of
stabilising speculation.	 Unfortunately the evidence could be
consistent with either a market inefficiency or the existence of
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time varying risk premia.	 The difficulties of testing for risk
premla are examined in a later part of this chapter.
From the point of view of corporate policy the implications are
unclear.	 It would seem that commercial forecasting services are
unlikely to provide superior forecasts. 	 It Is also possible
that forecasting success may be increased using a portfolio of
forecasts. However, it is possible that abnormal profits may be
earned using relatively simple trading strategies.
	 The real
difficulty rests in deciding whether the abnormal profits arise
from risk premia in foreign exchange markets or from market
inefficiencies. This latter issue is still an open issue, but
it will be assumed in the remainder of this chapter that
financial markets are more efficient than non financial markets.
II.B.iiI. ZI: Market Seentation
While market segmentation may arise from the segmentation of
international commodity markets, it may also arise independently
because of government restrictions or disincentives on overseas
investment, and because of investors' lack of information or
Irrational fears of expropiation. 	 The issue is however an
important one, since if capital markets are segmented
internationally, then corporate financial decision-making rules
will need to be modified. 	 Unfortunately, a satisfactory method
of' determining the extent of' segmentation has not been devised.
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One approach to examining the extent of capital market
segmentation is to examine the extent to which there are gains
from internationally diversified portfolios. 	 Grubel [1968],
Levy and Sarnat [1970], Lessard [197 1 ] and Solnik [1971b]
examined the possibility of obtaining efficient portfolios of
national stock market indices and found that there would be
considerable scope for risk reduction by using international
diversification. While these studies were based upon the degree
of correlation between market indices, an alternative approach
used by Agmon [1972], Solnik [197 1 c] and Lessard [1976] consists
of regressing stock returns or index returns on a world market
index. The implication of both types of study is that there are
substantial gains from international portfolio diversification.
The index approach has been successfully applied in a domestic
context, because any residual risk Is diversifiable. In an
international context where there are deviations from purchasing
power parity, investors in different countries will differ as to
the constituents of an efficient portfolio, unless they have
logarithmic utilities (see Adler and Dumas [1983]).
	
Moreover,
the rates of return may not be stationary. Maldonado and
Saunders [1981] produced evidence which suggested that returns
were not stationary, whereas Phillipatos et al. [1983], using a
more refined statistical technique, found evidence of
stationarity.
While one might argue that low covariances may be consistent with
segmentation, they may also be consistent with a perfectly
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integrated capital market, since the output mixes of countries
may differ, and therefore, may be subject to different state
variables. One might conclude that the portfolio approach may
not be an appropriate test of capital market segmentation.
It is however possible to produce evidence consistent with the
output mix explanation of low covariances by examining the role
of MNCs as tools for investor diversification. Studies by
Jacquillat et al. [1978], Brewer [1981] and Senshak and Beedles
(1980] all concluded that MNCs were poor surrogates for holding
stocks in different countries.
	 Only one study (Agmon and
Lessard [1977]) produced contradictory evidence.	 One might
conclude that this evidence was consistent with the output mix
hypothesis. However, it is difficult within this form of
research design to distinguish between the gains from exploiting
monopoly power, and the gains from international diversification
(see Errunza and Senbet (1981, 198k]). One would expect that
the completeness of the market will only be increased if MNCs
invest in countries where no other MNC has invested, since
investment by a UK MNC in the US is replicating market
opportunities which already exist.
An alternative approach used by Stehle [1977] is to specify
different asset pricing models under different conditions. In
order to overcome deviations from purchasing power parity, Stehle
assumed that investors have logarithmic utilities. In an
integrated capital market, the relevant portfolio is the world
portfolio, whereas in a world characterised by segmented national
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capital markets, the efficient portfolio will be the national
portfolio.	 Stehie, using US data, was unable to discriminate
between the two models.
Errunza and Losq [1985) use a variant of the Stulz [1981a] model
to test the segmentation hypothesis. 	 Unlike the Stehle [1977]
approach, it incorporates a continuum from complete integration
to complete segmentation. 	 They discovered that there was
'tentative' support for a hypothesis of mild segmentation when US
returns were examined against the returns from a number of less
developed countries.
On balance, it might be concluded that there are considerable
problems associated with the development of an appropiate test of
the degree of international capital market segmentation.
Empirical work to date suggests that capital markets are neither
totally integrated nor totally segmented, but that a degree of
segmentation exists.	 However, this result is extremely
tentative until further research is completed in this area.
II.C: Testing the Predictions of the Traditional Theory
In the previous part, some tests of the sufficient conditions for
the theory of international parity were examined. 	 One might
conclude that while financial markets would seem to be relatively
perfect and frictionles, goods markets are not. It would be
premature to conclude that the theory of international parity
does not hold on the basis of this evidence, since it is quite
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possible that there is an alternative set of sufficient
conditions.
	 In this section an instrumentalist approach Is
applied by examining the predictions of the traditional theory.
Each of the predictions is examined in turn and tests of the
poredictions are discussed.
II.C.i: Purchasing
 Power frI Theory (PPP)
Purchasing power parity is one of the most important predictions
of the traditional theory, since it is a necessary condition for
the absence of economic exposure in a single commodity world, or
in a world where homothetic preferences prevail.
The origins of PPP may be traced back to the writings of the
Spanish Salamanca School in the late sixteenth century (see
Kalamatousakis [1978), Officer [1976, 1976a, 1982a, 1982b) and
Einzig [1970]).
	
More recently, Gustav Cassel has been
acknowledged as the driving force in the twentieth century and
coined the term 'Purchasing Power Parity' in Cassel [1918].
Officer [1976] distinguishes two versions of PPP. 	 Firstly,
there is the absolute version which states that the exchange rate
equals the ratio of the foreign to the domestic price level.
Unfortunately, as Isard [1978] points out, this version is
virtually untestable.	 Secondly, there is the relative version
of PPP which states that the exchange rate reflects changes in
the price level between two countries since a base period when
the two exchange rates were in equilibrium. 	 While this version
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is testable, it should be pointed out that it is unlikely that
one can establish or indeed identify an initial equilibrium.
The mechanism by which PPP is attained is a further issue.
Grauer et al. [1976] have proven that PPP may be attained if
individuals have homothetic tastes and commodity price parity
holds.	 Empirical studies summarised in the previous section did
not support the existence of either homothetic tastes or
commodity price parity. 	 An alternative approach is to examine
PPP in a macroeconomic context and argue that PPP is the outcome
of monetary equilibrium. 	 Cassel [1916a] suggested the
'Quantitative Theory of Money' as a mechanism to attain PPP.
Similarly Frenke]. [1976] argues that PPP is a product of
international monetary equilibrium and that (Frenkel [1978,
p188]):
"The relationship embodied in the traditional forms of PPP
should not be viewed as a theory of the determination of
exchange rates.	 Rather, it describes an equilibrium
relationship between two endogenous variables. As such,
the PPP relation should be viewed as a short cut rather
than a substitute for a complete model of the determination
of prices and exchange rates."
This argument amounts to PPP having the same status as the
Phillips Curve, a construct which has been empirically observed,
for which there is no underlying theory. The only difficulty
with this approach is that one has no explanation available when
PPP does not hold. The empirical view should be contrasted with
the view of Cassel [1921, p 183] which would suggest that PPP has
the status of a theory rather than the status of a 'relation'.
Similarly Officer [1976, p5] says that:
"Following Cassel, the criterion for a PPP theory adopted in
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this review is that the PPP be the most important
determinant of the exchange rate."
This leads to the issue of other determinants of the exchange
rate.	 In principle, if monetary factors dominate real factors,
then PPP may be the most important determinant of the exchange
rate.	 Examples of real factors might include productivity
biases (see Ballassa [196 14], Officer [1976a] and Hsieh [1982]),
and changes in trade patterns (see Korteweg [1980]).	 The kernel
of this work is that the ratio of tradeable to non tradeable
goods within a price index will influence the PPP relationship.
Many real factors will affect the ratio including productivity
and raw material prices (e.g. oil).
Apart from the difficulty of deciding whether PPP is a theory or
a relationship or a major determinant of exchange rates, there is
also the issue of time horizon. Until the mid seventies, it was
believed that PPP held in the long run, but that deviations were
observed in the short run. Since there is no theory of PPP, it
is impossible to suggest the mechanisms which ensure that the
relationship holds in the long run. 	 Moreover, the existence of
a long run relationship may be inconsistent with market
efficiency, since one would expect to observe a serial
correlation as the exchange rate was being driven back towards
its long run equilibrium value.	 Indeed from a policy making
point of view, the long run construct may not be particularly
helpful.	 Mussa [1976, p 193] points out that:
"The horizon of the policy maker is typically much shorter
than a decade ... the advocacy of a monetary approach to
the balance of payments necessarily involves the assertion
that these 'longer run consequences' materialize within a
time horizon of two to three years."
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To conclude, PPP maybe a theory, or a relationship, or a major
determinant of exchange rate changes. 	 It may hold in the long
run, or in the short run, or both.	 There may be other real
factors which cause exchange rate changes. 	 The next issue is
whether or not it holds.
IIC.i.1: Tests	 Purchasin Power Parity
The first published tests of PPP were Cassel E1916a]. Following
the collapse of the Gold Standard in 191 1 , he used data of price
indices, money supply and exchange rate changes. Cassel [1916a,
p63-64], concluded:
"All other factors, such as e.g. the balance of trade, and
the confidence in the future of this or that country in the
world, have only a quite temporary or secondary
importance."
It would seem reasonable to infer that his concept of 'short'
was extremely short, given that he only used two years data and
in one case, eleven months data.
	 It also reinforces the
interpretation of PPP as the main factor influencing exchange
rate changes, and the possibility of a monetary explanation of
PPP.
Gaill1ot (1970] used data on the exchange rate between the U.S.
and Canadian dollars, the French and Swiss francs, the Yen,
Sterling, the Deutschmark and the Lire. He compared the average
wholesale price index (WPI) from 1903 to 1907 with the average
WPI from 1963 to 1967. There were large deviations observed for
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some currencies, in particular the yen. He concluded that PPP
held in the long run, and, using casual observation, he suggested
the possibility of five year cycles of positive deviations from
PPP preceeded by negative deviations in the following decade.
This evidence suggests that deviations are serially correlated.
This could lead to an interpretation of an informational
inefficiency in the foreign exchange market.
Aliber and Stickney [1975] examined the relationship between
changes in the consumer price index and exchange rates for 18
countries from 1960 to 1971 inclusive, using annual data. (They
also used the wholesale price index and found it was immaterial
with a few exceptions). The highest average deviation for any
one country over the period was 5.6% and for most countries, the
deviation was in the +/-1% range. However, they also observed
annual deviations of' up to 73%. The evidence of average
deviations over the period being less than absolute deviations in
any one year, led to the conclusion of PPP deviations being more
likely in the short run than the long run, under pegged exchange
rates. They also found, by observation, that there were
differences between the deviations of developed and developing
countries with respect to both the sign and the size of' the
deviations.
While the results of the Cassel [1916a] studies support PPP in
the relatively short run, the Gailliot (1970] and Aliber and
Stickney [1975] studies find that the relationship holds over
periods of a decade or so.	 Moreover, if deviations from PPP
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were a totally random event, to ensure market efficiency, one
would expect the mean deviation to be zero.
Hodgson and Phelps (1975] examined monthly data on the floating
rate period from 1919 to 1925 with 11! countries using the CPI
(the WPI was used for Austria). They found that movements in
relative prices explained ninety per cent of the variation when
lags between price level changes and exchange rate changes were
taken into account. Their methodology consisted of using a
regression technique with lagged coefficients. They found that
PPP changes preceded exchange rate changes. The average lag
between a change in the Index and an exchange rate change was 6
months, but the majority of the impact was in the first three
months.	 They concluded (op. cit. p63]:
"With the passage of' a relatively short period of time,
current purchasing power parities begin to exert a dominant
influence on exchange rates and explain a remarkably high
percentage of the variation."
Rogaiski and Vinso [1977] also examined the 1920s floating period
for six currencies and the Canadian dollar from 1953 to 1957 when
It was floating. Unlike Hodgson and Phel p s[1975], they used a
more sophisticated technique to examine serial correlation and
found that price changes were immediately incorporated in the
exchange rate. They also pointed out that predictable lags
would be inconsistent with an efficient market hypothesis.
In a similar study, Roll [1979] examined the issue of deviations
from PPP using twenty years of monthly data (1956 to 1976) from
twenty-three countries. The express concern of' the study was to
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investigate the existence of serial correlations and their
implications for market efficiency. .The author concluded that
[op.cit.]:
"With a few significant exceptions, there is little evidence
of disequilibria nor of slow adjustment of prices to a long
run parity. Indeed, the general impression for most
countries and for all of the largest trading nations is a
very rapid adjustment of less than one month's duration."
Frenkel £1978] also examined the 1920s floating period, using the
monthly cross rates between the dollar, the pound and the franc
from 1921 to 1925. The most interesting part of his study was an
attempt to analyse the pattern of causality between exchange
rates and prices. Unlike previous studies, he found that
exchange rates performed better as independent variables. This
evidence would be consistent with faster speeds of adjustment in
asset markets than commodity markets. He found further evidence
to support this hypothesis as well as finding that exchange rate
changes were incorporated more quickly in commodity prices If
they were anticipated, where the degree of anticipation equalled
the difference between the forward rate and the subsequent spot
rate.
Genberg £1978] found that deviations from PPP during fixed rate
periods were smaller and less prolonged than deviations during
floating rate periods. However, his conclusion is based upon
only four years of floating rate data.
Adler and Lehmann [1983] used a distributed lag regression
technique and they could not reject the hypothesis that PPP
deviations follow a martinga].e.	 It is a noteworthy study since
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it used ten years of recent floating rate data, and it was
compared with fixed rate data. Moreover, both annual and
monthly data were used, and lags of up to ten years duration were
tested.
While recent investigations of PPP suggest that deviations are
likely to be observed, studies of the determination of black
market exchange rates (Culbertson [1975], Fishelson [1978], Giddy
[1978a] and Gupta [1981]) support PPP to the extent that PPP acts
as a predictor of black market exchange rates. Kaveos and
Seifert [1985] have confirmed the Adler and Lehmann [1983] result
for black market exchange rates in South America.
One might conclude that deviations from purchasing power parity
are the norm and behave as a martingale. 	 It may be concluded
that exchange risk will arise. Even in the absence of
deviations from PPP, Cornell [1979] argues that exchange risk
will exist since exchange rates are more variable than price
indices.	 He suggests that this arises due to a diversification
effect among commodities. As yet, this hypothesis has not been
tested, and if a real time inflation index were devised, it is
quite possible that the diversification effect may be immaterial.
II.C.ii .Th. Unbiased Forward Rate
In its simplest form the unbiased forward rate effect
hypothesises that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of
the future spot rate. 	 In principle, it is similar to a test of
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market efficiency and involves testing a joint hypothesis.	 The
first part of the hypothesis is that the market is efficient with
respect to all publicly available information concerning the
future spot rate and that this is reflected in the forward rate.
The second part of the hypothesis is that there is no risk
premium included In the forward rate.
During the mid seventies, it was maintained (e.g. Giddy [1976a,
p 890]) that the existence of a risk premium would be Inconsistent
with an efficient market since it involved a trader in one
country benefiting at the expense of a trader in another country.
There are three difficulties with this approach.	 Firstly, the
approach implies that distributions with means of zero are risk
free.	 Secondly, it assumes that traders in different countries
use the same measures of real returns. 	 Solnik [197I]
demonstrates that should national consumption baskets differ,
then different measures of 'benefit' will be used. Thirdly,
there is the possibility of monetary disturbances which has been
examined by Grauer et al. [1976].
	
While international asset
pricing theorists agree that a risk premium will exist in
conditions where there are deviations from purchasing power
parity, or monetary disturbances, or both, there is as yet no
agreement on the measure of a systematic risk premium.
Moreover, it is unlikely that progress will be made in this area
due to the difficulties Inherent in tests of' International. asset
pricing models.	 Firstly, some models including Solnik [197k]
involve the Identification of a world market portfolio.	 It is
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unlikely that a world market portfolio will be identified because
of both the Roll [1977] critique and other difficulties
highlighted by Solnik [1978].
	
Alternative formulations, such as
the Stu].z [1981] extension of the Breeden [1979] model are also
untestable since it relies on the observation of state variables
(see Cornell [1981]). Solnik [1983b] proposed an extension of
the Ross [1976] arbitrage pricing theory to cope with
international asset pricing. The model has been tested by o
et al. [1986] and they rejected international arbitrage pricing.
Unfortunately, their study tested a joint hypothesis of arbitrage
pricing theory and a unitary capital market.	 Therefore, their
result could be due to either the failure of arbitrage pricing
theory, segmented capital markets or both. The prospects of
identifying a risk premium are slim and this author concurs with
the conclusion of Haache et al. (1981, pZ95]:
"While the theoretical implications of risk premia for
exchange rate determination are thus far reaching, it is
difficult to identify them in practice. Evidence on the
existence and magnitude of risk premia is necessarily
indirect, since there are no reliable data on expected
exchange rate movements. Moreover, only very partial data
are available on the currency distribution of official, and
private portfolios; and they are all necessarily ex post,
reflecting responses to exchange rates, interest rates and
other variables, as well as variations in ex ante portfolio
preferences."
The implication of this quotation is that it is unlikely that a
test may be devised which would allow researchers to specify a
test which would discriminate among competing asset pricing
formulations.	 Empirical work to date has been limited to
attempts at ascertaining the existence of risk premia. A
variety of approaches have been used, and each method is examined
in turn in the following section.
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II.e.iii; 
.Th. Unbiased Forward Rate; Tests
A simple approach to testing whether the forward rate is unbiased
is to examine the prediction error of the forward rate. If the
mean prediction error is zero, then one might conclude that the
forward rate was an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.
Cornell [1977] using four years of monthly data found that the
forecast error was zero. 	 Levich [1979a] tested the forward rate
as a predictor of the direction of change of the spot rate and
found that it did so correctly in 50% of the cases which
consisted of nine currencies from 1967 to 1979. Similarly
Kohihagen [1975] found that the ninety day forward rate was an
unbiased predictor of the spot rate for six currencies from 1971
to 197 1L,	 These conclusions are also supported by Logue et al.
[1978] and Frankel [1980]. However, this form of test is
unlikely to identify a risk premium if the risk premium varies
over time and on average equals zero.
An alternative approach is to regress the forward rate on the
realised spot rate. In principle one could conclude that unless
the regression line has a slope of unity and an intercept of one,
then it is likely that there are either transaction costs or a
risk premium.	 Unfortunately, the test has produced mixed
results.	 Kaserinan [1973], Bilson [1976], Bilson and Levich
[1977] and London [1978] could not reject the null hypothesis of
unbiased prediction.	 On the other hand, Frankel [1980], Frenkel
(1977] and Tryon [1979] rejected the null hypothesis.	 Jacobs
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[1982] argues that the test is biased against rejecting the null
hypothesis, since it assumes that there are no expectational
errors, in order that the actual future spot may be used instead
of the expected future spot rate. Jacobs [1982] replicated this
test using both an autoregressive expectations model and the
actual future spot rate with the same data set. He found that
he could not reject the null hypothesis using the realised spot
rate, but that the null hypothesis was rejected when the
expectations model was incorporated in the test.
A third approach is to examine the prediction errors for serial
correlation. Cornell [1977], Frankel [1980] and Hansen and
Hodrick [1980] tested the prediction errors and found that there
were significant autocorrelations. 	 Geweke and Feige [1979]
found that the returns on forward contracts exhibited
autocorrelation.	 Similarly, Stockmari [1978] found that there
were biases for some currencies, and perhaps more interestingly,
that the risk premium was likely to be volatile. Baillie et al.
[1983] used an unrestricted bivariate autoregression and Wald
tests to reject the hypothesis for six currencies from 1973 to
1980. Finally, Cosset [1982], Cumby and Obstfeld [1981], Hakkio
(1981], Longworth (1981], Meese and Singleton [1982] provide
indirect evidence which is inconsistent with the unbiased forward
rate hypothesis.
Logue and Sweeney [198k] adopted a novel approach of using the
interest rate parity theorem in the eurocurrency market to
examine biases in the forward rate.	 They found evidence of
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considerable biases in the forward rate and suggested term premia
as an explanation. However, the influence of expectations is
ignored and a debatable annualisation technique is used.
Moreover, their results are consistent with a number of
alternative specifications of the bias.
The evidence rejects the hypothesis that the forward rate is an
unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. The most recent
studies are virtually unanimous in this regard and it has been
shown that earlier studies used a methodology which would not
reject the hypothesis if the risk premium varied over time and
had a mean of zero. 	 It was also pointed out that the test is a
joint hypothesis of market efficiency and a risk premium.
	 If
the market is efficient, then one would expect that the
explanation for bias is attributable to risk premia.
A number of researchers including Kaserman [1973] and Wong
[197.8] have observed that the forward rate consistently
underestimated the future spot rate when the spot rate was
increasing, and overestimated the future spot when it was
decreasing. Levich [1978b] obtained similar results and the
latter attributed his results to transaction costs which penalise
speculation. Baillie et al. [198 1 ] and Hodrick and Srivastava
[198I ] produce evidence which supports a risk premium explanation
rather than a market inefficiency explanation. Recent research
by Hodrick et al. [1986] and Fama [198 1 ] also supports the
existence of a risk premium explanation and produce evidence of a
time varying risk premium.
	
Unfortunately, identifying the risk
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premium is problematic due to the difficulties inherent in
testing international asset pricing formulations. Roll and
Solnik (1977] using data between 1953 and 1973 found some
evidence of a systematic risk premium.	 Cosset [198 Z ] using an
arbitrage pricing theory formulation also found that there were
systematic biases in forward rates. 	 Fukao E1981] produced
evidence that the risk premium may be a function of Indebtedness
for three out of five countries. 	 However, the results from all
three studies are not convincing, and considerably more research
will need to be done in this area.
It would seem that the unbiased forward rate hypothesis has been
well and truly rejected. 	 Unfortunately, it can only be replaced
by a vacuum.	 Econometric evidence suggests that the bias is
more likely to arise from a risk premium rather than a market
inefficiency and that the risk premium Is most likely to vary
over time and have a mean of zero. From a practical point of
view, one can only conclude that the forward rate seems to
underestimate exchange rate changes if the exchange rate is
increasing and overestimate exchange rate changes when the spot
rate is decreasing.	 There is also the nagging possibility that
the observed biases may arise from a market inefficiency, given
the recent studies of Bilson [198 11] and Sweeney [1986].
Unfortunately, the whole issue is unlikely to be resolved until a
testable formulation of risk premia is devised which is immune to
capital market segmentation.
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II.C.iv: Interest Rate Parity Theorem IIRPT1
IRPT states that the forward discount or premium equals the
interest rate differential between two currencies.
Traditionally, the method by which this relationship is achieved
is covered interest arbitrage as enunciated by Keynes [1923].
Indeed, covered interest arbitrage seems to be the basis for
determining forward rates in unregulated markets. Herring and
Marstori (1976 fn.3] using survey techniques reported that:
"Foreign exchange traders said that Eurocurrency rate
differentials determined the forward rates that they
quoted, while Eurocurrency traders said that forward
exchange rates determined differentials between non-dollar
Eurocurrency rates and the Eurodollar rate."
In order to attain an equilibrium and encourage arbitrage, profit
making opportunities must exist. Deardorff [1981 p361] refers
to this as the 'paradox' of IRPT and suggests another possible
mechanism which he calls 'one way arbitrage'. This latter
possibility arises from the commercial transactions of firms.
For example, a firm with a foreign currency denominated liability
could pay its creditor by transacting in a number of different
spot, forward and money market combinations. The main
difference between the two methanisms is lower transaction costs.
Deardorff (1981] maintains that covered interest arbitrage is
three times more expensive than one way arbitrage.
There have been a number of studies of the empirical validity of'
the IRPT, and they have confirmed the validity of the IRPT.
Branson (1969] compared the Canadian and U.S. markets and
concluded that transaction costs were significant. 	 Giddy and
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Dufey [1975] maintained that deviations were insignificant, while
Frenkel and Levich [1975,1977] found that unexploited profit
opportunities were unlikely except in 'turbulent periods' (1968-
9).	 AlIber [1973] tested IRPT in both Eurocurrency and domestic
financial markets.	 He found that deviations were significantly
lower in the Eurocurrency markets.
	 Marston [1976] tested IRPT
in. the Eurocurrency markets. Over a six year period using
monthly data, the regression equation produced an exact fit, and
deviations were only observed when he used weekly observations
over a one year period. 	 Other studies include Pippen.ger [1978],
Browne (1983], McCallum [1977] and Callier [1981].
	
These
results are however dependent on their calculations of
transaction costs under covered interest arbitrage.	 If one way
arbitrage possibilities exist, then there will be unexploited
profit opportunities.
The IRPT represents a relatively accurate representation of
financial market behaviour, with the exception of turbulent
periods.	 However, the studies which were surveyed used
monthly data, and it is quite possible that the relationship may
not hold in periods of less than one month. 	 A number of
explanations of' turbulent periods have been advanced and are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, Keynes [1923] suggested the possibility of limits to the
supply of arbitrage funds. 	 Prachowny [1970] and Frenkel [1973]
have argued that such a situation could occur when the lending
and borrowing rates differ or when the borrowing rate is a
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function of the gross liabilities of the borrower. Frenkel and
Levich [1977] provide evidence of the elasticity of supply of
arbitrage funds being virtually infinite, however they also
suggest that some limit on the funds available for arbitrage may
explain their results for turbulent periods.
Se.condly, AlIber [1973] attributes the superior performance of
the IRPT in Eurocurrency markets to political risks, in
particular the imposition or potential imposition of exchange
controls. This is also simillar to Dooley's [1976] argument of
non comparable assets. 	 Stoll [1968] and Brown [1977] have also
examined this issue.
Other phenomena which may interfere with IRPT include premature
repatriation (Officer and Willet [1970], asymmetric taxes (Levi
[1979]) and time lags between the observation of arbitrage
opportunities and the execution of transactions (Frenkel and
Levlch [1975]).
Covered interest arbitrage is therefore the rule when there are
no political risks in unregulated markets. There are possible
exceptions which may arise in the short run because of'
Insufficient liquidity and time lags in the execution of
transactions. There may be opportunities to earn excess returns
from covered transactions because of one way arbitrage
opportunities and asymmetric taxes.
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II.C.v:The Fisher Effect
The Fisher effect states that nominal interest rates incorporate
inflationary expectations.	 Two types of test of the Fisher
effect have been attempted. Firstly, researchers have attempted
to establish the link between yields on short dated government
bonds and proxies for expected inflation. Secondly, attempts
have been made to assess the Incorporation of inflationary
expectations into security prices. The Fisher Effect might not
hold because of tax effects (Miles [1983]) or aggregate supply
effects (Peek and Wilcox [1983]).
Inflationary expectations and interest rates have been
Investigated as far back as Fisher [1930].	 Recent tests include
Faina [1975] and Fama and Gibbons [1981].
	
These studies relied
on treasury bill rates as proxies for Inflationary expectations
and therefore involve assumptions of stable real interest rates.
Peek and Wilcox [1983] attempted to overcome this deficiency by
using the Livingston Survey of inflationary expectations to
examine the post-war stability of the Fisher effect. They found
that tax and aggregate supply effects were important and that the
demand for bonds from abroad exerted influence on the interest
rate In the U.S.	 This latter effect was particularly noticeable
in the seventies, and may be attributed to the redistribution
effect of Increased oil prices. Kane et. al. (1983], using a
Fama [1975] type methodology, tested the Fisher Effect on the
Euromarkets.	 They found evidence of reasonable though non-
conclusive evidence of' the Fisher Effect holding on international
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markets.
Early tests of Inflation and the equities market, such as Nelson
[1976], Jaffe and Mandelker [1976], Bodie [1976], Fama and
Schwert [1977], produced evidence of a negative relationship
between stock market returns and inflation using treasury bills
as proxies for expected inflation. In a related vein, Schwert
[1981] found that the market reacted negatively to unanticipated
Inflation and that this information was not incorporated until
the announcement of the price index figures about one month after
the inflation occurred. In order to explain the negative
relation between inflationary expectations and stock market
returns, Geske and Roll [1981] suggested a mechanism whereby a
decrease in stock prices would signal an expectation of decreased
economic activity. This in turn would signal an expectation of
decreased government revenue, an increased government deficit and
an increase In the money supply. Geske and Roll [1983] also
report a successful test of this model on U.S. data. 	 Solnik
[1983a] tested the Geske and Roll [1983] model internationally,
using data from nine countries from 1971 to 1980. 	 He rejected
the assumption of real returns not being a function of the
exchange rate (i.e. the Fisher effect). Furthermore, his
results were consistent with the Geske and Roll [1981] model.
Gultekin [1983a] also reports international tests but Solnik
[1983a] maintains that they are deficient. Gultekin [1983b]
tested the relationship for U.S. data using the Livingston Survey
of inflationary expectations.
	
His results suggest that the
negative relationship between inflation and stock market returns
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may not be clearcut, however this problem may arise from biases
in the LivingstoR data (see Figlewski and Wachtel (19813).
Finally, Peel and Pope [1985] tested the hypothesis in the UK and
found strong support for the hypothesis when the possibility of
variable real rates of return was incorporated using econometric
techniq ues.
One might conclude that the Fisher Effect does seem to hold
unless there are tax effects or aggregate supply effects arising
from exchange rate changes and exogenous shocks. The results
of tests of the Fisher Effect and stock returns are not clearcut,
and the presence of the Geske - Roll effect is at odds with the
presence of the Fisher effect.
II.C.vi:	 International Fisher Effect (IFE)
The IFE states that the expected change in the exchange rate
equals the interest rate differential between two currencies and
is named after its original proponent Irving Fisher (Fisher
[1930]).	 It differs from the IRPT, since it is not a risk free
transaction.	 The investor must trade at an uncertain future
spot rate. One might therefore expect that the results of
empirical tests of this relationship would yield results similar
to those obtained in tests of the unbiased forward rate.
Giddy and Dufey [1975] examined the interest rate differential to
see if' It was an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate and
concluded that it was reasonably unbiased.	 Aliber and Stickney
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[1975] tested the relationship using annual interest rate
differentials and observed exchange rates.	 They found that
deviations were significant but less than PPP deviations. 	 They
also suggested that deviations were greater for developing
countries.	 However their evidence was based upon a smaller
number of observations for developing countries which included
Levich and Frenkel's [1977] turbulent period. 	 Cumby and
Obstfeld [1981] examined the Eurocurrency market using more
sophisticated techniques.	 They assume that traders formulate
rational expectations and that any observed deviations will be
due to 'white noise', If IFE holds.
	
They report significant
serial correlation in the error terms and therefore re3ect IFE.
This result is consistent with the existence of a risk premium,
and the forward rate tests.	 There results are however
sensitive to non normal exchange rate distributions. 	 Mishkin
[198Z ] examined whether real interest rates were equalised across
countries and rejected the International Fisher Effect.	 On the
basis of his study, he suggested that all future attempts at
modelling should incorporate time varying risk premia, different
real interest rates and deviations from purchasing power parity.
The results of tests of the International Fisher Effect suggest
that it is unlikely to hold. 	 However, there Is no theoretical
rationale for the observed deviations apart from a possible link
to biases In the forward rate.	 The ImplicatIons of
international asset pricing models for the International Fisher
Effect are as yet unexplored and it would be premature to attempt
to explain the observed deviations.
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III: A SYNTHESIS
The previous sections have examined a considerable volume of
empirical studies of exchange rate behaviour. 	 This material
will be drawn on again in later chapters. 	 This section attempts
to make some inferences from the studies and to offer a rationale
for the observed behaviour.
III.i:Smary
This chapter has focussed on the theory of international parity.
An attempt was made to examine a wide range of studies in order
to illustrate the methodological problems inherent in many of the
studies and to demonstrate why international parity was accepted
until the mid seventies and to document its subsequent rejection.
The assumptions of international parity were examined and it was
pointed out that apart from the theory being inconsistentwith a
monetary economy, three of the assumptions were unlikely to hold.
It would however seem reasonable to conclude that financial
markets are closer to perfection than goods markets. 	 In
addition, tests of informational efficiency in foreign exchange
markets suggest that the market is at least efficient with
respect to some simple models which use historical exchange rate
data.
The predictive ability of the international parity theory was
also examined.	 The theory predicts six relationships. 	 While
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one relationship has not been tested, there is reason to doubt
the other five predictions. It was pointed out that PPP
deviations can not be statistically distinguished from a
martingale process, while the forward rate seemed to be a biased
predictor of the future spot rate.	 Both the International
Fisher effect and the domestic Fisher effect also seemed unlikely
to hold; fortunately, interest rate parity does seem to hold
except in 'turbulent' periods. On both descriptive and
predictive counts, the theory of international parity is of
questionable usefulness. While it may be useful. as a heuristic
device to order scholarly research, Eaker's [1977] argument that
the theory of international parity may assist in the
identification of profitable opportunities may be rejected.
Profit - making opportunities are unlikely to be identified
unless the presence of risk premia and transaction costs are
incorporated into the model.
111.11 : A Rationale
Given that the theory of international parity was advanced by
early twentieth century economists such as Keynes, Fisher and
Cassel, it would seem natural to examine the progress of
contemporary economists.	 Krueger [1983], points out that
theories of exchange rate determination have evolved, inter alia,
with changes in the international environment. For example, she
points out that in 1969, she entitled a review article 'Balance
of Payments Theory', rather than 'Exchange Rate Determination'.
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This change of emphasis may be attributed to three basic factors.
Firstly, there was the resurgence of 'monetarist' approaches to
monetary and macroeconomic phenomena. 	 Secondly, the advent of
floating exchange rates in the early seventies and the subsequent
unexpected volatility of exchange rate changes.	 Thirdly, there
was the increased significance of international capital flows
relative to international trade flows. 	 These issues are
discussed more fully In the following paragraphs.
The 'monetary approach to the balance of payments' is indicative
of the 'monetarist' influence. Essentially, in its stricter
forms, it is a macroeconomic equivalent of the theory of
international parity.	 The literature has been surveyed by
Frenkel and Johnson [1978], and Whitman [1975] who referred to
the stricter form as 'Global Monetaris&.
	 Hahn [1977] points
out that this literature, is based on an assumption of a
frictionless, costless, instantaneous adjustment world with
efficient resource allocation, perfectly mobile capital, neutral
money, and real output being dependent on neo-classical forces.
The similarity of the position adopted by Hahn in his critique of
global monetarism and the Solnik [1978] critique of Giddy [1976a]
is remarkable.	 The positions may be characterised as Neo-
Keynesian and Hard Monetarist.
Dornbusch [1976], in an attempt to explain exchange rate
volatility, used an assumption of perfect financial markets and
sticky goods markets to explain overshooting. 	 Dornbusch argues
that In a full employment economy where the money supply is
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increased, interest rates will decrease if' the change in the
money supply is expected to be permanent. However, goods
markets will not react immediately, an exchange rate decline will
be expected and exchange rates will decrease. As the money
supply change filters through into the goods market, prices will
increase and the exchange rate will tend back to the PPP level.
This phenomenon is referred to as 'overshooting'.	 In situations
of less than full employment, 'undershooting' may be observed.
The Dornbusch [1976] model includes both the influence of the
monetary approach to the balance of payments and the observed
volatility of exchange rates.	 The final strand in the exchange
rate determination literature is the growth of capital flows
relative to trade flows. Macroeconomists are now suggesting
that the foreign exchange markets behave as if' they were asset
markets because of their volatility rather than adjusting
smoothly to international price level differentials. Branson
[1983] maintains that a 'consensus' has been reached among
macroeconomists which uses asset market equilibrium to explain
short run exchange rate changes and real factors to influence
exchange rate changes in the long run. Frenkel [1981a, 1981b]
provides evidence supporting the negligible influence of
inflation differentials, however, these results have been
disputed by Davutyan and Pippenger [1985].
	
The OECD [1981 p59]
supports such an approach:
"The main economic variables thought to explain exchange
rates are monetary conditions (and expected interest rate
differentials), current account developments and relative
price performance. But over recent months the influence
of inflation differentials has been uncharacteristically
small or operated with considerable delay, the dominant
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role being played by monetary conditions and current
account developments."
The asset market approach is now being used by macroeconotnists to
test for the impact of 'news' on exchange rate changes. 	 Branson
[1983], Dornbusch (19801, Cosset et al. [1985] and Frenkel
(1981b] have examined the impact of news. 	 With the exception of
the Cosset et al. [1985] study, they do not explicitly model the
arrival of new information, but rely on autoregressive techniques
to extrapolate the impact of news.
	 While this approach is still
in its Infancy, It does imply that exchange rate changes are
Influenced by unanticipated changes or Innovations rather than by
Inflation differentials.
IV: Stinmary, Conclusions and Implications
In this chapter, the theory of international parity has been
reviewed.	 While a series of necessary conditions for the
existence of international parity has not been proposed, it was
shown that the sufficient conditions suggested by SolnIk [1978]
were unlikely to be met.	 A review of empirical studies of the
sufficient conditions revealed that goods markets were likely to
be significantly more inefficient and imperfect than financial
markets.
The predictions of the theory of international parity were also
examined and it was shown that many of the predictions were not
borne out in practice.	 Indeed, the only prediction which was
supported was the interest rate parity theorem. This finding is
consistent with financial markets being more efficient than goods
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markets.	 A model was then suggested which incorporated this
difference between financial and non financial markets and recent
macroeconomic theories were reviewed which view foreign
currencies as a store of value rather than a medium of exchange.
The review has significant Implications for the management of
foreign exchange risk.
Firstly, a necessary condition for the existence of' economic
exposure to foreign exchange risk is that deviations from
purchasing power parity exist. Recent research shows that
deviations from purchasing power parity behave as a martingale.
This finding implies that that real economic exposure exists
since the direction of the deviation will be uncertain.
Secondly, exchange rates are not normally distributed.
	 This
fact becomes most apparent when daily data are examined. As
yet, there has not been an examination of the implications of
this result for models of exchange rate changes, or indeed,
whether these findings are consistent with market efficiency.
The finding is important since the measurement of' risk within a
mean variance context becomes problematic unless restrictive
assumptions are made about the utility of the decision maker.
Thirdly, the evidence suggests that foreign exchange markets are
relatively efficient in an informational sense. This evidence
is consistent with an asset market view of foreign currencies.
Moreover, it is unlikely that it is possible to consistently
produce superior forecasts of' exchange rate changes. 	 Research
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to date found that forecasting services do not perform
particularly well, and this research ignored the costs of
purchasing forecasts. However, there is some recent evidence of
possible inefficiencies in foreign exchange markets.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to say whether they are
Inefficiencies, or arise from unspecified risk premia. Until,
this issue is resolved, it Is difficult to know whether
corporations should proceed on the basis of market efficiency or
market inefficiency.
Fourthly, the issue of whether world capital markets are
segmented or Integrated is still an open issue. There is some
evidence which suggests that the US capital market may be mildly
segmented.	 From the point of view of corporate policy, a safe
conclusion may be that they are partially but not totally
segmented.	 It Is quite possible that MNCs are In a unique
position to take advantage of such imperfections.
Fifth, forward rates seem to be biased predictors of future spot
rates.	 While there is no empirically tested theoretical
rationale for this observation, it should be incorporated in the
hedging decision, since the bias will constitute part of the
opportunity cost of using a forward hedge.
Finally, Interest rate parity is a relatively valid description
of a real world phenomenon. However, It does not necessarily
Imply that there are no exploitable opportunities, since
corporations are In a position to take advantage of both
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turbulent periods and one way arbitrage. 	 Moreover, the
relationship is more successful in Eurocurrency markets and this
in turn would suggest opportunities for MNCs to exploit
differences between regulated and unregulated market rates.
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CHAPTER 3
CORPORATE EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK
In the previous chapter, the international financial environment
was examined.	 It was demonstrated that deviations from
purchasing power parity were commonplace. 	 In this chapter the
implications of deviations from purchasing power parity from the
point of view of the corporation are examined. In the first
instance, it is necessary to show that the cash flows of firms
way be exposed to purchasing power parity deviations.
In the first part of this chapter, the different types of
exposure are discussed. It is argued that the only type of
exposure that poses a conceptual problem is economic exposure to
exchange risk. Previous research on economic exposure has
focused upon partial models of economic exposure, and the
limitations of a partial equilibrium approach are discussed in
the second part of this chapter.	 A variety of models of
economic exposure are reviewed in the third section, and the
possibilities of measuring exposure are discussed in the fourth
section.
	 The conclusion is somewhat pessimistic. 	 Corporate
exposure to exchange risk is unlikely to be measurable.
I: Classifications of Expose to Foreign Exchange Risk
Conventionally, exposure to exchange risk is classified as being
either a translation, transaction or economic exposure. Each
class of exposure is examined in the following paragraphs, and
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some of the difficulties inherent in the classification of
exposure are discu5sed.
I.i Translation ExDosur
When the financial statements of the foreign subsidiaries of a
MNC are consolidated, it is necessary to express the individual
statements in a numeraire currency and this gives rise to
(Eiteman and Stonehill [1986, p155)):
"Accounting based changes in the consolidated financial
statements cau8ed by a change in exchange rates."
Translation exposure has been excluded from consideration in this
thesis because it is no longer an important issue.	 There is
evidence that US MNCs were extremely concerned by translation
exposure when FAS 8 (FASB [1975]) was in operation. Surveys
such as Evans et al. [1978] found that US MNCs devoted
considerable resources to the management of translation exposure.
However, FItS 8 (FASB [1975]) was replaced by FItS 52 (FASB [1981])
and it is unlikely that translation exposure is still an issue in
the US.
	 Indeed, a recent study by Doukas [198'] found that
sixty per cent of the firms surveyed hedged translation exposure
under FItS 8.	 Under FItS 52, he found that only three per cent of
the respondents were hedging translation exposure.	 One would
expect that a similar situation pertains in the UK given the
similarity between SSAP 20 and FAS 52, however, the management of
translation exposure in the UK has not been examined empirically.
Apart from the decreased management interest in translation
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exposure, stock market based research of FAS 8 (Griffin [1979],
Makin [1978a], Dukes [1978] and Fredrlkson and Mogus [1978])
found that there was no price reaction to FAS 8. This evidence
implies that shareholders may be indifferent to translation
exposure, or at any rate, indifferent to where unrealised foreign
exchange gains and losses are reported.
Given both the apparent lack of management and shareholder
interest in translation exposure, it will be ignored in the
remainder of this chapter.
I.ii: Transaction ExDosure
Transaction exposure has received considerable attention in both
the practitioner and the academic literature. Srinivasulu [1981,
p 17] defines it as the:
"Uncertain domestic value of' a cash flow known and fixed in
foreign currency."
Foreign currency denominated monetary assets and liabilities are
frequently cited as examples of transaction exposure, despite the
possibility that they may not be certain with respect to amount
and timing due to credit risks, political risks and disputes with
customers or suppliers. Consequently, it could be argued that
transaction exposures are a special case of cash flow exposure in
general, and while the assumption of' certainty with respect to
timing and amount may be a useful construct in the development of
decision models, it may be inappropriate in a practical context.
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Transaction exposure will always exist unless nominal exchange
... rates are constant.
	 Such a condition implies that transaction
exposure will not exist if exchange rates are permanently fixed.
I.iii: Economic Exposure
The third class of exposure to foreign exchange risk is economic
exposure.	 It has been defined by Srinivasulu [1981, p 17] as:
"The uncertain domestic value of a cash flow that is
uncertain in foreign currency."
The only difference between transaction exposure and economic
exposure is that transaction exposure is a special case of
economic exposure where the amount Is certain in foreign
currency. The source of this exposure is the failure of
exchange rate changes to reflect International inflation
differentials, since such deviations from puriasing power parity
lead to subsidies and tarriffs on goods from different countries.
It Is also possible that exchange rate changes will have more
subtle Influences on the cash flows of firms. For example,
changes in exchange rates may effect the sourcing decision of
entirely domestic Industries such as electricity generation.
I.iv: Difficulties with 	 Classification ..L Exchange ipk
The Srinlvasulu [1981] definitions of' exposure are based upon
classifying foreign currency exposures as either certain or
uncertain with respect to amount and timing of' the foreign
currency cash flow. This classification may be inappropriate
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for a number of' reasons.
Firstly, it is possible that the cash flows of the firm may be
affected by exchange rate changes even if the cash flow is not
denominated in foreign currency.
	 This issue is examined in
the third section of this chapter. Moreover, the cash flows of
the firm may be affected by exchange rate changes even if there
are no foreign currency denominated items and the firm does not
produce traded goods, or source in traded goods markets.
	 This
latter possibility has been ignored in the literature and is
discussed in the second section of this chapter.
	 The
classification scheme is not collectively exhaustive.
Secondly, the source of cash flow uncertainty is not identified.
For example, a cash flow may be uncertain due to exchange rate
changes, or because of other uncertain state variables.
Moreover, from a management point of view, the degree of
uncertainty is probably important. Compare the uncertainty
surrounding the cash flow from export sales over a period of time
with the uncertainty of an exporter in a letter of credit
situation.
In the remainder of this chapter, the analysis will concentrate
on cash flows which are uncertain with respect to amount and
timing, in cases where the uncertainty arises from exchange rate
changes. Exposures which are certain with respect to amount and
timing are conceptually uncomplicated since they are readily
identifiable.	 Cash flows which are uncertain due to factors
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other than exchange rate changes are also readily identifiable
in terms of exchange risk exposure.
II: From General to Partial Equilibrium.
In the previous section, it was pointed out that industries which
have no involvement whatsoever in traded goods markets, and have
no foreign currency cash flows whatsoever, may be exposed to the
effects of exchange rate changes. 	 The reason that this may
arise is due to the macroeconomic impact of exchange rate
changes.	 The macroeconomic impact may be significant.
Consider the case of the public sector deficit.
The government can finance a public sector deficit from a number
of sources such as sales of non marketable debt, open market
operations, the printing press and balance of payment flows. (cf.
Goodhart [1976, chapter 13], Vane and Thompson [1979, chapter
3]). It amounts to saying that for every government
transaction, there is a debit and a credit; a deficit must be
financed somehow. 	 The impact of changes in the financing or
size of government deficits may influence goods markets,
financial markets and foreign exchange markets. From an
individual firm's point of view, all manner of cash flows may be
affected since turnover, costs, taxation, financing costs and
foreign exchange risk could be potentially affected.
Because of this interdependence within the market system,
exchange risk becomes a classic chicken and egg p roblem.	 For
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example, a reduction in the public sector deficit may affect the
inflation rate, the demand for the firm's products and the
exchange rate. The difficulty lies in uncovering the exogenous
and the endogenous variables.
Unfortunately, economists have to a large extent, ignored the
short run reactions of the economy to autonomous disturbances.
Economists have tended to focus on the characteristics of
equilibrium states rather than the transition towards
equilibrium. One notable exception is the Flow of Funds
literature (cf. Bain [1973], Freund and Zinbarg [1963], Mason
[1976] and the Wilson Report [1981 chapter 11]). On the other
hand, managerial and financial economists focus on situations of
partial equilibrium, for example, the capital asset pricing model
and the net present value rule.
The discussion of corporate exposure in this chapter assumes that
a partial equilibrium situation pertains, since there has been
little research in a general equilibrium context and because it
would make the problem intractable. There are two implications
from this discussion.
Firstly, it will be difficult to decide in practice when exchange
rate changes may be considered autonomous or exogenous
disturbances and when they are actually endogenous reactions to
other variables.
Secondly, discussion within a partial framework precludes the
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location of "optimal" decision rules.	 This issue may be
circumvented by making assumptions about the goals of decision
makers.	 However, it is still unlikely that a partial framework
has incorporated all possible effects of a particular decision
alternative.
III: Corporate Exposure to Exchange Risk.
This section begins by analysing a model advanced by Srinivasulu
[1983).	 The purpose of using the model is to provide a
classificatory framework for prior research. The main
innovation of the model is to discuss the foreign exchange risk
(FER) problem in a three country rather than a two country
framework.
Srinivasulu [1983, p p 5O.-55] begins by assuming a single time
period where the set of physical assets at the beginning of' the
period are constant until the end of' the period.	 He then
developed the following equation for expected end of period
wealth.
w t	 Wt_1(wO(1+rO)+w1/el,t_1(1+rl)el,t+w2/e2,t_1(1+r2)e2,t}
where:
r0
	= random return in the period from the domestic subsidiary
N?•
r i ,r2 random return in foreign currency of' the foreign
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subsidiaries "1" and "2".
e1 ,e2
 = prices of a unit of currencies 1 and 2 respectively, in
terms of currency 0.
e l,t_lthe current spot exchange rate which is known with
certainty.
e l,t	 the end of period expected spot rate which is a random
variable.
= the forward rate which is known with certainty.
the proportion of wealth (Wt-1) invested in country "0".
= initial wealth.
= end of period wealth.
Finally, taxes are ignored in the model, or assumed symmetric.
It is then assumed that second order effects may be ignored and
that:
el,t = el,t_1 (1+(ei,t-ei,i..i/ei,t_,))
then if Re1 = e1,t-e1,t_1/e1,t_1
the first return equation may be reformulated as:
wt = Wt_i(wo(1+ro)+wi(1+ri+Rei)+w2(1+r2+Re2)}
The main characteristic of this equation is the existence of a
return from holding physical assets and a foreign exchange
return.	 The variance of' the expected terminal wealth (S 2 ) is
then constructed as:
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32: WO2S2rO+w12{S2r1 +32Reti200v(r1 ,Re1)}
+W22{S2 2 ..32 R2+2cov(r2 'e2)}
+2wOwl{cov(rO,rl)+cov(rO ,Re1)}
+2W0w2(cov(r0,r2)+cov(r0,Re2)}
+2W1 w2 {cov(r 1
 ,r2)+cov(r1 ,Re2)}
+cov(Re 1
 ,r2)+cov(Re1 ,Re2)}
This equation has five variance terms and ten covarlance terms.
The covariance terms may be classified as:
1. Gains from international corporate diversification:
cov(r0,r1), cov(rO,r2), cov(rl,r2).
2. The structure of subsidiary operations: cov(r1,Re2),
cov(Re1 ,r2).
3. The management of a portfolio of currencies: cov(Re1,Re2)
II. The exchange risk of domestic operations: cov(r0,Re1),
cov(r0,Re2).
5.	 Intersubsidiary linkages: cov(r1,Re2), cov(r2,Re1).
These five categories provide a useful framework for ciiscussing
some prior research on FER.
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III.A: Gains froi International Firii Diversification
Chapter two discussed the issue of segmented capital markets.
Shareholders will value gains from international diversification
under conditions of capital market segmentation, since the MNC
offers opportunities of risk diversification which might
otherwise be unavailable.
	 The main economic justification for
the existence of diversification opportunities Is the existence
of correlations of less than one between different national
economies.	 The Levy and Sarnat [1970] study found stronger
links between European economies using ex post data. 	 This
finding is In accord with the intuitive explanation of higher
integration of geographically close economies in a relatively
free trade zone. However, as pointed out in the previous
chapter, our understanding of the causes of these covariances is
at a primitive stage. It may well be that multinationality
increases the opportunities to exploit product and factor market
Imperfections, rather than an opportunity to diversify risk.
If opportunities to reduce foreign exchange risk arise because of
International diversification, it will be necessary to have a
stable covar'iance matrix.
	
This may be the case (Phillipatos et
al. [1983]).	 Moreover, a technique for measuring the
covariances will be necessary. Eun and Resnick [1981 ] compared
a number of techniques, and found that a national market mean
model was the most efficient of the models tested. Such a model
Is also consistent with market segmentation.
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III.B: The Structure of Subsidiary Operations.
Dufey [1972] was the first to examine the possibility of exchange
rate changes affecting the costs, revenues and volumes of the
foreign subsidiary. Prior to this other authors such as
Heckerman [1972] had assumed that cash flows in foreign currency
terms were assumed known and fixed, with respect to amount and
timing.	 Dufey [1972, p52] pointed out that this assumption was
misleading and that:
"local currency revenue and cost streams will not follow the
pattern projected before the devaluation. In fact, after the
devaluation, these local currency flows will exhibit
differences that are systematic and predictable as to
direction. Therefore, a uniform, indiscriminate application
of' the devaluation percentage to the projected pre-
devaluation cash flow gives an inaccurate picture."
This approach was later formalised by Shapiro [1975] and
simplified versions of Shapiro's approach with minor
modifications were produced by Jacque [1978] and Walker
[1978]. These simplifications have been in turn adopted by
Kettell (1979] and Levi [1983].
Conceptually, the approach is relatively straightforward, and it
consists of an application of the elasticities approach to the
balance of payments.
	 As yet, the Marshall-Lerner condition has
not been applied at the firm level. 	 It is unlikely that it
will offer any new insights.
	 At the micro level, the approach
may amount to an analytical examination of the exchange rate
elasticity of revenues and costs.
As a basis for further discussion the original Shapiro model is
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adopted.	 Differential equations are used in the model in order
to evaluate the effects of simultaneous inflation and
devaluation, and to provide a more concise account of this
covariance. It should however be pointed out that the model
assumes a set of relationships between exchange rate changes and
firm characteristics as distinct from deducing such
relationships.	 It will however be demonstrated that if
purchasing power parity should hold, exposure does not exist.
The Shapiro [1975] model has been criticised as failing to
distinguish between movements along the demand curve and demand
curve shifts Hendershott [1975]. This exposition will attempt
to clarify this difficulty by discussing real income effects
separately.
The theory begins with a discussion of the demand curve and the
cost curve.	 The effects of inflation and devaluation on
profitability are then discussed individually.	 Finally, the
effects of simultaneous inflation and devaluation are discussed.
III.B.i:	 Demand Curve
It is assumed that the firm is oligopolistic and headquartered
in Britain with a single overseas subsidiary. The traditional
determinants of demand are the price of a good, the prices of
other goods, income and tastes.	 The latter factors produce
shifts in the demand curve while price changes produce movements
along the demand curve. 	 The demand for the product of the
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subsidiary in local currency is described as a function of
quantity Q 1 , the local wholesale price index W, and the sterling
value of the local currency or exchange rate F.
P 1
	p1 ( Q1, W, F)
It is then argued that the partial derivatives behave according
to a number of factors such as the degree of import competition.
It is assumed that the derivative of price with respect to
quantity Is less than zero. 	 This Implies that the demand curve
for the firm's product is downward sloping.	 In other words, the
firm sells in an imperfect or oligopolistic market. 	 The
derivative of prices with respect to inflation is assumed to be
greater than or equal to zero. This implies that it may not be
possible to increase prices in line with inflation because of
import competition, price controls or other inflexibilities.
Formally, these two derivatives are expressed In the following
way:
6p i / 'SQi <0
6P1 / '5W >= 0
In the absence of import competition and inflexibilities, and
given demand functions which are homogenous to degree zero in
money prices, It would be possible for'S P 1
 / 'S W = p 1 / w.
The derivative of prices with respect to the exchange rate is
assumed to be less than or equal to zero. 	 This is based upon
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the presumption that if the local currency devalues, then local
goods would have a competitive ad'iantage relative to imported
goods. If the derivative is set to zero, then it would imply
that there was either no import competition, or alternatively,
that overseas competitors were prepared to accept a decrease in
their profitability in order to maintain market share.
Formally, this derivative is expressed as:
Pi / oF <: C
The exports of the firm are assumed to be denominated in dollars
and to be a function of quantity	 alone.	 It should be
pointed out that this assumption may be unrealistic, since one
would expect that in conditions where the subsidiary is subject
to import competition, its competitiveness should be increased
when foreign inflation exceeds domestic inflation (ceteris
paribus).
= 2 (Qx)
The demand curve for exports is also expected to be downward
sloping.
0 2 / OQx< 0
It is assumed that the domestic and export pricing decisions are
independent of one another.	 This constitutes an immediate
violation of the law of one price.	 Horst [1971] examines the
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case of interdependence in the setting of prices.
III.B.ii:	 Cost Curve
The traditional theory of costs maintains that costs are a
function of the output level, factor prices, technology and in
te long run, capital. Shapiro treats the sterling cost curve
of the foreign subsidiary as a function of the quantity produced,
the price index and the exchange rate.
c1 = c1 (Qi Qx, W, F)
This is one of the confusing aspects of the model, since revenues
are denominated in the local currency of the subsidiary, whereas
costs are denominated in the currency of the parent. The
partial derivatives are expected to behave in the following way.
Firstly it is assumed that costs will increase as output
increases.
6C1 / 6Q > 0
Secondly, it is assumed that local costs will increase as the
general level of prices increases.
5C1 /
	
> 0
It is however possible that the increase in costs will be less
than the increase in inflation because of factor market
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inflexibilities and the opportunity to substitute imported
factors for local factors. 	 Therefore,
c1 / o < Ci /W
Exchange rates are expected to increase costs in sterling terms
aa sterling is revalued.
6C1 / 6 F > 0
However, there may be opportunities to substitute local for
imported inputs, and so:
6 C1 / 6 F < C1 / F.
III.B.lii:Inflation 	 Profitability.
The profit of the firm (S), is defined as:
S =	 i(Qi,W,F)Qi F} + U2(Qx)Qx} - C1(Q1 +
Partial differentials are obtained so that the effects of
inflation on profitability may be analysed.
6 S/6W = ( i /°W)Q1F - 6 C1 /6W
The interpretation of this partial derivative is straightforward.
It simply says that the effects of inflation on profitability
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will depend on the effects of inflation on costs and revenues.
The intuitive simplicity of the model may be seen in the
situation where both prices and costs are homogenous to degree
zero in prices, and there are no exports. In this case, prices,
costs and profits will increase in line with inflation, and real
profits will remain unchanged:
= P1 /W Qi F - C1 1W
= 31W
Similarly, if it is impossible to increase prices, or there is
very stiff import competition, or all of the goods produced are
exported, then profits will be adversely affected to the extent
that costs are affected by inflation.
	 The effect on profits
will be:
= - tS C 1 ,i6j < o
III.B.lv: Profitability	Local Currency Devaluation.
The analysis in this section is similar to the analysis of the
effects of inflation on profitability. 	 The first step is to
evaluate the partial derivative of profit with respect to
devaluation.
6S/cSF =P 1 /5F Q1 F + P1 Q1 - C1 /F
Again, this equation is self evident.	 Profits will be affected
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by a devaluation to the extent that prices in the local market
and costs are affected by devaluation. Note that exports are
unaffected by devaluation because exports were assumed not to
have an exchange rate elasticity. In the case where the firm
exports all of its output, it will be better off to the extent
that profit margins will be increased because local costs will
h,ave decreased.
tSS/iSF = -.C1 /6F < 0
Therfore, the firm will gain on devaluation. This is in accord
with the elasticities approach to the balance of payments. The
derivatives are of opposite sign to the inflation case because a
devaluation locally Is a revaluation in sterling terms.
On the other hand, suppose that none of the output is exported.
Further, assume that the firm faces no import competition in
product markets.
= P 1
 Q1 -C MF
= l Qi - Ci IF
= S/F > 0
In this case, costs are increased by the devaluation but there
will be no increase in revenue, unless the devaluation has an
impact on macroeconomic variables. Therefore, the firm loses
out to the extent that its costs are affected by the devaluation.
On the other hand, If the firm competes with overseas producers
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in local markets, then it will be at an advantage as they will be
forced to either accept a decrease in their profitability or
alternatively sacrifice market share to domestic producers.
It should however be pointed out that a MNC will be interested in
the profits of foreign subsidiaries in terms of parent currency
arid so there will be a translation impact.
III.B.v: j. Case	 Simultaneous Inflation	 Devaluation.
This section examines the interaction of inflation and
devaluation.	 In order to accomplish this task, it is necessary
to use differential equations. 	 The total effect on profit of
the Inflation devaluation cycle may be stated as:
dS = 6 S/6 W dW 6 SI6F dF
This equation states that the rate of change of profits is
related to the rates of change of inflation and the exchange
rate.	 Using the previous sections on the individual effects of
inflation and devaluation, this may be expanded to:
dS = {sP1 / w Qi F - C1 M W} dW
+ P1 / F Q1 F + P1 Q1 - 6C . 4 F}dF
Unfortunately, In this situation the results are somewhat more
ambiguous.	 If the firt exports all of its production, then:
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dS = -6C1
 , W dW - C1 /F dF
If purchasing power parity holds, then dF/F = -dW/W, and it would
be possible for dS = 0.
	
In other words, the firm is unaffected
if Purchasing Power Parity holds. If PPP does not hold, then
the exporter will be adversely affected if devaluations fail to
match the inflation rate.
= 0, then changes in profit may be described as:
dS > P1 Q1 F fdW/W + dF/F} +tS P1 /F Q1 F dF
It is difficult to reach any firm conclusions in this case.
Unless the terms of trade detiororate the domestic producer will
not gain. The domestic firm may gain if the elasticity of
demand with respect to devaluation is sufficiently negative.
Even in this case, the presence of strong import competition in
the firm's product markets may be sufficient to eradicate such
benefits. The time span of the cycle may be important since if
an exporter gains initially due to devaluation, and then loses
out to the same absolute extent because of local inflation, he
may be better off due to the time value of money. Therefore, it
would be unwise to suggest that there is no exposure since
purchasing power parity holds in the long run.
Finally, It can be seen that the firm will experience a decrease
in profits in the case of price controls unless costs are also
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fixed or react perversely to inflation or devaluation.
1II.B.vi Real Income Effects
The discussion of real income effects make the discussion
somewhat more realistic, since they attempt to broaden the scope
of the model beyond the reaction of the firm to an autonomous
shock, to the possible repercussions in other markets of'
inflation and devaluation, and the possible effects of such a
situation on the activities of the firm.
The existence of real income effects is to some extent ana.lagous
to a Phillips curve. If expectations are rational [Muth 1961],
and one produced an expectations augmented Phillips curve, then,
real Income effects would disappear (for an elaboration, cf.
Goodhart [1976]).	 The existence of' real income effects
presupposes that money is non neutral with respect to real
variables.	 This would also be the case in the Dornbuzch [1976]
unemployment case, where undershooting occurs. The existence of'
real income effects and real effects in general may ameliorate
the inflation devaluation cycle from the point of view of the
firm.	 This would arise since consumer and government spending
might be increased. One might also find that countries with
large amounts of' foreign currency denominated debt may benefit
from revaluation since the local currency financing costs would
decrease and government spending may be increased or taxes
reduced.
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Therefore, the possibility of real income effects should not be
ignored.	 They are probably time and location specific.	 Should
such effects prevail, they are a source of additional threat and
opportunity for firms.
III.B.vli:The Effects	 Financing Practices.
Jacque [1981] points out that the Shapiro [1975] model fails to
take account of the subsidiaries financing practices.
	 Hodder
[1982] incorporates the liability structure of the firm into the
analysis by assLinirig:
i) Two countries and a single time period.
ii) Net worth is positive and predetermined. The real asset
position of the firm is assumed fixed for the year; further,
it Is assumed that the market value of the firm equals the
net worth of the firm, which in turn equals the sum of the
market values of the firm's assets and liabilities.
iii) Physical assets are assumed homogenous except for their
location.
iv) Liabilities are homogenous with respect to all factors
other than currency of denomination and the applicable
interest rate in the currency of denomination.
v) Physical asset prices deviate between countries by a random
factor.
vi) Exposure is defined as the exposure of the rate of return on
net worth to exchange rate changes after adjustment for
general price change in the home country.
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vii) For the purposes of deriving an optimal decision rule it
is assumed that the decision maker has a quadratic loss
function. This assumption, is similiar to the analysis of
Shapiro [1977].
This leads to exposure (E) being deduced as:
E = NW (Covr,e / Var e)
where: NW = net worth
r = the real rate of return on net worth
e = the rate of change of the exchange rate
This exposure measure may then be decomposed into:
1) The exposure of domestic assets
ii) The exposure of foreign assets
iii) The exposure of net worth to PPP deviations
iv) The exposure of foreign currency denominated liabilities
These exposures are related to one another as follows:
E= i) -ii) -iii) -iv)
Shapiro's model deals with the cases of 1) and ii). The policy
implication of the model is that exposure is manipulated by
altering the ratio of overseas to home debt. The exposure of
balance sheet items is more difficult to understand.	 Hodder
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[1982] cleverly sidesteps a number of important issues by
assuming that the market value of the firm equals the net worth
of the firm which in turn equals the market value of the sum of
the values of individual assets and liabilities of the firm.
Under these circumstances, all accounting problems have been
assumed away and an economic measure of income is assumed. The
plausibility of this assumption is examined in section IV of this
chapter.
It may be concluded that should deviations from purchasing power
parity exist, the costs and revenues of the firm may be affected.
The extent to which costs and revenues will be affected will
depend on the degree of tradability of the firm's factors and
products, the macroeconomic impact of exchange rate changes and
the degree of flexibility of product and factor market prices.
III. C: The Portfolio Effect of Multi Currency Holdings
This aspect has been dealt with by Makin [1978] and GUll [1977].
The main practical implication of this research is that
maintaining open positions in currencies may decrease rather than
increase risk.
Conceptually, it is a variant of the portfolio approach to
security investment (see Markowitz [1952,1959]). Makin [1978]
examines a situation similar to Sharpe's [1963] diagonal model.
Makin's model focuses on the management of monetary assets and
liabilities, however, it could in principle, be extended to the
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location of physical assets. The approach assumes that there
are stable covariances between currency movements, so that the
management of a portfolio of assets and liabilities becomes
equivalent to a series of investments in a portfolio model. A
quadratic utility function Is assumed In order to produce
'optimal' results. The most interesting Insight of the model,
Is that an optimal solution may include open positions in certain
currencies, whereas a 'one by one' approach would suggest that
either one hedges everything or nothing. 	 The Gull [1977] model
is similar in approach and Blackie [1978] also advocates such an
approach.	 Friedman [1981] points out some shortcomings with the
model, some of which are corrected by Makin [1981].
III.D: The Exchange Risk of the Domestic Firm
It follows from the Hodder [1978, 1982] model that the domestic
firm Is exposed since:
E = I) - Iv)
This also Illustrates the counter intuitive result that the
purely domestic firm may be more exposed than the international
firm. This also follows from the Shapiro [1975] model, In the
cases where the firm has both domestically sourced inputs and
domestic sales. The exposure of the domestic firm arises from a
number of factors which are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
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Firstly, if either the firm produces tradeable goods or some of
the firm's factors are tradeable goods, then it will be exposed
to exchange rate changes. In an open economy, non traded goods
could also be affected by exchange rate changes.
Secondly, if domestic inflation is uncertain, then the domestic
firm will be exposed to an inflationary risk. Under certain
circumstances, this risk could be avoided by purchasing foreign
currency denominated bonds.
Thirdly, exchange risk will be increased if there is high import
competition in product markets. This effect will be exacerbated
if there is a high degree of substitutability between domestic
and foreign goods. Conversely, high import competition or
foreign substitutability in input markets will decrease exchange
risk.	 Therefore, the higher the percentage of tradeable inputs
used, the lower the exchange risk.
Fourthly, if prices are more inflexible in factor markets,
exchange risk will increase as local value added increases. It
might also be suggested that restrictions on the openness of' an
economy such as high transport costs or restrictive trade
policies will decrease exchange risk.
III.E: Intersubsld.tary Linkages.
Intersubsidiary linkages consist of the effect of' exchange rate
changes in a third currency on the cash flows of the foreign
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subsidiary. They arise from the use of a three country model in
the work of Sinivasulu [1983].	 Possible examples may include
the setting of certain prices in the world economy in dollar
terms, or competition from third countries. Srinivasulu [1983]
does not discuss the issue and in an example in Srinivasulu
[1983, chapter 5] this term is taken as given.
III.F: Conclusions
The Shapiro [1975] model implies that it is impossible to
generalise about the effects of foreign exchange risk on the
corporate sector.	 It will affect different firms in different
ways.	 The model does however suggest that cash flows are
exposed to foreign exchange risk in situations where PPP does not
hold.	 In order to maintain some simplicity in the model, the
effects of financial decisions such as the debt equity ratio were
not discussed.	 The analysis does however highlight several key
variables.
It was shown that the degree of tradability, price flexibility
and substitutability of the firm's products and factors will
determine the extent to which it is exposed to foreign exchange
risk. Other influences on the exposure of the firm will include
the impact of exchange rate changes on government policy and
other macroeconomic variables. In the discussion of the Hodder
[1982] model, it was pointed out that the presence of
opportunities to raise debt in more than one country may
ameliorate economic exposure.
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Some counterintuitive results were also deduced. Portfolio
analysis of multicurrency holdings suggests that open positions
in currencies may be desirable, while it was also shown that the
pure domestic firm in an open economy may be as exposed to
exchange risk as the internationally oriented firm. Finally, it
was shown that the covariances between currencies other than the
home currency, and the covariances of real asset returns, may
also have an impact on the exposure of the firm.
IV: Measuring Exposure to Exchange Risk
In the previous sections, the nature of corporate exposure to
foreign exchange risk was examined. In this section accounting,
statistical and qualitative measurement of foreign exchange
exposure are examined. It will be shown that both statistical
and accounting approaches to the measurement of economic exposure
to foreign exchange risk are unlikely to be successful, and that
ultimately, qualitative approaches to the measurement of foreign
exchange exposure are likely to be the only operational
technique. However, qualitative measurement amounts to the
production of a more refined classification of exposure, and it
is argued that measurement in a quantitative manner is unlikely,
and that the real issue is the development of a more
sophisticated classification of exposure.
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IV.A: Accounting Measures of Exposure
Perfect and complete markets provide an opportunity to obtain a
rigorous analysis of the difficulties of measuring economic
exposure using accounting statements. This, in turn, highlights
the differences between measuring translation (or accounting)
eposure, and economic exposure.	 This characterisation, is
based on the work of Debreu [1959].	 For the purposes of this
exposition, the following definitions are used.
1)	 'Complete Markets' are defined as the presence of
organised markets which permit trading in all consumption
goods and all factors of production. Furthermore,
following Debreu [1959, chapter 7], if uncertainty is
assumed, completeness includes a set of markets in which
all conceivable state contingent trades may be made.
ii) 'Perfect Markets' are markets which operate in a
frictionless, costless, instantaneous manner. 	 It Is also
assumed that all traders are prices takers and that there
are no indivisibilities.
There are two significant features of the model. Firstly, the
model is not monetised (see Debreu [1959, p36, fn.3]).
Secondly, the valuation of assets is not a problem within this
model, since, the present values of all assets will equal their
current replaoement cost or their net realisable value. Since a
complete set of markets exists, all the assets and liabilities of
the firm have market values.	 This means that the balance sheet
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measure of net worth equals the market value of the firm. This
is similar to the second assumption in the Hodder [1982] model.
If worldwide identical homothetic preferences exist, purchasing
power parity will prevail, since the law of one price will hold
in perfect markets.
Beaver and Wolfson [1982] demonstrate that within such a setting,
the use of current asset values and current exchange rates as a
translation procedure for accounting statements, is the only
translation method which possesses both economic interpretability
and symmetry. Economic interpretability implies that the
consolidated net worth will equal the present value of MNC future
cash flows. Symmetry implies that the relationships between
accounting numbers will be identical both in parent and
subsidiary currencies.
Beaver and Wolfson examined the properties of two other
translation methods (the current exchange rate - historic value
method (C/H) and the historic exchange rate - historic value
method (H/H)). They demonstrate that the H/H method possesses
neither symettry nor interpretability while the C/H method is
only symmetric. As yet, it has not been demonstrated that
perfect and complete markets are a necessary condition, (as
distinct from a sufficient condition), for these results.
Movement away from a perfect and complete markets framework is
problematic, and the solution to the problem of foreign currency
translation depends on a solution to the problem of inflation
accounting outside of perfect and complete markets. The perfect
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and complete markets setting is highly unrealistic since, within
such a setting, it is difficult to know why academics would
devote scarce resources to non problems, such as exchange risk,
inflation accounting and foreign currency translation ( for
further discussion, see Beaver and Demski [1979], Beaver and
Wolfson [19], Bromwich [1977], Bromwich and Wells [1981 ] and
Revsine [1973]).
The analysis indicates that the measurement of economic exposure
is a non trivial issue, because the existence of incomplete
markets will lead to many assets being non marketable, and asset
valuation will be panibiguous. Market imperfections will lead to
transaction costs, which will lead in turn to divergences between
replacement costs and realisable values. Imperfections in
second hand asset markets also pose problems in calculating
depreciation charges, and cast doubt on the applicability of
single period solutions to multi period problems (Cf. Bogue and
Roll [197's]). This result questions the Srinivasulu [1983]
single period solution and the Hodder [1982] solution which
assumed complete markets in order to measure net worth (e. g. the
valuation of growth opportunities; see Myers and Turnbull [1977])
and a single period solution.
Glick [1986] uses a present value framework to demonstrate that
the Beaver and Wolfson [1982] results will be violated when there
are deviations from the traditional theory of international
parity in a complete markets framework. 	 To some extent, there
is an internal inconsistency, since it is difficult to know how
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deviations from neutrality might occur in situations where there
were no difficulties in the measurement of asset values.
In principle however, the use of present values is appealing and,
in the absence of a fully specified model, present values may
provide an approximation to the value of the firm. This
observation has prompted some authors (e.g. Cornell and Shapiro
[1983], Shapiro [1986] and Eiteman and Stonehill [1986]) to
suggest that exposure to exchange risk is the impact of exchange
rate changes on the value of the firm or on the net present value
of corporate cash flows.
	 Hekman [1985] uses a present value
framework to produce a potentially estimable coefficient of
exposure.
	
However, there are a number of restrictive
assumptions made in the analysis, including the assumption that
all elements of' value are assumed to be functions of a single
'variable source - the vector of expected exchange rates.
Moreover, it is assumed that the stochastic exchange rate process
is fixed. While the model represents a useful first step
towards integrating the analysis of foreign exchange excposure
and corporate valuation theory, it is unlikely that the model
could be applied in practice without substantially more
development.
However, there are a number of potentially devastating criticisms
of the net present value approach. Firstly, it is questionable
whether value maximisation will be unanimously supported in
segmented international capital markets.	 Secondly, a present
value is a value which is known and certain if market prices are
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used.	 It is vacuous to attempt to find a covariance between a
current non random market value, and an infinite series of random
future exchange rates.	 Adler and Dumas [1985, fn.6] point out:
"In finance, notional changes in present values are used to
evaluate the impact of current decisions that will effect
future outcomes: but no financial decision is required for
measuring exposure. The approach taken here enables
financial decision analysis and exposure measurement to be
kept apart: Exposure is a matter of the future,
instantaneous covariation of contemporaneous prices and
exchange rates either at discrete points of, or
continuously over, time.	 It is the value of hedging that
requires present value comparisons."
The implication of the analysis is clear.	 Examining the impact
of exchange rate changes on present values is of' little interest.
The real issue is the examination of the covariation between the
random value of the firm's value at some future point in time and
the random exchange rate at some future point in time. 	 This
possibility is examined in the following section.
IV.B: Statistical Approathes to the Measure!ent of Exposure
In the previous section it was argued that neither accounting nor
present value techniques were likely to permit the measurement of
exposure in a meaningful way. 	 It was pointed out that a
measure of exposure should reflect the covariation of future
values with future exchange rates. 	 Adler and Dumas [1985]
propose that such an approach may be implemented by obtaining the
regression coefficient between future values and future exchange
rates. This approach is theoretically useful, since measurement
can be accomplished, in principle, and the measured exposure may
be hedged using forward contracts. 	 Unfortunately, the approach
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is unlikely to be operational for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, the model is based within a single period context, and
multiperiod or dynamic hedging strategies are excluded.
Moreover, It Is possible that exchange rate changes in previous
periods will effect cash flows in the current period. This in
turn would imply the use of a multiple regression model.
Secondly, without a complete model of the relationship between
firm value and exchange rates, it will be necessary to use
historical data.	 This in turn involves assuming that the past
is a valid representation of the future.
	 It is unlikely that
the processes which influence the value of the firm and the
exchange rate are likely to be stationary.
	 Thirdly, the
possibility of non stationary processes which may also be non
normal violates the assumptions of a regression approach. 	 It
was shown in chapter two that this is likely to be the case for
exchange rate changes.	 However, the approach may be useful for
hedging portfolios of overseas assets, and this possibility has
been examined by Adler and Simon C 1986).	 As yet, the approach
has not been applied to individual corporate stocks.
Unfortunately, the measure of exposure is a statistical
decomposition, and there is no underlying theory of the
relationship. The approach is similar to the application of the
market model, before the capital asset pricing model was
conceived.	 The exchange rate is not a state variable, but an
equilibrium price. It is therefore quite possible that the
variabjlity of the market value of the firm might be increased
rather than decreased by the Introduction of a hedging strategy
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based upon the regression coefficient.	 Moreover, in segmented
capital markets, it is possible that the firm's optimal hedge
will not be unanimously supported. 	 In conclusion, the approach
is a theoretical advance on present value definitions of
exposure, but is unlikely to be implementable in practice. In
the next section, a qualitative approach to the measurement of
ecposure is examined.
IV. C: Qualitative Measures of Foreign Exchange Risk
It has been shown in the previous two sections that quantitative
techniques are imperfect in a number of respects.
	 In this
section, a qualitative approach to the measurement of exposure is
examined.
Transaction exposures are relatively simple to measure. A
transaction exposure as defined by Srinivasulu [1983) is simply
an amount of foreign currency which has a regression coefficient
of one with exchange rates and the H-squared of the regression
equation is also one. In the case of exposures which are
uncertain as to realisation, for example an export order in a
letter of' credit situation, the regression coefficient of the
expected amount will also be one and the R-squared of the
regression equation will be less than one. This latter
observation arises since the regression equation will not explain
the portion of uncertainty arising from the possibility of' the
letter of credit failing to materialise. 	 Alternatively, these
transaction and near-transaction exposures are independent of the
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exchange rate when stated in foreign currency. This in turn
leads to the following definitions of eXpO8U.re.
A Transaction Exoosure is a foreign currency cash flow which
has a regression coefficient of one with the exchange rate.
Moreover, the R-squared of' the regression equation equals
one.
Economic Exoosure is any foreign currency cash flow which
does not meet the conditions of a transaction exposure, and
any home currency cash flow which does not have a
coefficient of zero with the exchange rate.
Flood and Lessard [19861 suggest that economic exposure should be
separated into a 'competitive' effect and a 'conversion' effect.
The competitive effect is due to the effects of exchange rates on
the local currency cash flows of' the subsidiary or the parent
currency cash flows of domestic subsidiaries. The conversion
effect arises from the conversion of foreign subsidiary cash
flows into the currency of the parent.	 The Issue of real
interest is the measurement of the competitive effect. 	 Flood
and Lessard [1986, pp.3 )4-35] suggest four types of' prototype
firm. The first type Is the exporter firm which sells its
products in global markets, but sources in segmented markets.
The second prototype Is the local market firm which both sources
and sells in segmented local markets. The importer firm
purchases in global markets and sells in segmented markets. The
global firm Is the final prototype and both purchases and sells
In global markets. The approach is simply a categorisation
of the inputs and outputs of' the firm by the degree of
tradeability.
It is unfortunate that progress in operationalising the
measurement of' exposure has advanced so little. 	 It is probably
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an indication of the intractability of the area that concepts
which are almost fifteen years old have not been operationlised
beyond simple qualitative categories.
V: Sxary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined the manner in which corporations are
exposed to exchange risk. A number of models which have been
advanced In the literature were discussed, in order to examine
the nature of exposure.	 In particular It was pointed out that
these models are limited, since they adopt a partial equilibrium
or ceteris parjbus assumption In order to provide some analytical
tractability. The models suggest that It is difficult to
understand exposure unless one focusses on the activities of
individual firms.	 It was also demonstrated that the purely
'domestic firm is also exposed to exchange risk. This last
insight arises because It was argued that it was the tradeability
of the Inputs and outputs of the firm will Influence the exposure
of the firm.
It was also pointed out that common categories of' exposure were
imperfect and the following definitions of exposure were
suggested.
A Transaction Exoosure is a foreign currency cash flow which
has a regression coefficient of one with the exchange rate.
Moreover, the H-squared of the regression equation equals
one.
An, Economic ExDosure is any foreign currency cash flow which
does not meet the conditions of a transaction exposure, and
any home currency cash flow which does not have a
coefficient of zero with the exchange rate.
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The measurement of exposure was then examined.
	
It was pointed
out that while the measurement of transaction exposure is
straightforward, the measurement of economic exposure is not.
A number of different measurement techniques were examined.
Firstly, it was shown that accounting reports were unlikely to
provi de a measure of exposure unless perfect and complete markets
prevailed.	 The sensitivity of the present value of future cash
flows to exchange rate changes was also examined.	 It was argued
that an attempt to correlate a certain current market value with
a future random variable was ill conceived.
	 A theoretically
superior statistical technique was also examined, but it was
argued that the approach was unlikely to be operational.
Finally, a qualitative approach to the measurement of exposure
was examined, and it is probably the only measurement technique
capable of immediate practical application.
A number of issues were sidestepped entirely in this chapter.
i) Taxes were ignored, or assumed symmetric.
ii) Single period frameworks were used in many cases. These
are limited since solutions in a single period framework may
not be optimal within a multi period model. Moreover, the
existence of incomplete, imperfect markets and the
possibility of technical change may become relavant.
iii) In many cases, models employing a mean variance framework
were used, rather than more complete models of' capital
markets.
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CHAPTER 14
MANAGING EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK
It was argued in the previous two chapters that there were
grounds for believing that foreign exchange risk exists, and that
corporations are exposed to it.
	 In this chapter, two issues are
qxamined.	 Firstly, the normative case for the management of
foreign exchange risk will be examined. Secondly, having
demonstrated a normative case, the techniques which may be used
to manage foreign exchange risk will be examined.
I: The Normative Case for the Management of Foreign Exchange Risk
While foreign exchange risk may exist and affect the cash flows
of corporations, it is also necessary to demonstrate that
corporations should manage it. Dufey and Srinivasulu [19814,
p5 1 ] summarise the case against managing foreign exchange risk
(FER) as:
"FER does not exist: even if it exists, it need not be
hedged; even if it is to be hedged, corporations need not
hedge it."
The case against managing exchange risk [cf. Wihlborg 1980, p29)
is based initially on the premise that the equilibrium
relationships outlined in chapter 2 hold, and that real as
distinct from nominal exchange risk is irrelevant. This premise
is based in particular on Purchasing Power Parity theory (PPP)
and the failure of' PPP to hold in practice is a sufficient
condition for exchange risk to exist, given that deviations from
PPP and hence real exchange rate changes are unanticipated.
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In chapter 2, it was shown that there is considerable evidence
of deviations from Ppp.
The maximisation of shareholder wealth is often assumed as the
normative goal of corporate financial policy. 	 Early writers
such as Solomon [1963], postulated this goal in order to
operationalise the concept of profit maximisation. 	 While, such
a goal may seem plausible, more recent literature points out that
the conditions necessary to demonstrate that a certain policy
will be unanimously supported by shareholders, requires
restrictive assumptions even within a partial equilibrium
context. For example, it is necessary to assume that a decision
will not affect the pay offs of other firms or the consumption
opportunities of shareholders. In a general equilibrium
context, the issue becomes even more complex, and assumptions
become so restrictive as to render shareholders indifferent to
the firm's financing and investment decisions (for a fuller
review of these issues, see DeAngelo [1981]). Moreover, in
practice, it is possible that there will be agency (see Jensen
and Heckling [1976]) considerations in the development of
policies which are 'optimal' from the point of' view of' the
shareholders. Stulz [1981 ] demonstrates that value maximisirig
firms will pursue active hedging strategies because managerial
income is an increasing function of changes in the value of the
firm.
There is however one argument against hedging which is
inadmissable.	 Giddy [1976, p100] argues that:
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"...exchanging currency via the forward market yields just
as much uncertainty as would waiting until the payment date
and exchanging currency in the spot market each time."
This argument is an argument similar to that of Aliber [1978].
It is based upon the observation that the average deviation of
the forward rate from the future spot tends towards zero in the
long run.	 The approach involves assuming that managers and
shareholders are risk neutral, and only concerned about long run
expected values.	 It amounts to assuming that risks with
expected values of zero do not matter. 	 Moreover, it may be in
the interests of shareholders to have a smooth earnings stream.
This may be due to the existence of assymetric tax laws which
restrict the carrying forward or back of losses or progressive
	
tax rates (Smith and Stulz [1985]).	 There might also be a fear
of adverse public attention if profits are seen to be extremely
	
'.high (Cf. Ronen and Sadan [1980]).
	
Finally, regulatory bodies,
particularly in the banking sector, may insist on a low foreign
exchange exposure.
Having disposed of the zero mean fallacy, the case against
hedging in a value maximisation framework is examined.
I.A: Hedging and Value Mimisation
Hedging is simply a technique for altering the currency
denomination of' the firm's liabilities.
	 This is a useful
insight, since the main arguments against hedging are based upon
Modligiani and Miller [1958] (MM).	 The MM model has been
extended into the international arena by a number of academics
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including Baron [1976], Dumas [1978] and Feiger and Jacquillat
[1981].	 In an integrated world capital market, hedging is
irrelevant.	 There is no reason why shareholders should not
engage in 'homemade hedging'.
Alternatively, the argument may be stated using the capital asset
pricing model [CAPM] as enunciated by Sharpe [196U, Lintner
[1965] and Mossin [1966].	 It is argued that risks which can be
diversified away by shareholders are irrelevant to the
shareholder wealth maximisation principle.
	 For example, Logue
and Oldfield [1977] argue that:
"Most foreign exchange hedging activity is ill conceived and
has little or no effect on the value of the firm. [A
negative effect may even occur as a result of' hedging
costs.] It appears then that corporate hedging activity
in the foreign exchange market is at best irrelevant and at
worst costly."
Even if' exchange risks are systematic, Lessard [1981 pp352-356]
and Logue and Oldfield [1977] argue that hedging foreign exchange
risks is only moving the corporation along the security market
line and therefore does not enhance shareholder wealth.
Therefore, it is unnecessary for the firm to hedge since the
change in risk profile will be offset by an identical change in
its expected return.	 The logic is simple.	 The value of a
hedged firm will equal the value of an unhedged firm, because the
value of' a hedge in equilibrium will be zero. However, In order
to achieve this outcome, a 'homemade hedging' mechanism is
necessary.
	
The case for hedging then rests upon the barriers to
homemade hedging, which will consist of either capital market
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Imperfections or information asymmetries.
The first type of imperfection is the presence of bankruptcy
risk. It has been suggested by a number of writers, including
Logue and OldfIeld [1977], Makin [1978], and Adler and Dumas
[1983, 1982], and examined analytically by Smith and Stulz
[1985]. The underlying principle may be based on the
possibility of the firm encountering short run liquidity
difficulties, or breaching bond covenants because of foreign
exchange losses. 	 Normally, examples such as the Herstatt bank
and the Franklin bank are cited as examples of exchange rate
losses leading to the collapse of a firm. Other examples
Include the debt repayment difficulties of Laker Airways.
Unfortunately there has been no rigorous empirical research
carried out of this Issue and there Is evidence that bankruptcy
costs may be trivial (Warner [1977a,b]). However, even in the
trivial bankruptcy case, hedging will be justified If the costs
of hedging are less than the reduction in the expected costs of
bankruptcy.
The second possibility Is the existence of Institutional
constraints to 'homemade hedging'. Institutional barriers may
consist of barriers to Individuals entering the foreign exchange
markets or the presence of fixed transaction costs. The essence
of this argument Is that the shareholder would only wish to
transact in small quantities and It Is therefore more economical
for firms to do so.	 However, It could be argued that large
Institutional shareholders are In a position to transact in large
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quantities in foreign exchange markets.
The third possibility is that firms may be in a position to
mediate risks internally, and maximise transaction cost savings.
This possibility is based to some extent on a 'markets and
hierarchies' (Williamson [1976]) view of industrial organisation.
Prindi [1976] suggested the classification of hedging techniques
as either 'internal' or 'external'.	 The former type of hedge is
mediated through the firm or 'hierarchy' while the latter hedge
is mediated through markets. 	 Examples of internal hedging
techniques might include adjusting intra-firm funds flows to
decrease exposure, while examples of market based hedges might
include hedging in either forward or money markets. Internal
techniques are used because the costs of transacting in markets
are too high, or because of the existence of imperfections such
as capital market regulations, exchange controls and taxes or
because there are no markets.
The fourth type of imperfection is the presence of information
asymmetries. Baron [1976] developed a model which used
'homemade hedging', however it assumes the shareholder has
perfect information about the output level, and the firm's
production and cost functions (both assumed deterministic).
	 The
model also assumes zero transaction costs.	 It would seem
reasonable to argue that the firm has an informational advantage
in this respect and should therefore hedge on behalf of' the
shareholder.
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Finally, in the presence of' transaction costs, leaving exchange
risks uncovered may be desirable since shareholders are
interested ultimately in consumption and the consumption
opportunity set may be exposed to foreign exchange risks (see
Eaker [1981] and Feiger and Jacquillat [1981, pp 213-15]). This
suggestion may be seen in the context of the Stulz [1981] and
Breeden [1979] consumption based asset pricing models. 	 Eaker
[1981] suggests the use of a trade weighted index (Kouri and
Braga deMacedo [1978]) in adjusting foreign returns.	 Makin
[1981, p li1] argues against this position and maintains that:
"Since the optimal real bond differs for each investor with
different expenditure patterns, which themselves change
over time, management of real risks must be done at the
investor level...Information costs suggest that investors
may find it easier to diversify real risks on their own
while leaving the management of foreign exchange risk to
company managers."
In this section, it has been argued that there is a normative
case for corporate management of foreign exchange risk. In the
presence of an integrated perfect world capital market with no
information assymetries, conditions similar to the MM conditions
would hold and hedging would be irrelevant. However, in the
presence of market imperfections or information asymmetries,
there will be barriers to homemade hedging and corporate hedging
may be desirable.	 A number of imperfections were discussed,
including taxes, the presence of regulatory authorities and
bankruptcy costs, barriers to capital market entry, the
availability of internal hedging techniques and shareholder
information asymmetries. In the next section, foreign exchange
risk management is examined.
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II: Managing Foreign Exchange Risk
So far, it has been demonstrated that foreign exchange risk
exists and that exchange rate changes may affect the cash flows
of the firm.
	 It has also been shown that there is a normative
case for the management of foreign exchange risk. 	 In this
ection, the techniques which might be used to manage foreign
exchange risk are examined.	 The first part of this section
focuses on the techniques which may be applied to the management
of transaction exposures. 	 In the second part, the discussion is
expanded to the management of all the effects of exchange rate
changes on the cash flows of the firm.
II. A: The Management of Transaction Exposure
In chapter three, a transaction exposure was defined as a foreign
currency cash flow which has a regression coefficient of one with
the exchange rate, and the R-squared of the regression equation
is also one.
The management of transaction exposure is the area of foreign
exchange risk management which has received virtually all the
attention in the literature.	 By definition, it is much easier
to apply operations research models to a transaction exposure
than an economic exposure. 	 There are two types of technique
which may be used to manage transaction exposures. 	 One could
use financial Instruments to hedge the exposure (External/Market
Techniques), or alternatively, modify operational variables
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(Internal/Hierarchy Techniques) in order to prevent transaction
exposures from occurring in the first place. 	 The two types of
technique are discussed in the following paragraphs.
ILA.i: External Techniaues
There are two types of external or market based methods of
managing pure transaction exposures. 	 Firstly, one could
purchase forward contracts, so that the exposure was partially or
totally covered.	 Alternatively, one could use a combination of
spot and money market transactions to achieve the same result.
If interest rate parity holds, transaction costs are trivial and
taxes are symmetric, then the decision maker would be indifferent
when faced with a choice between the two techniques. 	 If these
conditions do not hold, then the decision maker must compute the
least cost method.	 Having evaluated the cost of hedging, the
decision maker need only decide on the appropriate level of
cover.	 Kohihagen [1978] developed a model for the selection of
the appropriate level of cover without exchange rate
expectations.	 Folks [1973] and Wheelwright [1975] have
suggested techniques that managers might use to determine the
appropriate level of cover, which incorporate the preferences of
the decision maker. 	 Babbel [1983] developes a model which
permits the incorporation of deviations from parity conditions.
His model is particularly interesting, since in ten of the
thirteen possibilities he examines, he finds that knowledge of
the decision maker's preferences is unnecessary, providing the
decision maker is risk averse. 	 Yang [198 14] developes a model of
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the value of a forward contract but assumes that international
parity holds, and his recommendations are based upon the zero
expected value fallacy. Finally, Eaker and Grant [985] use a
stochastic dynamic programming approach which decision makers
might use when forward contracts are unavailable for long term
maturities.
The management of pure transaction exposure using external
techniques would seem to be a relatively straightforward exercise
if parity conditions hold and it is sufficient to incorporate the
risk preferences of the decision maker. Unfortunately, there
are few normative solutions once one moves outside of this
framework.	 Indeed the very case for the management of foreign
exchange risk presupposes that there are imperfections and
frictions.	 If one is content with the normative case for
managing foreign exchange risk, then the measurement of the costs
and benefits of hedging should be evaluated from a shareholder's
point of view.	 Benefits will include the ability to take
advantage of size barriers and segementation in foreign exchange
markets, different tax regimes, decreases in bankruptcy costs and
the presence of information asymmetries. 	 The costs of hedging
are equally difficult to evaluate, given the presence of a biased
forward exchange rate.
II.A..ii: Internal Technicues
The MNC is also in a position to use 'internal' (Prindl £1976])
techniques to manage foreign exchange risk. 	 The techniques
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include netting, altering the currency of invoice (Schwab and
Lusztig (1978fl, leading and lagging, and altering the
denomination of working capital items in foreign subsidiaries.
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to suggest how the
costs of these techniques might be evaluated, since they may
include organisational implications in terms of performance
evaluation, and changes in the political risk profile of the MNC
due to the risk of offending host governments.
One might conclude that If the preferences of the shareholders
are shared by the decision maker and parity conditions prevail,
then the management of transaction exposure Is straightforward.
The decision becomes considerably more judgemental when one
considers the possibility of deviations from parity, since the
costs and benefits of hedging are more difficult to measure, and
there may be a case for the use of Internal techniques due to
frictions and imperfections in foreign exchange markets.
II.B: The Management of Eeonomi Exposure
Unlike examinations of the management of transaction exposure,
the management of economic exposure poses considerable problems,
since given the difficulties inherent In measuring economic
exposure, the possibility of Immunislng economic exposures is
unlIkely, and at best one can hope for partial hedges of economic
exposure.	 However, the recent advent of foreign currency
optIons permits immunisation of foreign currency cash flows which
are subject to a source of uncertainty which is binomlally
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distributed.	 The case of binomial uncertainty is examined in
section II.B.i, and all other types of economic exposure are
exaniined in section II.B.ii.
II.B.i: IIi. Management	 Economic ExDosure:	 Binomial Case
The binomial case is a relatively simple type of economic
exposure.	 A foreign currency cash flow would be included in
this case if it satisfied the following conditions:
i) The regression coefficient of the cash flow with the
exchange rate is one.
ii) The R-squared of' the regression equation is less than one.
iii) The residual uncertainty which is unexplained by the
regression equation is binomially distributed.
Any foreign cash currency cash flow which is coningent upon a
state variable which will be either realised or unrealised, may
be included in this category. 	 Examples would include bidding
on foreign currency denominated contracts, offers to purchase
foreign firms and orders from foreign customers where a letter of
credit had not been received. 	 The issue of foreign currency
price lists might also be included in situations where demand was
extremely price elastic.
The external techniques that might be used in the binomial case
include foreign currency options and forward contracts. 	 Eaker
and Grant [1985] use stochastic dynamic programming to examine
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the case of a foreign currency tender. 	 Their solution involves
the use of forward contracts and an assumption of' an unbiased
forward rate and quadratic utility.	 Using these assumptions,
they show that the amount which is covered in the forward market
will depend upon the probability of winning the contract.
	 An
alternative technique is the use of foreign currency options.
In this case, the Eaker and Grant [1985] solution becomes
redundant since the decision to use the hedging instrument will
be identical to the decision to use a forward contract in the
transaction exposure case, because the option permits the total
immunisation of the foreign exchange risk. It should also be
noted that a foreign currency option may be replicated using
forward contracts and delta hedging (see Giddy [1983] and Cooper
[1985]).
	
However, the delta hedging technique and the use of
options require a model of' option prices.
There are a variety of foreign currency option pricing models
which •are modifications of the Merton t1973J proportional
dividend option pricing model. Garnian and Kohlhagen [1983],
Biger and Hull [1983], Grabbe [1983] and Yang [1985] have
developed virtually Identical option pricing models for European
options. Gemmull [1985] suggests a binomial solution for the
pricing of American options. The main differences between these
models and the Black-Scholes model are threefold (Grabbe [1983]).
Firstly, there will be two interest rates in the equation, a home
and a foreign rate. Secondly, the Interest rate is assumed
stochastic since foreign exchange prices will covary with
interest rates, unlike stock prices, where the covariance may be
Qiapter 1: Page 125
immaterial.
	
Thirdly, American calls will strictly be worth more
than European calls.
As yet, there have been no tests of these models. Gemmill
[1985] examined some sterling-dollar options in April 1985 and
found that they were mispriced by between six and twelve per
cent.	 Bodurtha and Courtadon [1986] tested the efficiency of
the Philadelphia market and concluded that it was efficient.
The main barriers to the development of more accurate models of
foreign currency options are unlikely until the underlying
stochastic process generating exchange rate changes is
understood, and the nature of the relationship between the
forward rate and the realised spot rate is understood.
The availability of foreign currency options permits the
management of economic exposures which satisfy the conditions of
the binomial case. Giddy [1983] suggests that foreign currency
options might be used to protect the exposure arising from the
issue of a foreign currency price list.	 However, immunisation
of the risk will be impossible unless demand is extremely price
elastic.	 If demand is not price elastic, then the quantity to
be hedged will be contingent upon the expected vector of prices
and quantities. Unfortunately, the application of foreign
currency options to situations where the residual uncertainty of
the foreign currency cash flow is not binomially distributed have
not been examined in the literature. Moreover, apart from the
discussion of 'homemade options', , the use of internal techniques
to manage simple economic exposures has not been discussed in the
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literature.
II.B.ii .fl. Management	 Economic Extosure I]i. General Case
In this section, the management of economic exposure in cases
which do not satisfy the conditions of the binomial case are
examined.	 In order to facilitate the analysis, the Srinivasulu
[1983] and Hodder [1982] models are used to facilitate the
analysis.
Both the Srinivasulu [1983] and the Hodder [1982] analysis
assumed that the physical asset position of the firm was fixed
for the time period under consideration.
	 By default, the only
policy variable available to corporate management is manipulation
of financial variables to alter the exposure.	 This possibility
is discussed in section II.B.iil.
	 Alternatively, one may assuse
that the firm can exercise some control over its physical asset
position and thereby alter its exposure.	 This possibility will
be examined in section II.Biv.
II.B.iii: Financial Strate gies	 Economic Exosure Management
From the discussion in chapter three, it follows that the firm
could alter its exposure by altering the currency composition of
its liabilities.	 The approach presupposes that the deosion
maker can specify his preferences, and measure exposure by
specifying the covariance terms and the weightings.
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Both Srinivasulu [1983] and Hodder [1982], do not succeed in
linking their 'optimal' solutions to shareholder wealth. 	 This
may to some extent be explained by the difficulties involved in
specifying international asset pricing models.
If a managerial objective function can be specified, there are
still the difficulties of' measuring both the covariance terms and
the portfolio weights, and the establishment of the stability of
these terms.	 Later in this chapter, it is argued that these
problems may prove insurmountable. 	 However the difficulties are
self evident when one considers the measurement problems
discussed in chapter three.
If both of' these problems were overcome, the hedging decision is
relatively straightforward. 	 It was pointed out that the main
difference between a transaction exposure and an economic
exposure is that the amount which is exposed is stochastic.	 On
an expected value basis, the computation of' the proportion to be
hedged could be evaluated with a modified version of the Eaker
and Grant [1985] model.	 However, complete immunisation would be
impossible without a portfolio of foreign currency options.
This latter strate' could be potentially costly.
II.B.iv ODerational Strate gies	 Economic Exoosure Management
The firm should not be constrained to using purely financial
methods to alter its asset and liability structure.
	
Dufey
[197k] posed the question of:
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"Could we profitably exist as a purely financial
institution?"
He then argued that firms could alter real variables, in an
effort to manage economic exposure. Such an approach is
consistent with the advantages of firms lying in their
production, organisational, marketing and technical skills.
Within the approach taken in chapter three, this would imply
attempting to alter the covariance and variance terms in the
definition of exposure of terminal wealth.
	 The following
paragraphs discuss some of these covariance terms individually,
and the means by which they may be altered.
II.B.iv. 1: Diversifv1n Internationally
Eiteman and Stonehill [1986, p201] argue that by diversifying
internationally, the firm has more flexibility to react to
exchange rate disequilibria.	 This however is also suggested as
a panacaea for other International business risks.
International diversi fi cation may involve prohibitive transaction
costs if it Is used purely as a technique to decrease economic
exposure.	 However, Investment and disinvestment are obvious
techniques for altering the weightings of the Srinivasulu [1983]
exposure equations.
II.B.iv.2: Altering .th.. Structure	 Firm's Ooerations
This approach Is advocated by Shapiro [1986, chap.9] and Cornell
and Shapiro [1983] and represents an elaboration of the Dufey
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[197 Z ] argument.	 Shapiro [1986, p2k5] proposes that there are a
number of 'pre-active strategies' which may be undertaken by the
production and marketing functions. Among the marketing options
available to the firm (Shapiro [1982, cha p.9], Shapiro and
Robertson £1976]) are:
1) Market selection and segmentation: This involves selecting
the markets within which to sell products, and the resources
to be devoted to the marketing effort in each market.
Market segmentation may also be relevant, since exchange
rate changes may have real income effects. Markets which
are segmented by their income elasticity of demand might be
significant. This opportunity assumes that preferences are
non identical and non homothetic. 	 This strategy, is
however a longer run option and would only be influenced by
exchange risk considerations if disequilibria were expected
to be persistent.
2) Pricing strategy: The ability of the firm to adjust its
prices to the effects of inflation and devaluation, was
highlighted as a key variable affecting profitability in
chapter three. The price sensitivity of the markets in
which the firm operates or the price elasticity of demand is
crucial in determining optimal strategies, should the firm
attempt to maximise profit. In addition, economic exposure
may affect strategies such as vintage pricing, market
penetration and price discrimination.
	 Finally, real income
effects may also affect such strategies.	 The origin of
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competitors is also likely to be important, since it will
determine their economic exposure. 	 This could in turn be
linked to a prediction of their likely reaction in the wake
of exchange rate changes.
3) Promotional strategy: Since economic exposure affects other
marketing variables, promotional strategy may also be
affected, because it will reinforce both pricing and market
selection strategies.
4) Product strategy: Because monetary factors and product
markets are to some extent interdependent, economic exposure
may alter optimal product introduction and deletion
decisions, such as the timing of such events.
Apart from economic exposure initiatives in the marketing
function, the production function may also react (Shapiro [1986,
chap
.9]).	 Such initiatives might include:
1)	 Product sourcing and input mix decisions: In chapter 3 it
was indicated that economic exposure could be reduced if the
firm were able to alter its sourcing of inputs and final
products in the light of monetary disturbances.
	 In
addition, the scope of' foreign competition in the local
market and its origin was mentioned in chapter 3. Plant
profitability could be enhanced if the firm can take
advantage of deviations from the law of one price.	 Such a
policy may be impossible, due to transport costs, or
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constrained by local sourcing as a prerequisite for quality
control.
2)	 Plant location: Shapiro [1986, pp.255-6] and Srinivasu].0
[1981] cite some anecdotal evidence of plant location
decision which were motivated by economic exposure
considerations.
In order to implement these strategies, Shapiro [1986, pp.256-7]
suggests planning as the key.	 The evidence	 presented in
chapter 2 Indicates that currency forecasting is a haphazard
task. The alternative is the creation of scenarios under the
most likely exchange rate changes and their effects on the firm's
operations.	 This would permit analysis of the firm's
competitive position under alternative scenarios.
	 Given this
information, it is simply a case of designing contingency plans
to deal with actual exchange rate changes as they occur.
In a similar vein,	 Naumanri-Etienne [1977] used a simulation
model to examine how firms could manage economic exposure.
	 He
concluded that management of' economic exposure would require:
1) Knowledge of the sourcing and sales characteristics of the
operation.
2) The ability to analyse the effect of unanticipated exchange
rate changes on future cash flows.
3) The ability to take anticipatory action.
iapter 1: Page 132
Finally, the Eitemari and Stonehill [1983, p 195] argument for
flexibility is relevant, since this policy would enhance the
ability of the MNC to take anticipatory action and execute
contingent plans.
II.B.iv.R: 
.fli. Portfolio	 Currencies
The counter intuitive results of open positions in currencies
being superior to fully hedged positions was discussed in chapter
3.	 This section will be limited to the discussion of the
portfolio effects on monetary assets and liabilities.
	 The
portfolio method is equally applicable to physical assets
however, given both the stickiness and incompleteness of physical
asset markets, it is unlikely that one could predict the impact
of foreign currency covariances on physical asset prices.
	 The
portfolio of currencies concept is also of relevance to the
discussion of transaction exposure, since if there is a stable
covariance, the naive hedging decision will be sub optimal (see
Makin [1978] and Gull [1976].	 Walther [1983] has tested this
possibility and found that if one sought to minimise risk, a
naive hedging model was superior to a portfolio model.
	 It is
however an open issue as to whether there are stable covariances
between currencies, and if so, how it relates to both market
efficiency and the observed distribution of exchange rate
changes.
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II.C: Summary and Conclusions
In this section, the techniques that may be used for managing
transaction and economic exposure were examined. 	 If markets are
frictionless, the preferences of the decision maker known and
stochastic exposures capable of measurement, then there are a
number of financial instruments which may be used to manage
foreign exchange risk.	 If financial markets are not
frictionless, then there may be a case for the use of internal
techniques rather than external market based techniques. 	 It was
also pointed out that in many cases the hedging decision is
probably one which requires the use of judgement rather than
operations research techniques. 	 In the next section theories of
internal organisation are examined, and in the final section, the
implications of' a theory of internal organisation for foreign
exchange risk management are examined.
III: Theories of Internal Organisation
This section reviews the issue of the internal organisation of
the firm.	 It is relevant to the discussion, since it may place
constraints on the ability of the firm to manage exposure to
foreign exchange risk.	 In the preceding sections, the firm was
treated as a black box, where there was a single preference
function which could be applied to a measure of exposure, and
'optimal' hedging decisions could be made.	 In this section,
the internal workings of the black box are examined using markets
and hierarchies theory (Williamson [1975]).
	
It was considered
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Thiessen [1983], Spicer and Ballew [1982]) and as an explanation
of' the history of cost accounting (Johnson [1983a,b, 1980]).
Cooper [1983], using the Burrell and Morgan [1979] classification
scheme, argues that as a framework for management accounting, it
fails to take account of more radical social science approaches.
Flamholtz [1983] argues that the value of the framework as a
historical explanation may be limited by the historical facts
selected, while Crawford [198k] has used an alternative framework
to examine the development of management accounting.
III.B: Intellectual Pedigree
If the manager of' an MNC had unlimited and costless information,
unlimited computational ability and unlimited time at his
disposal, the foreign exchange risk problem would be
significantly easier to solve, since one could follow a method
similar to that of' Srinivasulu (19833 and suggested by Shapiro
[1982], and select the optimum risk return profile.
Alternatively, he could select an optimal strate and hedge in
financial markets. 	 This approach may be described as a 'global
rationality' perspective. 	 'Bounded rationality' is behaviour
which is (Simon [1961 p.xxiv]):
"Intendedly rational, but only limitedly so."
A useful analogy is the game of chess.	 If' one could compute a
complete decision tree, (i.e. global rationality), winning would
be easy, but nobody would play. It is a game, because people
play in an adaptive sequential way, and examine limited sets of'
alternatives, playing at most a few moves ahead. (see Simon
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[1972, p166], VonNeumann and Morgenstern [1953, p125]).
Alternatively, it might be compared to finding one's way in a
fog, where one can see only a few yards ahead. It also follows
that some environments are foggier than others and that the
ability to see any distance in the fog may vary across
individuals.
If there were a complete set of' contingent claims markets,
computational complexity would no longer be a problem, since one
would have the computations available in market prices
(Williamson [1975, pp .22-23]).
	
Furthermore, limits on language
lead to inabilities to communicate task specific information,
which in turn leads to learning (March and Simon (1958, chap.6],
Simon [1972]). Again, if complete markets existed, this might
be overcome, since the information could be traded.
Assuming that the bounded rationality constraint is binding,
uncertainty exists, and there are an incomplete set of markets to
deal with uncertainty, a rationale for internal organisation
begins to emerge. However, these conditions do not provide a
reason for not resorting to markets to rent some computational
skills. Williamson [1975, chap.2] argues that market mediation
may be more costly, if' there are small numbers and the
possibility of opportunism. The small numbers situation is self
evident, since it is similar to the bilateral monopoly situations
in introductory textbooks. If the small numbers situation is
combined with opportunistic inclinations, hierarchies may be more
economical, since they may lower bargaining and maladaptation
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costs.
Opportunism [Williamson 1975, p26] arises from individuals being
guided by self interest with the addition of "guile" or strategic
behaviour.
	
Williamson [op.cit.] argues that this may lead to:
"... selective or distorted information disclosure [and]
self disbelieved promises regarding future conduct."
These are the four sufficient conditions for the phenomenon of
'information impactedness'. Given information impactedness,
transaction costs arise in market transactions, and it may be
possible to lower transaction costs by mediating transactions
through heirarchies.
This central. role accorded to transaction costs has antecedents
in the work of Commons [19311], Coase [1937] and Hayek [19115].
Williamson [1975, p2] argues that:
"...transactional considerations, not technology, are
typically decisive it deterii '.ihicb oie of
organisation will obtain in what circumstances and why."
This casts his approach in contrast to approaches which consider
technology as the most important influence on modes of
organisation (see Chandler [1977], Chandler and Daems [1980],
Porter and Livesay [1977], Moss [1981, chaps. 6 and 7],
Williamson [1980]). Furthermore the application of' the
framework outside of the U.S. may be doubtful, given the
different development of divislonalised companies in the U.K. and
Europe (Franko [19711], Hannah [1981])
Apart from the four conditions outlined above, Williamson [1975,
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pp .37-38] also admits that 'atmosphere' arises. This author
argues that it is the omission of this cotcept from the main body
of the theory which gives rise to differences between the
economic approach to internal organisation and sociological views
of the organisation.	 Williamson [1975, p38] admits that:
"The standard economic model...assumes that individuals
regard transactions in a strictly neutral, instrumental
way."
Williamson [1975, p p.38-9] then examines the possibility that
internal modes of transacting may contribute to quasimoral
involvements among the parties.	 Thereafter, the subject
receives virtually no mention until the concluding chapter. 	 An
interesting example of the issue of non neutral transactions in
other approaches to the organisation is illustrated by the
'socio-technical' systems approach. Emery and Trist [1960]
stress ideas such as 'belongingness' within a social system as
crucial to task performance. Empirical support and further
interpretations of this approach may be found in Miller [1975],
Rice [1953] and Trist and Bamforth [1951].
Such approaches may not augur well for studying the applicability
of markets and hierarchies theory to the study of behaviour
within organisations, however Williamson and Ouchi [1981]
introduce the possibility of 'soft' (social) contracting within
heirarchies as an alternative to 'hard' (economic) contracting.
The issue of power is however dismissed.
"...power considerations will usually give way to
efficiency - at least in profit making enterprises, if'
observations are taken at sufficiently long intervals, say
a decade."
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They then argue that:
"...power explains results when the organisation sacrifices
efficiency to serve special interests, we concede that this
occurs. But we do not believe that major organisational
changes in the commercial sector are explained in these
terms.	 The evidence is all to the contrary."
For some arguments from a sociological and organisational theory
point of view which deal with the issues of power and atmosphere,
see Bauer and Cohen [1983], Francis [1983], Turk [1983] and
Willman [1983].
Contingency theories of organisation design are to some extent
similar.	 For example, Gaibraith [1973, 1977] relies on an
information processing approach to organisational design, while
Lorsch and Allen [1973] rely on the ideas of diversity and
interdependence.	 Both the contingency and the markets and
hierarchies approaches do share common ground, since they stress
the ideas of efficiency and effectiveness.
Pfeffer [1978] suggests that an alternative approach may be
discerned which he refers to as the power based approach.
Within this approach, he top.cit. p.xv] includes the work of
Cyert and March [1963], Weick [1969] and March and Olsen [1976].
He argues that these approaches are concerned with control, power
and influence rather than efficiency and effectiveness.
Swieringa and Waterhouse [1982] argue that all these approaches
are complementary, and that together permit a broader perspective
of organisational problems. They attempt to deduce the role of
management accounting in each situation.
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The traditional or neo classical model assumes that there is a
single rational choice and a single rational decision maker.
In addition, there is an idea of a 'correct' choice and
management accounting produces information on the consequences of
each alternative to permit such a choice.
The Cyert and March [1963] behavioural model allows estimates of
future costs to be discredited or embraced as aids to
negotiation.	 This is similar to Hopwood's [1980] idea of
accounting as an 'ammunition machine' where there is relative
certainty about the consequences, but relative uncertainty about
the objectives.
The Cohen and March [197 I ] 'garbage can model' would allow
management accounting to receive varying ammounts of attention in
the process of producing decisions from the can of problems and
solutions.
The Weick [1969] organislng model would imply management
accounting facilitating the process of enacting, selecting, and
retaining aspects of the environment. 	 This situation is
similar to Hopwood's [1980] 'rationalisation machine'.
The Williamson [1975] model might use accounting information to
promote cooperative behaviour and to maintain perceptions of
equity in the distribution of rewards.
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Having examined the prior applications of markets and hierarchies
theory, and its place among alternative theories of' organisation
design, its implications for internal organisation are examined
in the following section.
III.C: Markets and Hierarchies: Implications for Internal
Organi satlon
Williamson [1975,1970] studies the existence of the
divisionalised or M-form firm.	 Due to the conditions of
information impactedness and capital market imperfections, the M-
form firm may be a superior transaction mode.	 This is reflected
in Williamson [1975 p136] where he maintains that the M-form firm
has:
"...mitigated capital market failures by transferring
functions traditionally imputed to the capital market to
the firm instead."
From a regulatory point of view, the approach may be seen as mid
way between the Mont Perlon type view of Friedman C 1 g62l and the
other extreme of Berle and Means [1968], Galbraith [1952,1967]
and Ackerman [1973].
The representation of the large firm as a miniature capital
market is however intriguing. It leads to the following
representation of the internal organisation of the firm
(Williamson [1970, pp.138-150, 176-77], cited in Williamson
[1975, p137]):
"1.The responsibility for operating decisions is assigned to
[essentially self contained] operating divisions or quasi
firms.
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2.The elite staff attached to the general office performs
both advisory and audit functions. Both have the effect
of securing greater control over operating division
behaviour.
3.The general office is principally concerned with
strategic decisions, involving planning, appraisal and
control, including the allocation of resources among the
[competing] operating divisions.
k.The separation of the general office from operations
provides general office executives with the psychological
commitment to be concerned with the overall performance
of the organisation.
5.The resulting structure displays both rationality and
synergy: the whole is greater [more effective, more
efficient] than the sum of the parts."
The following sections discuss these issues In turn.
1II.C.i: Oeratin Divisions 	 Autonomy
Operating decisions are contextually specific. Mintzberg [1978,
p60] points out that a new product decision In a brewery might be
considered strategic, whereas in a toy factory It might be
considered operational. 	 Another example might be the pricing
decision In a ship yard and in a restaurant.
Self contained units pose problems, since they depend on the
nature of product and factor market interdependencles and may
therefore be firm specific (Williamson and Bhargarva, [1973]).
This In turn might suggest that the presence of interdivisional
dependencies may be a concern of the general management, since
they will require coordination. This might explain for example
the presence of centralised transaction exposure management in
some MNCs.	 It might also lead to different coordinative
mechanisms in vertically and horizontally diversified firms.
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Indeed, this line of reasoning has been pursued by contingency
theorists.	 Lorsch and Allen [1973] argue that co-ordinative
mechanisms will be necessary as diversity and interdepence
increase. In addition, the Information Processing approach of
Galbraith [1973,1977] implies that diversity and interdependence
would lead to a need to increase the information processing
capacity of the firm.	 Demands on information processing
capacity may be satisfied by:
1. doing nothing or allowing slack
2. creating vertical information channels
3. creating horizontal information channels
11.	 creating independent units, to minimise interdependence
5.	 strategic choice; modify the demands for capacity
The creation of independent units is only one possible option
within this framework however, divislonalised firms are the only
form of organisation in Williamson [1975].	 From the point of
view of contingency theory, the M-Forin represents only one type
of contingent form.
In conclusion, specific operating decisions are contextually
specific; the divisionalised organisation (creation of autonomous
units) is only one type of organisational form; the creation of'
autonomous units is less likely to be effective and efficient if
there are substantial interdependencies between units.
III.C.ii: Management Control	 Audit
Within markets and hierarchies theory, management control is
perceived as the ability to extract information from
subsidiaries, perform internal audits, monitor in an advisory
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capacity and the ability to produce superior incentive schemes.
The Internal capital market is superior since shareholders,
particularly if they are widely dispersed, are unlikely to be
able to carry out these tasks.
III.C.iii: Planninz. Annraisal	 Resource Allocation
Resource allocation and planning may pose a problem since
decentralisation may be undertaken in order to take advantage of
local information. This in turn creates information asymmetries
in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. 	 The existence of
opportunism may lead to the distortion and manipulation of
information flows to headquarters in order to impede the resource
allocation process.
	 A number of formal models have been devised
to overcome this problem, which attempt to manipulate the
incentive scheme to induce truthful revelation of forecasts
(Groves [1973], Groves and Loeb [1979], Weitzman [1976,1980],
Gonik [1978]).
	
Unfortunately, these models are single period
and therefore, In order to be implemented, must assume that the
agent is bounded rational to the extent of seeing only one period
ahead.
III.C.iv:	 Orientation	 Headcuarters
This claim is broadly in line with Allen's [1970, pp22-23]
remarks on the headquarter's of conglomerate firms.
"...corporate and divisional executives focused their
attention on different segments of their firms' task
environments. Corporate contacts with external groups and
organisations centered mainly around stockholders, the
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financial community, potential merger candidates, and
governmental agencies. By way of contrast, top level
divisional personnel were concerned mainly with the external
groups which affected their ability to develop, sell and
produce goods and services in their particular industries."
Lorsch and Allen [1973, p23] also found that headquarters were
less formally organised than divisions, placed greater emphasis
on financial goals and exhibited a longer time perspective.
Lorsch and Allen [1973 p1 1 8] examined differences between four
conglomerate firms and two vertically integrated firms. They
found that the size of headquarters staff was significantly
greater in the vertically integrated firms, and that the HQ
controlled functions such as purchasing, marketing, and the
planning and scheduling of output.
IV: Internal Organisatlon and Exposure Management.
In previous sections, it was argued that foreign exchange risk
should be managed by firms.	 It was shown in chapter three that
exchange risk consisted of a variety of covariance terms.
	 In
this chapter, exposure was classified as being either of two
types, economic exposure or transaction exposure.
	 In this
section, the implications of a theory of internal organisation
are examined.
Bounded rationality implies that individuals have limits to both
their computational ability and language. 	 This constraint may
be overcome if there is a complete set of contingent claims
markets.	 For example, if contingent claims markets were
frictionless and complete, foreign exchange risk management would
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be relatively straightforward. It would simply require the
identification of cash flow streams which were exposed to foreign
exchange risk and the choice of the appropriate contingent claim
to achieve a risk free position. 	 As such, the only difficulty
within a hierarchy would be ensuring that the risk preferences of
shareholders were reflected in the decision. However,
shareholders might prefer to know that all risks were covered so
that they could achieve their own desired exposure to foreign
exchange risk. Alternatively, compensation and audit schemes
could be created within the hierarchy to ensure that a certain
set of preferences was reflected in hedging decisions. 	 However,
total immunisatlon from exchange risk would be possible.
On the other hand, if markets are incomplete (limited to options
and forward contracts), then risks will have to be immunised
using internal techniques.	 Moreover, obtaining solutions
similar to that of Srinivasulu [1983] will be Impossible since
the bounded rationality constraint will be binding. Frictions
In contingent claims markets will also lead to the consideration
of Internal techniques.
If internal techniques are used, a number of difficulties may
arise. Firstly, in order to take advantage of the covarlance
terms postulated by Srinivasulu [1983], It will be necessary to
centralise the management of foreign exchange risk. This need
will arise since transacting In external markets will either be
Impossible (due to the lack of sophisticated contingent claims
contracts) or costly (due to the existence of frictions In
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contingent claims markets). Secondly, centralisation will be a
costly exercise because of communication and language
difficulties, and the potential threat to operating unit
autonomy.	 Language and communication difficulties arise because
a transaction exposure requires only the communication of three
parameters, an amount, a date and a currency.
	 An economic
exposure which satisfies the conditions of the binomial case
requires communication of the three transaction exposure
parameters and a probability parameter for the binomially
distributed contingent variable.
	 An economic exposure requires
the same information set, except that a probability density
function will need to be specified along with the possible
multiperiod interrelationships of cash flows and exchange rate
changes. Therefore, economic exposure will be more expensive to
centralise than transaction exposure. Moreover, autonomy will
be interfered with when internal techniques are used, since
optimal action from a subsidiary point of view may be sub-optimal
from a HQ point of view, due to the existence of covariance
terms. Moreover, many of the internal techniques, in particular
pre-active strategies, require that the HQ become involved in
operational decision making.
V: Concluslon3
This chapter began by attempting to show that there was a
normative case for managing foreign exchange risk. The
discussion was carried on within the framework of the shareholder
wealth maximisation paradigm.	 It was argued that the case
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rested on the existence of barriers to homemade hedging which
arose from the presence of size related transaction costs,
bankruptcy costs, taxes and information asymmetries.
Some of the techniques which may be used to manage foreign
exchange risk were examined. They were classified as being
either external/market based techniques or internal/hierarchy
based techniques.	 It was then argued that if contingent claims
markets were frictionless and complete, there would be little
incentive to use internal techniques. Internal techniques are
most useful in cases where either transactions costs are high or
there are incomplete contingent claims markets.
Theories of internal organisation were reviewed, and Williamson's
[1975] markets and hierarchies theory was invoked as a useful
heuristic device. The implications of the theory are clear.
If contingent claims markets are Incomplete, the bounded
rationality constraint becomes binding.	 In order to take
advantage of exchange risk covariance terms, centralisation of
foreign exchange risk management is desirable.	 However, there
may be barriers or costs to centralisation, including the costs
of communicating complex data sets (Including probability density
functions) within the organisation, and the possibility that many
Internal techniques may interfere with operating unit autonomy.
This In turn may lead to the centralisation of subsets of foreign
exchange risk, which are relatively cheap to centralise.	 For
example, pure transaction exposures require the least
quantity of communication and are capable of neutrallsatlon In
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contingent claims markets.
In the next chapter, a research methodology is proposed to
examine the management of foreign exchange risk in UK MNCs, which
takes into account the observations in this chapter on internal
organisational considerations.
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RAPTER FIVE
RFEAR METhODOLOGY
In the previous three chapters, the existing literature on
foreign exchange risk and its management was reviewed. 	 On the
basis of the review, a research methodology is suggested in this
chapter which permits the examination of foreign exchange risk
management in practice.	 The purpose of the examination is to
provide data which will be useful in the explanation of foreign
exchange risk management in practice, which in turn may be used
to suggest how the practice of foreign exchange risk management
a.
may be improved.
In the first section of the chapter some stylised facts based on
the analysis in the previous chapter are summarised.	 The role
of the stylised facts is to act as a benchmark for the evaluation
of previous studies of foreign exchange risk management which are
surveyed in the second section of the chapter.
	 In the third
section, the research methodology used in this study Is examined1
and the limitations of the methodology are highlighted. 	 The
actual data collection process and methods used are summarised in
section four.
	 Finally, the data analysis and the presentation
of results are described in section five.
I: Stylised Facts
The basic thrust of this section is that studies which focus on
the foreign exchange risk management role of HQ treasurers are
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unlikely to reveal how exposures other than transaction exposures
are managed.	 Therefore, studies which have examined the HQ
treasury role alone have examined subsets of the foreign exchange
risk management task.
Firstly, it was argued in the previous chapter that pure
transaction exposures may be the only exposures which are capable
of centralisation, due to the costs of communicating and
aggregating the parameters of economic and contingent transaction
exposures.	 Moreover, given that contingent claims markets are
incomplete, the use of internal techniques will be necessary.
However, the use of internal techniques, for example pre-active
strategies, will require HQ knowledge of, and HQ interference In
operational decision making. 	 This latter observation Is
inconsistent with the philosophy of the M-Form organisatlon.
Secondly, given the possibility that economic exposures are most
likely to be Internalised at a subsidiary level (due to
communication and aggregation costs), observation at a subsidiary
level will be necessary In order to understand the management of
economic exposure.
Thirdly, the majority of previous normative research has focused
on the management of transaction exposure, in particular, the use
of relevant external techniques.	 Very few techniques have been
suggested which might be helpful in the management of economic
exposure.	 Srinivasulu [1983] and Hodder [19] focus on the use
of external techniques, while Shapiro [1986, chap.9] suggests the
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use of internal techniques.	 However, the prescription of pre-
active strategies is based upon introspection rather than
observation.	 It is impossible to know whether the list of pre-
active strategies is complete, and whether techniques other than
pre-active strategies are available.
Therefore, in order to further knowledge of the management of
foreign exchange risk beyond the management of readily
centralisable pure transaction exposures, it would be desirable
that research methods incorporate the insights from the
discussion of internal organisational considerations in the
previous chapter.
II: Previou3 Investigations
This section examines previous attempts at describing foreign
exchange risk management in practice. The aim of this section
is to highlight the uniqueness of the approach being used by this
author, as all as some of the onsiderattos
the design of an appropriate research method.
The empirical investigation of foreign exchange risk management
consists of three tasks. The observation of foreign exchange
exposures, the observation of subsequent management action and
the explanation of the observed management action. In the
following paragraphs, previous attempts to investigate foreign
exchange risk management are examined and evaluated in terms of
their success or otherwise in completing these three tasks.
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II.A: Research Methods in Previous Investigations
'True' experiments (Campbell and Stanley [1963]) have not been
used to examine foreign exchange risk management due to the
nature of exchange rate changes and the prohibitive costs of
manipulating them as an independent variable. 	 Naujnann-Etienne
[1977] has used a simulation technique to study corporate
exposure to exchange risk and his findings were summarised in
chapter four.	 The study is however notable, since economic
rather than transaction exposure was examined in the model.
A quasi experimental design was used by Rodriguez [1980] to infer
the risk attitudes of HQ treasury managers. 	 She found that the
observed management action depended on the forecasted direction
of the exposure.	 Her research design was based upon accounting
infomation on working capita]. balances by currency to infer both
the actual exposures and the subsequent management action.
While the design was most appropriate for the study of pure
transaction exposures, it is unlikely to be appropriate for the
study of economic exposure. 	 This latter difficulty arises,
since it is unlikely that economic exposures could be measured in
an objective manner, and management action will be more difficult
to observe.
Apart from the Rodriguez [1980] study, all other published
studies of foreign exchange risk management have used opinion
research of one sort or another, since they depended on obtaining
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the views of what treasurers or other organisational actors said
they did. .'However, the opinion studies have varied considerably
in their approaches, ranging from large sample mail quetionnaires
to multiple interviews in a few companies.
The large scale mail studies have proved particularly popular
among US researchers.	 The studies include Evans et al. [1978],
Jilling [1978], Doukas [198 14]. 	 Survey instruments were
addressed to the treasurers of US MNCs and were motivated
primarily by the impact of US accounting regulations on treasury
practices.	 Bun et al. [1981] and Soenen et al. [1985] surveyed
treasurers and examined the management of transaction exposures.'
Interviews have been used by Collier and Davis [1985], Earl
[19814] and Tran [1980].
	
While the Collier and Davis [1985]
study focused explicitly on HQ treasurers' attitudes toward
foreign exchange risks arising from transaction exposures, the
Earl [19814] study included interviews with divisional personnel,
and resulted in the development of a stage model of foreign
exchange risk management.
Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned studies shed any light
whatsoever on the management of contingent exposures.	 Even In
the Earl [19811] stage model, the fourth stage of managing
economic exposure Is purely speculative, and not based upon the
practices that were actually observed. Indeed the only study
which does examine economic exposure is Hague et al. [19714].
Hague et al. examined the impact of the 1967 Sterling devaluation
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on a small sample of firms in order to ascertain the price and
quantity effects of devaluation. It is notable that the study
focused upon operational rather than financial personnel,
however, the results of the study are only of tangential
relevance to this study.
II.B: Methodological Limitations of Previous Investigations
Apart from the fact that previous investigations have focused
upon the management of transaction exposures at a HQ level, there
are also a number of limitations associated with the research
methods used in previous studies.	 These limitations arise from
the use of accounts of action, and the difficulties inherent in
the use of survey instruments.
II.B.i: .fl.	 Accounts	 Action
None of the studies reviewed by this author directly observed
foreign exchange risk management. 	 They all relied on accounts
of action, rather than the observation of action. It is quite
possible that accounts of action and action may be different.
Unfortunately, the observation of foreign exchange risk
management is equally problematic. 	 Foreign exchange rate
changes are uncertain and it would be impossible to plan a
research project which could rely upon sufficient exchange rate
variability to permit observation of action in periods of less
than a few years. Moreover, MNCs are by definition large and
geographically dispersed; the probability of an exchange rate
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change affecting more than one part of the orgariisation is high,
and observation would be impossible without a large research
team. Indeed these conjectures may go some way toward explaing
the dearth of studies based upon observation.
The Rodriguez [1980] study neatly circumvents these difficulties
by using archival data which permits the observation of both
exposures and their subsequent management.	 Unfortunately, as
pointed out earlier, such data are unlikely to be available for
economic exposures.
All of the other studies surveyed relied upon participants'
accounts of foreign exchange risk management, although they did
differ in their degree of detail and structure. Diesing [1971,
p5] stresses that survey and fieldwork are two ends of a spectrum
rather than distinct kinds of' method. This concept of a
spectrum might result in work such as Earl [198 1 ] being placed
toward the fieldwork side, and mail surveys (e.g. Evans et al.
[19781 being placed close to the other end of' the spectrum.
Sudman and Bradburn [1982, chap.1] argue that survey reponses are
in principle verifiable, but that reponse errors may arise due to
memory, motivation, communication and knowledge. The
possibility of response errors may be important when the results
of studies which surveyed management responses to FAS8 are
examined, since there may have been incentives for managers to
exaggerate the detrimental effects of' FAS8.
The main shortcoming of the survey method is its failure to
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assist in explaining the perceived practices. The mail
questionnaire may be admirably suited to the enumeration of' the
foreign exchange risk management techniques at I-IQs, although none
of the surveys have explained why enumerated techniques are used
or chosen. Indeed, explanation is entirely absent, and the
discussion of sample characteristics is invoked to demonstrate
the representativeness of the sample, and then swiftly discarded.
The Earl [198 1 ] study lies toward the field-work end of the
spectrum.	 He uses a stage model to explain the observed
practices. His study is somewhat restricted, since it relies
upon the participant's explanations of changes in three UK MNCs.
There is a degree of triangulation in his study, since multiple
interviews were used, but it is impossible to know the extent to
which his results were biased by the existence of ex post
rationalisatlons of the ways in which practices responded to
certain external events. 	 Furthermore, ex post rationalisations
may be confounded by the participants' memories or lack of
knowledge of the events. Unfortunately, the study of foreign
exchange risk management, due to the aforementioned barriers to
direct observation, are going to be inevitably based upon ex post
rationalisations rather than ex ante or during-the-event
ratlonalisations.
II.B.il: Limitations	 Survey Instruments
The biases inherent in the design of survey instruments have been
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examined by Cronbach [19 1 6].	 Many of his criticisms are
particularly relevant to mail questionnaires, but also apply to a
lesser extent to structured and semi structured interviews.
Firstly, the researcher defines the questions.	 In an area such
as foreign exchange risk management, a researcher immersed in the
normative foreign exchange risk management literature would be
most likely to focus upon questions relating to pure transaction
exposures.	 This would arise since very little is known about
the management of economic exposure, and it is very difficult to
know what questions should be asked.	 This difficulty is
compounded by the firm specific nature of economic exposure.
Finally, the terminology and discourse of economic exposure Is
not codified.	 Researchers differ In their interpretations of
economic exposure, and it Is unlikely that unambiguous questions
could be posed.	 As such, there Is an extremely high probability
of semantic misinterpretation of terminology.
Secondly, the researcher defines the available response set.
Given the relatively unedifying state of normative research on
the management of economic exposure, the reponse sets are likely
to be relatively small.	 Moreover, the presentation of a
response set based upon prior normative research will not reveal
Innovative management techniques In the empirical domain.
	 A
defined reponse set Is likely to hamper progress in an area of
study which Is by nature primarily Inductive rather than
deductive.
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Thirdly, survey instruments are invariably sent to HQ treasury
staff. It is highly unlikely that such studies will reveal
anything other than the management of exposures which are capable
of centralisation. This may be particularly disturbing for UK
MNCs, since a recent study by Collier and Davis [1985] revealed
that the majority of UK MNCs do not manage the pure transaction
exposures of their overseas subsidiaries at the HQ.	 The
implications of this result are examined more closely in chapter
six.
In conclusion, despite the dearth of prior research on what MNCs
actually do, the majority of studies have utilised highly
structured survey instruments. Inevitably, such surveys will
tend to reinforce models that are currently advocated in the
normative foreign exchange risk management literature and
vindicate the preconceptions of the researcher. Such surveys
are unlikely to provide insights on the other factors which may
be Important in the management of foreign exchange risk, or
permit the development of descriptive theories of foreign
exchange risk management.
III: Research Methods in thi$ Study
In the following chapters, the results of an investigation of
foreign exchange risk management in UK MNCs by this author are
examined.	 The aim of this section is to summarise the actual
research methodology used, along with its advantages and
limitations.	 In particular, it will be argued, that apart from
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providing a cost effective technique for replicating the results
of other UK studies, the methods also permit the examination of
the aspects of foreign exchange risk management which are
decentralised.
The main justification for the study Is pragmatic.	 No attempt
is made to justify the method by reference to either
epistemological or ontological criteria, since it is the opinion
of this author that they represent metaphysical criteria, rather
than provide descriptions of what researchers do. The choice of
ontology has been to some extent side-stepped by adopting a
research method which may accommodate either an objective or a
relatively interpretive view of reality. However, an empiricist
stance has been adopted which implies that this author considers
empiricism desirable. Moreover, the research approach is
explicitly managerial in ideology and a functionalist theory
(Markets and Hierarchies Theory) was adopted as a heuristic
device in the previous chapter.
The study is primarily inductive since it is concerned with the
development of' a descriptive theory of foreign exchange risk
management.	 From the point of view of the previous paragraph,
it follows that this author believes that there are commonalities
in the foreign exchange risk management practices of MNCs.
These preconceptions have been stated explicitly since an
inductive technique which is not subject to preconceptions of one
sort or another is probably an unattainable goal. However, the
adopted research methods are consistent with alternative sets of
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preconceptions, and hence permit the alteration of preconceptions
during the course of the study. Such an approach may be
considered more desirable than an approach which does not permit
the modification of preconceptions. The remainder of this
section examines the research design and methods used in this
study.
III.A: Research Design
The aim of the research design is to produce a richer description
of foreign exchange risk management in practice. It is
suggested that the availability of richer descriptive data is
more likely to permit the development of descriptive and
explanatory theories of' foreign exchange risk management. Three
types of theory may be envisaged.	 Firstly, it is possible that
all MNCs with the same type of exposure use the same management
strategies and techniques. Such a finding would be consistent
with the view that foreign exchange risk management is determined
primarily by the nature of' the exposure.	 It is equally likely
that firms with the same types of exposure pursue entirely
different strategies. 	 Such a finding could be consistent with
either a contingency theory formulation or alternatively, the
Interaction of organisational actors and their interpretations
and definitions of the situation. A final alternative might be
a professlonalisation approach to actual practices, where
practices are the outcome of' power and disciplinary struggles
within organisatlons. In the following paragraphs, the basic
research design which will be used to provide descriptions of
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practice is summarised.	 The issue of theory development is then
examined.
Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out that if foreign
exchange risk management is dispersed throughout the MNC, then
there may be considerable problems in describing foreign
exchange risk management using anything other than structured
survey methods, due to the enormous size and geographical
dispersion of the MNC. If structured survey methods are
inappropriate, then there are only two alternatives available.
One possibility would be to observe foreign exchange risk
management throughout a MNC.
	 The main barrier to such an
approach would be the costs of travelling throughout the world to
visit foreign subsidiaries.	 An alternative approach would be to
study a cross section of subsidiaries in a single country.	 This
latter approach has been chosen in this study.
The next step was the choice of an appropriate definition of an
MNC. The Stopford [1982] definition of an MNC was chosen for a
variety of reasons. Firstly, any definition of an MNC will be
arbitrary.	 Secondly, Stopford and Dunning [1983] have prepared
statistics using their definition of an MNC for all MNCs in the
world.	 Finally, the Stopford and Turner [1985] study of UK MNCs
is based upon this definition. 	 Therefore, the use of an 'off
the peg' definition is justified by virtue of the standardisation
it entails, and the possibility of comparing the results of this
study with other studies in the international business field.
The Stopford [1982] definItion yields a list of sixty nine UK
iapter 5: Page 163
MNCs. Nine of these companies were deleted for a number of
reasons including effective state or overseas control,
insignificant multinational involvement and the absence of a
stock exchange quotation. A full list of the sixty companies in
the population, and a list of companies removed from the Stopford
[1982] list are included in Appendix One.
In order to make the best possible use of available resources, a
random sample (using a random number generator) of twenty
multinational companies was chosen.	 The choice of a sample of
twenty was based upon two factors. Firstly, twenty companies
represented a manageable nuniber of companies in that they could
be examined in depth. Secondly, twenty companies was sufficient
to permit some degree of inference of population proportions,
and hence increase the external validity of the study. The
inferences are based upon the use of a hypergeometric
distribution which is a binomial distribution modified for
sampling without replacement. A set of hypergeometric
distribution tables were developed for a sample of twenty from a
population of sixty; the tables are included in Appendix Two.
The choice of a simple random sample was motivated by
insufficient knowledge of the characteristics of the MNCs which
would render an alternative sampling criterion more appropriate.
However, the use of a random sample does permit an assessment of
the significance of foreign exchange risks in UK MNCs.
The choice of foreign subsidiary was constrained by time and cost
considerations.	 The Republic of Ireland was chosen as a
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suitable location because of its geographical proximity, the lack
of language barriers and the author's familiarity with the local
environment. Moreover, from the point of view of foreign
exchange risk management, the Irish and British currencies were
identical until 1979, and the study represented an opportunity to
examine how the Irish subsidiaries of UK MNCs were affected by,
and responded to the presence of foreign exchange risks.
However, it should be pointed out that there may be systematic
differences between foreign exchange risk management in Irish
subsidiaries and other foreign subsidiaries because of the
geographical proximity of Irish subsidiaries, the absence of a
language barrier and the absence of exchange risk until 1979.
If such systematic biases exist, then they represent a major
limitation to the study.
In order to alleviate this limitation to some extent, the HQ of
the companies was also examined. The aim of visiting the HQ was
to evaluate the involvement of the HQ in the management of
foreign exchange risk, as well as permitting the documentation of
possible differences between the management of the Irish
subsidiary and other foreign subsidiaries. Finally, other
studies have focused exclusively on the role of the HQ treasury
function, and the investigation of HQ activity permits the
results of this study to be related to the results of other
studies.
The foregoing research design may be considered superior to other
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research designs, since it permits the results of other studies
to be replicated, as well as permitting the study of the
management of exposures other than transaction exposures. 	 The
research methods were chosen so that the development of a
descriptive theory would be possible. 	 In order to guide the
choice of method and the analysis of data, a grounded theory
approach was adopted. 	 The idea of theory grounded in data
would seem admirably suited to the task of explaining foreign
exchange risk management since its creators (Glaser and Strauss
[1967]) argue in their opening paragraph that:
"Most writing on sociological method has been concerned with
how accurate facts can be obtained, and how theory can be
more rigorously tested. In this book we address ourselves
to the equally important enterprise of how the discovery of
theory from data - systematically obtained and analyzed in
social research - can be furthered."
As an approach, it stresses the discovery of' the concepts and
hypotheses that are relevant to the area being researched.
Indeed, the approach has been endorsed as being a method of
restoring balance in business and accounting research by Buckley
et al. [1976, pp.'9-5O] and Otley [198 1 ].	 Glaser and Strauss
[1967, p7] aim to make "generation a legitimate enterprise" by
suggesting methods of' grounding theory in data and providing the:
"Ingredients of a defense against internalised professional
mandates dictating that sociologists research and write in
the verification rhetoric."
The grounding of' theory in data may be legitimated by arguing
that (Glaser and Strauss [1967, pk]:
"Theory based on data can usually not be completely refuted
by more data or replaced by another theory."
This in turn leads to two fundamental tenets of grounded theory.
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Firstly, there is the principle of' the chronological primacY of
data over ideas; data should lead to the Idea. 	 Secondly,
rather than using statistical sampling, Glaser and Strauss (1967,
p45] argue that theoretical sampling should be used.	 They
define theoretical sampling [op. cit., p45] as the:
"Process of data collection for generating theory whereby
the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data
and decides what data to collect next and where to find
them in order to develop his theory as it emerges ... the
initial decisions are not based on a preconceived
theoretical framework."
It would seem that the concept of theoretical sampling is at odds
with the research design set out in the previous pragraphs.
However, this probably reflects a broader tension associated with
the use of grounded theory.	 Miles [1979, p591] points out:
"... much has been written about developing "grounded
theory," "being open to what the site has to tell us," and
slowly evolving a coherent framework rather than "imposing"
one from the start. But the need to develop grounded
theory usually exists in tension with the need for clarity
and focus; research projects that pretend to come to the
study with no assumptions usually encounter much
difficulty. We believed that a rough working frame needs
to be in place near the beginning of fieldwork ... the risk
is not that of "imposing" a self blinding framework, but
that an incoherent, bulky, irrelevant, meaningless set of
observations may be produced, which no one can (or even
wants to) make sense of."
Within this study, a tension does exist.
	 It could be argued
that the tension could be mitigated by remaining true to the
concept of theoretical sampling and maintaining a more fluid
research design. However, the nature of the research problem
(examining the HQs (In London for the most part) and foreign
subsidiaries of MNC5) dictated the use of a well planned research
itinerary.	 Moreover, given that the subjects being interviewed
were relatively senior individuals, there was little or no
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opportunity to develop the theory as it emerged on particular
sites.
Having resolved the issue of data collection, the next step is
the analysis of data. Sieber [1976] surveyed seven respected
textbooks on field methods and found that the texts devoted only
5 to 10% of the pages to data analysis.	 He pointed out
[op.cit., p1]:
"Methodologists obviously prefer to spend more time on such
matters as gaining access, interviewing, choosing
informants, handling reciprocities, and so on, rather than
on the intellectual work of analysis."
The basic techniques available for the analysis of data is called
the 'constant comparative method' by Glaser and Strauss [1967].
The basic concept of the technique is that one set of data is
tested on a second set of data which maximises the differences
between the two sets of data.
	 This in turn implies focusing on
outliers rather than adopting a verificationist approach.
One very real practical difficulty with the grounded theory
technique is the difficulty of simultaneous data collection,
coding and analysis in the field. Indeed, both Glaser and
Strauss [1967] and G].aser [1978] stress the idea of theoretical
pacing and withdrawing from the field during research studies.
This was a major problem with the research design used in this
study because of the need to visit geographically dispersed
locations.
Miles [1979] discusses this issue and suggests (Miles [1976],
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cited in Miles [1979]) that retrospective analysis of data may be
undertaken by proceeding through the data In the order in which
It was collected, attempting to produce generalisations from the
data, attempting to find evidence which supports the
generalisations, and evidence which refutes the generalisations.
When gerierailsations have been found, one should attempt to
produce and test predictions within the data. To a certain
extent the presence of statistical sampling may facilitate the
retrospective analysis of data since there Is more likely to be
a broad cross section of data for testing predictions and
hypotheses within the data.
III B: Data Collection Methods
Given that both the empirical observation of foreign exchange
risk management will be problematic, and the use of large scale
survey instruments inappropriate, the remaining available methods
might include interviews, archival data and unobtrusive measures.
The two methods which were used were interviews supported by
archival data.	 In the first part of this section, the use of
interviews is discussed.	 In the second part, the archival data
is discussed.
III.B.i: Interviews
If direct observation of foreign exchange risk management is not
feasible, then one must examine the extent to which Interviews
may act as surrogates for observation. 	 Becker and Geer [1957]
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compare the use of the 'interview conversation' (see Blum [19)42])
arid participant observation.
	 They describe the interview
conversation as:
"In this kind of interview, the interviewer explores many
facets of his interviewee's concerns, treating subjects as
they come up in conversation, pursuing interesting leads,
allowing his Imagination and ingenuity full rein as he
tries to develop new hypotheses and test them in in the
course of the interview."
The differences between the interview and observation are
attributed to two interacting forces, the kinds of words and acts
of the people under study that the researcher has access to, and
the kind of sensitivity the researcher has to the problems and
data produced by the informant, due to the lack of a rich
experiential context. Trow [1957] argues that Becker and Geer
[1957] fail to address the issue of:
"What kinds of problems are best studied through what kinds
of methods; ... how can various methods at our disposal
complement one another."
Using the criteria of 'adequacy' and 'efficiency', Zelditch
[1962] suggested that certain methods were most suited to certain
types of information. He distinguished three types of
Information. The first type of information one might seek would
be a frequency distribution.
	 If this were the case then
enumeration or a sample would be best. If one sought an
incident history, then participant observation was most suitable.
However, if one sought to establish institutional norms and
statuses, then an interview would be the superior research
method.
If one were studying foreign exchange risk management, then data
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on the most frequently used hedging technique might be collected
using an enumeration or a sample. Interviews might be
sufficient as sources of information on the reasons for choosing
particular techniques, while participant observation might be
best suited to examining the emergence of new policies.
However, there may be limitations to the use of interviews as a
technique, since it is quite possible that errors in
interviewee's responses may arise from memory, motivation,
communication and knowledge (see Sudman and Bradburn [1982]).
This in turn may lead to the researcher being a victim of
rationalised accounts of exchange risk management, packaged for
public consumption. 	 Moreover, VanMaanen [1979, p5 1t4] argues
that:
"A central postulate of the ethnographic method is that
people lie about the things that matter most to them"
This difficulty is overcome to some extent by the use of multiple
interviews in the same organisation as well as the availability
of alternative data to uncover and perhaps explain such lies.
Apart from the difficulties of using interviews as a surrogate
for observation, there are a number of biases which may arise in
interviews including the race (Athey et al. [1966]) and age
(Riesman and Ehrlich [1961] of the interviewer. These
observations prompted Webb et al. [1971] to argue:
"If we heeded all the known biases, without considering ow'
ignorance of' major interactions, there could be no such
thing as a 'simple' survey. The understandable reaction
by most researchers has been to ignore these biases and
assume them away. The biases are lawful and consistent,
and all research employing face to face interviewing or
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questionnaire administration is subject to them."
One might conclude that interviews are by no means a perfect
research method.
	 In particular, there are limitations to the
use of interviews as surrogates for observation. 	 Moreover,
there are biases inherent in the use of interviews, which are
extremely likely to arise.
	
Denzin [1970] discusses the concept
of' triangulation. The aim of triangulation is to use more than
one source of data, so that by combining independently collected
sets of data about the same subject, one can locate a more
accurate account of reality. In order to overcome biases in
interviews as a research method, multiple interviews were used
along with archival data which is discussed In the following
section.
III.B.ii: Archival Data
In order to permit triangulation, archival data was used as a
supplement to interviews. The archival data collected came from
two sources.	 Firstly, all relevant publicly available
information was located. 	 This was used to act as a guide to
interviews and also shed some light on the exposures of the
sample companies. This in turn permitted the comparison of the
interviewer's and the interviewee's perceptions of exposure which
It was hoped would prove helpful (see Downey and Ireland [1979],
Tinker [1976]). Secondly, an attempt was made to obtain copies
of relevant company documents, at any rate, to be permitted to
see the documents.
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It might be argued that the use of pre-Interview information
might bias the interviewer's perceptions oi' corporate practice
and directly contradict a grounded theory approach. In order to
overcome this problem, it was decided that all specific questions
which had arisen from the analysis of archival data would be
deferred until the very end of the interview.
III.C: Stxsmary
In this section some of the conceptual issues arisng from the
research design and methods were discussed.
	
A population of
sixty UK MNCs was defined and a random sample of 20 companies was
chosen. It was decided to focus on foreign exchange risk
management activities at both the HQ and the Irish subsidiaries
of the sample. A grounded theory approach was Invoked as a
method to guide both the data collection and the data analysis.
However, It was pointed out that for practical reasons, an
adoption of the grounded theory approach was necessary. The
research methods were guided by the notion of triangulation,
which consists of using a variety of complementary methods In
order to establish a description of foreign exchange risk
management which may be closer to reality than a single data
collection method.	 The main research methods being used to
triangulate were archival data and Interviews.
	 In the next
sectIon, the actual data collection process Is described.
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IV: The Data Collection Process
It was argued In the first section of this chapter that both
foreign subsidiaries and the HQ of MNCs would need to be the two
objects of investigation of a study of foreign exchange risk
management.	 In the first part of this section, the data
collection process used for the Irish subsidiaries is described.
In the second part, the data collection process in the UK is
described.
IV.A: The Irish Subsidiaries
There were three basic stages to the data collection process at
Irish subsidiaries.	 They were the pilot study, the collection
of publicly available information and the interviews with the
subsidiary personnel. Each stage is dealt with in the following
paragraphs.
IV.k 1 jj The. Pilot Study
The first step in the collection of data on the Irish
subsidiaries was interviews in seven companies in March 19814.
The seven companies were all subsidiaries of MNCs in the random
sample, and it was established that access would not be a
problem.	 One problem which did emerge at this stage was that
the author was not sufficiently familiar with either the
companies or the environment in which they operated to benefit
completely from the interviews.	 One local economist, the Irish
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Tourist Board, The Central Bank, The British Embassy, the
Industrial Development Authority and a representative of the
Confederation of Irish Industry were also contacted at this
stage.
'Cold' telephone calls were used to establish initial contacts.
Normally, this resulted in being passed from secretary to
secretary, until eventually (usually after a number of telephone
calls), contact was established with the finance director. In
many respects, the process was analagous to selling life
insurance. Once contact was established, interviews were
relatively easily arranged, and all interviewees interviewed at
this stage expressed a willingness to be interviewed again.
All interviews were approached with the stated aim of documenting
the effects of the break with sterling on their operations, in
order to avoid confusing the issue with terms such as 'economic'
exposure.	 Moreover, the break with sterling might be a subject
that seemed more immediate and of more direct relevance. 	 It was
stressed that the author was attempting to establish if the right
questions were being posed, and interviews were allowed to
proceed in a relatively unstructured manner.
The first two companies contacted were asked if they would allow
interviews to be taped. They were both unwilling to do so. A
notepad was used to record interviews and the notes were then
elaborated after the interviews. 	 In fact, the notepad emerged
as a useful device for allowing the interviewer some time to
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consider the interviewee's points.
The main implications of the pilot study were that interviews
would provide the required information on exposures and their
management, that establishing access to interviewees could be
achieved by telephoning prospective interviewees directly and
that the taping of' interviews would restrict the extent to which
interviewees would express themselves freely. Finally, the need
for an intimate knowledge of both the companies and their
environments became apparent.
IV.A.1i: Ili. Archival Da
The collection of archival data commenced in June 198 1L	 Three
types of data were collected, exchange rate information,
government statistics and company specific information.
The collection of' exchange rate information had two aims.
Firstly, the calculation of purchasing power parity deviations
for the Punt against Sterling, the Dollar and the Deutsehemark,
in order to isolate time periods which were particularly critical
in terms of deviations from purchasing power parity. 	 The IMF
'International Financial Statistics' were used for this purpose
and the resultant calculations are included in Appendix 3.
Secondly, all newspaper and magazine articles on the Punt were
summarised, in order that a summary could be made of the
attitudes of various Interest groups towards exchange rate
changes and to be aware of expectations prior to exchange rate
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realignments.
Several types of government statistics and publications were
examined, in order to obtain information on a variety of issues.
UK data on overseas investments by UK residents was examined in
order to establish any peculiarities in UK investment in Ireland.
The most significant feature of this analysis was that the
majority of UK Investment was in the food, drink and tobacco
sector and that there was virtually no investment in extractive
industries in Ireland, due to the lack of natural resources in
Ireland. Irish balance of payments and census of production
data were also examined, particularly for industries where sample
firms were dominant.	 Unfortunately, it proved Impossible to
discern any Immediate relationship between purchasing power
parity deviations and balance of payments data.
	 The census of
production data were used to establish the Inputs used in various
industries and this in turn would permit analysis of the possible
effects of exchange rates on costs, given that some types of
input are more likely to be tradeable than others. Finally, the
regular reports of the Irish National Prices Commission were
surveyed for price increases awarded to firms in the sample In
order to establish how exchange rate changes were incorporated
within the price control mechanism. A representative of the
National Prices Commission was interviewed in order to get
further information on this Issue.
Finally, the Commercial Library in Dublin press cutting
collection was used to trace Information appearing in the press
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on particular companies.	 The author was very pleasantly
surprised by the amount of information which was available
dealing with individual companies. Apart from information about
new products, new investments, promotions, closures, appointments
and resignations, there was a considerable amount of 'gossip'
Information in business magazines.	 In addition to this
information, some of the Irish subsidiaries published annual
reports.	 The parent company annual reports were also examined
for Information relating to Irish subsidiaries.
All of the archival data were used to prepare pre-interview notes
which would be used as examples of economic exposure during the
Interviews.	 The basic guide used in the construction of pre-
Interview notes Is contained In Appendix Four.
IV.A.iii: Interviews
Interviews were conducted in September and October 198, and two
Interviews were conducted in December 198'L
	
Of the twenty MNCS
In the sample, four companies had no Irish subsidiary.	 However,
a number of companies had more than one subsidiary, and twenty
two Interviews were carried out.
	 There were more than twenty
two IrIsh subsidiaries, but no interviews were carried out in
subsidiaries which were effectively controlled and responsible to
another Irish subsidiary.	 A summary of the size of' the
subsidIarIes visited, along with the personnel interviewed are
presented in Appendix Five.
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The structure of the interviews was relatively straightforward.
Interviews were scheduled to last about one hour. The first
three quarters of an hour was allocated to allowing the executive
to describe the effects of the cessation of parity between the
Irish and UK pounds in his firm, along with the responses of his
firm to the break.	 The author attempted to keep his
interference to a minimum and many of the Blum [192] guidelines
were used.	 In particular, the author found that his
comparative youth was extremely useful in using inteDprtation
of the narrative as a non directive technique.	 Changes of
subject were only used where interviews seemed to be getting out
of control. There were only two cases of Interviews getting
out of control, the first Interview in the pilot study and an
interview with a particularly difficult subject during the main
interview phase.
When the main unstructured portion of the interview was complete,
the Intet'viewer asked specific questions arising from the
analysis of archival data, which had not been dealt with during
the interview.	 Following the coverage of' issues arising from
the archival data, interviewees were invited to make additional
comments or ask the interviewer some questions. The success of
this period varied from case to case, sometimes, It was extremely
rewarding, while in other cases, It did not provide any useful
Information and became a social conversation.
	 For the most
part, interviewees reacted extremely positively to the interview
and were impressed by the author's apparent knowledge and
understanding of their companies which had emerged during the
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section of the interview devoted to specific questions.
The Irish interviews were rewritten and elaborated upon the
completion of the interviews.
	
The original interview schedule
was rewitten in order to code the data, and theoretical memos
(Glaser [1978fl were maintained during both the collection of
archival data and the interview phase. 	 A summary of the
results of the interviews was sent to the interviewees in July
1985.	 The aim of sending the results was to provoke further
discussion with the interviewees, and act as a validation of the
findings.	 Unfortunately, this exercise was a dismal failure,
and there was no response whatsoever from the interviewees.	 A
number of interviewees were contacted who were most likely to be
interested in the summary, but they had nothing to add.
IV.B: Data Collection in the UK
A similar process was used in the UK when the HQs were
approached.	 Sixteen of the MNCs were investigated during
November and December 1981 , three companies in May 1985 and one
company in March 1986.	 In many repects, access to the UK
companies was considerably easier than obtaining access to the
Irish subsidiaries, although it was extremely difficult to
arrange mutually suitable appointments with the UK personnel.
There were three phases to the UK interviews. 	 Firstly, pre-
interview notes were constructed for each company using both
archival material, and material collected at the Irish
subsidiaries.	 Secondly, interviews were conducted with the
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treasurers of the UK MNCs, and finally, a case study of a single
company was conducted. 	 Each phase is dealt with in the
following paragraphs.
IV.B.i: Archival Material
The London Business School Library was the main source of
archival material used.	 The data included financial analysts
reports, newspaper and magazine reports, financial reports and
other ephemera.
Financial analysts' reports were located for all of the
companies, and where possible reports were examined from a
variety of brokers from 1979 to 1984.	 These were particularly
useful in revealing the risks which analysts perceived different
firms faced.	 They were also useful in highlighting the
financial analysts' views of exchange risk. 	 Some of the
analysts' reports were of a very high quality and revealed
considerable amounts of information which were not available
elsewhere.
Newspaper and magazine reports relating to particular industries
and companies were also examined. 	 Unfortunately, cuttings were
available only for the previous three to twelve months and the
analysis was limited to this period. 	 However, cuttings were
located for a number of companies for periods prior to 198k.
Finally, various documents issued by companies were examined
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including financial reports, press releases and in house
magazines. The 'Review of Operations' in the financial reports
was often quite helpful in providing data on the exposures of
individual businesses.
The archival information was then consolidated with the material
from the Irish subsidiaries to produce the pre-interview notes.
In virtually all of the cases, the Irish subsidiary was not
informed of the impending visit to the parent company, and the
parent company was not informed of the visit to the Irish
subsidiary.	 This policy was used in order to protect the
informants in the Irish subsidiaries, while at the same time,
guaranteeing openness from the Irish informants.
IV.B.ii: Interviews
The structure of the interviews was similar to the Irish
interviews.	 Invariably, the interviewee had the job title of
either 'Treasurer' or 'Assistant Treasurer'.	 In larger
companies, there was an Assistant Treasurer charged with the
management of foreign exchange risk, whereas in companies with a
smaller treasury function, the treasurer was interviewed. In
one company, there was no treasurer, and the financial controller
was interviewed. 	 Interviews lasted three quarters of' an hour on
average.	 The interviews were carried out in three stages.
The first stage dominated the interview. 	 The treasurer was
informed that the aim of the study was to examine both the
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management of transaction exposure and economic exposure in UK
MNCs. He was then asked to describe foreign exchange risk
management at the company and the role of the HQ treasury in the
management of foreign exchange risk.
The second stage consisted of a series of specific questions
based upon the pre-interview notes and proved most informative.
In most cases it led to the emergence of significant new issues
and facts.
The third stage was a period of general discussion. It normally
became an extension of the second stage and, in a number of
cases, led to a revision of the pre-interview notes used in later
interviews.
In some respects, the quality of the theoretical memos and coding
deteriorated relative to the Irish interviews. This arose
because of the inordinate amount of time spent travelling to
interview sites and to the London Business School. However, by
this stage the quality of note-taking at interviews had improved
sufficiently to permit virtual transcriptions of the interviews
to be produced.	 Moreover, the coding which took place within
the interviews was also substantial. In order to facilitate the
analysis of the UK data retrospectively, a microcomputer database
management system was used to sort the coded data.
Unfortunately, the technique was not particularly successful, due
to the size of the data file, and the difficulty of remembering
the context of statements on particular topics. 	 Eventually, the
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original Interview texts were resorted to during the
retrospective analysis phase.
IV.B.iii: Case StudY
During the interview phase, it emerged that three companies were
in the process of reviewing their foreign exchange risk
management policies. Unfortunately, two of the companies were
located outside London, and involved a day's journey from
Glasgow.	 For this reason, it was decided to commence a case
study of the London based company. The reason for focusing on a
company which was in the process of changing its policies was the
ability to find out the stated reasons at the time for the
adoption of a particular policy. It was hoped that the
examination of the process of altering the policy would
complement the other data which had been collected.
In all, six days, over a period of one year were spent in the
company. During each visit a number of' the individuals involved
in the review of policy and the implementation of a new policy
were interviewed. The data from each visit was then re-examined
in order to produce theoretical memos which would highlight
points to be pursued at the following meeting. Documents which
had been circulated among the individuals involved in the
decision were also inspected. 	 Information was also gathered on
the company's reaction to exchange rate changes during the course
of the year.
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The case study proved extremely helpful arid influenced many of
the ideas in the ensuing chapters.	 However, the case study has
not been published, since much of the data collected was of a
sensitive nature, and the Identity of the company would be
obvious.
V: Analysis of Data and Presentation of Results
Whilst the grounded theory approach guided the data collection
process, it was pointed out In section three that it fails to
address the issue of data analysis. 	 Moreover, the presentation
of results has received no attention in this literature.
	 This
latter issue only became apparent when the data analysis was
underway.
	 In this section, the analysis and presentation of the
data are discussed.
V.A: Data Analysis
Three different approaches were used to analyse the data.
Firstly, the data were analysed on a case-by-case basis. 	 A
'case' refers to either a single foreign subsidiary or a single
HQ.	 This analysis was carried out both in the field and, to a
lesser extent, retrospectively. The analysis of the management
of transaction exposure was based primarily on interview data
whilst information on transaction exposures was derived from both
archival and interview data.	 The analysis of economic exposure
and its subsequent management was based upon archival data, and
interview data were used to verify this analysis.
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Secondly, a topic-by-topic analysis was employed to analyse the
data retrospectively.	 The results of this analysis are
presented in the following four chapters. 	 The HQ treasury role
in the management of transaction exposure is discussed in Chapter
Six.	 This represented a natural starting point, since it was
the subject-matter of previous studies. 	 In chapter Seven, the
HQ treasury role in the management of economic exposure is
examined. Textbook treatments of foreign exchange risk
management (e.g. Eiteman and Stonehill [1986] and Shapiro [1986])
argue that the HQ treasurer should be involved in the management
of economic exposure.	 Foreign exchange risk management at a
subsidiary level is summarised in chapter eight. Finally,
economic exposure for the MNC as a whole is described in Chapter
Nine.
Thirdly, a MNC-by-MNC analysis was carried out. This permitted
some conclusions to be drawn on the management of foreign
exchange risk in the MNC as a whole.
V.B: Presentation of Results
The author encountered considerable difficulties in deciding upon
a method for the presentation of results. This issue has
received very little attention in the literature, and it is
difficult to know how one might choose among alternative methods
of presentation.	 Two criteria guided the presentation of
results in this thesis.	 Firstly, the need to ensure that the
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results of the study were defensible and that the reader could be
convinced that results were not plucked from the air. Secondly,
the conflicting requirement of maintaining the anonymity of both
the individuals and the companies involved in the study.
The issue of defensibility is critical, and given the dearth of
prior accounting research using inductive techniques, there Is no
generally accepted rhetoric available for the presentation and
evaluation of this form of research. Indeed, this observation
supports Otley's [198 Z ) claim that accounting studies which have
used an inductive technique have been clothed in a deductive
rhetoric. Otley suggests that case studies may be' an
appropriate research technique, although presenting case studies
becomes problematic if it is necessary to maintain the anonymity
of both companies and individuals. This issue was of
considerable importance in this study since the population was
relatively small, and most of the companies are highly visible.
Moreover, in a study using multiple cases, it is necessary to
explicate issues which are common to cases.
Given these considerations, the results presented in thapters Six
to Nine use a topic-by-topic style of presentation. In order to
maintain the anonymity of the participants in the study, Greek
letters have been used throughout these chapters to denote
individual companies. In addition, descriptions of corporate
practices and attitudes have been described in a manner which
minimises the probability of revealing the identity of the
participants.	 In order to maximise the defensibility of the
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study, the author has attempted to introduce significant amounts
of' original data in order to highlight the origins of assertions,
statements and hypotheses. It is hoped that by presenting
these data, the interested reader may be able to challenge, or
offer alternative formulations of, these assertions, statements
and hypotheses.
Unfortunately, it proved difficult to reach many general
conclusions about the management of foreign exchange risk in UK
MNCs at the level of the sample, since the conclusions are
necessarily (due to exposure being company specific) based upon
individual companies.	 In order to articulate the issues
arising in Chapters Six to Nine, the main findings of the study
have been incorporated within a decision support model in Chapter
Ten. The decision support model is useful since it highlights
both the decisions relevant to the management of foreign exchange
risk, and the data necessary to make those decisions.
Moreover, the model is inductively derived by synthesizing the
literature review in the previous three chapters and the
discussion of actual foreign exchange risk management in the
following four chapters.
VI: Sunmary and Conc1iionz
In this chapter the research methods used in this study and the
justification for the methods has been discussed. 	 It was
pointed out that the foreign subsidiary may play a key role in
the management of foreign exchange risk and that to date, this
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issue has been ignored by researchers.
The research design used in this study was based upon an
examination of foreign exchange risk management at both the HQ
and the Irish subsidiary of UK MNCs. It was also argued that
mail questionnaires were inappropriate for this research problem.
Since field research of some description was considered most
appropriate, a random sample of twenty companies was chosen as
the basis for the study.	 A variety of research methods were
used to achieve a degree of triangulation. 	 The research
methods included a case study, interview-conversations and
descriptive data concerning the companies. 	 Exchange rate data,
and a variety of government statistics were used as a supplement
to this information.
The analysis of data was guided by the concept of grounded
theory and the use of the constant comparative method. 	 In the
following chapters the outcomes of this analysis are smimarised.
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QIAPTER 6
TRANSACTION EXPOSURE AND THE HQ TREASURER
In chapter 5, it was pointed out that previous empirical studies
had focused on the HQ treasury as the nucleus of foreign exchange
risk management activity in the MNC. In the present chapter,
the results of this study concerning the management of
transaction exposure are compared with earlier studies, and a
descriptive theory of the management of transaction exposure is
developed.
Previous UK research (Davis and Collier [1985], Earl [1983])
would suggest that the management of transaction exposure is the
key foreign exchange risk management (FERM) task of the HQ
treasurer. Davis and Collier [1985] examined the hedging of
transaction exposure in UK MNCs which centralised the FERM
function while Earl [1983] attempted to predict the future
direction of HQ treasury involvement in FERM. In this chapter,
it is argued that the presence of transaction costs may explain
the nature of HQ treasury involvement in FERM, and the
predictions of the hypothesis are similar to the findings of Earl
£1 98].
In the first part of this chapter the transaction exposure
management role in the 20 sample companies is summarised and
compared with the results of Collier and Davis [1985]. Excerpts
from interviews with HQ treasurers are used extensively in order
to justify the classification of HQ involvement, and to describe
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the treasurer's perceptions of the chosen mode of central
intervention. An analytical framework is used in section II in
order to synthesize the material presented in section I, and to
provide a rationale for the practices described in section I.
Finally, some of the implications of' the rationale are discussed
in section III.
I: The Role of' the HQ Treasurer: Transaction Exposure
The management of the exchange risks arising from foreign
currency denominated transactions would seem to be the main day-
to-day involvement of HQ treasury in foreign exchange risk
management.	 Indeed, this observation is consistent with the
views of treasurers.	 Eighteen treasurers commenced by
describing this function when asked to describe their FERM role.
The other two treasurers maintained that they were not concerned
with FERM since the HQ had little or no transaction exposure.
The latter two companies (Theta and Kappa) are described in the
following paragraph.
Neither of the companies had much trade between the UK and
overseas and the two companies had the lowest exports as a
percentage of sales in the sample. 	 Theta's exports amounted to
1% of sales, while Kappa had virtually no exports. 	 Kappa's
treasurer described their attitude toward FERM in the following
way:
"The overall criterion is the size relative to the
business...we were very hard put to find an export figure
for our accounts under the old Companies Act."
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Theta was in a similar position and also had a policy of
reinvesting dividends in its overseas subsidiaries.
	 The
remaining eighteen companies in the sample all has some trade
related transaction exposure. 	 The remainder of this chapter
deals with these companies.
I. A: Clansitication of Practices
The practices of the eighteen companies were classified in a
manner similar to Collier and Davis [1985]. The Collier and
Davis classification distinguishes between foreign currency
transactions which arise in foreign and UK subsidiaries. This
distinction is necessary, since they found that HQ treasurers are
more likely to be involved in foreign currency transactions which
are generated by UK subsidiaries. 	 Apart from identifying the
source of foreign currency transactions, it is also necessary to
classify the degree of HQ involvement in the management of the
risks and costs of foreign currency transactions.
McRae and Walker [1980] suggest that the following degrees of
involvement of the HQ treasury in the transaction exposures of
operating units could be distinguished.
1. Setting overall exposure management guidelines.
2. Making specific decisions on each operating unit's
exposures.
3. Taking exposure management action.
Unfortunately, these categories were not sufficiently fine for
the classification of the companies observed by this author.
Two extra degrees of involvement were added to this list, both of
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which are considerably weaker than the setting of overall
exposure management guidelines. The five categories and the
criteria used to classify corporate practices are described in
the following paragraphs.
The first category is one of no involvement whatsoever. 	 This
was essentially a default category, and was used when the weakest
conditions in the second category were not satisfied.
A second category was used when the HQ treasurer had a liaison
role with treasurers in the domestic and foreign subsidiaries.
The following situations were classified as liaison roles:
1) The HQ and subsidiary treasurers agree to act in a
specific way in the foreign exchange markets (e.g. cover
dollars forward), and agreement is voluntary.
2) The HQ treasurer expects to be kept informed of large
exposures in foreign currency but may not interfere with the
subsidiary's hedging decision.
The third category of overall exposure management guidelines was
interpreted in a manner similar to McRae and Walker [1980].
It included:
1) Instructions to operating units to cover all transaction
expos ures.
2) Policies which required operating units to ensure that
exposures in certain currencies did not exceed specified
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amounts.
3)	 Companies where the treasurer could have some input into the
degree of cover which an operating unit might have on
transactions, but would not be in a position to alter or
overule the subsidiary's decision.
The issue of specific directives by central management is the
fourth category of HQ Intervention.	 This category includes:
1) Issuing advice which the subsidiaries are expected to comply
with
2) Instructing subsidiaries to take specific actions in
specific currencies.
3) Subsidiaries which were expected to contact the HQ for
further instructions when a transaction exceeded a specified
amount.
The fifth and final category is where the HQ actually makes
decisions as to the degree of exposure and takes the appropriate
action on behalf of the subsidiary.
The results of the twofold classification system are displayed in
table 6.1.
	 Each cell in Table 6.1 represents the number of
companies with a particular configuration of involvement in
overseas and UK transactions.
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Table	 Degree	 j involvement jo, Transaction ExDosures
UK
Degree of
Involvement None
None	 2
Liaison	 1
Guidelines	 2
Directives	 3
Action	 2
Total	 10
Overseas
Liaison Guidelines Directives Action Total
2
1	 2
2
1
5	 1	 8
6	 0	 1	 1	 18
In common with previous UK studies, it may be seen in Table 6.1
tlrat there is significantly less involvement in transactions
generated by overseas subsidiaries. 	 Moreover, this represents a
practice which is significantly different from results reported
by US researchers.	 For example, Jilling [1977,1978] reported
that the majority of US MNCs were centralised. 	 This finding
would suggest that there is a systematic difference between the
practices of UK and US MNCs. 	 However it is also possible that
this result arose from an inadequate research methodology.
These inadequacies are discussed in the following paragraph.
Soenen and Aggarwal [1985] conducted a survey of the FERM
practices of European companies and reported that of a sample of
59 large UK companies, 68% of' those companies reported that
foreign exchange risk management was centralised at the HQ.
Similarly, Demirag [1985] using a sample of 105 UK firms found
that 72.3% of the respondents had either centralised or
relatively centralised foreign exchange risk management.
Examination of' Demirag's survey instrument revealed that there
was no distinction made between transactions arising in UK and
overseas subsidiaries. Similarly, Jilling [1977,1978] made no
distinction in his survey instrument, and it is also possible
that no distinction was made in the Soenen and Aggarwal [1985]
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study, since it was not reported in their results. Rather than
concluding that there is a difference between foreign exchange
risk management in the UK and the US, it might be helpful to use
a similar survey instrument in both countries. In addition, the
fact that no distinction was noted by these researchers may
suggest that questionnaire respondents are inclined to
overestimate the degree of centralisation and that HQ personnel
are ethnocentric since they see 'centralised' and 'centra].ised in
the UK' as virtually identical terms.
In order to validate the results in Table 6.1, the results were
compared with the results of Collier and Davis [1985]. Collier
and Davis used a mail questionnaire and respondents were expected
to classify themselves using the McRae and Walker [1980]
categories of Involvement.
	 Since the results of this study used
five categories rather than four, the categories of 'Liaison
Role' and 'General Guidelines' were merged.	 It should also be
pointed out that the Collier and Davis [1985] study was based
upon 87 firms, whereas this study used only 18. 	 The comparison
of the two studies is tabulated in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Decree	 1iQ Involvement
comoared with Collier 	 Davis [1985]
UK %
	
Overseas %
Collier et al. This Study Collier et al. This Study
None	 11%	 11%	 32%	 55%
Liaison	 25%	 22%	 39%	 33%
&Guideline
Directive	 17%	 22%	 21%	 6%
Action	 '6%	 ''%	 8%	 6%
Total	 99% (1)	 100%	 100%	 100%
Note: (1) Difference arises due to rounding
The first important point about Table 6.2 is the remarkable
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similarity between the results of this study and those of the
Collier and Davis [1985] study with respect to UK transactions.
Moreover if one takes the 'Directive' category and the 'Action'
category as constituting 'Centralised' then the percentage of
firms which are centralised for UK transactions in both this
study and the Collier and Davis [1985] study is remarkably
similar to the proportion of firms which reported centralised
foreign exchange risk management in the Soenen and Aggarwal
[1985] study and the Demirag [1985] study.	 Moreover, the
results are reassuring since they are all to some extent similar.
Secondly, there is a considerable difference between the results
of this study and the Collier and Davis [1985] study for
transaction exposures arising in overseas subsidiaries. 	 The
similarity between the results for UK transactions would suggest
that the criteria used for categorising companies in this study
yields results which are similar to the categories chosen by
respondents in mail questionnaires.	 However, since identical
criteria were used for classifying the treatment of overseas
transactions, one would expect similar results. 	 There are two
possible explanations.	 Firstly, it is possible that executives
overestimate their involvement in the management of transaction
exposures arising in overseas subsidiaries.
	 Alternatively,
since the Collier and Davis [1985] study may have included a
number of smaller companies with a small number of overseas
affiliates, greater central control was exerted.
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I.B: Description of Individual Practices
In the following paragraphs, the degree of centralisation in each
company is described.	 In order to aid the reader, each company
has been named and the names are used throughout chapters six to
nine.	 The Greek alphabet has been used to name the companies,
and the company names in each category of Table 6.1 are displayed
in Table 6.3.
	
The data used in this section was based upon
interviews with HQ treasurers.
Table 3j De gree . j JQ. involvement in Transaction Extosures:
ComDan Names
Degree of	 Overseas
Involvement None Liaison Guidelines Directives Action
None
UK Liaison	 v	 p
Guidelines	 I
Directives BX
Action	 o a	 TrnA)C1	 -	 it
I.B.i Autonomous Management	 both .
	
Overseas Transactions.
Zeta and Psi were the two companies in this category.
Coincidentally, both companies had been extremely profitable,
family dominated enterprises until the end of the 1970s.
However, Zeta was a vertically integrated company with a
relatively narrow product range, whilst Psi was an extremely
diverse conglomerate (the most diverse company in the sample).
Zeta had hired a firm of consultants and, at the time the
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interview was carried out (late 198 l ), was about to introduce a
system to manage UK exposures. The proposed system was a system
where the HQ would take action on behalf of the subsidiaries.
The treasury department had only commenced operating in 1981, and
the liberalisation of exchange controls, the maturation of the
company and the increasing cost of money were suggested as
reasons for its initial foundation. The main benefits sought
from a centralised transaction exposure management system were:
1. Transaction cost savings from netting.
2. The advantages of having personnel specialising in managing
exchange risk rather than managing exposure on a half-day
per week basis.
3. Economies of scale, since only one division was large enough
to have a full time person employed in foreign exchange risk
management.
Given the benefits of centralisation from a HQ point of view, it
is interesting to note that the treasurer had received a positive
response from the operating units:
"We had a very positive response from the
subsidiaries...they were quite happy to see someone else
take away a 'risk'.., we say you've got a receivable, and
we tell them it will be worth so much sterling"
The treasury staff realised that they depended ultimately on the
goodwill of divisional staff, and that unless the divisions were
willing to participate in a centralised transaction exposure
system, there would be little value in setting up the system in
the first place.	 In fact the interviewee pointed out that there
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was a major tension between the centralised management of foreign
exchange risk, and divisional profit responsibility.
"A central treasury is up against a wall, particularly
because of the way the group is going ... [moving towards]
a more decentralised management style ... a centralised
treasury is against the way this is going ... divisional
managers are responsible for divisional, profitability and
it is then pushed down the divisions ... we feel that if we
try to impose in that sort of a climate, it won't work; it
might have worked five or 10 years ago ... the system needs
to be driven by the businesses ... it must be something
that they want to do."
-he conflict of centralised management of foreign exchange risk
with the deceritralisation of operational decision making was a
recurring theme in the interviews. 	 Indeed, in Psi, this was
probably one of the main barriers tocentralisation.	 The
treasurer described the company in the following way.
"It is a diverse company and therefore there is a limit to
the extent to which they would want to or could centralise
traditionally it has been a decentralised group and we
give total autonomy to the operating companies ... the
finance people in the businesses know more about day-to-day
foreign exchange risk management ... here at the centre we
are concerned with long run finance."
Apart from not taking central action, there was no information
system for monitoring exposures, or indeed, no knowledge at the
centre of either the nature or denomination of foreign currency
cash flows.	 Occasionally, the centre might be informed of
extremely large transactions (at least £10 mln.).
	
The treasurer
realised that there were considerable opportunities to net
certain currencies at the centre, but he felt that the actual
initiation of a system could be problematic given the attitude of
the divisional finance managers.
"They all appreciate that they are part of a large group
they want to be told clearly what we want from them ... if
we mess them around, they won't like it ... therefore we
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are unlikely to see a big bang"
In conclusion, It may be seen that the decentralisatlon of
operational decision making may be perceived to be a key reason
for the absence of a centralised foreign exchange risk management
capability even when It is acknowledged that there may be
substantial transaction cost savings with a centralised
transaction exposure management system.
I.B.iI: Liaison with .
	 Subsidiaries: Autonomous Overseas
Subsidiaries
Nu was the only company in this category. The treasurer
described the management of transaction exposure in the UK in the
following way:
"We get kept informed and give guidance and may in certain
circumstances take it on here rather than the subsidiary
taking it on with a local bank ... this mostly arises when
there is an opportunity to match it with another
subsidiary ... we could intervene, but we wouldn't
intervene as a matter of course ... we tend to operate on a
decentralised basis and interfere as little as possible
only if we saw exposure increasing on a vulnerable currency
would we take action ... if there's a conflict between
decentralisation and treasury management then
decentralisation get it ... they are responsible for their
own destiny."
Again, it may be seen that while opportunities for transaction
cost savings were acknowledged to exist, there was no formal
mechanism for realising the savings, and the treasury had no
methods of altering the risk positions adopted by the
subsidiaries.
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I.B.ili: Guidelines .t.
	
Subsidiaries: Autonomous Overseas
Subsidiaries
Delta and Gamma were included in this category. 	 Delta's
treasurer described UK transaction exposure management in the
following way:
"We leave this up to the individual operating companies.
It's decentralised at the moment but we intend centralising
it ... we control the treasurer ... he is really just a
financial accountant at [name of a division] and we tell
him to hedge everything ... all the UK subsidiaries have
a long standing rule ... to cover everything ... its not
their business to deal in currency but to make things
the foreign subsidiaries either deal in their own currency
or if they are off shoots from the UK then we would invoice
them in local currency."
The main reasons given for the intention to centralise the
management of transaction exposure were:
1. Transaction cost savings since the centre would not use
local banks, and would also have more up to date information
and better quotes.
2. The opportunity to net.
The treasurer was then asked what the impetus for managing
transaction exposure at the centre was:
"Well, it started when I came 12 years ago and I said that
it was about time that we should do it ... its a major
problem in a group that preaches autonomy ... this in turn
leads to one saying that one should not interfere in
transaction exposure because its day-to-day ... details
have to be worked out ... in principle we are going to work
as their banker."
Gamma, the other company in this category, was in the same
industry, but the role of the treasurer was somewhat different.
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He described himself as 'the animal of the business' rather than
the business being the animal of the treasurer. He described
his role as:
"I wouldn't create paper chases and I've kept away because
intervening in the transmission of cash isn't wise. I
could argue at the extent of cover, maybe, but that would
be all because the transaction is between [name of a
division] and its overseas subsidiaries."
It is also noteworthy that Gamma was essentially an exporter to
its own marketing subsidiaries overseas, and that very few
materials were imported from overseas, hence the opportunities to
net were extremely restricted.
I.B1v: Directives	 Subsidiaries Autonomous Overseas
Subsidiaries
There were three companies in this category, Beta, Lambda and
Phi.	 All three insisted upon the UK subsidiaries contacting
them if a transaction exceeded a certain amount. 	 The limit in
Beta was £100,000, £50,000 in Lambda, and all transactions in
Phi.	 When a transaction exceeded these limits, the subsidiary
would contact the HQ and was advised on the action it should
take.	 Possibly the most interesting aspect of these companies
was the reasoning lying behind their positions.
Lambda intended centralising the management of transaction
exposure, and had retained the services of a management
consultant.	 On the other hand, Beta had been more centralised
until relatively recently. 	 Lambda was concerned about the lack
of information at the centre on both transaction exposures at a
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subsidiary level and their subsequent managinent. 	 In addition,
there was a possibility of netting opportunities arising, however
the treasurer was most concerned about the subsidiary's view
being different from the HQ view.
Beta had had a more centralised system in previous years but had
moved to a position of specific directives.	 Seemingly, there
were very few opportunities to net, and transaction costs were•
minimised by reaching an agreement with a large clearing bank to
offer preferential rates to subsidiaries dealing with local
branch banks.	 Moreover, the treasurer claimed that when the
centralised system was in operation:
"One tended to scrabble around in a crisis ... if there was
a change in the exchange rate of 2%, there was intense
activity gathering information and going Into the market
and picking up bad rates ... this way [I.e. decentralised]
it averages out."
Phi also had very few netting opportunities. For the most part,
It was an exporter from the UK with virtually no imports from
abroad.	 Moreover, exports accounted for only 8% of group
turnover.	 Their approach to transaction exposure was described
in the following way:
"We manage it as soon as we are aware of it and cover it,
but sometimes we may not do so ... we are not closely
monitored by the board and we use the forward exchange
market. We require the subsidiaries to do the dealing for
themselves by contacting us."
I.B.v: Centralise	 Subsidiaries: Autonomous Overseas
nicron and Alpha were included in this configuration.
	 Both
companies had significant exports and imports from the UK.
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nicron described their policy in the following way.
"Any exposure that is greater than $5 mm. is referred to
the HQ and we would take the covering decision here.
Otherwise, the divisions have the option to take spot or
forward from the centre and then we would act as a banker.
But there are some penalties if they don't buy forward
if they sell a receipt that doesn't arrive, then we give
them flexibility If it is, for example, a month late
it's a sweetener to the divisions, but if' they buy spot,
they must do it at the ruling rate."
Alpha's treasurer described its policies in similar terms.
"We are responsible for managing foreign exchange risk in
the UK and we act as a bank to our UK subsidiaries ... but
we won't accept the risk until they have a firm commitment.
As soon as they do, they pass it on to us and we take the
appropriate action ... we just make it normal policy to
hedge firm transactions and they pass them on to us."
It is also interesting to note how the treasurer viewed the
centralisation of the foreign exchange risk management function.
"In treasury, maybe we could decentralise foreign exchange
but we would have to keep borrowing control here.
However, we are essentially a banker and we provide a
cheaper service and a better rate than they would get
elsewhere; in fact, I am absolutely sure about that."
Finally, the treasurer described how foreign exchange risk
management in Alpha had changed over time.
"We've gone through the phase of seeing currency as distinct
and separate from everything else ... its part of the wider
management of each business unit ... it is an illusion to
think that you can centralise one aspect of a decentralised
decision making system ... now we have our cake and eat it
with centralised hedging and the rest of exchange rates are
an integral part of the businesses."
I.B.vI: Liaison with both Overseas
	 Subsidiaries
Rho was the only company in this configuration. 	 Interestingly,
rather than perceiving the HQ treasury as a 'Banker' to
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subsidiaries, this company described itself as a 'Central Banker'
to the whole group. The Central Bank role was described in the
following way:
"Hedging is a trading decision. They are responsible for
budgeted profit and if they feel that they can reach this
comfortably, they're not going to jeopardise it ... they
can ask us or their banks for advice ... the decision is so
important that we might counter it ... but this is quite
rare ... it's their own denision but its our business."
For the most part however, if there was a difference of opinion
between the HQ and the divisions, then the HQ would buy forward
contracts on its own behalf in order to achieve the desired HQ
risk posture. The treasurer was fully aware that this was a
costly exercise, however, he argued that:
"We don't want to interfere with decentralisation.
	
The
strength of decentralisation is enormous here - we couldn't
run a [plant] at all well. People are already doing quite
well and the strength of the business is to allow this to
continue and it is no use attempting to co ordinate them."
However, whilst the treasurer was dedicated to decentralisation,
he also pointed out that:
"Despite the desire to control subsidiaries, we grew by
acquisition and many of' them were publicly quoted, and long
established and so they all have reminiscences of
independence."
I.B.vii: Centralise	 Subsidiaries: Liaison with Overseas
There were five companies within this category, Tau, Sigma,
Omega, Epsilon and Iota. In this section, the practices of the
five companies are examined in turn, and it will be pointed out
that the extent of the liaison with overseas subsidiaries
differed considerably, whereas an in-house banking arrangement
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was used for the UK subsidiaries.
Each of the companies operated on a geographical basis, with a
treasury centre in each country. The treasury centre in each
country acted as a banker to the subsidiaries in that particular
country, and HQ treasury acted as a banker to the UK
subsidiaries, and had some liaison with overseas subsidiaries.
For the most part, liaison was confined to Europe and the US,
with virtually no contact with other foreign subsidiaries.
Iota described the structure in the following way:
"We don't like the operating companies doing their own
thing so we act as a banker to them. So we insist on the
companies coming to us. The foreign subsidiaries have
their own local centres ... the local centres are
responsible for their own hedging and we don't get exposure
information from them because of things like exchange
controls."
The actual banking relationship operated in the following way:
"When the operating company contracts, they come to [HQ] to
buy or sell foreign exchange ... the spot forward decision
depends on the payment terms e.g. if it's due in 90 days,
we would do it for them. At the centre, we take all
these, and they often balance out, and we get a net trading
position.	 Exports are approximately equal to imports
we give them a contract note, just like a bank. We get
our rates straight from Reuter ... indeed many of the
companies have their own Reuter screen for commodities and
this means that they can see that they are getting a fair
rate. We sometimes have problems where they might quote
newspapers at us and they would complain [that] they
weren't getting a fair rate. They seem to think that we
are out to get them."
Liaison with overseas subsidiaries had been modified to some
extent two months prior to the interview. 	 The aim of' the
changes was to centralise the management of exposure on a
European basis.
	 An informal committee was formed of the
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treasurers of the larger European operations, and initially at
any rate, they aimed to reach a joint decision on whether they
should stay long or short in particular currencies. The
committee also discussed the raising of finance, and seemed to
function as a method of decreasing the costs of raising finance.
However, there was no liaison with subsidiaries outside Europe.
Tau had a similar relationship to the UK and overseas
subsidiaries:
"It is a small operation in the UK ... and we act as an in
house bank as well as having some contact with the overseas
divisions.	 All of the UK subsidiaries have no bank or
treasury function.	 Overseas, it depends on the size of
the company, but it should be pointed out that in Germany,
France, Italy and Spain, we have a liaison function. In
each [overseas] company, the finance director and the
treasury executive are the same person. We operate a cash
pooling arrangement in each country and we concentrate the
banking with local banks. 	 The US now accounts for 33% of
turnover.	 It has its own finance HQ (a satellite) and
they do the day to day management there and would have a
dotted line [relationship] with us here. We liaise with
them, particularly in respect of' short run financial and
commercial paper."
Sigma was in a similar position. The treasury department was
responsible mainly for the UK. A netting system was operated
using currency deposit accounts and the treasury acted as a
banker to the divisions by using forward contracts. The company
had a significant proportion of its business in the US, and the
finance HQ in the US was responsible for doing forward cover in
the US.
	 They hoped to move to a current account situation
between the US and the UK but liaison was confined at the time of
the interview to using know-how from the US companies and
applying it in the UK. The treasurer summed up the conversation
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in the following way:
"But, it is really just the UK and we have just one FX
dealer ... the divisions ring him and he sells them a
forward contract ... the divisions are obliged to do so
the main reason for this is to achieve economies of scale."
Epsilon had an active policy of maximising the foreign currency
receipts and payments at the centre by using a reinvoicirig
company.	 Daily contact was maintained between the treasurer in
each significant European country . 	 Every morning, agreement
was reached on the extent of cover which should be maintained in
over twenty currencies between levels of 25% and 75%. Receipts
and payments were sold to the HQ at a forward rate. The forward
rate used was not necessarily related to forward rates avilable
in the market place.
	 Contact was also maintained with the US
subsidiaries.
Omega also operated as a banker to the UK subsidiaries.
Receipts and payments originating in the UK were sold to the
centre at the forward or spot rate and a similar treasury
function operated in the overseas subsidiaries. The policy with
respect to overseas subsidiaries was stated in the following way:
"The basic position that we have now reached is ... Firstly,
the centre would like you to be neutral but we realise that
there may be local knowledge which would mean that taking
an exposure would be superior ... Secondly, you should
realise that you are doing it ... Thirdly we should know
about it."
Given the information on exposures the HQ could then either
contact the local board and suggest that a position should be
rendered neutral, or alternatively, take the opposite action at
the centre.
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I.B.viii: Directives	 jh j	 Overseas ubsidiaries
Until relatively recently, the only company in this category (Mu)
had had an extremely centralised exposure management system.
However, the most important currencies had recently been floated,
and so, centralised trading became more difficult because the
subsidiaries were located in distant time zones. 	 The system
used had been modified by allowing all subsidiaries in both the
UK and overseas to engage in their own trading.
	 However,
specific limits were set in each currency which local treasurers
were not permitted to exceed.
	 The actual levels of exposure
permitted in each currency depended on the quality of the
treasurer, the relationship with the local banking community and
the forecastability of the currency.	 Moreover, all subsidiaries
were expected to submit monthly reports of their positions, and
the limit could be altered in order to change the exposure. 	 It
should however be pointed out that the bulk of this company's
business was overseas in a relatively small number of countries.
Moreover, there was no opportunity to net and the debt ratio of
the company was extremely high.
I.B.ix: Centralised Mana gement	 Overseas	 Subsidiaries
Pi, the most highly centralised company, managed all European
transaction exposures from the Centre. The parent company only
had a 33-50% stake in all other overseas subsidiaries. 	 A
reinvoicing vehicle was based in the UK, using a sophisticated
Qiapter 6: Page 210
European computer network. The system operated in the following
way:
"If one subsidiary has a receipt or payment in a foreign
currency, they input it into the data-base and then we
apply the forward rate in the local currency of the company
against the invoice currency."
Timely exposure reports were then available in order to allow the
UK treasurer to net currencies, as well as being able to treat
EMS currencies as a bloc.	 Moreover, it was possible to take a
consistent view on exchange rate forecasts, and apply it to both
actual and forecasted positions.
	 Finally, since this
information was available at the centre, leading and lagging
using financial instruments was possible.
I.C: Conclusions
In this section, the involvement of HQ treasuries in the
management of transaction exposure was classified and compared
with the results of previous studies. Each company was then
examined individually, using excerpts from interviews with HQ
treasurers. In the following section, this data is interpreted
and an attempt is made to explain the practices within a
transaction cost framework.
II: Explaining the Management of Transaction Exposure
In this section an attempt is made to explain why different
companies have different degrees of HQ involvement in the
management of transaction exposure. 	 In section II.A,
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the management of transaction exposure in a world with no
transaction costs is examined. The analysis is then extended
to a world with transaction costs in section II.B, and the
results of the analysis are compared with actual practices In
section II.C.
II.A: Managing Transaction Exposure with Trivial Transaction
Costs
Ass e:
1 •	 A unique exchange rate and forward rate for each currency.
2. A unique worldwide real cost of capital, and the Fisher
effect holds.
3. Each individual In the organisatlon has Identical risk-
return preferences.
Z.	 There are no information asymmetries in the organisation.
5. The organisatlon does not have superior forecasting ability.
6. All individuals are risk neutral.
Assumption 1 implies that there are no bid-ask spreads in foreign
exchange markets, and that at any point in time the exchange rate
In any location, for any size of transaction will be the same.
Assumption 2 implies that borrowing and lending rates will be the
same in all currencies after allowing for expected exchange rate
changes and correction for biases in the forward rate, and that
there are no barriers to capital market entry. 	 Assumptions 3,
and 5 ensure that there are no Internal control problems and
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assumption 6 Is a convenient simplifying assumptiorL.	 If all six
asssumptions hold, then there would be no HQ involvement in the
management of foreign exchange risk.	 Moreover, positions would
be left uncovered, since the use of the forward market may
involve a risk premium. 	 In the following paragraphs, the
implications of progressively relaxing these assumptions are
discussed.
II.A.i: Risk Averse Individuals
If the individuals in the firm are equally risk averse, then they
will need to decide whether they wish to hedge transaction
exposure.	 Under assumptions 1 and 2, the costs of a forward
market and a money market hedge will be identical and the costs
of hedging will depend on the risk premium included in the
forward rate. The costs of internal techniques will be
evaluated relative to this risk premium and netting will not be
uzed as an internal technique since the risk premia will cancel
one another out.	 In this situation, there is no role for HQ
involvement since risk preferences are identical throughout the
organisation.	 The only internal technique which would require
central intervention is netting and this would not result in any
cost savings.
IA.ii: Non-Identical Risk Return Preferences
Even if the risk preferences of the subsidiary differ from those
of the HQ, there is still no role for central intervention in
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FERM.	 Since there are no information asymmetries, the HQ will
know the subsidiary exposures and the extent to which these
exposures have been hedged. The HQ may attain its own desired
risk-return preferences by either purchasing or selling
currencies forward.
II.A.iii:	 Presence	 Information Asymmetries
If there are information asymmetries, then there is a
justification for a liaison role, since the HQ will need
information about subsidiary exposures in order to attain its
preferred risk-return position.
II.A.iv: Superior Forecastinz Ability
If the firm has superior forecasting ability, then it will be
necessary to ensure that this Information is communicated
throughout the organisatlon. However, there is no
justification for Increasing central Intervention beyond a
liaison role since, in the absence of transaction costs, HQ and
subsidiary units may communicate forecasts and exposures by
liaising with one another, and the desired risk-return
preferences of the HQ may be attained without interfering with
subsidiary autonomy.
II.A.v: Conc1usion
In the previous paragraphs, It has been argued that there is no
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scope for central intervention in the management of transaction
exposure beyond a liaison role, if there are no transaction costs
in foreign exchange markets. This proposition holds even if
risk-return preferences differ, there are information
asymmetries, and the firm has superior forecasting ability.
There is one possible caveat to this result, the costs of
liaising and internal communication may be non-trivial.
However, one would expect that the costs of liaising are less
than the costs of increased central intervention.
II.B: Managing Transaction Exposure in the Presence of
Transaction Costs
It was argued in section ILA that central intervention in the
management of transaction exposure, beyond a liaison role, is
unnecessary if the following conditions hold:
1. There is a unique worldwide exchange rate
2. There is a unique worldwide real interest rate, and the
Fisher effect holds.
In section ILB.i, the implications of a non-unique exchange rate
are examined.	 The possibility of non-unique exchange rates is
discussed in section II.B.ii.
II.B.i: Non-Uni q ue Exchange Rates
Non-unique exchange rates manifest themselves in a number of
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ways.	 Firstly, in order to facilitate trading and
intermediation in foreign exchange markets, there will be bid-ask
spreads.	 Secondly, the bid-ask spreads, as a percentage of the
amount traded, may be greater for smaller amounts.
	 Finally, due
to communication costs, rates may vary spatially.	 For example,
rates available in regional banks may not be as competitive as
the rates available in major financial centres. There are two
cases which are of particular interest, the MNC with no netting
opportunities and the MNC with netting oppotunities.
fl.B.i.a: fl	 without Netting ODortunities
If the MNC has no netting opportunities, then there may be a
justification for moving beyond the liaison role. The presence
of bid-ask spreads implies that the centre may not be prepared to
offset the actions of subsidiaries in order to attain its own
desired risk-return profile. 	 One would expect that the issue
of general guidelines would facilitate the centre's desire to
articulate its risk-return preferences. Moreover, if'
transaction costs vary spatially or are a function of size, there
may be a case for consolidating exposures at the centre in order
to achieve economies of scale and access to the most competitive
market prices.
While the presence of' bid-ask spreads explains the presence of
general guidelines, and the existence of transaction costs which
are size related or vary spatially, it is difficult to understand
the use of specific directives.	 There are three possible
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rationales for the use of specific directives.	 Firstly, the
firm may have superior forecasting ability and wish to ensure
that corporate forecasts were reflected in hedging decisions.
However, in this situation, it would be equally possible to
communicate a forecast rather than a directive.	 Secondly, by
requiring operating units to contact the centre when transactions
exceed a stated amount, the centre may be ensuring that the
subsidiary has located the most competitive exchange rates
available.	 Thirdly, directives to take specific actions in
specific currencies may simply reflect the centre's desired risk-
return preferences, since some currencies are more volatile than
others.
II.B.i.b: 
.fli. 1N with Netting Opportunities
The case for centralised action is strengthened considerably by
the presence of netting opportunities. 	 f it is possible to
net exposures arising in autonomous operating units at the
centre, then the MNC can economise on the bid-ask spreads. 	 One
would expect that centralised action is more likely if intra-
subsidiary netting opportunities are available.
LB.ii Non-Unicue Interest Rates
Non-unique interest rates may manifest themselves in a variety of
ways.	 Firstly, there may be differences between lending and
borrowing rates.	 Secondly, the difference between borrowing
and lending rates may be greater for smaller transactions.
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Thirdly, there may be geographically segmented money markets.
It is'quite possible, under these circumstances, that there will
be a rationale for HQ interference in the management of
transaction exposure, since the HQ may find the money market
hedge more economical than the forward hedge.
II.B.iii: Conclusions
In this section, it has been argued that the presence of
transaction costs may represent a rationale for increased HQ
involvement in the management of transaction exposure. This
rationale is based upon the ability of the HQ to economise on
transaction costs by netting exposures, consolidating exposures
and the use of hedging techniques other than the forward market.
It was also argued that the use of specific directives and
general guidelines ensures that HQ risk-return preferences are
reflected in operating unit decision making.
	 It should be
pointed out that increased central involvement may not be
costless.	 Costs will include communication costs and the
intangible costs of interference with sub-unit autonomy. In the
following section, this analysis is compared with the description
of practices in section I.
II. C: Implications of the Analysis
In the previous section, three motives (netting, consolidation
and hedging technique) for increased HQ involvement in FERM were
suggested.	 In this section, each of' these motives Is examined
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with respect to observed practices. The costs of
centralisation are then examined and an attempt is made to
explain why there is less HQ involvement in transactions arising
overseas.
The. Netting Motive
It was asserted in section ILB that centralised action is
unlikely in cases where there is no opportunity to economise on
transaction costs at the centre. 	 In this section, it is shown
that practice is consistent with this hypothesis. In table 6.k,
the opportunity to net and the presence of centralised action for
exposures arising in the UK are summarised.
table 6. lL Netting pp ortunities .g, Centralised Action
Netting	 Netting	 Total
Possible	 Unlikely
Centre takes
Action	 8	 0	 8
Subsidiary	 5	 5	 10
takes Action
Total	 13	 5	 18
Using the Fisher Exact Probability Test, the probability of
observing this ocourence, if centralised action were a random
event, is 2.9. One might conclude that there is a relationship
between the presence of netting opportunities and centralised
action.	 However, this relationship becomes more convincing when
one examines the five companies which did not take centralised
action but did have netting opportunities.
The treasurers in Zeta, Delta and Lambda all intended
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centralising the management of transaction exposure. Both Zeta
and Lambda were in the process of altering the degree of central
involvement and had retained the services of' management
consultants. The treasurer in Delta had been trying
unsuccessfully, for the previous twelve years, to increase the
involvement of the treasury.
The two companies which had access to netting opportunities but
did not intend centralising were Mu and Psi. 	 Whilst Mu did not
have a formal centralised system, the treasurer argued that there
were only sporadic netting opportunities and that the HQ did
attempt to locate intra-subsidiary netting opportunities when the
need arose. Psi was the most diverse company in the sample,
and no attempt had been made at the centre to facilitate intra-
subsidiary netting.
II.C.11:	 Consolidation Motive
The consolidation motive was cited by many of the companies using
a centralised facility as another reason for centralising the
management of transaction exposure. However, there was no
company which had used centralised action and did not have
netting opportunities (see Table 6.k).
	
Two companies (Mu and
Beta) did not have netting opportunities but had operated a
centralised system in earlier years. Both companies now use a
system of' specific directives. Beta had reached an agreement
with its bank which permitted realisation of' the consolidation
opportunities without using a regime of centralised action.
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The agreement with the bank granted preferential rates on small
transactions to Beta's operating units. Mu had been in a
position of obtaining better rates in the London market than its
foreign subsidiaries could obtain in local markets, but when the
currencies of its operating subsidiaries were floated, the
benefits decreased considerably.
II.C.iii: I1	 echniaue Motive
The technique motive was not evident in any of the interviews,
however, seven of' the companies (Tau, Sigma, Omega, Epsilon, Iota
and P1) which used centralised action made extensive use of both
money market Instruments and forward contracts for hedging.
The choice between the two techniques depended upon both
International money market conditions and tax considerations.
II.C.iv: .Th.. Costs 	 Centralisation
There are two types of' cost which may act as barriers to
centralisation. 	 Firstly, there are the costs of communicating
both policy and exposures within the organisation. 	 Secondly,
If' there is central involvement beyond a liaison role, operating
unit autonomy may be decreased. Whilst the former cost was
trivial for UK transactions, interference with divisional
autonomy was a recurring theme in the Interviews (see excerpts in
section I). The Issue of' minlmising Interference with operating
unit autonomy is dicsussed in the following paragraphs.
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All of the companies which operated a regime of centralised
action used an in-house bank mechanism. The mechanism permits
the decoupling of operating decisions and transaction exposure
management considerations. In many respects, it is similar to
a transfer pricing mechanism since exposures are transferred at
market prices (Epsilon was the only company which did not use
market-based prices) to the central treasury. Moreover,
communication costs are minimised since the sub-unit would incur
similar costs if It transacted externally, and the treasury need
only Insist upon transactions being executed Internally in order
to impose the HQ's risk-return preferences on the management of
foreign exchange risk. While the in-house bank may be
consistent with the M-Form hypothesis, subsidiaries were required
(in all cases but two) to purchase forward contracts. This was
justified by the need to maximise netting opportunities by
altering the timing of cash flows.
II.C.v: Overseas SubsidiarIes
As pointed out in section I, thirteen of the sample companies
had greater HQ involvement In exposures arising In the UK. One
would expect that there would be considerable transaction cost
savings arising from global foreign exchange risk management.
The main barriers to global FERM arise from political, geographic
and Informational considerations. However, it is also argued
In section II.C.v.d that a number of' companies have used
reinvoicing tactics to minimise the exposure of their overseas
marketing affiliates.
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ILCvi Political Considerations
Political considerations may be important for a number of
reasons. Firstly, the parent may only have a 50% stake in
foreign subsidiaries, and any attempt to interfere with the day-
to-day running of the subsidiary may be frowned upon by the local
shareholders.	 Many of the companies had subsidiaries -
in countries which required local participation (e.g. India,
Nigeria and South America), and there were also operational
reasons for non wholly owned subsidiaries. 	 Secondly, host
governments may view a HQ involvement in local subsidiaries as
unnecessary interference and a threat to domestic policy. This
would be particularly likely if the local government was
attempting to enforce exchange controls, or alternatively if the
local government suspected that transactions were not being
translated at an arms length rate.
II.C.v.b: Informational Considerations
Informational considerations arise since it is quite possible
that local subsidiaries have superior forecasting ability. This
may be the case where the currency in which the local subsidiary
operates constitutes only a small proportion of group exposure,
but a significant proportion of the subsidiary exposure. 	 It is
highly unlikely that scarce HQ resources will be allocated to
the task of forecasting an Insignificant currency.
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Apart from poor HQ forecasting ability, virtually all of the MNCs
had virtually no exposure reporting system for foreign
subsidiaries, and the resources available at HQ were often
inadequate. For example, Nu used manual procedures to
consolidate Its annual accounts, while Gamma invoiced in Sterling
If possible because Its computer could not cope with foreign
currencies.	 Omega and P1 were the only companies with formal
international exposure information systems. Pi used a European
computer network to facilitate a sophisticated European
reinvoicing system (see section I.B.ix) and European exposure
reports were available on a daily basis. Omega introduced a
reporting system while the research was in progress, and some of
the difficulties they encountered are summarised in the following
paragraph.
Omega decided that it was necessary to gather information on the
exposures of foreign subsidiaries, as a first step towards
managing exposure on a global basis. It was decided that
information should be collected on the foreign currency
denominated assets (including stocks) and liabilities (including
forward contracts) of each subsidiary on a quarterly basis. The
first problem encountered was that following the initial, request
for a report, the information did not begin to materialise for a
considerable time. Three months after the initial request and a
reminder, one or two subsidiaries had not yet provided the
information. Moreover, there were considerable difficulties
reconciling the numbers in the ad hoc report to financial
accounting information provided by the subsidiaries. 	 For
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example, the financial accounts suggested an exposure of' one
subsidiary of about $250,000, and the reported exposure was $1.5
billion.	 In addition, the HQ had only allowed for numbers of up
to 7 digits in the software. As it turned out, exposures of
some subsidiaries in some currencies exceeded seven digits.
Furthermore, semantic problems arose because a foreign currency
asset to the HQ may not be a foreign currency asset to a
subsidiary operating in that currency. Finally, the treasury
department did not know how to interpret or use the information
once it became available.
The treasurer of Tau had considered the introduction of worlwide
netting, however his attempts came to nought because of
Informational and political co nsiderati ens.
"It's a chicken and an egg without full information on each
company's exposures, can't do much and don't know every
detail ... It would require too much information and also
[named industry] exports are sensitive politically, and
therefore [we] would need to exclude some and this would
mean that we could not introduce netting ... also there
were strong in house objections to it ... we don't have a
lot of two way flows."
LC.v.c: GeoraDhic Considerations
Geographical considerations will influence the costs of
communicating with the HQ. If the internal bank mechanism is
used, there may be significant costs In communicating with HQ in
order to purchase and confirm the purchase of a contract. These
problems will be exacerbated by factors such as differences in
time zones and language differences. An alternative miit be to
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report exposure on a periodic basis to the HQ, but this could
also be a costly exercise.
II.C.v.d:	 Foreizn Marketing Subsidiary
Eleven companies used wholly-owned foreign marketing subsidiaries
to sell products manufactured in the UK. Six of these companies
(Lambda, Alpha, Omicron, P1, Delta and Epsilon) invoiced their
foreign marketing affiliates in foreign currency while the other
five (Gamma, Iota, Tau, Beta and Rho) invoiced foreign affiliates
in Sterling. Three of the six companies (Alpha, Delta and
Epsilon) were primarily UK based manufacturers, and the use of
invoice policy resulted in he UK accounting for a
disproportionate amount of the MNCs' transaction exposure.
II.D: Concluslonz'
In this section, an attempt was made to explain why different
MNCs have different degrees of HQ intervention in the management
of transaction exposure. 	 It was argued that If there were no
transaction costs in foreign exchange markets, then a liaison
role would ensure that the desired risk return preferences of the
HQ could be attained. 	 In the presence of transaction costs, it
was argued that there would be three motives for increased
centralisation, the consolidation, netting and technique motives.
However, It was also argued that centralisation may be costly,
since It will entail increased communication costs and interfere
with divisional autonomy.	 The data in section I were used to
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examine this hypothesis, and it would seem that the netting
motive dominates.	 It was also shown that companies which use
centralised action chose an in-house bank structure which
minimises interference with divisional autonomy. 	 The fact that
there is less HQ involvement in transactions arising in overseas
subsidiaries (see Table 6.1) was attributed to geographical,
political and informational considerations. 	 However, it was
also argued that the degree of involvement in transactions
arising in overseas subsidiaries may be underestimated in Table
6.1 since a number of companies invoice their foreign marketing
subsidiaries in foreign currency.
III: Implications of the Netting Motive
In this section two issues are discussed. 	 Firstly, in the
previous section it was argued that the sample of companies acted
as if they were minimising transaction costs. 	 Obviously, it
would be premature to accept this finding, given that it was
based on a limited sample of multinational companies. 	 In the
first part of this section, the prospects for testing this
hypothesis are examined. Secondly, apart from explaining why
companies behave in a certain manner, it is also necessary to
attempt to predict how they will behave in the future. In the
second part of this section, some predictions which are
consistent with the hypothesis are examined.
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111.1: Th. Testability	Hvoothesis
The basic hypothesis is that ceteris paribus a relationship
exists between centralised action and transaction costs.
Therefore, centralised action is unlikely to be found in
situations where transaction costs are trivial. 	 Conversely,
when transaction costs are material, one would expect to observe
a greater degree of centralised action, provided that netting
opportunities existed, in order to produce cost savings.
The main variables one might attempt to observe would be the
availability of netting opportunities, and the degree of central
action.	 This could then be tested using cross sectional data.
In order to examine the impact of transaction costs, the study
could be extended to MNCs located in different countries with
different levels of transaction costs.
	 One would expect to
observe a greater degree of centralised action in countries where
transaction costs are highest.
III.ii: Predictions Consiste
Of the 18 companies with significant transaction exposures which
were surveyed, 50% of the companies were in the position of
either intending to increase the amount of centralised action, or
alternatively, in the process of increasing the amount of
centralised action.	 Soenen and Aggarwal [1985] found that 51%
of the UK companies that they surveyed expected the degree of
centralisation to increase.	 The results are therefore broadly
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similar.
Given that transaction costs are expected to remain constant, and
netting opportunities have not altered, one would expect that the
surveyed companies expect the costs of a centralised facility to
decrease. This is probably quite a realistic assumption, given
the impact of more efficient and less costly communications
technologies.	 However, it is based on the assumption that
market transaction costs have not altered. One would expect
that more efficient and less costly communication technologies
would also have an impact on the transaction costs in financial
markets.	 The real issue will be the extent to which the cost
benefit equation will change. If transaction costs (fixed
transaction fees and bid ask spreads) fall substantially in
foreign exchange markets, one would expect that the companies
with relatively low netting opportunities should revert to a
decentralised system. 	 Conversely, if the cost of the central
facility decreases s.ubstantially, then a greater degree of
centralised action would be expected. Therefore, an increase in
the amount of centralised action in the future is not necessarily
a foregone conclusion.
IV: Sunmary and Conclusions
In this chapter the role of the HQ treasury in the management of
transaction exposure has been examined. The practices of a
sample of 20 UK MNCs were summarised and the results were found
to be similar to those of Collier and Davis [1985].
	
A set of
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criteria for identifying the degree of HQ treasury involvement
was suggested, and the classification system used was justified
by using excerpts from interviews with HQ treasurers.
The degree of HQ involvement was explained by using a transaction
cost framework. It was argued that three are three motives
for centralisation, netting, consolidation and the availability
of alternative hedging techniques. 	 However, there may be costs
to increased centralisation arising from the need to communicate
exposures and directives, and the possibility of interference
with operating unit autonomy. In practice, it would seem that
the netting motive dominates the centralisation decision and that
the possibility of interference with sub-unit autonomy is
ameliorated by using an in-house bank. It was also shown that
there was less central involvement in transactions arising in
overseas subsidiaries, and it was argued that this was due to the
existence of political, geographic and informational
considerations.
It was also claimed that the netting motive was capable of
verification using cross sectional data. In addition, it was
argued (if' the netting motive is valid) that despite treasurers'
desires to increase the degree of centralised action, there may
be a case for decreasing the degree of centralised action, should
market transaction costs decrease in the future.
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APTER 7
ECONC4IC EXPOSURE AND THE HQ TREASURER
In the previous chapter, the role of the HQ treasurer in the
management of transaction exposure was discussed. In this
chapter, the roles of the HQ treasurer in the management of
economic exposure are identified. 	 In the first section of this
chapter HQ treasury involvement in the management of economic
exposure is described. It is argued in the second section that
HQ treasury Involvement is minimal and some of the barriers to
treasury involvement are discussed.
I: The Management of Econc.dc Exposure
In this section, the role of the HQ treasury in the management of
economic exposure in the twenty companies Is examined. In
chapter 3, It was pointed out that foreign currency options
permit the immunisation of some forms of economic exposure.
Corporate uses of foreign currency options are described in
section l.A.	 One might also expect that treasurers may have
some input in both financing and investment decisions which
influence the economic exposure of the MNC.
	 This issue is
examined in section I.B. It was also found that some treasurers
had attempted to manage economic exposure explicitly, and their
experiences are described in section I.C.
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I.A: Corporate Uses of Foreign Currency Options
Rather than the treasurer being involved in the management of
foreign currency denominated transactions only after they arise,
it has been suggested (e.g. Kenyon [1981]) that the treasurer
should become involved in transaction exposures before they are
realised. The advent of foreign currency options might be
expected to facilitate this process, since binomial economic
exposures may be protected with foreign currency options. In
this section, the use of foreign currency options for the
protection of foreign currency tenders, foreign currency price
lists and other contingent exposures is discussed.
I.A.i: Forei gn Currency Tenders
Tendering is obviously limited to companies involved in large
supply contracts. Only four companies were involved in
contracting which would involve tenders (Psi, Sigma, Gamma and
Beta), and Psi confined itself to UK contracting. 	 Moreover,
Gamma was the only company involved in contracts which were
sufficiently large and long term that an adverse change in
exchange rates could have catastrophic effects on the firm. In
the following paragraphs, the practices of the companies are
descibed.
Sigma had a centralised in-house bank. 	 The company had
commenced selling foreign currency options to its subsidiaries,
and sold them in a similar way to forward contracts. 	 The
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treasurer described the use of options in the following way:
"We provide them to the divisions for hedging risks. This
Is for uncertain cash flows ... mostly it is in bidding
situations and also for some foreign earnings and we don't
lay them off ... it's really like an insurance policy but
we would look at each one individually ... We don't use the
Black-Scholes model, but there may be opportunities ... We
send out instructions [to the divisions] on how to deal
with foreign currency and we have a lot of personal contact
there are a lot of misunderstandings and there is also
a lot of bank hype ... We use them mainly for tendering
We would have equipment sourced from everywhere and use
options on both sides and there has been no occasion where
we have laid them off in the market"
Beta (which used specific directives for transaction exposure)
realised that currency options could be potentially applied in
tender situations but felt that they were currently too
expensive; for this reason, no options had been purchased to
date.	 One of the difficulties with the use of options in Beta
(as far as the HQ was concerned) was that exposure was not deemed
to arise until a firm contract existed.
Gamma undertook extremely large foreign currency denominated
contract work. The company used options sporadically for
contracts, however they also used internal techniques to minimise
the period of exposure.	 The internal technique consisted of
not setting a foreign currency price until the company had been
shortlisted for the tender, and including an expiration date in
the bid document.	 The company would then purchase an option to
protect itself during the period of exposure. The treasurer
could not say if the policy of minimising the exposure had an
adverse effect on the company's competitiveness, since there were
many considerations other than price in an overseas tender and
one never knew when a tender was lost whether one was second or
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twelfth.
Gamma also had a policy which required that all foreign currency
contracts should be examined by the treasurer. This policy
ensured that the treasurer had examined the foreign currency
aspects of the contract.	 In general, all contracts were covered
in the forward market if the bid was successful.
	 The role of
the treasurer was essentially advisory and he did not have the
power to interfere with divisional decisions.
One might conclude by saying that foreign currency options have
not been used in the classic tender situation. This is due to
the relatively recent availability of foreign currency options,
the difficulties of incorporating options within a system of
specific directives and the availability of internal techniques.
However, there was only one company in the sample that was
extremely dependent on tendering, and it is possible that it is
unrepresentative of other companies in a similar situation.
I.A.ii: Forei gn Currency Price Lists
In many respects, foreign currency price lists are similar to
foreign currency tenders since they involve setting a price in
foreign currency and receiving an uncertain amount of foreign
currency at some future date.	 However, the period of exposure
arising from a price list may be a year long, but sales to a
single country are unlikely to form a significant proportion of
sales or profits.	 It was argued in chapter four that a single
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foreign currency option will immunise the exposure arising from a
foreign currency price list only if demand for the product is
extremely price elastic.
The use of price lists varied from company to company, since some
companies were involved in markets where there was no such thing
as a price list, or alternatively where there was a world market
price and the firm was a price-taker. Six companies issued
price lists in foreign currency, but none of the treasurers had
any involvement in pricing decisions. 	 Only two of the six
treasurers (Alpha and Phi) realised that options could be used to
Immunise this form of exposure, and both companies were selling
products which were relatively price elastic. However, whilst
both treasurers realised that there was a potential use for
options in this situation, neither treasurer had operationalised
the concept.	 For example, the treasurer in Alpha described the
problem in the following way:
"With a lot of the exposure, It is much more fuzzy than
academics, management consultants and bankers make out.
For example, when we are selling to Sweden, we must Invoice
In local currency.	 We have to react to the customers.
Unlike what people like you say, we don't have any choice
in the matter. Therefore as soon as we draw up a price
list, we are exposed, but we don't have any orders yet so
at that moment the business is carrying the risk, but we
won't accept the risk until they have a firm commitment
We may be able to use options as the market develops, but
this may prove expensive, so we will probably leave the
purchase of options up to the commercial units ... but this
will be reviewed as the need arises."
He added that:
"We don't get Involved with them on price lists ... that is
a risk for them ... It Is part of being in business."
The evidence would suggest that foreign currency options had not
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been used for covering foreign currency price lists, but it is
possible that since the field worlewas carried out, they have
been applied in some of these companies.
X.A.iii: Miscellaneous Annlications
A number of companies were considering applying foreign currency
options to exposures other than price lists and foreign currency
tenders.	 The applications included the sale of subdidiaries,
uncertain orders and the use of options as an alternative to
forward contracts.	 Each of the applications is considered in
the following paragraphs.
I.A.lii.a: Disinvestment
Omicron had recently agreed to sell a relatively large overseas
subsidiary to a local entrepreneur. 	 The treasurer was
considering the use of an option in order to protect the company
until the host country government consented to the sale.
Agreement had been reached to sell the subsidiary once before and
the host country government had not consented to the sale. 	 It
was likely to be three months before the host government would
make a decision and the sale was denominated in US dollars.
I.A.iii.b: Uncertain Orders
The treasurer of Delta saw a potential role for options in coping
with uncertain orders.
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"It [options] also interests us where we have an annual
schedule of orders but we don't know when during the year
and options would make sense for a part of this business
and then Ewe would] replace [them] with forward contracts
on the actual ... [this is] very important because the
schedules have a fixed foreign currency price. We would
ceritralise this because the divisions wouldn't understand
it."
In many respects, this application is similar to the use of
options for foreign currency tenders and price lists, except that
only a subset of the orders would be used as a basis for
determining the quantity of options to purchase.
I.A.iii.c: ODtions	 Substitutes j2 . Forward Cntracts
Two companies (Omega and Omicron) were considering selling
foreign currency options to operating units as a substitute for
forward contracts, and as an instrument to cover contingent
exposures.
Omicron's treasurer described his position in the following way:
"We have not told the divisions about options, but we may
start it up as a service to the divisions and write options
it's where the money is, like insurance ... but [we
would] need to be sophisticated ... for example, I have no
real time information on our exposure."
Omega had purchased software to generate option prices in order
to sell foreign currency options to operating units, however
sales of options had not commenced. Omega was also considering
the use of options to protect dividend payments from foreign
affiliates in order that there would be some upside potential.
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I.A.iv: Conclusions
While the advent of foreign currency options of fers significant
new opportunities for corporate treasurers to become involved in
hedging economic exposures, there was little evidence of their
widespread use in FERM at the time the interviews were
conducted.
I. B: The Investment and Financing Decisions
In the long run, the investment and financing decisions may be
used to alter the exposure of the MNC (see chapter four). In
this section, the involvement of the treasurer in the financing
and investment decisions is described, and the incorporation of
exchange rate considerations within these decisions is also
examined.
I.B.i .fl. Investment Decision
In this part, the inclusion of exchange rates in investment
decisions is discussed. One would expect that treasurers might
be concerned about investment proposals which had a considerable
degree of economic exposure.	 For the most part, companies
seemed to be guided by general stategic considerations, rather
than the output of investment models. 	 Involvement of' the
treasurer varied from none whatsoever to some input into the
process.
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In some companies, there was little or no knowledge of how
investment decisions were made.	 For example, one treasurer
replied:
"We do have an investment controller, but there is very
little interplay between me and him. I'm not even sure
how investments are justified ... it's probably crude."
[iicron]
Alternatively, exchange rates were seen as an insignificant
factor in the investment decision process.
"It depends on the investment ... we look at the investment
the choice of location and the exchange rate may come
in later ... but the main market will be the main
consideration ... If it were the US market then we would go
to the US and we wouldn't locate in the UK and sell 90% to
the US. If it were a world market, we would look at
different locations ... but the main rule is to locate
where the market is.	 The exchange rate is not a major
factor but it is a factor."
[Delta]
Similarly, another treasurer said that:
"The company sees needs for investment and we don't have
choice as to location"
[Beta]
Another treasurer described investment decisions:
"[It is] not incorporated ... the exchange rate is very low
down ... see it as a long run investment."
[Rho]
Some companies maintained that exchange rate considerations
should be incorporated in investment decisions:
"Exchange rates are always part of the process ... now with
the increasing volatility of exchange rates, we will pay
more attention to them, for example, the vulnerability of
the currency and the ability to remit profits."
[Zeta]
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These excerpts are representative of' the vast majority of the
companies in the sample.	 When treasurers were asked about the
investment decision, they were either unsure about the techniques
used or maintained that it was a strategic decision. 	 Even firms
which used technically sophisticated appraisal techniques failed
to incorporate exchange rate effects other than the effect of
exchange rate changes on the translated value of expected
dividends. Only two companies (Phi and Sigma) attempted to
incorporate more sophisticated exchange rate analyses into
capital investment appraisal.
Phi's investment appraisal system included a sophisticated
financial model for evaluating the effects of exchange rate
changes on the sourcing and financing of capital investments.
However, the results of the analysis were not fully incorporated
into the investment decision. For example, the treasurer
described how an investment was made in a South American country
which was adversely affected by exchange rate changes.
"They [the investment appraisal techniques] were sound. We
used DCF •.. we include country and exposure risk in the
cost of capital but [name of' country] could not be
assessed.	 [The exchange rate change was unexpected]
we built in some devaluation but there were political
problems with the plant and political disagreements and
people in the organisation had an interest in this."
Sigma was the only company which explicitly incorporated the
effects of exchange rate changes on project cash flows into the
analysis of prospective investments. The treasurer was asked
about a particular recent investment in the US which had been
badly affected by the strength of the dollar.
"The [treasury] team work with corporate planning ... the
thapter 7: Page 2IO
worst business is [a US subsidiary] ... there is import
penetration and decreased exports, leading to rockbottom
prices.	 There is not much that we can do ... it is just
an economic fact of life ... there are a lot of assets in
the US and we benefit from the cash flow from this in
dollar terms ... though if we had [fore]seen this, we may
not have invested in it [i.e. US subsidiary]."
The treasurer was then asked about the investment appraisal
techniques which were used:
"We do sensitivity analysis and so on ... it is very
important to be sophisticated in our business and we
include inflation and exchange rate scenarios in our
analysis ... we just didn't foresee such a scenario ... We
are also assesssing the competition much more ... it's a
subjective thing."
One might conclude by saying that cases may arise where the
investment appraisal process is a ritual and the decision has to
large extent been made in terms of whether the proposal may be
integrated with existing strategies. In cases where financial
analysis is used to guide investment decisions, the actual
treatment of exchange rate changes is limited to the effects of'
exchange rate changes on translated cash flows to the parent.
Even when sophisticated financial analysis is used unanticipated
exchange rate changes may occur which were not incorporated into
the investment decision process in the first place.
I.B.11: Exchange Rate changes .an,	 Financing Decision
In chapter four, it was pointed out that both the Hodder [1982]
and the Srinivasulu [1983] models relied on alterations in the
denomination of debt as techniques for the management of' economic
exposure. In this part some of the considerations in the
currency of denomination .deoision are examined.
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The basic policy guiding the currency of denomination decisions
for borrowings was to match local assets and liabilities.
	 In
all, thirteen companies pursued this basic strategy. 	 Seven
companies made some use of this policy, but it was then modified
to take account of specific local conditions such as exchange
controls, local inflation, interest rates and taxes.
	 One
company was attempting to move from the basic matching position,
to a position which would optimise on as many counts as possible.
There were many reasons for the adoption of the policy of
matching assets and liabilities.	 For example, one company had
an extremely highly publicised financing mismatch in the
seventies.	 Considerable losses had been made due to the
mismatch, and their current policy was described in the following
terms.
"We hedge the balance sheet through borrowing ._ we do not
seek publicity"
[Tau]
More often than not, debt policy was not actively managed, and
was solved as a sequential problem on a piecemeal basis.
"We look at the consolidated balance sheet and try not to
borrow unless there are equivalent assets [in that country]
we would not touch Swiss Francs ... we used Deutsche
Marks for a major acquisition in Germany ... in the US we
used dollars ... we also balance dollar borrowings with
dollar assets ... we had some dollar borrowing from pre
exchange control days for Australia and South Africa
the links between these currencies are more tenuous now so
that when the US acquisition came up we re-assessed our
position vis a vis the dollar borrowing."
[Zeta]
Even companies which claimed that they were unconcerned with
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translation exposure pursued a policy of matching assets and
liabilities.
"We don't cover it [translation exposure]. Stockholders
know that we have overseas operations when they buy our
shares and so we must ask if they would want us to lay off
the risk. They want involvement in overseas countries.
We do try and get an overall world gearing ratio and we try
to maintain this in individual countries ... we look at our'
borrowings relative to our assets and hedge if they were
above or below a certain level. Of course this is also
concerned with economic exposure ... however, we are not
concerned with paying cash to protect a reported position."
[Alpha]
Some companies did however modify the matching rule for a variety
of reasons.	 For example, two companies (Kappa and Phi) were
relatively exposed to hyper inflationary economies. 	 They still
pursued the basic matching rule but modified it in the following
ways.
"Companies in Israel can borrow hard currency, dollars,
sterling and DM and then service it out of Shekel earnings
and this leads to a sensible interest coupon ... also
'linkage' in Israel ... borrowing is linked to the
inflation index. Therefore it is a mix of linkage and US
financing ... living with inflation is a problem."
[Kappa]
"We try to match borrowings and assets ... in the States
this is 90% ... it is too much and it is due to the fact
that we are starting up there. In [two named countries],
we have limited matching because it is easier to get
dollars there than local currency. 	 Therefore, we match
75% if possible."
[Phi]
Another barrier to matching was the existence of exchange
controls.
"The main exposure is in [a foreign currency], however we
can't cover this because of exchange controls in [foreign
country].
	
Therefore we try to circumvent this by
decreasing net worth.
	
[We intend] to change the credit
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terms between the UK and [foreign country] so that [foreign
currency] borrowing will increase and therefore decrease
exposure."
[Lanibda]
A number of other companies attempted to minimise financing costs
by modifying the matching rules to take account of taxes,
interest rates and exchange rates. For example, one company was
prepared to consider altering financing if exchange rates
changed.
"The exchange rate is fundamental to financing. The broad
rule is to match ... no rule is Immutable and if the dollar
stood at two point four we might look at it differently."
[Psi]
Another company was prepared to go a stage further and take
positions.
"In the long run we don't hedge the balance sheet because we
are a true multinational with manufacturing around the
world ... therefore we leave the currency exposure In any
currency and gear up the subsidiaries to the same level
but this varies for tax and exchange control reasons
and within this we take a view ... we have confidence in
our ability to forecast in the long run, but not in the
short run."
[Sigma]
However, It would be fair to conclude that by and large,
companies were not concerned with exposure considerations when
financing decisions were made. Decisions were guided by the
assets in particular countries, with adjustments to the basic
policy in order either to adapt to host country conditions, or in
two cases, to take positions in foreign currencies. One
treasurer was keen to go out on a limb on financing, but had not
done so to date:
"I prefer to have aggressive treasury management: take a
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view on currencies ... for example, DM finance would be
more successful in the last three years ... stable interest
rates ... so we might get into DM, but there were the
lessons of the early seventies. The DM is extreme and we
shouldn't be constrained because our assets are in the US."
[Rho]
However, this decision was guided by the minimisation of
financing costs rather than the management of foreign exchange
risk.	 While the debt policies of the companies may appear
relatively unsophisticated, there was considerable sophistication
attached to the ways in which debt was raised, once the financing
decision was made:
"For example, if you have a Japanese factory to be built and
you don't want to raise the money locally, we would buy
tranches of Yen when we thought the DM was good.
Therefore everytime it reached 3.3, we would buy Yen; there
Is a known requirement of exchange."
ETau]
Omega was the only company that was considering the introduction
of a strategic plan to manage its debt equity ratio:
"Previously, finance was just a by product ... we will look
at the management of the balance sheet and the income
statement and tax management ... foreign exchange will be
Implicated in them all."
This plan included using debt as an instrument to minimise
transaction exposure.
However, possibly the main reason for pursuing the convention of
matching assets and liabilities, was a fear of the consequences
if it were not followed. Gamma was primarily an exporter and
decided to hedge expected sales to the US. Debt was rejected as
a technique to decrease the company's economic exposure because
of the impact it might have on the debt equity ratio:
Qiapter 7: Page 2I5
"There is a tendency to use the forward market and then to
use bank accounts to increase the flexibility with respect
to timing. But there is the problem of volumes. For
example, we have $100 million [sales in the US and our
total borrowing is about $60 million, and so we couldn't do
it without mucking up the balance sheet."
To conclude, all of the firms in the sample used relatively
conventional financing techniques and attempted to match assets
and liabilities in individual countries.	 Borrowing policy as
an exposure management technique was constrained by custom,
institutional factors and corporate policy. Marginal
modifications were made to borrowing policies in order to reflect
exchange control, inflationary, tax and interest rate
considerations. Very few treasurers were prepared to consider
'taking a view' on borrowings and only one company intended
relating borrowing directly to the firm's foreign exchange
exposure.
I.C: Managing Econoic Expostne
The majority of the treasurers interviewed had no understanding
of economic exposure and 'foreign exchange risk management' and
'the management of transaction exposure' were seen as synonomou3.
In Table 7.1, treasurers' perceptions of foreign exchange risk
are classified as either transactional or economic. Treasurers
were classified as 'transactional' if they viewed exchange risk
purely in terms of transactions, without reference to the
influence of exchange rate changes on prices, costs and volumes.
Conversely, treasurers that did incorporate the effects of
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exchange rate changes on prices, costs and volumes were
categorised as 'economic'.
Table 7.1: Treasurers' Perce ptions	 Exchange Risk
Transactional	 Economic
(1 14 MNCs)	 (6 MNCs)
Theta
Phi
Nu
Si gm a
Alpha
Beta
Delta
Omicron
Rho
Zeta
Kappa
Psi
Mu
Iota
Lambda
Tau
Omega
Epsilon
Pi
Gamma
All of' the companies which had transactional outlooks focused
almost exclusively on foreign currency denominated items which
were certain with respect to amount.	 Zeta was one of the few
companies in this group which may have been prepared to become
involved in economic exposures:
"We will also talk to them about prospective exposures, for
example their budgets and forecasts and if they feel they
want to talk about it we will do it then and then later
take it on as a specific item if it does occur. It is
possible that some areas may not be confident enough to
hedge until they have received or placed an order. But I
can't see the centre taking a flier on a possible future
order."
Six treasurers acknowledged the presence of economic exposure and
had attempted to incorporate it within FERM activities.
Each company is examined in turn in the following paragraphs.
I.C.i: Fosilon
The treasurer maintained that the company was exposed until
prices could be increased in local markets. While he claimed
that this was the exposure which was managed, his description of
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the management of foreign exchange risk seemed to be based upon
transaction exposures.
I.C.ii: .j
Pi (the company with the European computer network) assumed that
prices were fixed for two years. Exposure was measured as a
rolling forecast of foreign currency cash flows over the
following year. The forecasts of foreign currency cash flows
(updated monthly) were then used as a basis for hedging
decisions, and leading and lagging was used to minimise
transaction costs.
I.C.lii: Gamma
Gamma (as described in section I.B.ii) had sold dollars forward
over two years in order to protect exports to the US. - The aim
of the exercise was to ensure that the firm could export
profitably in the future, should sterling strengthen against the
dollar (at the time of the interview, the exchange rate was
$1.1).	 However, only a percentage (between Z 0% and 60%) of the
anticipated sales were covered, and this percentage had been
determined following discussions between senior HQ management,
divisional management and the treasurer.
I.C.iv: Lambda
Lambda was considering using a similar tactic:
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"At the moment we are uncertain as to the US and we may lock
in a yeart sales if the dollar climbs again ... 50% or so
I don't understand why they won't do 100% e.g. lock in
at $1.5 or whatever ... there would be a good profit if
they did lock in but they could be even better ... there is
no rationale except the budget exchange rate. The big
problem at a senior management level is trying to work out
what companies are trying to do."
I.C.v: I
The treasurer in Tau had participated in the Earl [1983] study
and had questioned transactional approaches to foreign exchange
risk:
"The theoretical situation on forward cover ... maybe there
is very little benefit of 100% forward cover, for example
when does the exposure arise from [named country] or [named
country] ... there is added value there ... but if it's
sold to a third party, then part of the UK is also added
value ... and so what should be covered forward ... [what
is the] economic exposure ... we have tried to do so with
third party [sales], irrespective of the Invoice ... but It
does give way to accounting problems, for example, reaching
budget targets and this Is very important to [the]
companies."
This comment is most interesting since management accounting
systems are suggested as a barrier to the management of economic
exposure. This issue Is explored more fully in section II and
chapter 9.
I.C.vl: Omega
A committee was appointed in Omega to examine the management of
economic exposure.	 The committee had contacted all of the
divisions over a two year period and obtained descriptions of
each division's economic exposure. The division which accounted
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for the largest proportion of sales and profits was a company
which sourced in global markets, and sold its products in locally
segmented oligopolistic markets. There was a degree of added
value in each local market, and the local markets were extremely
uncompetitive in terms of price competition. 	 The main economic
exposure was the inability to Increase prices in the short run,
despite fluctuations In exchange markets leading to fluctuations
In the price of its raw materials.
The definition of the problem became an accounting issue. The
division's materials were denominated in a currency other than
sterling, and the profitability of' the subsidiaries de'ended upon
the level of the exchange rate in the short run. The committee
became involved In a debate similar to the inflation accounting
debate.	 If replacement cost accounting were used to measure
subsidiary performance, then the cost of goods sold would reflect
the opportunity cost of raw materials. 	 It was also realised
that If historic cost accounting were used,then it would result
In entirely different hedging practices in the subsidiaries.
Moreover, the policy adopted would have a considerable influence
on Omega's published financial statements, and the transition
from the existing policy to a new policycould influence teh
exchange rate. Finally, If the treasury function had the
discretion to alter the policy In response to anticipated
exchange rates, substantial benefits could accrue. However,
this last policy would involve interference with performance
evaluation and the firm's tax posItion, and in essence the
centralised management of economic and transaction exposure.
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The historic versus replacement cost debate continued for nearly
three months.	 Eventually, it was realised that if the
functional currency of the company was changed from Sterling to
another currency, the problem would be resolved. 	 The proposal
involved ceasing to use Sterling for accounting and planning
purposes. It was also suggested that shareholders were aware of
the exposure of the company and that financial reports should be
presented in the functional currency, and then translated into
Sterling at the year end. Dividend policy would be based upon
the results denominated in functional currency. In short, the
functional currency accounting system resolved the performance
evaluation issue, but could affect the company's tax liability,
share price and banking relationships.
The board turned down the proposal, and also rejected the
proposal of a centralised system. The management of economic
exposure was rejected, simply because the tax and accounting
issues could not be resolved. 	 The position of the treasury had
reverted to the management of transaction exposure:
"Now we realise that the responsibility lies with the
businesses because they create the exposure in the first
place, therefore we should get them thinking."
The result of the attempt to manage economic exposure had come to
nought.	 The process had only led to a refinement of' the
treasury role in the management of transaction exposure. A
global information system was developed for transaction exposures
(see chapter 6) and the UK in-house bank had created clones of
itself in the largest overseas subsidiaries which liaised with
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one another. Economic exposure was only recognised to the
extent that the time taken to obtain a price increase was
included in the exposure reporting system.
I.C.vli: Conclusions
Economic exposure has not been examined in the majority of sample
companies.	 Seventy per cent of the treasurers saw FERM and the
management of transaction exposure as synonomous terms. Six
companies had attempted to progress beyond viewing FERM in terms
of transactions and this process had manifested itself in a
variety of ways. Three types of response were identified,
relating exposure to the time required to increase prices, using
the forward market to cover anticipated cash flows and analysing
the economic exposure of the company with a view to managing it.
II: Discussion
The aim of this section is to discuss some of the issues arising
from section I in order to highlight the barriers to HQ treasury
involvement in the management of economic exposure. Three
alternative approaches to the management of economic exposure are
discussed.	 Firstly, financial instruments may be used to
manage economic exposures.	 Secondly, the MNC could examine its
economic exposure and alternative techniques to decrease the
exposure.	 Finally, the treasurer could ensure that foreign
exchange considerations were incorporated within operational
decisions.	 Each approach is discussed in the following
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paragraphs.
II.A: Financial Instrnients and Economic Exposure
In this section, the use of forward contracts and foreign
currency options to manage economic exposure is discussed.
Given the comments in section I.B.ii, borrowing is not discussed
as a technique since corporations seem reluctant to use it.
II.A.i: Forward Contracts
Forward contracts were used by Gamma, and were being considered
by Lambda, as a technique to manage economic exposure (see
sections I.ciij and I.C.iv). Delta was in the same industry
as Gamma, and the treasurer was asked if he would consider a
similar tactic:
"It's a gamble ... two or three years out just on
expectation ... it's a thought though ... if there was a
regular flow, it might be justified ... but I am talking
about a relatively low number of machines."
This statement highlights the main difficulty with the forward
hedge, the anticipated cash flow must be relatively stable and
certain.	 Both Gamma and Lambda had a relatively stable, certain
demand for their products in the US.	 Indeed, demand for
Lambda's products was so stable that:
"The main way of identifying exposure is the budget, but as
they depart from the budget, for example re-equipment, it
won't identify the source of the equipment or the sourcing
of the Eraw material] could be in Germany, the US or the
UK."
The fact that budgets were used as a tool for measuring exposure
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and that deviations arose from re-equipment rather than a failure
to attain sales targets serves to demonstrate the degree of -.
certainty in Lambda's product markets.	 Gamma had only covered
forward for one division which exported luxury, highly
differentiated consumer goods. The other divisions which
exported to the US manufactured capital equipment and had not
covered anticipated sales.
The basic problem arises from the certainty of forward contracts,
and the contingent nature of foreign currency cash flows.
Treasurers were, by and large, reluctant to have such mismatches.
For example:
"[Three years ago], we had a 66 million dollar contract from
a [named country] ... it was sold three years forward at
1.96 and it led to horrific losses.	 It was before I
arrived ... it was my predecessor who did it. 	 The
contract was cancelled and it generated huge losses."
[Omicron]
It is probably no coincidence that the treasurers in both Gamma
and Lambda did not make the final decision on the forward hedge.
The companies which used an in-house bank were reluctant to
become involved in such exposures:
"So we are going for the global management of exposure but
we are also saying that the onus is on the businesses to
analyze their exposure ... the idea of of reponsibility is
important ... they create the exposure ... we don't want to
feel foolish if' we advise them wrongly."
[Omega]
The advantage of more decentralised systems is that
responsibility for the outcomes of decisions is dispersed
throughout the organisation.
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In conclusion, forward contracts may be an appropriate tactic for
reducing economic exposure if foreign currency cash flows are
relatively stable and if responsibility for the decision cannot
be attributed to a specific individual.
II.A.i1: Currency ODtions
While the corporations in the sample had made very little use of
options (see section I.A), they may be potentially useful
techniques for the management of economic exposure. All of the
companies with an in-house bank were either considering the use
of foreign currency options, or selling them to operating units
(Omega and Sigma).	 Foreign currency options are easily
integrated into the bank structure since they are simply another
product that the bank sells to the subsidiaries. 	 Moreover, if
the centre is able to net the contingent exposures, the treasury
becomes more profitable.	 Finally, the possibility of
undesirable exposures if cash flows fail to materialise is
avoided.
There are a number of difficulties with foreign currency options.
Firstly, they are costly and therefore unsuitable for low margin
products. This will become particularly important if companies
have to purchase options in the marketplace rather than netting
them internally. Secondly, options are complex financial
Instruments and operating units may not understand the nature of
Options.	 Moreover, no techniques have been suggested for the
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measurement of' economic exposure in practice. This In turn
Implies that it Is Impossible to know the quantity of options to
purchase, except in the simplest situations (i.e. binomial
exposures). Thirdly, companies which have formulated their FERM
policies In terms of transaction exposures may be unable to
accommodate options in existing policies.
II.A.iii: Conclusions
There are limits to the use of financial instruments as
techniques for the management of economic exposure. 	 Borrowing
seems to be institutionalised and inflexible, forward contracts
may be suitable If' cash flows are stable and responsibility can
be dispersed, and options are costly, difficult to use and
difficult to accommodate within systems which utilise policies
based upon transactions.
II.B: Conprehensive Systems
The treasurers in Omega and Tau attempted to systemise the
management of economic exposure In their companies (see section
I.C.v and I.C.vl). Both attempts were unsuccessful because they
were radical and interfered with existing systems of performance
eval uation.
II.B.1 Radical Change
The management of economic exposure may Involve radical changes
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in existing practices for companies which have used transactional
concepts of foreign exchange risk. An analysis of economic
exposure may require a change in the currency denomination of
debt of the MNC, since the matching of assets and liabilities may
be inappropriate.	 This in turn may alter the company's tax
liability and financial statements. 	 Moreover, financing
practices in individual countries may fail to comply with local
norms.	 Changes In the functional currency of the company, or
particular divisions, may also be appropriate. 	 Epsilon was the
only company which used a functional currency other than sterling
for one of Its divisions. 	 Omega's treasurer had attempted to
alter the functional currency but it had been rejected by the
board since it represented to great an upheaval.
Based upon a sample of two, radical changes in corporate
practices , which may be necessary if the firm alters its
definition of exposure, may have consequences which cannot be
anticipated.	 For this reason, inertia is likely to prevail.
II.B.ii: Performance Evaluation	 Accountability
systems of performance evaluation and accountability may also be
affected by changes in FERM policies, because of operating unit
Interdepencies and performance evaluation criteria.
Operating unit interdependencies are relevant since (as in the
case of' Tau) the amount which should be covered in each operating
unit may not be optimal from an operating unit point of view,
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even if the firm had a policy of eliminating all foreign exchange
risks.
If operating costs are likely to be volatile due to exchange rate
changes (unless the functional currency is altered in order to
decrease volatility), then replacement cost systems of
performance evaluation may be more appropriate. This in turn
may modify operating unit behaviour since operating units will be
subject to funds flow rather than profitability targets.
II.B.iii: Conclusions
Comprehensive approaches to the management of economic exposure
may involve substantial organisational upheavals.
Unfortunately, there was no company in the sample which had
attempted to implement a comprehensive system, and this result is
somewhat speculative.
II. C: The Operational Invo1veent of Treasurers
Treasurers were reluctant to become involved in operating
decisions. This may be attributed to the transactional approach
which dominated their views of FERM and the fear of losing
professional credibility.
Risk aversion seemed to dominate advice given to subsidiaries:
"But the treasury department does operate as a service
company ... for example if they [the businesses] get a
complex order and they need help to sort It out, we would
talk them through it and attempt to explain why we
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recommended a particular course of action.	 This helps to
educate them.	 Some companies do call us and say they are
in a position to invoice in dollars or sterling ... we
always recommend that they contract in sterling if possible
because it is our base currency •.. but I think that we
only find out what they're up to by default ... but we are
attempting to educate these people."
[Iota]
Moreover, treasurers were extremely reluctant to pass forecasts
to operating units other than the budgeted rate, or externally
purchased forecasts:
"I merely have an asset called money.
	 We will advise on
currencies ... buy in strong, sell in weak."
[Epsilon]
"I don't have any control over the [divisional staff] but
they may ask us for opinions.	 Currency is only a small
part of it and I do not have any fresh opinions. We use
an outside body for advice and get an opinion. This means
that I can ensure that there is no simultaneous conflict of
exchange rate expectations between divisions."
[Mu]
In fact, there was little or no evidence of treasury involvement
in operational decisions, such as pricing, investment or sourcing
decisions.
III: Conclusions
The majority of HQ treasurers are preoccupied with transactional
definitions of foreign exchange risk. Only 30% of the
treasurers had made any attempt to come to grips with exposures
other than transaction exposures. However, it is possible that
the availability of foreign currency options may lead to a
realisation that economic exposures exist.
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Treasury involvement in operational decision making was minima].
(e.g. investment, pricing and sourcing decisions). One company
had used forward contracts to cover economic exposure, but it was
argued that It was unlikely to be a popular tactic since It could
only be applied to relatively certain exposures and Individuals
may be reluctant to accept responsibility If' exposures failed to
materialise.	 Foreign currency options overcome this latter
difficulty, however due to their complexity, their potential had
not been realised. Borrowing policies seemed to be very
Inflexible and the companies seemed reluctant to apply policies
other than matching.
Two companies had attempted to take a systematic approach to the
management of economic exposure. 	 In both cases, the attempts
were unsuccessful. This lack of success was attributed to
organlsatlonal fears of the consequences of radical changes In
policies and the Implications of such changes for systems of
accountability and control.
It Is possible that economic exposure may be trivial. This in
turn would explain the lack of HQ involvement. The economic
exposures of' the sampled companies are examined in chapters eight
and nine. It will be shown that the economic exposures of some
MNCs are considerable.	 A model is proposed in chapter ten which
permits the measurement of' economic exposure In a straightforward
manner. It may then be used to examine the effects of'
alternative FERM strategies and tactics, and hence assist
treasurers to anticipate their consequences.
Qiapter 7: Page 260
APTER 8
EXCHANGE RISK AND THE FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY
The role of the HQ treasurer in the management of foreign
exchange risk was examined in the previous two chapters. It
was shown that the majority of UK MNC are not involved in the
management of foreign exchange risks which arise in foreign
subsidiaries.	 In this chapter, the management of foreign
exchange risk at a foreign subsidiary level is examined.
In chapter five, it was pointed out that four of the MNCs in the
sample had no Irish subsidiaries (Nu, Mu, Gamma, Psi).
However, of the sixteen remaining MNCs, a number of the companies
had more than one Irish subsidiary.	 In all, personnel at twenty
two subsidiaries were interviewed. The characteristics of the
subsidiaries, and the personnel interviewed, are summarised in
Appendix Five.
The notation used to denote the names of subsidiaries in this
chapter is somewhat more complex than the previous two chapters.
Some of the companies had more than one Irish subsidiary, and
individual subsidiaries may have had more than one product group.
Thirty one product groups were defined and are displayed in Table
8.1. It a company has more than one product group, then if the
company were called 'Upsilon', the product groups are described
as 'tJpsilonl', 'Upsilon2' and so on.
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Tab1 Li.
Details	 Iri.1 Subsidiaries
CoxnDarnr Name:	 Subsidiaries flsited:	 Product GrouDst
Alpha	 2
	
2
Beta	 1
	
1
Gamma	 0
	
0
Del t a	 1
	
1
Epsilon	 1
Zeta
	
1
	
1
Theta	 2
	
2
Iota
	
1
	
3
Kappa	 1
	
1
Lambda	 1
	
2
Mu
	
0
	
0
Nu
	 0
	
0
Omicron	 1
	
1
P1
	
1
	
3
Rho	 2
	
2
Sigma	 1
	
1
Tau
	
3
	
3
Phi
	
1
	
'2
Psi
	
0
	
0
Omega
	 2.	 2.
Total
	
22
	
31
In the first section of this chapter, the immediate impact of the
cessation of parity between the Irish pound (the Punt) and the UK
pound is examined.	 The management of transaction exposure at a
subsidiary level is discussed in the second section.
	 Finally,
the nature of economic exposure is discussed.
I: The liriediate Iiipaet of the Break with Sterling
In December 1978, exchange controls on transactions between the
UK and Ireland were introduced by the Irish Central Bank. The
introduotion of exchange controls was motivated by the Irish
decision to join the European Monetary System (EMS), and the
possibility that the Irish Punt would no longer be at par with
Sterling.	 In the first part of this section, the nature of the
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exchange controls and their implementation is examined. In the
second part, the response of firms to the introduction of
exchange controls is discussed.
I. A Irish Exchange Controls
In this part, the nature and implementation of exchange controls
are examined. While exchange controls were perceived by the
interviewees as a constraint on hedging practices, it is argued
in this section that a number of firms had successfully
negotiated concessions from the Central Bank. 	 Moreover, the
advent of 'Hedge' contracts allow; firms to circumvent exchange
controls completely.	 The nature of Irish exchange controls is
discussed In section I.A.I.	 In section I.A.iI, the regulation
of forward contracts Is examined.
	 Finally, the implementation
of exchange controls Is described.
I.A.I: Ij Nature	 Irish exchange controls
The stated purpose of' Irish exchange controls Is to protect
Irish reserve; and to regulate the effects of capital movements
on the Irish exchange rate (Exchange Control Act 19511).
Exchange controls are operated In the Republic of Ireland under
the Exchange Control Acts 19511 to 1978. Prior to December 18
1978, transactions between Irish residents and UK residents were
exempted from this legislation. Capital transactions are
restricted under the legislation, while current transactions are
supervised.
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Capital transactions were restricted between the UK and the Irish
Republic following the introduction of exchange controls. Prior
to the introduction of exchange controls, Irish financial markets
were extremely underdeveloped since the London markets were
freely accessible. This in turn meant that the Irish inter-
bank market was insignificant, and that the Irish Stock Exchange
was equivalent to other UK provincial exchanges in Manchester,
Belfast and so on. 	 Restrictions on capital transactions implied
that portfolio investment and inter-bank lending had to be done
in Dublin rather than London. Moreover, specific permission
had to be sought for transactions between the Irish subsidiaries
of MNCs and non-residents for capital transactions, and in
seeking such permission, it would have to be demonstrated that
the transaction was being undertaken for productive purposes.
Indeed, if a resident were owned or controlled by a non-resident,
local currency loans from residents would also require Central
Bank permission.
Current transactions, by contrast, are merely supervised. In
order to make a payment to a non-resident, one must provide
evidence of purchase and the value of the goods, evidence that
the goods have been either imported or are in transit, and
complete an exchange control form giving details of the
transaction.	 Special permission must be sought for advance
payments which will be granted if it can be shown that it is
normal practice.	 Similar provisions apply to exports, save
that special permission must be sought for exports with credit
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periods of more than six months.	 Finally, foreign currency hold
accounts may be permitted if a resident is engaged in both import
and export. However, evidence must be provided of the frequency
and size of the foreign currency transactions, and the account
should preferably be held with an authorised dealer.
I.A.ii: Hedin Instruments
Forward cover is available if there is a firm contract either to
pay or receive foreign currency which is trade related. 	 Cover
is only available for periods of more than twenty one days and
less than one year.	 Initially, forward cover had to be entered
into within thirty days of the risk arising.
	 In January 1983,
amid expectations of a devaluation of the Punt, this period was
reduced from thirty to fifteen days. Newspapers [Irish Press
and Irish Times, January 28 1983] suggested that this move was a
response to leading and lagging, and that there were amounts of
up to 1100 million Punts which were unexplained in the Balance of
Payments statistics.	 Initially, the Central Bank was the sole
provider of forward cover. In July 1980, 14 banks created an
inter-bank forward market under the supervision of the Central
Bank.
'Hedge' contracts became available in 19811. The 'Hedge'
contract was based upon similar contracts which had been made
available when exchange controls were enforced in Australia
(Cocks [1982]).
	
A 'Hedge' is a contract between two parties
where one party agrees to pay to the other party at a future date
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an adjustment in Irish Pounds. The adjustment represents the
difference between the amount of foreign exchange specified in
the contract at the 'Hedge' contract exchange rate and the rate
of conversion at the settlement date. The contract was
introduced by the Bank of Ireland (a local clearing bank), and
may only be settled at the end of a month. 	 The availability of
the 'Hedge' contract permits foreign exchange exposures to be
covered which could not be covered under exchange controls. The
'Hedge' contract avoids exchange controls since it is an Irish
Punt transaction between two Irish residents.
In conclusion, Irish exchange controls place considerable
restrictions on transactions of either a capital or non trade
related nature.	 Financial transactions which are trade related
are only subject to supervision, but, until the advent of the
'Hedge' contract, there were considerable limitations on the uses
to which forward cover might be put. In the following section,
the implementation of exchange controls is examined.
I.A.iii: I. Implementation	 Exchange Controls
While the nature of exchange controls in the Republic of Ireland
is relatively straightforward, the application of exchange
controls was far from straightforward. Authorised Dealers and
Banks were charged with the task of administering the application
of exchange controls to trade related items.
	
Moreover, the
restrictions on the availability of forward cover also hampered
the activities of firms.
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The banks which were charged with the administr.ztion of exchange
controls were, initially, extremely rigid in the application of
exchange controls. This was probably due to learning on the
part of the participants in the administration of exchange
controls, since the Central Bank was also applying Exchange
Controls quite rigidly, and was reluctant to permit the use of
foreign currency hold accounts. By 198, the system was running
more smoothly, and foreign currency hold accounts were normally
permitted. However, one interviewee in a rural. area did report
that his local bank manager was unfamiliar with the application
of exchange controls.
By 198k, the system had become considerably more discretionary.
Larger companies found that the Central Bank was more flexible if'
it believed that It could trust the firm and if the firm was well
established. For example, one company which found the
paperwork necessary to comply with exchange controls too
burdensome, persuaded the Central Bank to allow them to use an
audit certificate which stated that they were complying with
exchange controls.
The main difficulty relating to exchange control was the
availability of forward cover. Some of the sample companies had
transactions which either matured in less than twenty one days or
more than one year. None of' the firms had successfully
negotiated a concession on the former issue, but some firms had
obtained permission to hedge for periods of more than one year.
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The application of this rule was however haphazard, since a
number of other companies reported that they were not granted
permission to obtain forward cover for a period of more than one
year. Similarly, one company had obtained an extension of the
purchase of foreign currency within fifteen days of the risk date
while others had not.
While all of the sample firms maintained that they adhered to
exchange controls, one company (Rho2) had an informal arrangement
with its UK division to borrow foreign currency on its behalf.
One interviewee (Iota) also reported that there were a number of
firms which had created documentation in order to take advantage
of' forecasted changes in the Punt exchange rate.
In conclusion, the implementation of exchange controls in Ireland
is somewhat different from the nature of exchange controls in
Ireland.	 It would seem that provided there are bona fide
commercial reasons and that a firm is well established, it is
possible to obtain Central Bank permission for forward exchange
transactions outside the scope of exchange controls. 	 The only
area where there would seem to be very little flexibility is for
forward cover requirements of' less than twenty one days.
I.B: The Reaction of Fires to the Break
Surprisingly, there was very little reaction from companies
following the announcement of exchange controls, and the
inevitable break with Sterling.	 Two types of change took place,
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changes in the internal organisation of the subsidiaries, and
changes in the financing of subsidiaries.
	 Each type of change
is discussed in the following paragraphs.
I.B.i: Changes in Subsidiary Finances
Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out that the financial
markets in Ireland were relatively undeveloped until the advent
of exchange controls. Eleven of the companies (all of which
were manufacturing companies), had raised debt on the London
market. The main reason for the use of UK debt had been lower
rates (up to 1% less) in London. Upon the announcement of
Ireland's entry to the EMS, all of these companies, commenced
switching their debt to the Dublin market, and covered any
remaining Sterling debt in the forward market. It is most
likely that this reaction was prompted by fears of an exposure to
foreign exchange risk, since there were expectations at this
stage that the Punt might rise or tall against the Pound.
Moreover, at this stage, forward cover was available from the
Irish Central Bank at parity.
I.B.ii: Internal Oranisational Chanes
Prior to the break, a number of companies ran their Irish
subsidiaries under the auspices of the relevant UK product
groups, and the Irish subsidiary was treated in a similar way to
the Irish subsidiary. Upon the introduction of exchange
controls, financial management was decentralised to the Irish
thapter 8: Page 269
subsidiaries by either appointing treasury staff to the Irish
subsidiaries, or, in one case, setting up a regional financial
office in Dublin.
Four companies introduced local treasury management in their
Irish subsidiaries. In three of these cases (Thetal, Theta2 and
Lambda), the finance director assumed reponsibility for the
administration of Irish finances and working capital. In the
fourth case (Omega2), the firm changed from being a branch of the
UK division to a subsidiary. Prior to the break, there was no
local financial function whatsoever.
Iota introduced a regional office to administer the accounting,
taxation and financial affairs of the Irish subsidiaries. As
such, it amounted to a matrix organisation structure, since the
operating companies were responsible to both the Irish
geographical organisation, and their respective product groups in
the UK. A treasurer was recruited to the regional office and
was responsible for raising debt for the Irish subsidiaries, and
managing the liquid assets and foreign exchange risks of the
Irish companies.
Apart from changes in the financial management of some of the
Irish subsidiaries, there were also some changes in the
operational characteristics of the Irish companies. For
example, a number of' firms reported increased local autonomy with
respect to pricing.	 In order to ensure that there was a unified
pricing structure in both the Republic and Northern Ireland,
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Epsilonl  became responsible for both territories. The reason
for this reorganisation arose from the fact that they were low
volume high value products, and therefore suoeptible to parallel
importing.	 Iota had not resolved a number of operational
problems by December 198'L.	 These difficulties arose since
Iota3's products were marketed in Northern Ireland by both the
Irish and the UK subsidiaries under different brand names. The
Irish Region wished to continue marketing in the North of
Ireland, whilst the UK product group wished to sell only the UK
brand in the North of Ireland.
Finally, it should be noted that eleven of the sixteen MNCs with
Irish Subsidiaries had more than one Irish subsidiary (see Table
8.1).	 Despite the scope for rationalising the financial
management of these companies, very few of the companies had done
so, apart from treating their Irish subsidiaries as a group for
tax purposes. Lambda and Pi had always had relatively
centralised management structures, since subsidiaries had been
acquired by the Irish HQ.
	
Tau had an arrangement between its
subsidiaries whereby cash balances were pooled, but there were no
other financial relationships. Iota, as mentioned earlier, had
adopted a matrix structure following the break with sterling.
Of the remaining seven companies, four companies were marketing
subsidiaries. However three of the MNCs had Irish subsidiaries
which were relatively large in their own right (Theta, Rho and
Omega) and one would expect considerable benefits to be derived
from a unified financial. structure.
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I.B.iii: Conclusions
For the most part, the break with sterling had very little
immediate Impact on the Irish subsidiaries. As such, there were
very few changes in the way in which the firms were organised or
financed.	 Firms with UK debt switched their debt to the Irish
market and firms without local treasury management introduced
local treasury management.	 In one case, a matrix type
organisation was introduced. It was however pointed out that
some companies had not rationalised their Irish subsidiaries,
despite the scope to do so.
II: Transaction Exposre and the Foreign Subsidiary
In the previous section, the nature of Irish exchange controls
and the Immediate impact of the break with sterling were
reviewed. In this section, the management of transaction
exposure in the Irish subsidiaries is reviewed. Having examined
the management of transaction exposure at the level of the
foreign subsidiary, the management of transaction exposure in the
foreign subsidiary is related to the management of transaction
exposure in the HQ in the second part of this section.
II.A: Managing Transaction Exposure: The Subsidiary
Given the existence of transaction exposure, the subsidiary has a
number of' choices. The exposure may be modified by altering the
invoice currency, or alternatively left unmodified. 	 The
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remaining exposure may then be left open, covered completely, or
actively managed. Each of these choices is examined in turn in
the following paragraphs, and a summary Is presented in Table
8.2.	 However, in order to manage exposures actively,
information is necessary on both the extent of the exposure and
the forecasted change in the exchange rate. 	 The Information
gathering practices of the firms which actively manage exposure
are also summarised.
Tpbia
Manain Transactlon Eosures .jn, Ireland
Alter Inyp lce	 ____	 Active
Currency	jum_b	 Management
Alpha2	 Epsilofll	 P12, P13
Delta	 Omegal	 Aiphal, Zeta
Epsilon2	 Tau 1	 Thetal, Theta2
Epsilon3	 Sigma	 lotal, Iota2
Epsilon	 Rho 1	 Iota3, Kappa
P11	 Bet a	 Lambdal, Lambda2
Zeta	 Delta	 Rho2, Tau2
Phil	 Tau3, Omega2
Ph i2
Omicron
Total:	 10
	
•1!	 16
II.A.i: Alterin.g	 Invoice jrren
Four companies (Alpha, Delta, Epsilon and Omicron) had a policy
of invoicing their overseas marketing affiliates in local
currency. This in turn meant that they had no sterling exposure
in the Irish subsidiaries. Under Irish exchange controls, it
was probably worthwhile from a parent point of view to use this
strategy, since the parent could net the Punts against other EMS
currencies, as well as avoid the provisions of Irish exchange
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controls.	 Therefore, six of the product groups in this
category had no transaction exposure due to parent company
policy. In the remaining four product groups the Irish
subsidiaries were responsible for altering the currency of
invoice.
The staff in Pi's Irish HQ decided to persuade Pu's suppliers in
the UK to invoice P11 in Punts. The industry was subject to
government supervision of gross margins, and the HQ staff decided
that net margins might be maximised by avoiding the
administrative costs of managing exchange rates. The company
successfully persuaded its suppliers to invoice in Punts, hence
eliminating P11's transaction exposze.
Zeta adopted a speculative position. It sourced many of its raw
materials from the UK parent, and exported a significant
percentage of Its products back to the UK parent. It spent over
two years persuading the parent to invoice raw materials in Punts
but finished goods continued to be invoiced in sterling. The
subsidiary management believed that this strate r would ensure
that their costs of production would be more certain, as well as
ensuring that the subsidiary would gain if the Punt were to
devalue against the Pound.
Finally, Phil Imported finished goods from the UK parent and
simply charged its customers on the basis of sterling converted
at parity into Punts, plus a surcharge to adjust the price to
reflect the average exchange rate in the previous month. The
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managing director believed that this tactic had not affected
sales adversely, and that as far as he was aware, his competitors
used a similar tactic. He did however report that customers
simply did not pay the surcharges relating to goods (Phi2) which
had been manufactured in Ireland but made use of UK raw
materials.
II.A.ii: Rules
	
Thumb
There were two types of rule of thumb which were used: leaving
all transactions uncovered, and covering all transactions
forward. Seven of the thirty one product groups used rules of
thumb.
Four of the product groups (Taul, Beta, Omegal and Delta) were
relatively small marketing subsidiaries with between twenty and
fifty employees.	 Beta and Otnegal had a rule of hedging
everything.	 The rule was probably used in these two instances
due to a lack of expertise and the costs of pursuing an
alternative strategy, as well as the risks of using the spot
market.	 Taul and Delta used a rule of thumb of not hedging at
all.	 Delta's accountant maintained that they would cover
forward if' forward cover were available for periods of less than
twenty one days. Taul was subject to government regulation of
gross margins, and any losses arising from foreign exchange
transactions could be recouped.
The remaining three subsidiaries (Epsiloni, Sigma and Rhol) were
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larger companies engaged in manufacturing.
	 Epsiloni was
involved in the processing of commodities priced in dollars and
perceived the dollar as too risky. However, the managing
director also believed that it was company policy not to
speculate.
Rhol was subject to a divisional policy of hedging everything
forward.	 Interestingly, other divisions in the same MNC (e.g.
Rho2) adopted more speculative strategies. One possible
explanation might be the fact that the MNC had a policy of
managing exchange risk at a divisional level, and the particular
division had 'a relatively low volume of foreign currency
transactions. However, margins in this particular industry were
extremely low and it was a high volume low value product.
Sigma also had a policy of hedging all foreign currency
transactions forward. The accountant explained that the company
was regulated by the National Prices Commission and that any gain
or loss would be compensated in the subsequent review of the
prices of this monopolist. Moreover, the use of forward
contracts facilitated the price control process since one knew in
advance what costs would be and the way in which they would be
classified. Therefore, there was no incentive to become
involved in the administrative costs of adopting a more active
foreign exchange risk management strategy.
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II.A.iii: Active Management	 Transaction ExDos11r
Sixteen product groups were engaged in the active management of
transaction exposure.	 However the degree of' activity and risk
aversion varied considerably from company to company. 	 All of'
the companies normally covered transactions relating to the
purchase of capital equipment. 	 However, practices varied with
respect to trade transactions, and one factor which explained
this was currency of denomination. In table 8.3, details of
the average percentage of transactions covered in each currency
are presented.
iable 
.L3.
Average ProDortion j Transactions Covered
Qspany	 Currency:
Nape:	 Sterling	 Dollar
Pi2	 75%	 10%	 100%
Pi3
	
10%
Aiphal	 10%	 100%
Zeta	 50%	 10%
	
50%
Thetal	 75%	 10%	 90%
Theta2	 50%	 10%	 70%
lotal	 75%	 10%	 100%
Iota2	 75%	 10%	 100%
Iota3
	
75%	 10%	 100%
Kappa	 50%	 100%
Lainbdal	 50%
Lambda2	 50%	 10%
Rho2	 50%	 10%	 70%
Tau2	 70%
Tau3
	
70%	 10%
Omega2	 ItO%	 10%
Average:	 61%	 10%	 83%
It may be seen from Table 8.3 that all of the companies were most
likely to cover dollar transactions and least likely to cover EMS
denominated transactions. All of the companies with EMS
exposures said that they did not cover EMS transactions unless a
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devaluation was imminent.	 However, when devaluations were
imminent, it was extremely difficult to procure reasonably priced
forward contracts.	 The dollar was perceived as an extremely
volatile currency, while the Sterling hedging was based upon
forecasts.	 If the volatility of Sterling was perceived to be
low (for example no more than +1- 2% in the next month), the
exposures were left uncovered. If a large exchange rate change
was forecasted with respect to direction, then forward cover or
leading and lagging were used to take advantage of the exchange
rate change.
These findings on the risk preferences of corporate treasurers
are similar to the results of Collier and Davis [1985]. They
found that long term exposure horizons (e.g. capital equipment),
irregular currency flows, few matching opportunities and the
volatility of currencies were the main factors influencing the
hedging decision. Certainly, this study supports these findings
with respect to long periods of exposure, and the volatility of
currencies.
In the following paragraphs, the hedging instruments used and the
information system used for hedging are examined.
II.A.iv: Heding Instruments
Forward contracts were the most popular hedging instrument for
trading transactions. However, both Omegal and Tau2 reported
obtaining favourable, rates using the 'Hedge'. 	 However, the
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'Hedge' had only been available for a few months before the study
was carried out.	 It is quite possible that it has become more
popular in the intervening two years.
Leading and lagging was also a popular technique, and used
extensively by these companies for the payment of dividends to
the parent, the settlement of other accounts with the parent and
the management of foreign currency hold accounts. This
observation is probably due to the non-availability of forward
cover for non-trading items.
II.A.v: ExDosure Information Systems
There are two aspects to the exposure information system.
Firstly obtaining information on the exposures which have been
generated, and secondly, obtaining forecasts of exchange rate
changes.
Smaller companies used the accounting system to obtain
information on exposure. In smaller companies, the management
accountant came across exposures when foreign currency invoices
were received or dispatched and on the basis of this information,
made a decision either to cover or leave the exposure open.
Forecast information was normally generated from newspapers and
other publicly available information.
Larger companies with stable operations used the budget
(sometimes up to three years in advance) as a source of
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information about exposures and used this information as a basis
for hedging decisions. The only relevant information not
contained in budgets was purchases of capital equipment and their
sourcing. The issue of capital equipment is examined later in
this chapter. Larger companies with stable markets also used
publicly available information in order to generate forecasts and
relied on the advice of banks.
Larger companies with unpredictable exposures relied on a variety
of mechanisms for gathering exposure information. Theta2 was
the only company which used formal weekly exposure reports from
operating units. 	 Iota used irregular exposure reports from
operating units. The remaining companies insisted on operating
units contacting them upon the creation of an exposure, although
in one case (Lambda), it was only necessary to contact the Irish
financial HQ if the exposure exceeded 25,000 Punts.
Forecasts in the larger companies with unpredictable exposures
were also more sophisticated. Two of the companies used their
own in-house forecasting services. Lambda employed an economist
and forecasts based upon fundamental variables were produced.
In Theta2, the treasurer collected exchange rate information and
applied chartist techniques to the data. Other companies with
large unpredictable exposures used publicly available information
together with the advice of banks and the services of a firm of
economic consultants in Dublin.
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II.B: Sub8ldlary - HQ Relationships
The management of transaction exposure in the Irish subsidiaries
of the UK MNCs was summarised in the previous paragraphs.
However, the next issue is the extent to which the HQ is involved
in the formulation of subsidiary policy. In chapter six, the
involvement of the HQ treasury in the exposures of overseas
subsidiaries was examined. This in turn leads to two issues.
Firstly, the extent to which the HQ Treasury is actually involved
in the transaction exposures of foreign subsidiaries.
Secondly, the extent to which line management from the HQ is
involved in the management of foreign exchange risks at the
subsidiaries.
II.B.i:	 Subsidiary .a.n, 
.th IIQ. Treasury
In chapter six, it was shown that while the majority of UK
treasuries are not involved in the management of transaction
exposure in foreign subsidiaries, some companies maintain that
they are involved. In the following paragraphs, this role is
examined from a subsidiary point of view.
It may be recalled from chapter six that six companies maintained
a liaison role with their foreign subsidiaries, Nu issued
specific directives and Pj took centralised action on behalf of
foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, twelve companies maintained
that their subsidiaries were autonomous with respect to
transaction exposure.	 The aim of this section is to investigate
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the extent to which these claims were borne out in practice.
Firstly, Nu did not have an Irish subsidiary and Pi only had a
Z5% holding in its Irish subsidiary. Secondly, of the six
companies that maintained a liaison role with their foreign
subsidiaries, four' companies (Sigma, Tau, Epsilon and Iota) only
did so with their largest European and US subsidiaries.
Therefore, in these cases, the Irish subsidiary was autonomous.
There was evidence that the remaining two companies (Omega and
Rho) which maintained a liaison function with their overseas
subsidiaries actually liaised with their Irish subsidiaries.
The treasurer of' Omega2 had passed information to the HQ and had
been consulted when the company was reassessing its FERM
policies. The treasurer of Rho2 described the UK treasurer as
'giving directions' which were subsequently ignored because the
HQ treasurer saw things from a Sterling point of' view rather than
a Punt point of view. 	 The Irish treasurer' pointed out that
this was inevitable because Sterling was in a different exchange
rate regime and there were no exchange controls in the UK. This
in turn meant that the definition of exposure used in the UK
(goods about to be shipped), could not be applied in the
Republic, since a firm order was required in order to comply with
Irish exchange controls. However, some foreign currency
borrowing had been undertaken by the UK treasurer on behalf of'
the Irish subsidiary.
While the results summarised in this section triangulate with the
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results summarised in chapter six, it also emerged that the line
management from the UK influenced the way in which transaction
exposures were managed in Ireland. This issue is dealt with in
the following paragraphs.
II.B.ii: j1.. Subsidiary	Divisions
While the Involvement of the HQ treasury in Irish transaction
exposure management was extremely limited, it was found that
members of the Irish Board from the UK divisions often exerted
considerable influence on the management of transaction exposure.
This process consisted of UK board members issuing specific
directives under the cloak of parent company policy. For
example, Rhol's UK division had a rule of hedging all exposures.
The Irish finance director of Rhol maintained that it was parent
company policy to hedge everything.	 Another Irish subsidiary
of the same company (save that It was In a different division -
Rho2) actively managed its exposure. The finance director of
Rhol assured the author that the other Irish subsidiary (Rho2)
had to pursue parent company policy as well.
The divisional policy was implemented either formally or
informally. Formal mechanisms included a requirement that all
hedging decisions be approved by the board, or alternatively that
all transactions exceeding a certain limit must be covered, or
that exposures in certain currencies should not exceed specific
limits.	 Informal mechanisms included notions of collective
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Irrelevant None Foriial Informal
Al ph a2
Epsjlo
Epsjlon3
Epsjlonk
Omicron
Beta
Delta
Thetal
Theta2
Kappa
Lambdal
Lambda
P11,2,3
Phil ,2
Si gina
Omega2
Epsiloni
lotal
Iota2
Iota3
Rho 1
Aiphal
Zeta
Rho2
Taut
Tau2
Ta u3
Omega2
responsibility where the local treasurer would never go out on a
limb without the approval of the UK divisional representative, or
alternatively, statements to the effect that no praise would be
forthcoming for foreign exchange gains and that losses would be
penalised.	 Tau3's finance director described it in the
following way:
"Come 1979, imports [of a raw material] increased in price;
we were price controlled [by the National Prices
Commission] and it is not easy to pass on cost increases
because there are irregular price increases [mostly annual]
so it was a drain on cash and decreased
competitiveness. We looked at forward purchases and
entered the forward market for brief periods (less than
three months) and did reasonably okay - well not too bad -
so we discussed this at our regular monthly management
meetings and decided that the use of forward cover would
help build up a known cost factor. The people from the
UK said that we are here for the business and not to gamble
on foreign exchange and they felt that we shouldn't go into
the long run (more than three months) hedging. Even if we
won at three months there would be no praise, but our
knuckles would get rapped if we lost."
The extent to which the sample companies' FERM policies were
influenced by divisional managers is presented in Table 8.4
(excluding companies invoiced in Punts. 	 Firms were classified
as subject to formal, informal or no influence.
Table .a&: Divisional Influence
Total: 5
	
111	 5
	 7
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Of the thirty one product groups, twelve were subject to some
divisional interference. Moreover, in seven of the twelve
cases, this influence was informal and relatively subtle (see
Table 8.11).	 While it is impossible (given the nature of the
data) to determine whether this divisional involvement is a good
thing or a bad thing, it is necessary to be aware of it. It
would also be interesting to know whether this is a deliberate
strategy based upon the presumption that the UK divisional
representative is the best judge of' the ability of subsidiary
personnel, or an unanticipated consequence of UK divisional staff
on Irish boards applying principles which may be perfectly valid
In some exchange rate regimes and not in others.
II.C: Sunmary and no1us1ons
In this section, the management of transaction exposure at a
foreign subsidiary level was examined. The different strategies
adopted by firms were examined, as well as the information used
for active hedging strategies. 	 These data were then compared
with the results pertaining to the management of transaction
exposures in foreign subsidiaries summarised in chapter six. It
was argued that while the roles in the Independent data sets were
in agreement, UK divisional staff were also involved In the
formulation of the transaction exposure management policy in the
foreign subsidiary.	 It was pointed out that It would be
interesting to examine whether this was an anticipated or
unanticipated consequence of the policy of appointing UK
personnel to the Irish Boards.
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III;Econoiiie Exposure and the Irish Subsidiary
In this section, the economic exposures of the Irish subsidiaries
are identified and the ways in which they are managed are
described.	 A procedure for classifying economic exposure is
developed, and the techniques used to manage economic exposure
are described.	 In order to clarify the analysis, the thirty one
product groups were classified as marketing subsidiaries,
domestic manufacturers and exporters. 	 This classification
scheme is presented in Table 8.5 and each class is discussed in
the following sections.
8.5
massification	 Product Group
Marketing
Subsidiary
Alpha2
Beta
Delta
Epsilon2
Epsilon3
Epsilo&$
Iota 1
ni cron
P11
Phil
Taul
nega1
Total: 12
Dotiesti 0
Manufacturer
Alphal
Epsiloni
Zeta
Thetal ,2
P12 ,3
Iota2,3
Tau2,3
Kappa
L ambdal
Ph 12
Rho2
Omega2
Si gina
17
Export
Manufacturer
Al ph al
Zeta
Lambdal
Lambda2
P i2
Rho 1
Rho2
Tau2
8
111.1: The Econoio Exposure of Marketing Subsidiaries
Marketing subsidiaries were chosen as the first class of product
groups to be analysed since the effects of exchange rate changes
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on the cost structure of the subsidiary is relatively
straightforward.	 The exposures of the twelve product groups
are described in this section along with the tactics used to
manage the exposures.
The twelve companies were subdivided into a number of groups
based upon the tradability of their product and factor markets.
In principle, this approach is reminiscent of the Flood and
Lessard [1986] paper discussed in chapter It. However, the
theoretical antecedents of the model are more closely connected
with the Hodder [1982] model (described in chapter 3), which in
turn may be related to the Scandinavian theory of the
International transmission of inflation (cf. Edgren et al.
(1968]), since commodities are classified as either tradable or
non-tradable.
The majority of the marketing subsidiaries used non-traded
factors of production since they were forced to purchase from the
parent arid local costs were non-tradable (e.g. labour, rent and
electricity). One subsidiary was free to source from any of' the
other subsidiaries, and could therefore alter its sourcing
policies to take advantage of deviations from purchasing power
parity.
The products which the subsidiaries sold were also classified as
either tradable or non-tradable.	 The basis for this
classification was the extent to which there was the degree of
overseas or local competition in product markets. The degree of
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tradability would in turn determine the extent to which the
competitive position of the subsidiary could be affected by
deviations from purchasing power parity.
	 The results of this
analysis are presented in Tables 8.6 and 8.7.
	
Each group is
discussed in the following sections.
iable	 Classification	 Marketing Subsidiaries
Product Markets
Non-Tradable	 Tradable	 Total
Factor	 Non-Tradable	 7	 11
Markets
Tradable	 1	 0	 1
Total	 8	 12
able 8.7: Classification	 Marketing Subsidiaries . Name
Non-Traded Traded	 Non-Traded	 Non-Traded
Products &	 Products &	 Products &	 Factors &
Factors	 Factors	 Traded Factors	 Traded Products
Epsilon2	 lotal	 Alpha2
EpsilonI	De ta
Omicron	 Epsilon3
P11	 Omegal
Phil
Tau 1
Beta
1II.A.i: Non-Traded Products 	 Factors
The majority of the marketing subsidiaries were included in this
group, since their economic exposure was minimal. All of the
companies in this group had a significant degree of' market power
and four of the companies (P11, Epsilon2, Omicron and Taul) were
subject to government price controls.
Companies which are subject to government price controls (The
Department of Health for pharmaceuticals, The National Prices
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Commission ENPC] for other industries) are likely to face minimal
price competition.	 Importers are subject to regulation of gross
margins.	 The NPC will award price increases, provided that
there is documentary evidence of import which shows the currency
of the exporter.	 An appropriate exchange rate is then applied
to the invoiced amount.	 The appropriate rate is based upon
bank counterfoils with either spot or forward exchange rates.
The NPC encourage the use of forward rates, since costs related
to foreign exchange gains and losses are awarded retrospectively.
In the absence of documentary evidence, the average exchange rate
for the previous three months is applied.
	 It was also reported
that there had been requests to produce bank statements for firms
which had attempted to mislead the NPC.	 Techniques used to
mislead the NPC included stockpiling, cosmetic alterations to
products, transfer pricing and launching new products with
inflated costs.
While the presence of government price regulation justifies the
inclusion of four of the firms in this category, the three other
companies were not subject to price regulation. EpsilonZ, Phi2
and Beta all sold highly differentiated products, which were
relatively price inelastic. The markets for all three product
groups were relatively small and therefore, not subject to price
regulation.
The main effect that exchange rate changes might have on cash
flows would be the time lag between an increase in the cost of
imported products due to exchange rate changes and the adjustment
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of prices to reflect the price change. Companies which were
subject to NPC regulation were exposed to the extent that there
was a time lag between a change in costs and permission being
granted to increase prices. Companies not subject to NPC
regulation were only exposed until price lists were revised.
Hereafter this form of exposure will be termed 'sticky price
exposure'.
The management of sticky price exposure depended on whether the
company was invoiced in Punts or Sterling.	 Pu, Epsilon2,
EpsilonZI, and Omicron were invoiced in Punts. 	 Changes in costs
could be anticipated at the budget stage, and the sticky price
exposure was effectively transferred to the UK division. 	 None
of the three companies which were invoiced in Sterling used
active hedging techniques (see Table 8.2). Phil used a currency
surcharge on its invoices which ensured that the time lag between
a change in exchange rates and a change in prices was minimised.
Taul left exposures uncovered since adverse changes in exchange
rates could be recouped from government regulatory bodies, whilst
Beta covered all transactions since pricing could be based upon
forward rates.
It also became apparent that some of the companies were affected
by a second type of exposure which arose from parallel importing.
Parallel importing consists of purchasing identical branded
products in a foreign market where there is a different price
structure. This issue has received considerable attention in
EEC competition policy (see Dosser et al.[1982]), particularly
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with respect to pharmaceuticals. It is relevant to economic
exposure since exchange rate changes may lead to short term
differences In national price structures, or accentuate existing
differences.	 This form of exposure is discussed more fully in
section III.A.iv.
Finally, three companies (Epsilon 1, Taul and Phil) were to some
extent exposed to the effects of exchange rate changes on
sectoral demand. This issue is discussed more fully in section
III.D.
III.A.ii: Traded Factors	 Non-Traded Products
lotal was the only company in this category. The company was
part of a duopoly and subject to NPC regulation.
	 It was
identical to the companies described in the previous section save
that it had freedom of sourcing. The Irish company had altered
its sourcing from the UK to European subsidiaries In order to
take advantage of deviations from purchasing power parity (see
Appendix II). The treasurer stressed the importance of regular
contact between the purchasing officer and the treasury
department in order to ensure that purchasing decisions were
based upon the most up-to-date exchange rate information. This
change in sourcing policies helped increase profitability, as
well as decreasing sticky price exposure (since the EMS
currencies were less volatile). However, the company was badly
affected by parallel importing (see section III.A.iv) and this
was partially attributable to UK subsidiaries having 'freedom of
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destination'.
flI.A.iii: Non-Traded Factors	 aded. Products
There were four companies in this category, and all four
companies had significant competitive exposures. This exposure
arose since costs were effectively Sterling denominated and
competition originated in either the US or European countries.
During the period 1979-1983, these companies were at a
disadvantage since Irish customers had an incentive to source in
the EEC or the US (see Appendix Ii).
The managerial response of all four companies was initiated in
the UK HQ and is described more fully for three of the companies
(Alpha2, Delta and Epsilon3) in chapter nine. All four
companies had begun to meet local executives more frequently in
order to gather more information about competitor activity.
Indeed Epsilon had developed a formal system for gathering
information on competitors' strengths and weaknesses.
	 The
response of the executives was favourable and they felt that it
was desirable that the HQ paid more attention to the grassroots.
However, the finance director of Delta was somewhat cynical about
the actual change.
All of' the companies modified their production and marketing
strategies.	 Alpha had concentrated on increasing the
differentiation of' its products by offering customised products
and closing plants which produced commodity products. 	 Delta had
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ratlonalised production and concentrated it on a single site.
Furthermore, the plant had been automated and the product range
reduced. Epsilon and Omega attempted to cut the European
capacity of their industries by reaching agreements with other
sup p11 ers.
All of the companies other than Omegal were invoiced in Punts.
The managing director of one of the companies pointed out that
there were considerable problems In making the sales force aware
of economic exposure, particularly when the local company was
invoiced in Punts. He complained that the business managers did
not see It as part of their jobs.
Delta's finance director stressed the importance of joint
meetings between the finance and marketing functions when foreign
competition was affecting market share, in order to strike a
balance between price and market share effects. He also pointed
out that the effects of exchange rate changes had been mitigated
to some extent, since the company had an extensive dealer network
unlike Its competitors. Unfortunately, the advantage of this
dealer network bad been eroded due to increased concentration in
the retail sector.
III.A.iv Parallel Imortin
While parallel importing is most frequently associated with the
pharmaceutical industry, large Irish supermarket chains engaged
in parallel importing many branded consumer goods which were low
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volume high value items.
	
In some cases, this arose because the
supermarket chains were in a position to obtain goods at the same
prices as the Irish subsidiaries from the UK divisions.
However, it also arose in situations where the Irish marketing
subsidiary had hedged purchases in the forward market and based
prices upon these exchange rates. However, during the period of
the forward contract, if the spot rate changes significantly,
supermarkets may commence purchasing in the UK and obtain branded
products more cheaply. Apart from large supermarket chains,
individuals were also engaged in parallel importing by either
going to Northern Ireland to purchase goods, or alternatively
individuals from Northern Ireland purchasing products in the
South of Ireland.
	 The companies which were selling low volume
high value items are shown in Tables 8.8 and 8.9.
table 
.k Classification	 Marketing £ubsidiaries
5ellin Low Volume Hi gh Value ood
Product Markets
Non-Tradable	 Tradable	 Total
Factor	 Non-Tradable	 3	 1	 U
Markets
Tradable	 1	 0
Total	 U	 1	 5
bLe	 Classification Lky. liame) L Marketing .j.D31diariesL
Sell 1. n L Vcl um High
Non_Traded	 Traded	 Non-Traded	
)on-Traded
productS &	 Products &	 Products &	
Pactors &
Factors	 Factors	
Traded Factors	 Products
tel ta
EpSi10	 lotal
EpSil0
TaU 1
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All five could be potentially affected by parallel importing.
However, both Epsilon2 and Taul were selling patented products in
government regulated markets and had ensured that government
licensing eliminated parallel importing. Moreover, the
government had been persuaded to maintain this relationship
because other firms in the industrial association were major
exporters. Epsilonll also sold patented products. In order to
decrease the susceptibility to parallel importing the Irish
subsidiary had taken control of the Northern Irish subsidiary
upon the break with Sterling. The objective of this arrangement
was to ensure that there was a unitary pricing policy in both
Northern and Southern Ireland, and hence force parallel importers
to travel to the UK.
Delta had also been affected by parallel importing. The parent
had a policy of' selling at the same price to the Irish subsidiary
and Irish supermarket chains, and so the latter went to the UK to
source. Therefore this variant of parallel importing did not
arise from exchange rates, but from the parent company pricing
policy. Fortunately, for distribution reasons, the Irish
company was also responsible for Northern Ireland, and despite
individuals crossing the border to buy the firm's products, the
Irish subsidiary never lost out. The only difficulty which
arose from parallel importing was that sales levels in the North
and the South had become more volatile when taken in isolation.
lotal was selling branded consumer products and circulated local
retail price lists.
	 In 1982, the company was badly hit by
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parallel importing, due to the position it had taken in the
forward market. Supermarkets stepped in and began to import the
branded products from the UK. The item received considerable
attention in the media.	 Seemingly, an agreement had been
reached in 1980 that Irish retailers would source from the Irish
marketing subsidiaries of UK MNCs. The IADT (a vociferous
association of small retailers) was extremely keen to enforce
this agreement since it was not in the interests of their
membership to have large multiples selling branded products at
anything less than the Irish price list. 	 Moreover, the closure
of the Irish marketing subsidiaries would increase their
purchasing costs. lotal became involved in this debate along
with supermarket chains and the confederation of Irish Industry.
Despite the fact that it was only a marketing subsidiary, it
controlled other manufacturing companies(Iota2 and Iota3).
	
This
in turn meant that it could obtain good copy by pointing out that
Irish jobs were at stake. The public debate was terminated
abruptly when it was discovered that the existence of such an
agreement would be outside the spirit of the Treaty of Rome.	 A
representative from a supermarket chain was contacted.
	 He
maintained that it was often difficult to sidestep local
subsidiaries, but that parallel importing was possible. He also
pointed out that there were certain areas where it was more
difficult to engage in parallel importing due to the possibility
of adverse attention in the media.	 For example, he suggested
that the importation of sugar (a nationalised industry) would be
potentially disastrous.
	 The only management reponse of the
lotal was to commence collecting information on UK prices in
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order to ensure that Irish prices never diverged from UK prices
to any great extent.
III.A.v: Conclusions
Economic exposure may be subdivided into four types, sticky price
exposure, competitive exposure (traded products and factors),
sectoral/macroecoriomic exposure and parallel import exposure.
In order to minimise exposure, more timely exposure-related
Information may be gathered and a variety of tactics may be used
to decrease the exposure. Sticky price exposure is minimised
by decreasing the time lag between exchange rate changes and
price changes.	 Competitive exposure is decreased by making
traded products less tradable and non-traded factors more
tradable. Parallel Import exposure may be decreased by
increasing the costs of engaging in parallel importing.
Macroeconomic/sectoral exposure is discussed in section IILD.
III.B: The Econonio Exposure of Manufacturing Subsidiaries
While the economic exposure of marketing subsidiaries is
relatively straightforward, the economic exposure of
manufacturing subsidiaries is somewhat more complicated. In
order to simplify the analysis the exposure arising from exports
is discussed in section III.C. A list of' the seventeen
companies in this category was presented in Table 8.5, and the
companies are classified In this section in a similar manner to
the marketing subsidiaries in section III.A.	 The results of'
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this classification are presented in Tables 8.10 and 8.11. 	 Each
group Is then discussed separately.
Table 8.10: ClassifIcation 	 Domestic Manufacturers
Product Markets
Non-Tradable	 Tradable	 Total
Factor	 Non-Tradable
	 8
	
3
	
11
Markets
Tradable
	 2
	
ii
	
6
Total
	
10
	
7
	
17
Thble 8.11 Classification jy.. Name) 	 Domestic Manufacturers
Non-Traded	 Traded	 Non-Traded	 Non-Traded
Products &	 Products &
	
Products &	 Factors &
Factors	 Factors	 Traded Factors	 Traded Products
Zeta
P13
Rho2
Lainbdal
Kappa
Si g!na
Omega2
Tau2
Aiphal	 P12
Epsilonl	 Iota2
Thetal
Theta2
Iota3
Ph 12
Tau3
III.B.i: Non-Traded Prcducts .an, Factors
All of the companies in this group (other than P13) were dominant
suppliers. Indeed, Lambdal had a market share of more than 90%.
Five of the companies (Sigma, Omega2, Rho2, Lambdal and Tau2)
were subject to NPC regulation and Kappa had been subject to NPC
regulation until demand for its products decreased significantly.
P13 sold its products to both P12 and third parties, however
quality was considered more important than price in its industry.
Kappa had been affected by parallel importing from Northern
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Ireland and had closed down its operations in border areas. The
company was also adversely affected by changes in government
spending and this issue will be discussed in section IILD. In
principle, Kappa could have sourced in global markets, however it
was part of a bilateral monopoly and if sourcing patterns were
altered, the supplier might go out of business or impose
sanctions in the future. The only tactic Kappa could use was
the threat of importation when negotiating with the supplier.
Apart from Kappa, the companies in this group were only affected
by exchange rate changes in two ways. Firstly, the companies
had a sticky price exposure, and for the majority of the
companies, management of this exposure consisted of ensuring that
the time lag between exchange rate changes and NPC permission to
increase prices was minimised. Omega2 eventually succeeded in
persuading the NPC to consider applications for price increases
on a monthly basis.	 Secondly, capita]. equipment was one traded
factor of production used by these companies. 	 The sourcing of
capita]. equipment is discussed in section III.B.v.
III.B.ii: Non-Traded Products 	 Traded Factors
Pi2 and Iota2 souroed raw materials in global markets and sold
their products in nationally segmented markets. Both companies
were dominant suppliers in the Irish market and subject to price
controls. As such, the effects of exchange rate changes could
be recouped and all their competitors were in a similar position.
Iota2 sourced in global commodity markets where there were close
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substitutes denominated in different currencies. In order to
take advantage of relative price differences in Punt terms, the
financial, purchasing and production personnel liaised with one
another during the purchase decision. 	 Production personnel were
involved since the alteration of input mix involved minor changes
in the production techniques. Moreover, the company attempted
to source in EMS currencies where possible because of the lower
volatility of the EMS prices and the resultant decrease in sticky
price exposure. P12 faced a single world price for its
materials.
III.B.iii: Traded Products	 IJon-Traded Factors
Three companies sold tradable products and sourced raw materials
locally. These companies were most susceptible to exchange rate
changes since none of the firms exported and only local raw
materials were used.	 If the Punt were revalued, firms in
overseas countries could compete more easily in the local market.
Unlike the importer companies, these companies were able to
compete with overseas Imports by pointing out that they
manufactured in Ireland.
	 For example, Phi2 took its customers
to see Its factory. It was the only domestic producer of the
product and the promotion recieved favourable media attention.
In addition, the promotion represented an opportunity to argue
that UK producers with excess capacity were dumping their
products on the Irish market at the expense of Irish jobs in an
unemployment black-spot.
	
The managing director found that the
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exercise had resulted in a stabilisation of market share. Tau3
and Iota3 also used the 'Guaranteed Irish', 'Foreign Dumping' and
'Jobs at Stake' tactics to decrease import competition.
However, it was pointed out that it was necessary to temper the
'Buy Irish' promotions because of EEC competition laws.
Tau3 also used threats of importation to decrease the cost of
purchases, despite the fact that the raw material could only be
sourced from a single supplier (due to transportation and quality
considerations). The tactic was successful and the supplier
agreed to bear fifty percent of the effects of changes in the
exchange rate.
III;B.iv: raded Product	 Factor Markets
Four companies were classified as both sourcing and selling in
global markets. Aiphal and Epsiloni were selling a product
which could be substituted for overseas products without any
difficulty. As such, both companies were exposed to the cost of
Irish non-traded factors relative to non-traded factors in other
countries. If the Irish Punt were revalued, Irish non traded
factors became relatively more expensive, and the firms would be
placed at a competitive disadvantage. The other two companies
(Thetal and Theta2), by virtue of their size, sourced raw
materials globally and gained a significant cost advantage
relative to smaller competitors.
Epsiloni was involved in processing a commodity with a single
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world price.	 The economic exposure consisted of the Irish
value added and the company had become uncompetitive with
European producers. In order to compete more effectively, the
company invested in new capital equipment and increased volumes
and productivity.
Alphal was in an identical position but it responded in a totally
different way. The company had two plants and all production of
homogenous products was switched to one of the plants. The
majority of' homogenous products were sold under contract to
government services. When the government failed to award
contracts to the company, and purchased from companies that had a
lower amount of Irish value added, the company was able to make
well publicised threats to close the plant because the government
had purchased imports.	 The strategy appears to have been
successful and the plant was still operating in 198 1 . The other
plant was then used to produce branded products of a marginally
higher quality which were packaged rather than loose and
advertised in the media. As such, the differentiation of the
products helped to decrease the economic exposure of' the plant.
The company also had freedom of sourcing, but, despite using
sourcing policy to take advantage of deviations from purchasing
power parity, the accountant was not involved in the decision.
However, because of' the price elasticity of the market, the
exchange rate was incorporated in the production decision and the
factory costing system.
Thetal and Theta2 had an extremely low local value added. The
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industry was oharacterised by a small number of large companies
and many smaller companies. Despite a high degree of price
competition in these companies' markets, both companies had the
resources to source their factors globally, unlike smaller local
competitors.	 There was extremely close liaison between the
treasurer and purchasing and marketing personnel. The pricing,
sourcing and hedging decisions were made simultaneously.
Moreover, the quality of the joint decision was critical, since
larger competitors were in the same position. 	 In order to
obtain information about potential sourcing opportunities,
extensive use was made of international trade fairs.
III.B.v Caital EcuiDment
The sourcing of capital equipment is one area where one would
expect that exchange rate considerations are important. 	 In
most cases there are no supplier dependencies, and given that
they involve large sums of money, one would expect that
deviations from purchasing power parity give rise to alternative
sourcing opportunities.
Unfortunately, in many cases, capital equipment was relatively
specialised and in many instances available from only one
supplier. One company found that there were opportunities to
make savings by contacting the agents in different countries,
since some agents were located in countries with less volatile
currencies and different agents had different hedging policies.
In cases where there was a sourcing choice, German sourcing was
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preferred for two reasons. Firstly, German equipment was more
competitively priced (see Appendix k). . Secondly, it was
possible to obtain favourable Punt-denominated payment terms
which was critical to some companies given exchange control
restrictions on capital items.
A number of participants also argued that spare parts were often
an important factor In the sourcing decision for twO reasons.
Firstly, there was an Incentive to stick with a single
manufacturer since one required only one set of' spare parts In
stock.	 Secondly, by purchasing from suppliers in EMS countries,
the Punt cost of future purchases of' spare parts was more certain
than spare parts from the US.
Finally, the Importance of' communication between financial and
engineering personnel was emphasised by the interviewees in cases
where there was a choice of' sourcing and financial arrangements.
This might arise if' there was a trade-off between the financial
arrangements (price, credit period, currency of Invoice, payment
terms) and the technical specifications of the equipment.
III.LvI: Conclusions
In this section, the importance of operational and promotional
responses to economic exposure has been highlighted. Finance
personnel are only likely to be involved in traded factor market
situations.	 Finally, many subsidiaries do not have a traded
good exposure.
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III. C: The Econoiiic Exposure of Exporting Firms
There were eight firms (see Table 8.5) which relied on exports to
a significant extent, and two of these companies exported the
majority of their output. The firms are classified in Tables
8.12 and 8.13.
Factor
Markets
lable 8.12 Classification L Exporters
Product Markets
Non-Tradable	 Tradable
Non-Tradable	 3	 3
Tradable	 0	 2
Total	 3	 5
Total
6
2
8
Table 8.1R: Classification	 Exporters	
____
Non-Traded Traded	 Non-Traded	 Non-Traded
Products &	 Products &	 Products &	 Factors &
Factors	 Factors	 Traded Factors	 Traded Products
Zeta
	
Pi2
	
Tau2
Lambdal
	
Aiphal
	
Lambda2
Rho2
	
Rho 1
III.C.i: Non-Traded Products .an, Factor
The three companies in this group exported extremely
differentiated products, which were unlikely to be sensitive to
exchange rate changes.	 Lambdal and Rho2 were large concerns
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producing 'Irish' products which were branded, and both products
were brand leaders. Zeta was relatively small (about 200
employees) and had Identified market niches in the US and Europe
which were not price sensitive. 	 All three companies assumed the
most conservative exchange rate in their pricing decisions.
III.C.ii Traded Products 	 Non-Traded Factors
Three companies sourced locally and sold their products in global
markets.
Tau 2 produced branded consumer goods for the parent company.
However, the company had to compete with other European
subsidiaries for export contracts which were awarded by the
divisional HQ. From the HQ point of view, this meant that the
company was sourcing in the cheapest locations. However from a
subsidiary point of view, the subsidiary was exposed to exchange
risk and was only able to compete with UK plants when Sterling
was overvalued (in purchasing power parity terms).
Lambda2 and Rhol produced agricultural products. 	 As such, they
competed in markets which approximated perfect competition. At
first sight, one would imagine that these companies had the
greatest economic exposure, however, the EEC's Common
Agricultural Policy isolated the companies by virtue of the
system of monetary compensatory amounts.
The EEC Common Agricultural Policy aims to stabilise farm incomes
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by setting the prices of agricultural products and absorbing any
surpluses or deficits at the quoted prices. Needless to say,
this gives rise to an economic exposure since exchange rate
changes will lead to changes in these prices in local currency
terms.	 Moreover, since the products are by their nature
homogenous, agricultural incomes would be exposed to exchange
rate changes. In order to overcome this possibility, the EEC
has a system of monetary compensatory amounts whereby trade in
agricultural products between countries is subject to a levy or
subsidy which is based upon the change in exchange rates since
the prices were originally set. This in turn implies that there
is no incentive to trade agricultural products arising from
economic exposure.
III;C.11i: Traded Droduct 	 Factor. Markets
P12 and Alphal were included in this group.
Pi2 purchased raw materials in a global market where the law of
one price operated. Despite the fact that it produced a branded
non price-sensitive product, the parent company had instituted a
system of competitive export contracting. This in turn meant
that the company had to compete with other European subsidiaries
for export contracts, and was exposed to the extent of local
value added. In order to overcome the possibility of free
market contracting, the company sought to make the award of
contracts a political or diplomatic process. The company was
only partly owned by the parent and concessions were negotiated
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with the parent subject to the award of contracts.
Aiphal was in a similar position, save that it was responsible
for the marketing of its own products. 	 Price was an extremely
Important factor in the marketing mix and the company's fortunes
had depended to a large extent on the degree of local, value added
and on the exchange rate.
	 In order to minimise its competitive
exposure, the company only exported relatively differentiated
products and concentrated on supplying 'up-market' retailers.
III.C.iv: SummarY
In this section, the importance of differentiated products as a
technique to lower traded good exposure has been highlighted.
The use of internal tendering schemes within MNCs was noted, as
was the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy on economic
exposure for firms exporting agricultural products.
III.D: The Macroeoonoiilc and Sectoral. Impact of Exchange Rate
ianges
In chapter three it was suggested that models of economic
exposure were partial equilibrium in nature and focused on the
corporate effects of exchange rate changes rather than the
macroeconomic effects. Three types of macroeconomic Impact
were identified; farm incomes, government spending and the export
sector.	 The firms affected by each type of impact are
identified in Table 8.11.
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Table 8.1k: Ib.. Macroeconomic ImDact	 Exhane Rate
Impact:	 Farii
Incones
Epsi 10 nIl
Kappa
Lambda2
Taul
Government
Spending
Ep silo ni
Kappa
Phil
Ph i2
Exporters
Epsilon3
Alpha2
P13
Omega 1
III.ID.i: Farm Incomes
Farm incomes were adversely affected by exchange rate changes
since farm output was effectively denominated in a basket of
European currencies ('The Green Pound'), and many farm inputs
were Sterling denominated. Given the scenario in appendix three
(Sterling overvalued and the DM undervalued in purchasing power
parity terms), farm incomes were squeezed. Since agriculture
accounts for about a third of Irish GNP, farm incomes are an
important factor, particularly for companies which are dependent
on agricultural demand. Three of the product lines in the
sample were badly affected by the decline in agricultural
incomes, and Alphal had closed a manufacturing subsidiary because
of' this factor.
III.D.Ii: Government SDendin
The government budget deficit was effected by exchange rate
changes due to the high level of government debt denominated in
foreign currencies. While this factor may have influenced the
level of government current account spending and the level of
both direct and Indirect taxation (and hence disposable incomes),
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the effect was felt most sharply in the level of government
capital spending.	 This in turn had a severe impact on the Irish
construction industry and four product groups were involved in
the construction industry.
III.D.iii: Ib. ExDort sector
Four firms sold a significant proportion of their products to
firms which were exporters. The managing director of Epsilon3
was particularly concerned about the possibility of a high
exchange rate leading to a decreased demand in this sector.
However, statements by the Irish Export Board (see Appendix Six)
would suggest that these fears were unjustified.
III.D.iv: Manain
	
Macroeconomic ImDact
As such, very little had been done by the affected companies
about the macroeconomic impact. On a year by year basis, both
agricultural demand and government spending could be forecast
with relative certainty and the forecasted values were used in
the preparation of budgets. Apart from reflecting the effects
in budgets, the only other reaction was to engage in lobbying
both as individual firms and through trade associations (see
Appendix Six) in the hope of influencing government policy.
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IV: Suivary and Concluslone
In this chapter, the management of foreign exchange risk in the
Irish subsidiaries of UK MNCs was reviewed.	 It was shown that
local exchange controls exerted a considerable influence on the
management of transaction exposure. It was also shown that the
findings of chapter six of the HQ treasury role in the management
of the transaction exposure of overseas subsidiaries was
consistent with the findings at a subsidiary level.
	 However, it
was also found that divisional managers exerted some influence on
the hedging decision in some of the subsidiaries.
The economic exposures of the subsidiaries were then examined
using an approach based upon the tradability of factors of
production and products. Apart from the exposure arising from
traded goods, three other aspects of economic exposure were
identified; sectoral/macroeconomic exposure, parallel import
exposure and sticky price exposure.
For the most part, the management of economic exposure was
characterised by an ad hoc ex post reaction to deviations from
purchasing power parity, but it was evident that some companies
had learnt from the experiences of the early eighties. However,
the tactics used after the event were in many respects similar to
the pre-active strategies suggested by Shapiro [1986], once one
interprets promotion in a broad sense and incorporates government
lobbying. While the evidence does suggest that operational
rather than financial responses are used, it would seem that
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there is a role for the local treasurer in the operational
responses.
Finally, sticky price exposure is closely related to transaction
exposure.	 This is a useful finding, since the management of
transaction exposure may approximate the management of economic
exposure, if sticky price exposure is the firm's only economic
exposure.
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CIAPTER 9
ECONOMIC EXPOSURE AND THE MNC
In this chapter, the economic exposure of the twenty MNCs is
examined. The material in the previous three chapters is then
synthesized to produce a series of guidelines for the management
of economic exposure. In order to operationalise the material
presented in this chapter, a decision support system is developed
in the following chapter.
I: The Econoiilo Expostre of the MNC
The analysis of the exposure of the MNC is somewhat more complex
than the analysis of the exposure of the subsidiary, since it is
impossible to obtain sufficient information on the activities of
the companies.	 Moreover, since many of the companies are
involved in a variety of different businesses, with varying
degrees of international involvement, it would be impossible to
establish the economic exposure of the MNC without relevant
segmental information detailing the extent of activity in
different product groups by region. Unfortunately, this
information was not available, and in some cases line of business
information for the MNC as a whole was unavailable. An attempt
was made to classify the economic exposures of"the companies
using the same technique as chapter eight, and the results are
contained in Table 9.1. It should however be pointed out that
the classification was based on considerably less information
than the classifications in chapter eight.
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	Table j.j Classification 	 . MNC,
Product Markets
	
Non-Tradable	 Tradable	 Total
Factor	 Non-Tradable
	 10
	
5
	
15
Markets
Tradable	 2
	
3
	
6
Total
	
12
	
8
	
20
Non-Traded
Factors &
Products
Theta, Zeta
Psl,Iota
Rho, Kappa
Lambda, Phi
Signia,Tau
Classification	 j MN_CE	 Name
Traded	 Non-Traded	 NØa-Traded
Factors &	 Products &	 Products & ON
Products	 Traded Factors	 Traded Factors
Mu	 P1	 Alpha
Nu	 Omega	 Beta
Omicron Gamma
Delta
Epsilon
li: non-Tradable Factor
	
Product Market
Fifty per cent of the companies in the sample were trading in
both non-traded product and factor markets. Given the absence
of traded good exposure, the key consideration In these companies
was the management of sticky price exposure.
Five of the companies (Phi, Kappa, Theta, Zeta, Sigma) were
Involved in non-tradable products with a high degree of value
added, which due to either the costs of transporting the products
or the possibility of' product deterioration in a short period of
time, were unlikely to face any overseas competition.
The remaining companies were involved in branded or patented
products of one sort or another and were also unlikely to face
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any import competition. In addition, since the products were
specific, there was very little opportunity to alter the sourcing
of the products.
Two of the companies (Phi and Kappa) were affected by government
spending in the countries in which they operated. 	 Phi made
considerable use of government lobbying. The company had also
encountered considerable macroeconomic problems in one of the
countries it operated in, and in order to minimise the impact,
purchased a facility in a neighbouring country which would
process output from the country which was having economic
problems.
Tourist spending in the UK had some impact on the performance of
Psi and Rho, however both companies were highly decentralised,
and the author was unable to ascertain the tactics, if' any, which
were used to manage the impact of exchange rates on tourism.
1.11: Traded factors: Non!-Traded Products
Omega and P1 operated in this category. 	 Both companies sourced
their factors in markets where the raw material had a single
dollar price. As such, both companies had no opportunity to
alter the sourcing of their products in response to deviations in
purchasing power parity. Therefore, the main issue with both of
these companies was the time lag between a change in material
prices and the reflection of the change in product prices.
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UK Productionb
63%
65%
72%
77%
56%
1.111: Non-Traded Factors: Traded Products
There were five companies in this category.
	
In many
respects, it represents the most interesting category, since one
would expect that companies in the category were most likely to
be badly affected by deviations from purchasing power parity,
given that they must compete globally using non-traded factors of
production.	 All five companies would be expected to have been
badly affected by the relative strength of Sterling in the early
eighties since the bulk of their production was based in the UK.
Details of their UK interests in 1981 are shown in Table 9.2.
Table 12
	
Sales	 Extorts: Traded Product Companies
Company	 UK Sales a UK Exportsa
Alpha	 113%	 20%
Beta	 59%	 6%
Gamma	 I$3%	 29%
Delta	 56%
	
21%
Epsilon	 311%	 22%
Notes:
a) Sales and exports are expressed as a percentage of total
sales.
b) UK Production represents the sum of UK sales and exports.
All five companies were manufacturing companies, and the bulk of
their costs were incurred on UK goods and services. One would
expect that these companies would be most susceptible to the
strength of' Sterling in the early eighties, due to the erosion of'
export competitiveness and the penetration of the UK market by
foreign manufacturers. 	 The experiences of the five companies
are described in the following paragraphs.
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I.iii.a: Aloha
Alpha was extremely badly affected by imports, particularly, from
the US. During the late seventies and the early eighties,
twenty five per cent of the capital employed was written off and
the UK work force was cut by a third. 	 It should however be
pointed out that the industry appeared to be in decline in any
case, and there had been a regular stream of redundancies since
1971. Therefore, a strong pound may have served mainly to speed
up the process, rather than constitute the main causal factor.
By 1978, Alpha's export margins were being affected by the
strength of Sterling. 	 In July 1979, large advertisements
began to appear in the financial press explaining how the
strength of' Sterling was adversely affecting the company. By
August 1979, the company began to announce organisationa]. changes
which would affect marketing policies and granted subsidiaries
freedom of sourcing.	 Intensive lobbying in both Westminister
and Brussels also began at this stage.	 It was argued that the
strength of Sterling combined with government intervention in the
US industry gave US exporters an advantage. Balance of
Payments statistics showed that in the first six months of 1979,
UK exports had increased 6% in value terms, whereas Imports in
the same period had increased by 25%. By this stage, it emerged
that the basic strategy of the company to deal with the downturn
was a three pronged attack.
Firstly, the EEC was persuaded to investigate the alleged
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dumping.	 The British Ministers also attempted to influence the
EEC Council of Ministers.	 The EEC did not respond, however
Britain was permitted to Introduce limited quota arrangements on
Imports.	 At the time, it was suggested in the financial press
that the EEC feared retaliatory US action on European Steel
exports.	 Secondly, the company began to attempt to shift
production overseas, in order to diversify itself. 	 Alpha began
to actively search for opportunities In the US. 	 Thirdly, the
company began to move out of market segments which were commodity
segments and susceptible to import competition, and used
marketing tactics to differentiate existing products. This
rearrangement also included attempts to increase value added on
products and a reorganisation of the company which allowed
greater autonomy to operating units, including freedom of
sourcing. Finally, the company emerged successfully with
considerable increases in both profitability and share prices
since 1982.
X.iIi.b Beta
Beta was in a similar position.	 It had been dominant in certain
sectors of its industry in the UK. By 1979, the UK market began
to be penetrated by imports, and the treasurer cited exchange
rates as a 'predominant reason' for the erosion of market share.
No attempts were made at campaigning for 'anti dumping'
legislation, since most of' the competition was European based.
The reaction to import penetration was to reduce UK capacity and
rationalise product lines.	 The marketing reaction was to
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attempt to segment the market for some of the firm's products,
and to increase product differentiation using packaging,
promotions and advertising. In other market segments, the
company invested in new plant in order to become the lowest cost
producer in certain segments. By 198 1 , according to
stockbrokers' reports, import penetration was still continuing,
and the company had been the subject of periodic take-Over
rumours.
I.iii.c Gamma
Gamma was also badly hit during the period of the strong Pound.
The company had adopted a strategy of concentrating on areas
which were more specialised and technologically based, and
disposed of businesses which were competitive capital equipment
markets.	 In the first six months of 1981  alone, pre-tax profits
doubled and this was attributed (by both the management and the
financial press) to the weakness of the dollar.
I.iii.d: Delta
Delta had a number of divisions.
	 In the mid-seventies one of
the divisions was a dominant global producer. 	 By 1979, there
were two forces at work, the strength of Sterling and the
company's distribution policy. 	 The company had a policy of
using tied distributors to market its products,	 and refused to
supply large retail chains.	 This in turn led to retail chains
beginning to import the product from overseas and with the added
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effect of the strength of Sterling, market share was eroded.
Between 1979 and 1981, the market share of imports had increased
from 10% to 116%. Moreover, despite obtaining major US export
contracts, the UK plant was unable to produce the product
profitably, and the company licensed Far Eastern producers to
manufacture to order.
	
Unfortunately, this led to some erosion
of market share in the company's Far Eastern markets. The
response of the company was to reduce the workforce drastically
in the UK, rationalise the product range, and introduce automated
manufacturing systems.	 According to press reports, there have
been recurrent difficulties with the computerised production
planning system.
	 There has also been an increase in the
proportion of components which are sourced overseas. By 19811,
the division had failed to recover, and a US management
consulting firm was appointed in 1985.
The largest division was involved in a commodity market. The
market was characterised by excess capacity at the turn of the
decade. The division was affected by a decrease in exports and
import penetration (particularly from Germany) when Sterling was
strong. There were attempts at rationalisation and the capacity
of the industry was decreased.	 In 198 11 agreement was reached
with another UK manufacturer to share facilities, and the company
had begun to source some raw materials overseas.	 By 1985, the
division had recovered to some extent and exports had increased
considerably.	 The managing director attributed this change in
fortune to the rationalisation in previous years.
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Other divisions were involved in producing capital equipment and
had lost ground due to both the strength of' Sterling and
aggressive Japanese competition. 	 There had been some increase
in exports to the US during the period 198k/85, which the
treasurer said was partially due to the strength of' the Dollar at
the time. However, in some areas, the company had been unable
to penetrate the US market during this period due to strong
lobbying by US congressmen.
I.iii.e: EDsilon
In many respects, Epsilon was similar to Alpha, since six per
cent of' sales arose from the same products as Alpha, and another
division in Epsilon produced a raw material for those products.
Epsilon was somewhat more fortunate than Alpha in that fifty five
per cent of sales were non-traded products. The company had
been pursuing a strategy of gradually increasing its
international involvement.	 In 1979, the strength of the British
Pound, began to affect both exports and profitability. 	 Exports
decreased for the first year since the sixties. 	 Moreover, the
company was facing increasing competition from both Europe and
the US. In 1979 alone, the US share one UK market had increased
from 7% to 32% and the US had also succeeded in obtaining a 110%
share of' the market in end-products. Apart from dollar based
competition, the company was also extremely sensitive to
fluctuations in the Deutsche Mark. One broker estimated (the
chairman endorsed his estimate) that if the DM fell by 20%, 1983
profits for the whole company would be 20% higher.
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Epsilon also made statements which were critical of government
exchange rate and interest rate policy in the press and the
annual report. However, there was no evidence of special
representations to either the government or trade associations.
The company also pursued a strategy of increasing its US
presence, shifting production overseas and increasing value
added.	 The process of increasing value added was also
accompanied by a greater concentration on marketing, increased
local autonomy and increased formal contact with both operating
units, distributors and customers.	 The performance of the
company has improved markedly in both accounting and share price
terms since 1981.
I.iii.f: Suxnmarv
The potted histories of the five companies which were selling
products in global markets from a UK manufacturing base were
examined in this section. It was shown that strategies had been
adopted by the companies in an attempt to prevent a recurrence of
the difficulties encountered in the early eighties. 	 However,
it may be argued that these potted histories are ex post
rationalisations of events. The author is quite aware of this
potential problem and in order to minimise this risk , a variety
of sources (interviews, annual reports, stockbroker reports and
press cuttings) were used to construct the histories.
However, it is quite possible that nothing fundamental changed in
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these business, and that the improved performance in recent years
is attributable to the strength of the US dollar. The acid test
of the success of these strategies will be the extent to which
the performance of these companies is not adversely affected in
future years, should the Pound's exchange rate be 'high' in
purchasing power parity terms.
1.iv Traded Product	 Factor Markets
There were three companies in this category. 	 The most notable
feature about them is their relative lack of dependence on the UK
market and UK production (see Table 9.3). Moreover, Mu and
Omicron were significant importers of products into the UK, for
sale in the UK market. Mu had diversified its production on a
worldwide basis.
Table 3j	 Sales	 Extorts: Traded Products an, Factors
Company	 UK Salesa UK Exportsa	 UK Productionb
Mu	 31%	 1%	 35%
Nu	 23%	 9%	 32%
Omicron	 25%	 9%	 3k%
Notes:
a) Sales and exports are expressed as a percentage of total
sales in 1981.
b) UK Production represents the s of UK sales and exports.
The economic exposure of each of these companies is examined in
the following paragraphs.
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I.iv.a: lisa
Sixty seven percent of Mu's turnover arose from buying,
processing and selling commodities in a global market. The
remaining portion of' turnover arose in the UK and another
European country from an Industry which had non-traded product
markets, but traded factor markets. Essentially, the company
had no economic exposure since there were world markets for both
the products and the factors, and the only exposure was the small
amount of local processing.	 The company was simple engaged in
trading in global markets.
I.Iv.b: iia
Nu has an extremely global spread of operations, and despite both
purchasing and selling in global markets, exchange rate changes
are unlikely to have any effect on the local currency
performances of the businesses, except for macroeconomic impacts.
The group Is however exposed to the translation impact of
exchange rate changes, because of its geographical diversity.
I.iv.c: Omicron
Omicron had considerable manufacturing interests in the
Commonwealth. The company maintained that the strength of
Sterling had led to an increase in UK import competition and a
decrease in export competitiveness. Attempts were made, through
a trade association, to persuade the EEC to introduce anti-
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dumping legislation.	 The effort was not successful and in fact,
Omicron's UK market share was constant during the period due to
its control of distribution in the UK. Moreover, because the
company was a global producer, the only real effect of exchange
rate changes was on the translation of overseas earnings.
Lv: Summary
In this section the economic exposure of the MNC was examined.
It was shown that although many UK MNCs may not have an economic
exposure of any dimension, some MNCs (particularly companies
dealin in traded product markets and non-traded factor markets)
do have. Moreover, individual subsidiaries or divisions may
have economic exposures and this may be a considerable problem at
lower levels of the hierarchy despite being irrelevant at a HQ
level.	 A classic case in point is the MNC dealing in traded
product and factor markets. At a HQ level, sufficient
international diversification will ensure that the MNC is not
exposed, however, the value added in individual countries will be
exposed, and local management will be concerned with economic
exposure.
II: Managing Eoonc..to Exposure
In this section, the management of economic exposure is discussed
by synthesizing the material in section I and the previous three
chapters.	 In the previous chapter, four types of economic
exposure were identified:
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1) Sticky Price Exposure
2) Traded Good Exposure
3) Parallel Import Exposure
k)	 Macroeconomic/Sector'a]. Exposure
Based upon the practices observed in the sample companies, the
management of each type of exposure is summarised in the
following sections.
II.A: Sticky Price Exposure
Sticky price exposure is the time lag between a change in costs
arising from exchange rate changes and altering prices. If the
firm is an exporter, then this would be extended to include the
time lag between the sale of products and the receipt of cash in
home currency. As shown in chapter seven, this type of exposure
was explicitly managed by Pi, Gamma and Epsilon.	 Omega had
begun to gather information to manage this form of exposure and
Lambda was considering a strategy similar to Gamma's. 	 Apart
from these companies, the other companies had not come to grips
with sticky price exposure and managed transaction exposure as a
surrogate for sticky price exposure. It is impossible to know
the extent to which this behaviour is sub-optimal, however the
decision support model in chapter ten may be used for this
purpose.
Based upon the experiences of Omega and P1, there is both a
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centralised and a decentralised approach to the management of
economic exposure.
II.A.i:	 Decentralised ADroach
Omega used a deceritralised approach to manage sticky price
exposure.	 Information was gathered at the centre on the time
lag so that the hedging behaviour of subsidiaries could be
evaluated and, if necessary, modified. The proposed
performance evaluation system based on current cost rather than
historical, cost factor prices ensured that subsidiaries would be
motivated to institute price increases as quickly as possible.
This was also illustrated in the Irish subsidiary when Omega2
succeeded in persuading the NPC to revise prices monthly.
II.A.ii: .fl, entralised ADropch
P1 combined a Europe—wide netting system and a treasury
management objective of managing sticky price exposure.
However, there approach may not be universally applicable, since
there were significant netting opportunities (and hence
transaction cost savings) and due to the nature of the industry,
it was difficult to decrease the time lag using operational
tactics.
1I.A.iii: Conclusions
Transaction exposure management systems and the management of
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sticky price exposure are inextricably linked.	 Companies
should consider the relationship between the two systems and
ensure that interdependencies between both systems are
understood. For example, while the practice of invoicing
overseas marketing subsidiaries in foreign currency may be an
effective way of maximising netting opportunities and transaction
cost savings, responsibility for sticky price exposure is
effectively shifted from the overseas operating unit to the UK
operating unit. If treasury management is focused on
individual transactions, then this sticky price exposure may
cease to be identifiable.
II.B: Traded Good Expostre
Essentially, the Shapiro C 1975] model is based on traded good
exposure in the overseas subsidiary. 	 Traded factor exposure Is
discussed in section II.B.i and traded product exposure is
examined in section II.B.Ii.
II.B.i: Traded Factors
In order to manage this exposure, the tradability of factors must
be increased. All of the techniques used to manage this form of
exposure were operational rather than financial. The
operational techniques which may be used are summarised In
section II.B.I.a and the management accounting issues are
considered in II.B.I.b.
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II.B.i.a: OperationaL Techniaues
There are two types of technique which may be used to manage this
form of exposure, sourcing policy and investment policy.
Investment policies are relevant since increasing the
international diversification of production will decrease
exposure.	 Factors including land, labour and electricity are
non-tradable. If international diversification is increased,
then these factors will behave 'as if' they are tradable. The
internal tendering techniques used by P1 and Tau constitute
mechanisms which facilitate this process. Alpha and Epsilon
began to shift production overseas at the beginning of this
decade, and the success of the strategy is highlighted by the low
traded good exposure of Mu, NU and Onicron.
If the MNC can alter its sourcing patterns in response to
deviations from purchasing power parity, then the traded good
exposure of the MNC can be decreased. Most of the firms were
unable to alter sourcing since the purchasing decision was based
upon considerations other than price (quality, delivery and
stable supply).	 However, there was more scope to alter the
sourcing of capita]. equipment.	 There are two preconditions for
this policy.	 Firstly, the importance of contact between the
financial and operational personnel was emphasized (e.g.
Lambdal and Iota2). Secondly, some form of information system
on prices in alternative locations is necessary (Thetal, Theta2
and lotal).
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When considerations other than price are paramount, there would
seem may be scope to bargain with suppliers.	 Quality, delivery
and stable supply considerations will give rise to symbiotic
seller-buyer relationships, if' the firm is a large customer.
Bargaining may then be based upon the possibility of going out of
business unless prices are decreased (Tau3) or the threat of'
sourcing elsewhere (Kappa).
II.B.i.b: Management Accounting Issues
The operational techniques used to manage traded factor exposure
give rise to two types of' management accounting issue:
performance appraisal and capital budgeting.
Quantitative analysis may be an input to the capital budgeting
decision.	 If it is, then it is necessary to ensure that the
externalities arising from international diversification are
reflected within the decision. Performance appraisal systems
may also be affected, since systems of internal tendering will
mean that subsidiary performance will be related to deviations
from purchasing power parity.
Performance appraisal may also be used to ensure that alternative
sourcing opportunities are exploited.	 Standard global costs of
factors may be used to evaluate purchasing performance. Iota2
included this possibility in the evaluation of manufacturing
performance, however the Information was not integrated into the
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management accounting system.
II.B.iI: Traded Products
Traded product exposure may be decreased by decreasing the
tradability of products.	 The techniques which may be used to
decrease tradability may be categorised as short and medium run.
II.B.ii.a: Short	 Tactics
In the short run (less than six months), promotional activity is
the only tactic. Essentially, it consiits of making a case to
either customers or the government on the traded good exposure of
the MNC.	 The case is based upon 'jobs in danger', 'foreign
dumping' or 'unfair foreign government subsidies'. 	 The
objective of' the activity is to either decrease the price
elasticity of' demand by appealing to nationalist sympathies, or
persuade the government to take action.
Government action may consist of' subsidies to the industry, the
Introduction of rion-tarriff barriers, the introduction of Import
quotas (Alpha), purchases of the industries output (Aiphal) or
making a case to the EEC.
II.B.iI.b: Mediwn	 Tactics
In the medium run (six to twelve months), the firm may consider
the introduction of 'barriers to entry' (Bath (1959]), colluding
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with foreign competitors or cost cutting and rationalisation
exercises.
The creation of barriers to entry increase the costs of foreign
competitors entering the local market, and hence decrease the
probability of a traded good exposure. Tau, Iota, Lambda, Psi
and Rho ensured that they were dealing in non-traded product
markets by using advertising, product quality and design,
reputation, customer service, controlled distribution and leased
equipment for use with their products. Similarly, the
companies which had been adversely affected by the 'strength' of
sterling at the beginning of the decade were attempting to use
these tactics.
Collusion with foreign competitors (either rationalisation or
market sharing arrangements) is another possible tactic.
Omegal, Epsilon3 and Phi had used this technique.
	 It is quite
possible that other firms had tacitly done so. Information
systems may also be modified to monitor traded good exposure by
gathering information on competitor activity (Sigma and Epsilon).
Rationalisation and cost cutting was used by Alpha, Epsilon,
Delta and Beta. As Shapiro [1986] quite correctly points out,
this is not a reponse to economic exposure since companies should
be operating at minimum cost anyhow.	 This latter fact may be
explained by either management inertia or political resistance
(government, labour unions and adverse publicity). 	 However, the
presence of' foreign comptition and the use of' promotional
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tactics may decrease political resistance.	 Ultimately,
companies with a traded good exposure may be sold (Gamma).
II. C: Parallel Importing
In some respects, parallel importing represents an optimum, since
its existence suggests that the MNC has been extremely successful
in the creation of barriers to entry. Unfortunately, there is
very little which may be done to ensure that it is prevented.
If it arises purely because of exchange rate changes, then the
only response may be the use of the political and promotional
strategies suggested for decreasing the tradability of products.
Examples might include persuading governments to certify the
quality and safety of the products and illegalise the sale of non
certified products (Epsilon2 and Taul). However, such action
may be contrary to the Treaty of Rome.
Barriers to parallel importing could also be created. 	 They
might include the extension of the distributive network, the
introduction of sanctions against distributors engaged in
parallel importing, or the withdrawal of customer service and
warranties. Again, such action is likely to be discouraged by
EEC competition policy and consumer groups. It is also possible
that minor infringements of EEC competition policy may lead to
more widespread EEC or nation state investigations of a MNC's
aotivities.
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Therefore, the management of parallel import exposure is similar
to the management of traded product exposure, since similar
techniques may be used. However, the use of such techniques is
more likely to incur the wrath of regulatory authorities.
Indeed, in the interests of long term profitability, it may be
prudent for MNCs to temper the activities of operating units in
this respect.
II.D: Sectoral aand MacroeooncJ.c Effects
Sectoral/macroeconomic effects are more difficult to manage,
since by definition, they are not firm specific and solutions may
lie at an industry rather than a firm level. 	 One possible
solution may be the use of political mechanisms to ensure
favourable fiscal treatment for individual sectors (Kappa and
Phi). However, the international firm can to some extent
overcome these effects by virtue of Its international
diversification, and the ability to alter either the sourcing or
destination of products (Phi) to other countries.
The sectoral effects are also unlikely to pose a performance
evaluation problem, since sectora]. changes are likely to be less
volatile than exchange rates and more predictable. Given this
property, seotoral effects are easily reflected within
conventional budgeting systems, since a forecast of sectoral
demand may be made and the effects reflected in the budget. In
the longer term, the prediction of sectoral effects will be
important from the point of view of the Investment decision.
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However, forecasting the sensitivity of sectora]. demand to
exchange rate changes is likely to be a difficult task given the
small number of observations available and the impact of many
other state variables on sectoral demand.
III: Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, the classification and management of economic
exposure was examined. Four classes of economic exposure were
highlighted; sticky price exposure, traded good exposure,
parallel import exposure and the macroeconomic and sectoral
consequences of exchange rate changes.
Two interesting issues emerge. Firstly, traded good exposure is
not of enormous importance to many UK MNCs. This in turn
suggests the need for a mode of analysis for the identification
of MNCs which are most susceptible to traded good exposure In
order to ensure that valuable managment time is not devoted to
the management of a non problem. Secondly, many of the
managerial responses which may be used to manage economic
exposure are operational rather than financial in nature.
Moreover, In many cases, there is probably only an isolated role
for the HQ treasurer in the management of economic exposure,
since many of the tactics will be specific to operating units.
Indeed, the role of the HQ treasurer may consist only of the
analysis of the effects of exchange rate changes on the MNC as a
whole and ensuring that performance evaluation and reward systems
ensure that economic exposure is managed from a HQ rather than an
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operating unit point of view. 	 To this end, a model is proposed
in chapter ten for measuring exposure and evaluating the impact
of alternative tactics on the MNC's exposure.
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APTER 10
A DECISI( SUPPORT SYST1
In the previous chapters, some of the theoretical and practical
issues connected with the management of foreign exchange risk
were examined. In this chapter an attempt is made to build upon
this knowledge by developing a decision support system which
might be applied to the management of foreign exchange risk.
The model was developed using a financial modelling computer
package, FcS-EPS.
" The computer model was developed because analytical models are
unlikely to produce any results about the combined effects of
transaction, economic and translation exposure. By using a
computer model, it is possible to integrate the three types of'
exposure in a multi-period setting.
	 The model is also
Interesting, since It demonstrates the information inputs which
are necessary for the management of foreign exchange risk.
Finally, by using a comprehensive model, , it Is possible to
examine the Impact of different foreign exchange risk scenarios
on corporate performance, and then use the model as a decision
support system.
In the first section of this chapter the theory underlying the
basic model Is examined. 	 A full listing of the basic model is
provided in Appendix Seven.	 A series of tests and sample output
from the basic model is presented in Appendix Eight. 	 Some
extensions and uses of the model are then summarised in the
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second section of this chapter.
I: The Basic Model
In this section, the basic decision support model is reviewed.
In principle, it consists of a multicurrency planning model which
permits the incorporation of a wide variety of assumptions and
decision environments.	 In the first part of this section, the
assumptions of the basic model are reviewed.	 The theoretical
underpinnings of the model are reviewed in part two.
1.1: lsstriptions of the Basic Model
The assumptions underlying the basic model are summarised in the
following paragraphs. They are simplifying assumptions and it
is possible to relax all of them by making appropriate
modifications to the basic logic of the model. Relaxations of
the assumptions are discussed in the second section of the
chapter. The assumptions relate to the environment which the
firm operates in and the nature of the firm.
I.A.i: Environmental Assumt1ons
The world is assumed to consist of a finite number of countries
and each of the countries has its own currency. 	 There is no
inflation in the world and the term structure of interest rates
is assumed to be flat.	 There are no transaction costs or bid-
ask spreads, no taxes (or taxes are assumed unitary and symmetric
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without carry forward or carry back provisions), and borrowing
arid lending rates are assumed equal.
I.A.ii: Assumptions about	 Nature	 ..th. Firm
The company is assumed to be headquartered in a single country.
The company's stock of assets is assumed constant with an
infinite economic life, and debt is constant and perpetual. The
analysis is restricted to 2Z monthly periods, and all business is
assumed to be transacted at the end of the month.
\/It Is also assumed that there Is a linear relationship between
total costs and output and that each subsidiary sells or
manufactures a single product (or if it is multi product, that a
suitable numeraire exists).
	
The impact of exchange rate
changes, other than invoicing effects, on prices, costs and
volumes Is also assumed to be linear. Transfers may take place
between subsidiaries, provided that purchases are only made from
a single subsidiary, and that a subsidiary is not simultaneously
Importing and exporting from another subsidiary. However, a
subsidiary may export to an infinite number of other
subsidiaries.
IB: Theoretical Framework
In this section the logic of the basic model is described.
Perhaps the most novel feature of the model is its flexibility.
It may be applied to any subsidiary within the MNC regardless of
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its location or function.	 A consolidation routine Is then
applied to the logic and the data may be combined to produce
Area, Divisional and Group results. The logic of the model may
be broken Into three sections; the information common to all
subsidiaries, the information necessary for individual
subsidiaries and the computational logic. 	 Each of these
sections is dealt with in turn in the following paragraphs.
The accounting system Implicit in the model is then reviewed.
______ Global Information
IB.ia Exchane Rates
Exchange Rates are entered using the convention of the number of
units of foreign currency per unit of home currency. 	 The
subscript 'p' is used to denote the currency of the parent and
the subscript 's' is used to denote the currency of the
subsidiary. The notation for exchange rates which are Initially
input Into the model is:
Ei, , t	 I = 1...n,s,p
t =
This notation may be Interpreted as the number of units of
currency 'I' per unit of the parent's currency 'p' in time period
it,.
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________ Interest Rates
Interest rates may vary over time, however the expected term
structure of interest rates is constant. 	 The notation used is:
Hit
where 'R' is the monthly interest rate which may be earned on
deposits denominated in currency '1' in time period 't'. 	 To
simplify the model, it is assumed that lending and borrowing
rates are equal.
'B.ii: Subsidiary Information
j I.B.ii.a: Forward Cover Rules
It is assumed in each time period 't' that the subsidiary has a
set of hedging rules which are used to guide the purchase of
forward currencies. These rules are denoted:
aj,t	 and
The rules are interpreted as the proportion 'a' of items which
are denominated in currency 'i' and are receivable in period 't',
and the proportion 'b' of items which are denominated in currency
'1' and are payable in period 't'.
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I.B.it.b Economic ExDosure .Q. .t
	
Subsidiary
In order to incorporate the impact of exchange rate changes on
prices, volumes and costs, other than the effects of the currency
of invoice, it is assumed the there is a linear relationship
between prices, volumes and costs and exchange rate changes.
The problem then becomes one of stating the effects of an x%
change in exchange rates on prices, costs or volumes. Having
analysed the possible impact of' exchange rate changes on these
variables, the information is summarised in the following way.
In the case of revenues, exchange rate changes may affect either
volumes, prices or both. The effect on volumes of an x% change
in the exchange rate 'i' is smimarised in the variable:
qi,t
If 'q
	
1' then an x% change in currency '1' is expected to lead
to an x% change in volumes. Conversely, 'q = 0' implies that a
change in exchange rate 'i' is not expected to influence volumes.
Since there is more than one currency, and only a single volume,
it is necessary to weight the sensitivity variable 'q' for the
relative impact of changes in different currencies.	 This is
achieved using the variable:
ej,t
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1= n
where:	 Z	 ej,
1=1
An identical weighting system is used for prices using the same
weights, however the sensitivity variable may take on values
other than the values for volumes. 	 The price sensitivity
parameter is:
i,t
It is assumed that there is a linear relationship between costs
and volumes, and all costs are classified as either fixed or
variable.	 In the case of variable costs, the sensitivity
parameter is:
r1 ,
And the weightings are:
Ui,t
n
where:	 Ul,t	 = 1
i: 1
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Fixed costs are treated in a similar way with a sensitivity
parameter:
si,t
And a series of weightings:
fi,t
i n
where:	 fj,t	 1
1=1
I.B..ii.c: Transaction ExDosure
	
.th.. Subsidiary
In order to operationalise the transaction exposure of the
subsidiary, it is necessary to have information on the invoice
currency of sales, variable costs and fixed costs. A variable
is used to express the proportion of sales, variable costs and
fixed costs invoiced in each currency.
For sales, the parameter is:
li,t
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1= n
where:	 E
1:1
In the case of variable costs:
k1 ,
1= n
where:	 z	 k1,	 = 1
i= 1
Finally, the proportion of fixed costs invoiced in currency jt
is denoted as:
'ji,t
i= n
where:	 Z	 i,t	 = 1
i= 1
IB.ii.d: fl. Characteristics	 Subsidiary
Finally, some information is necessary on the characteristics of
the subsidiary. 	 Firstly, there is a set of prices which are
applicable in each country.	 These prices are the expected
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prices during the period and are denoted:
BP1,t
In addition, there are budgeted variable and fixed costs denoted
respectively;
BVC1,t
BFCI,t
Apart from income statement Items, there are also items which
appear on the balance sheet, namely.
FAt	 : Fixed Assets
LAt	 : Liquid Assets
BSUt	 : Budgeted Stock (units)
Di,t
	
: Debt in Currency 'I'
Finally, it is necessary to take account of time lags. 	 Firstly,
there is the lag between ordering an item to be used in
manufacture (or to be sold) and the sale of that item in finished
form to a customer:
olt
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Secondly, there is the lag between ordering an item and receiving
the item, or receiving an invoice from the supplier:
p ult
Thirdly, there is the lag between receiving an item from a
supplier and actually paying for the item:
Fourthly, there is the time lag between receiving and paying for
fixed cost items.
felt
Finally, there is the time lag between selling an item to a
customer and receiving payment for the item:
dlt
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L.B.i1j: Th.Q. Model
LB.iii.a: Calculation 	 Exchange Rate Changes
Exchange rate changes are expressed in the currency of the
parent.	 The first step is to express the model in terms of the
subsidiary currency.
Ej/p,t/Es,p , t = Ej/s,t
Ultimately, the model is being used to examine the impact of
unexpected exchange rate changes on the company, and a cumulative
exchange rate change, since the beginning of the period, is
defined as:
1 - tEi,s,t/Ej,s,0]
LB.iil,.bj Incoroorati	 Exchange Rate anes j estimates
Volumes, Prices	 Cost
1. Volumes
The volume sold consists of the budgeted volume adjusted for the
effects of exchange rate changes.
1= n
Vt:	 (BV)(ej,)(1+(qj,)(CEj/5,)
j= 1
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2. Prices
There is a two stage process in the calculation of exchange rate
adjusted prices. 	 Firstly, it is necessary to calculate the
effects of exchange rates on prices which are invoiced in foreign
currency:
TP1,t BPj,t(1+(lj,t)(CEi,5,t))
Secondly, other effects of exchange rate changes on prices need
to be incorporated.
Pi,t = (1+(pl,t)(CEI/s,t))(TPj,t)
3. Sales
Sales are simply the product of prices and volumes.
i= n
St= E (Pj,t)(Vi,t)
i= 1
. Variable Costs
A two stage process similar to the process applied to prices is
applied to variable costs.	 Firstly, allowance is made for the
Qiapter 10: Page 3I9
effects of invoicing currency on unit variable costs.
i= ri
TVC1
	E (BVCt)(1+(ki,t)(CEi,s,t))
1=1
Secondly, the translated variable cost Is adjusted for the
effects of exchange rate changes.
1= n
VC	 E (TVCt)(ui,t)(1+(ri,t)(CEI/s,t))
i= 1
5. Fixed Costs
Again, a two stage process is used.
1= n
TFCt	E (BFCt)(1+(jj,t)(cEj/s,t))
i= 1
The translated fixed costs are then incorporated into the
calculation of the exchange rate adjusted fixed costs.
1= n
FCt... z (TFC)(fI,)(1+(si,t)(cEi/,t))
1=1
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6. Total Costs
Since a linear relationship between costs and volumes is assumed,
total costs are simply the fixed costs plus the number of units
sold times the volume sold.
TCt: FCt+((Vt)(VCt))
4L7. Interest Expense
Since debt may be denominated in foreign currency, interest
payments may also be denominated in foreign currency.
1= n
z (Dj,t)(Rj,t)/(Ej/s,t)
i= 1
8. Interest on Liquid Asset Balances
Finally, interest on liquid asset balances is calculated.
Because the interest on liquid asset balances is added to the
liquid asset balance, it is necessary to obtain a simultaneous
solution for liquid asset balances and interest on liquid asset
balances.	 The composition of liquid asset balances is
described later in this chapter.
	 The interest on liquid asset
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balances is calculated as:
ILAt LAt(Rs,t)
I.B.iii.c: Forei gn Exchaii	 Gains	 Losses
In order to allow for the possibility of forward hedging, forward
rates are assumed to be determined by the interest rate parity
theorem.
	
The forward discount or premium is then calculated as:
Fi,t (1^Ri,t)/(1+Rs,t)
Foreign exchange gains and losses may then be calculated for
transactions relating to sales, variable costs and fixed costs.
1. Sales
The foreign exchange gain or loss made on sales invoiced in
currency 'P is defined as:
FXS1,t St_dl(li,t_dl)(1-(1-ai,t_dl)(Ei,s,t_dl/Ei,s,t))+
dl(aj,t..dl)(Fj,t_dl'
This formula is somewhat complex. It calculates the effects of
exchange rate changes on items which were invoiced to customers
in a previous period and for which cash was received in the
current period. The exchange rate used is a weited average of
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the current exchange rate and the applicable forward rate at the
time of Invoicing. The weights are dependent on the proportion
of sales which are hedged.
2. Variable Costs
The foreign exchange gain or loss on Variable cost transactions
which were denominated in a foreign currency are calculated in a
similar way. However, it is necessary to specify how the
volume is arrived at. Exchange rate changes may affect volumes,
however since the exchange rate changes are not known in advance,
it is necessary to have a rule of thumb for ordering raw
materials and other inputs. Order volumes are calculated in the
following way.
OVt= BVt.,.1+[Vt-BVt]
The amount which is ordered depends on the anticipated budgeted
volume in a future period, which is then adjusted for any
difference between actual and budget volumes in the current
period.
It is then assumed that an invoice is received for the goods some
time after the order has been placed, and the volume of purchases
is calculated in the following way.
PVt= BVt+ol_puj+[Vt_pul -BVt...pu))
Qapter 10: page 353
Using the purchase volume, the foreign exchange gain or loss is
then arrived at in a similar way to the foreign exchange gain or
loss on sales.
FXVCI,t	 PVt_pal(VCi,t_pal)(kj,t_pal)(1_((1_bi,t_pal)
(Ei/s,..pal/Ej/5,)+(bj,,.p8J)(Fj,_pal p al
3. Fixed Costs
The foreign exchange gain or loss on fixed cost items is similar
to the gain or loss on sales in terms of its formulation.
FXFCj,t FCt_fcl(Ji,t_fcl)(1....((1_bj,t_fcl)(Ej,S,t_fcl/Ej,S,t)
ci
I.B.iii.d: Income
Income is defined as revenues less total costs less interest less
realised foreign exchange gains and losses, plus interest
payable/receivable on liquid asset balances.
t= St_TCt+FXt_It+ILAt
where:
FXt,. FXStFXVCt_FxFct
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I.B.iii.e: Balance Sheet ItemSL
1. Calculation of Inventory
Firstly, it is necessary to calculate a closing physical stock
figure.	 The opening budgeted stock figure is used as a basis
for this calculation.
SUt= SUt_i +PVt-Vt
Secondly, the current cost of' the units in stock is used to
produce a stock valuation. 	 It is assumed that a direct costing
system rather than an absorption based cost accounting system is
used.
STt= (SUt)(vCt)
This process causes problems from an accounting point of view
since closing stock in the previous period was valued using
previous period variable costs, while the opening stock in the
current period uses current period variable costs. In order to
compensate for this, it is necessary to have a gain or loss on
holding stock. This gain or loss will be:
FXSTt 
= SUt(VCt-VCt_i)
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2. Calculation of Debt Outstanding
Since debt is denominated in foreign currency, it is necessary to
translate it into the subsidiary currency.
1= n
Dt	 E Di,t/Ej/s,t
j: 1
Again, while this produces a current value for debt, it is
necessary to make an accounting entry for the gain or loss on
debt. This is calculated using the current value of the debt in
the currency of the subsidiary times the exchange rate change
since the previous period.
FXDI,t (Dj,t/Ej/s,t)((Ei/s,t/Ej/s,t_1)-1)
3. Calculation of the Qiange in Net Liquid Assets
The first step of this calculation is to sum the cash flows in
individual currencies.	 This process amounts to a netting
routine.
CFi,t= St_dl(l1,t_dl)(PVt_pal)(VCt_pal)(kt_pal)(FCi,_fcl)
(it-fol) -Rj,t(Dj,t/Ei/s,t)
The formula deducts the cash outflows in each currency from the
cash inflows in each currency. 	 The total cash flow in each
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period is then evaluated.
1= n
E FXI,t+CFI,t
1=1
In order to evaluate the change in liquid asset balances, the
liquid asset balance is reevaluated.
LAt LAt_i+CFt+ILAt
4 Calculation of Debtors and Ceditors
The calculation of Debtors and Creditors is carried out using the
exchange rates at which amounts were invoiced rather than the
current exchange rates.
	 In order to make the accounting system
internally consistent, it could be argued that unrealised gains
and losses on debtors and creditors should be taken into account.
In this model, they are ignored, because it would lead to a
considerable increase in the size of the programme with a
corresponding decrease In the efficiency of' the programme.
The calculation for debtors is simply:
DRt =
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A similar calculation is used for creditors.
CR t	 CRt_l+(PVt*VCt)+FCt_(PVt...pal*VC4...pal)_FCt_.fc1
5. Calculation of Reserves and Owner's Equity
The final item is the calculation of revenue reserves and owner's
equity.	 Revenue reserves are the revenue reserves in the
previous period plus the income in the current period.
RRt= RRt_i+Tt
Other items which are held in reserves are the holding gains or
losses on stocks and debt.
Owners equity is calculated using the other items on the balance
sheet.
OEt FAt+LAt+STt+DRt CRt-Dt-FXSTt-FXDt-RRt
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I.B.Iii.f: CalcLation j Groun Results
Using the subscript 's' to denote subsidiaries, and assuming that
there are 'm' subsidiaries, profit for the group as a whole is
calculated in the following manner.
s= m
Z Ys,t/Esip,t
	
S	 1.m
s=1
Assuming that there are no intracompany transactions, then Net
Assets for the multinational as a whole may also be calculated in
the same manner.
3= m
NAt	 z
s:1
LB.iy : The Acunting System
Since a double entry accounting system is not used in this model,
it is useful to examine the underlying accounting process in
order to demonstrate the integrity of the accounting system. In
Table 10.1, the complete list of transactions, with their
corresponding debit and credit entries are listed. It may be
seen that the calculation of debtors fails to take account of'
unrealised gains or losses on transactions invoiced in foreign
currency, unless it is assumed that the payment lags are equal to
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FXST
FXDt
Si.
FSTt
FXDt
FCt_t0
t-pa].
4- dl +FXSt
FCt
Pt
It
FC. fcl+FXFCt
P t... pal +FXV Ct
St
... dl
VCt
St
V C
F C
It
ILAt
FXFCt
FXV Ct
FXSt
one period, in which case, there will be no unrealised gains and
losses.
If a historic cost valuation basis were used, a stock flow
assumption of some description would need to be made. 	 This in
turn would lead to a considerable increase in the size of the
programme.	 Some allowance could be made for this factor by
putting the gain or loss on holding stock in the variable costs
account.
Table 10.1
Treatment	 Transactions under Double Entry
Current Cost Basis
Dr.	 Cr.
Share Capital
Revenue Reserves
Gain/Loss: Stock
Gain/Loss: Debt
Debt
Creditors
Liquid Assets
Debtors
Stock
Fixed Assets
Sales
Variable Costs
Fixed Costs
Interest on Debt
Interest on Liquid
Assets
FX Gain Loss Trade
* t = Purchases Vt(VCt)
I.B;v: Summary	Conclusions
In this section the informational requirements, structure, logic
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and assumptions of the basic model were summarised. Using a
Hewlett Packard 3000 minicomputer with a single user, a single
pass for one subsidiary using twenty four time periods and ten
currencies takes 13 minutes of CPU time.
	 The model may be
speeded up by restricting the number of currencies for each
subsidiary and compiling the logic.
	 Using two currencies and
a compiled programme reduces the computation time to two minutes.
II: Extending and Using the Ba$ic Model
In this section, some of the decision support uses of the basic
model are reviewed, and the relaxation of the basic assumptions
is discussed. In principle, all assumptions of the model may be
relaxed without any difficulty, due to the nature of FCS-EPS
programming. However, all modifications involve considerable
decreases in the efficiency of the model, but for specific
applications, where a modelling exercise may be done only
irregularly, these decreases are unlikely to be a burden.
Moreover, batch files may be set up which permit the programme to
be processed as a low priority. Indeed, due to the nature of'
the programme, it is possible to write batch files which modify
the internal logic of the model and permit the evaluation of the
materiality of' the relaxation of the assumptions. In the first
part of this section some of' the possible relaxations of the
assumptions are discussed. The applications of the model are
discussed in. part two.
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II:A: Relaxing the Assiptions of the Basic Model
II.A.i: Exchange Rate Processes
Using the 'Risk' function, the effects of different monetary
scenarios on the performance of the MNC may be evaluated. Any
user selected exchange rate probability density function may be
chosen.	 Moreover, the function may be varied over time and
hence assumed unstable.	 A similar process may be applied to any
of the variables in the model in order to render them stochastic.
However, the increase in machine overhead is considerable, since
a single random trial takes up to five minutes, and 150 to 200
trials will be necessary in order to establish the resultant
profit or cash flow distribution. In order to economise, and
given that the function of the model is to examine the impact of'
exchange rate changes, this author found that it was most
ef'ficent to specify forward rates and interest rates as a
funnction of the exchange rate.
II.A.ii: Relaxing	Environmental AssumDtions
Inflation may be incorporated in the model by assuming that costs
and prices are a function of inflation over time.
	 Inflation
may then be assumed as either exogenous or as partially exogenous
and partially a function of the exchange rate. This latter
assumption is particularly appealing, since it is consistent with
a Nordic Theory of Inflation (see Edgren et al. [1969]) which in
turn is consistent with the analysis of economic exposures using
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traded and non traded goods.
The assumption of a term structure of interest rates is relevant,
since it implies that the forward premium will incorporate
liquidity pretnia differentials. In order to incorporate this
effect, the calculation of the forward premium is modified to
include an allowance for term premia which are a function of the
settlement date of' the forward contract.
The existence of transaction costs which give rise to either bid—
ask spreads or unidentical lending and borrowing rates may be
incorporated using the 'Interest' function. Essentially, the
value applied depends on the sign of' the amount to which it is
applied.	 Using this function, transaction costs may be modelled
explicitly.	 If' transaction costs are lumpy, then it is
necessary to use a table of spot rates, and the spot rate applied
depends on the size of the transaction and the organisational
level of the operating unit.
A variety of functions exist in the programme for the calculation
of taxes which include both carry forward and carry back
provisions. Moreover, asymmetric treatment of particular items
(e.g. losses on liabilities) may be accommodated without any
difficulty.
II.A;iii: Relaxing	Firm Secifio Assotions
The model may be modified to incorporate the effects of
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investment and financing decisions.	 Moreover, a variety of
functions are available to incorporate different debt refunding
patterns.	 The increases in the computational complexity of the
model would be insignificant.
The extension of the model beyond twenty four time periods
simply results in a proportional increase in the computation time
of the model.	 Similarly, the relationship of costs to volumes
may be as complex as one wishes. However, precise specification
of cost functions and the incorportion of discontinuities in the
cost function may increase computation times considerably.
The assumption of a single product and simplified internal
transfer structures may also be relaxed. The use of numeraires
is likely to increase the efficiency of the model considerably,
since otherwise a separate calculation is necessary for each
product. This would be particularly inefficient in MNCs
manufacturing a wide range of consumer products. Internal
transfer structures are straightforward, provided that transfers
are heirarchical and that it Is not necessary to obtain
simultaneous solutions for a number of subsidiaries.
Linear exchange rate effects on costs volumes and prices are
easily modified and break points or time lags may be incorporated
without any difficulty. More sophisticated specifications might
Include the time lag between a change in exchange rates and a
change in operating variables, the possibility of overseas
competition only in conditions where there are prolonged changes
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in exchange rates of a certain magnitude, and the ability of
management to engage in political and promotional activities
which decrease the sensitivity of operating variables to adverse
exchange rate changes.
II.A.iv: Contingent Financial Instruments
The incorporation of foreign currency options into the model has
not been attempted.	 Conceptually, it is extremely simple,
since the information in the model is sufficient either to
incorporate an option pricing routine, or alternatively, treat
option prices as an exogenous variable. 	 E;ercise of the option
is straightforward, since it simply requires a specification of
the conditions under which the option will be exercised.
\JII.B: Applications of the Model
The model may be used as a decision support system in a variety
of contexts for the evaluation of the firm's foreign exchange
risk management policies, and the firm's exposure to exchange
rate changes. Some of the applications are examined in the
following sections.
I.B;i: Quantifvin Exnosure
Exposure may be measured in a straightforward manner.	 Once the
information requirements of the model have been met, the exposure
of the firm may be examined under different stochastic exchange
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rate scenarios, and the resultant profit and cash flow
probability density functions may be examined.
	 Exposure may
also be examined under different assumptions about the nature of
the firm and the likely effect of other exogenous variables.
II.B.ii: Transaction Exoosure Decision
A number of transaction exposure decisions may be evaluated.
Firstly, alternative centralisation policies may be examined and
compared. Examples might include simulation of the effects of
issuing guidelines to subsidiaries to either cover everything or
cover nothing.	 Similarly, the effects of changes in the
currency of invoice decision (particularly for internal
transactions) may be examined. 	 The presence of either an on-
shore or an off-shore reinvoicing vehicle may also be evaluated
by creating an operating unit which imports and exports in
different currencies.	 Moreover, the issue of transaction cost
savings arising from either the size of transactions or the
possibility of netting transactions may be examined. 	 With some
modifications to the model, the effect of making currency options
available to operating units could also be examined. Finally,
the effects of alternative tax regimes may be incorporated within
this analysis.
II.B.ili: Economic Exoosure Decisions
Economic exposures arising from the time lag between a change in
raw material costs and a price rise may be incorporated using
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time lags.	 Different transaction exposure policies may then be
evaluated as proxies for this variant of economic exposure.
The use of forward contracts or options to cover economic
exposures arising from the tradability of either factors or
products may be successfully evaluated using the model. Only
minor modifications of the model are necessary to evaluate the
possible costs and benefits attached to such a strategy.
Operational techniques were highlighted in the previous chapter
as a means of managing economic exposures. All of these
tactics amount to an adjustment in the functional specification
of the parameter which describes the sensitivity of costs, prices
and volumes to exchange rate changes. Therefore, the benefits
of altering the functional specification of the sensitivity
parameter may be calculated and compared with the costs of using
each tactic.
1I..iv: The Investment Decision
Individual investment projects may be examined by specifying an
operating unit of the MNC as an investment project. This in
turn permits the evaluation of an investment on either a stand-
alone basis or, alternatively, permit the incorporation of the
investment project as part of the MNC as a whole. This in turn
would permit the evaluation of any economic exposure
externalities which arise from investment projects.
Qiapter 10: Page 367
II.Lv: Performance Evaluation
Given both the actual exchange rate changes in a particular
period and the budgeted figure for an accounting period, the
effects of unexpected exchange rate changes on the operating
unit's performance may be isolated and evaluated.
II.B.vfl Financial Beoortln g	, Taxation Issues
Another possible application of the model lies in the analysis of
financial reporting and taxation issues. Examples would include
the examination of current versus historic cost accounting
systems and the effects of different financing policies on both
the accounting reports and the taxation liability of the MNC.
Finally, alternative accounting and consolidation techniques and
policies may be compared.
III: Smary and Conc1tionz
In this chapter, a flexible model for describing the exposure of
an MNC has been described. In order to increase the
computational efficiency of the model, a number of simplifying
assumptions were made, but it was argued that it was possible to
relax these assumptions. The model has been written for use in
F-EPS and there is a complete listing of this model in Appendix
Seven.	 Some tests of the model are presented in Appendix
Eight.
A number of' applications of the model as a decision support tool
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are also described.	 The model is implementable, but to use it
in practice, It may be necessary to create a user friendly
interface for data entry, in order to permit data to be entered
by untrained employees. 	 It should also be borne in mind that
the decision problem must be well specified, since a single
simulation of the exposure of a MNC with 1 00 subsidiaries dealing
in two currencies, using 200 trials will take about eleven days.
The model does however demonstrate that whilst exposure is a
computationally complex issue, it is possible to operationalise
exposure, and to evaluate the effects of different policies on
that exposure.	 The model is also of use within an academic
environment, since it facilitates the simulation of different
environments and regulations on the exposures of prototype MNCs.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY, CCCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this chapter, the material in the previous ten chapters is
summarised and the conclusions which may be drawn from the study
are considered. The implications of the study for' both the
research and practice of foreign exchange risk management are
then examined, and some suggestions for future research are made.
I: SLinmary
A first step in a study of foreign exchange risk management is to
examine both the behaviour and the determination of exchange rate
changes. It was shown in chapter two that if international
parity conditions prevail, then foreign exchange risk does not
exist.	 A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of
international parity were examined and assessed from both a
theoretical and empirical point of view. It was shown that
there may be good reasons for rejecting the sufficient conditions
on theoretical grounds and that empirical evidence (despite its
limitations) would also imply the rejection of the sufficient
conditions.	 It was also shown that the scenario which is most
consistent with the empirical evidence is a situation of
relatively efficient financial markets and relatively inefficient
goods markets. The implications of' such a scenario are that
exchange rates may under or overshoot, and that deviations from
purchasing power parity will exist.	 Given deviations from
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purchasing power parity, foreign exchange risk will exist and a
necessary condition for foreign exchange risk management is
fulfilled.
The discussion is also relevant to treasury management since a
number of relevant issues emerge from the analysis. Firstly, it
is quite possible that foreign exchange markets are
informational].y efficient and that commercially available
forecasting services are unlikely to produce superior forecasts.
However, recent evidence suggests that the use of filter rules
may yield abnormal returns.	 However abnormality is ill-defined
since the abnormal returns may represent risk premia which are,
as yet, theoretically mis-specified. 	 Hence, recent evidence may
be consistent with market efficiency.	 It was also pointed out
that intra-dally exchange rate changes behave as if they are
generated by an unstable stochastic process. The implications
of this research have not been examined, however, it may imply
that existing models of foreign currency option pricing and
international asset pricing are inappropriate.	 Finally, it was
shown that international capital markets are likely to exhibit
mild segmentation. This in turn implies that there may be
opportunities for MNCs to benefit from the existence of
segmentation.
Having examined the issue of exchange rate behaviour and
determination, and established the existence of foreign exchange
risk by virtue of observed deviations from purchasing power
parity, the exposure of the MNC to foreign exchange risk was
Qiapter 11: Page 371
examined (thapter Three).
Exposure was defined as the effects of exchange rate changes on
cash flows.	 Therefore, a flow rather than a stock concept of
exposure was adopted.	 Exposure was defined as being either an
economic or a transaction exposure.
A Transaction Exiosure Is a foreign currency cash flow which
has a regression coefficient of one with the exchange rate.
Moreover, the R-squared of the regression equation equals
one.
An Economic Exoosure is any foreign currency cash flow which
does not meet the conditions of a transaction exposure, and
any home currency cash flow which does not have a
coefficient of zero with the exchange rate.
The foreign exchange exposure of the MNC was then examined using
a model developed by Srinivasulu [1983] where foreign exchange
risk depends on five covariance terms.	 The five covariance
terms arise from the International diversification of operations,
the structure of subsidiary operations, the portfolio of
currencies, the exposure of the domestic firm and the existence
of intersubsidiary linkages. Previous models of foreign
exchange exposure were examined within this framework, and it was
shown that exposure is likely to be firm specific and depend upon
the tradability, price flexibility and substitutability of the
firm's products and factors of production.	 It was also shown
that it was necessary to incorporate the general equilibrium
consequences of exchange rate changes as well as the partial
equilibrium consequences.
Having discussed the nature of corporate exposure to foreign
exchange risk, the ways In which exposure may be measured were
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examined. It was shown that the conditions which are sufficient
for the measurement of' the effects of exchange rates on the
firm are similar to the sufficient conditions which are necessary
for the prevalence of international parity, and accounting
statements were discounted as a suitable measurement device. 	 It
was also argued that net present value approaches to the
measurement of economic exposure are inappropriate, and that a
theoretically sound way of measuring exposure was the use of a
regression equation.	 This in turn led to the definitions
suggested above for the components of exposure to foreign
exchange risk. A useful practical approach to measurement may
be the use of' qualitative measures of foreign exchange exposure,
and some previous literature on this possibility was reviewed.
Given that firms are exposed to foreign exchange risk, two more
issues were examined. The normative case for foreign exchange
risk management and the techniques which may be used to manage
foreign exchange risk (Qapter Four).
The normative case against the management of foreign exchange
risk rests upon an internationalised version of the Modligiatii
and Miller irrelevancy propositions. It can be shown that if
there are no barriers to homemade hedging, then shareholders
should manage foreign exchange risk. In practice, there will
be barriers to homemade hedging due to the existence of agency
costs, capital market imperfections and information asymmetries.
If these barriers to homemade hedging are significant, then the
corporate hedging decision is no longer irrelevant, and a
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normative case for the management of foreign exchange risk has
been established.
The different categories of exposure to foreign exchange risk
were then used as a basis for a review of the literature on the
management of foreign exchange risk. It was shown that the
management of' transaction exposure was the area which had
received the most attention in the foreign exchange risk
management literature. 	 Techniques were classified as being
either internal (mediated within the MNC) or external. (mediated
in financial markets). As such, the management of transaction
exposure is relatively straightforward unless, forward contracts
are unavailable for' settlement dates which are shorter than the
maturity date of the transaction. However, It was pointed out
that the evaluation of hedging decisions may be problematic if
markets are imperfect and incomplete, and the expected utility of
the decision maker is an inappropiate benchmark. The
management of contingent exposures was then examined and some
implications of the availability of foreign currency options were
explored.
The management of economic exposure was examined and It was
posited that the management of economic exposure was less
clearout, since there was the added complexity of an exposure
which was stochastic and difficult to measure. While It is
possible to manage economic exposure imperfectly using foreign
currency debt and forward contracts, operational techniques may
also be used to manage economic exposure. - Such techniques
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include international diversification, market selection and
segnientation, pricing promotional and product strategy, product
sourcing and input mix decisions, and plant location.
It was however argued that these normative suggestions may not be
used in practice, since it requires the collection of substantial
amounts of information about subsidiary operations and
considerable interference with decentralisation.	 Moreover, due
to bounded rationality and Information impactedness, there may
be excellent reasons for maintaining decentralisatiori. This In
turn Implies that the management of foreign exchange risk, whith
req uires centrallsatlon, will be In conflict with the need for
decentralisation within the organisatlon as a whole. This in
turn implies that the management of foreign exchange risk may be
decentralised or responsibility for its management may be shared
between the HQ and the operating units.
The foregoing dIscuss1on serves as a basis for some of the
desirable features of a research strategy for the empirical
Investigation of foreign exchange risk management in UK MNCs.
Previous empirical investigations in both the UK and the US are
reviewed, and It Is shown that the studies focused on the
management of transaction exposure by HQ treasury. It is
therefore necessary to examine how exposures other than
transaction exposures are managed and also, to allow for the
possibility that the management of exposure may be partially the
reponsibility of subsidiary personnel. 	 Moreover, if a theory
of internal organisation is invoked as a heuristic device, it Is
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more probable that the management of stochastic exposures is
carried out at a subsidiary level, since the costs of
communicating and aggregating stochastic exposures within the MNC
will be greater than the costs of communicating and aggregating
transaction exposures.
Given the lack of prior empirical research on the management of
economic exposures, it would be premature to attempt to specify
the techniques which may be used to manage economic exposure in
advance.	 A research design was proposed which overcomes the
issues of both knowing the right questions to ask and the
uncertainty about the locus of foreign exchange risk management
within the heirarchy.	 The design consisted of a field study in
both the Irish subsidiaries and the HQ of a random sample of 20
UK MNCs, using interviews, archival data and a single case study.
It is a particularly efficient research design since despite the
intensive nature of the field study, there is a measure of
external validity in the study because a random sample was used
from a population of 60 UK MNCs. The concepts of theoretical
sampling and triangulation, combined with the methodology of
grounded theory were used as a basis for the analysis of the
data.
The results of this field study were then presented in a manner
which highlighted the individual roles of the subsidiary and the
HQ, and also the economic exposure of the MNC.
Firstly, the HQ treasury role in the management of transaction
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exposure was examined.	 The HQ treasuries were categorised by
their degree of involvement in the management of transaction
exposure and the results were similar to previous UK studies.
It was found that in the majority of companies, the HQ treasury
had little or no role in the management of the transaction
exposures of the overseas subsidiary. It was also found that a
significant number of companies did not centralise the
transaction exposures of their UK subsidiaries.
	 A rationale
was advanced for this behaviour based upon transaction costs.
It was argued that the main rationale for the centralisation of
UK exposures was the possibility of transaction cost savings
arising from netting opportunities. Moreover, overseas
subsidiaries were not centralised due to the increased
transaction costs of centralising overseas subsidiaries.
	 It
was also found that the internal bank mechanism was a popular
method for the centralisation of transaction exposures, since it
ensured that the autonomy of' subsidiaries was left unscathed.
If the main motivation for centralisation is transaction cost
savings, which are in turn influenced by- the efficiency of
foreign exchange markets, then the degree of centralisation in
the future may be greater (due to the decreased costs of
communicating information within heirarchies) or decrease (due to
a decrease in foreign exchange transaction costs).
Having examined the role of the HQ treasurer in the management of'
transaction exposures, the next set of results focuses on the
role of the EQ treasurer in the management of other types of
exposure.	 It was found that, for the most part, treasury
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involvement in the management of economic exposure was minimal.
Pricing decisions, invoicing decisions, the investment
decisionand HQ willingness to become involved in unrealised
transactions were examined. In virtually all cases, it was not
the perceived role of the treasurer to become incvolved in these
issues. Only one company had hedged an economic exposure using
forward contracts. Curiously, it was innovation in financial
markets (the advent of' foreign currency options) which had
aroused central treasury interest In the protection of contingent
exposures.	 Some companies using the internal bank structure
were considering selling options to operating divisions.
Two cases of HQ treasury becoming Involved in economic exposure
were examined. In both eases the attempts were relatively
unsuccessful despite the fact that In one ease considerable
resources had been devoted to the problem. The reasons the
attempts failed arose to some extent from organisational
barriers, accounting and taxation Issues.
The management of' transaction exposure at a foreign subsidiary
level was then examined. It was found that the results were
consistent with the reported degree of centralisatlon at the HQ
level. Unfortunately, the analysis at a subsidiary level was
somewhat limited by the presence of Irish Exchange Controls,
since they implied that companies were forced to use
transactional definitions of' exposure. The practices of' the
firms were summarised and It was also pointed out that UK
divisional staff may become Involved in local hedging decisions.
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The economic exposures of both the Irish subsidiaries and the MNC
as a whole were then examined. This in turn led to the
definition of four types of economic exposure.
1) Sticky Price Exposure
2) Traded Good Exposure
3) Parallel Import Exposure
k)	 Macroeconomic/Sectoral Consequences of Exchange Rate
Q anges
Based on the observation of the tactics which were actually used
by both the MNC and the subsidary, some suggestions were made as
to how economic exposure might be managed. It was argued that
the management of transaction exposure may act as a surrogate for
the exposure which arises from sticky price exposure. In order
to discount the possibility of exposures arising from either the
tradability of products or the existence of' parallel imports,
some tactics were suggested which would render traded products
less tradable.	 It was also shown that there may be benefits
from making non-tradable factors more tradable. Finally, it was
suggested that if' these tactics were used within a decentra.lised
environment, then incentive schemes and performance evaluation
should reflect the existence of' economic exposure.
In order to operationalise the foregoing recommendations and the
theoretical review, a decision support system which uses a
computer based financial planning model was developed in chapter
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Ten. The model permits the measurement of the total exposure of
the MNC and the exposure of individual operating units, using a
technique similar to the regression equation technique.	 It may
then be used to simulate the effects of different policies and
exposure management tactics on the exposure of either the
subsidiary or the MNC, and permit the evaluation of alternatives.
II: Implications
Foreign exchange risk management is complicated and, in many
respects, a problem which is capable only of clarification rather
than resolution. However, the model developed in Chapter Ten
does go some way toward simplifying the task of foreign exchange
risk management since it permits meaningful measures of the
exposure of either cash flows, profits or measures of net worth
to be made in a straightforward manner. 	 Moreover, it is
possible to use the model to simulate the effects of different
management policies and strategies on the exposure of' the MNC.
Finally, for the first time a catalogue of the strategies and
tactics which may be used has been produced, so that
practitioners may have a greater appreciation of' the range of'
tactics which may be applied.
III: Suggestions for Future Research
The main difficulty in international financial management is the
lack of' a satisfactory normative or theoretical. framework.
	 In
the meantime, managers must still contend with the existence of
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foreign exchange risk. Research in the future is likel y to
concentrate on the managerial implications of foreign exchange
risk, and the suggestions for future research are based upon
this premise.
Firstly, further research on the behaviour of intra-dally
exchange rate changes is necessary. 	 An understanding of these
statistical processes is important for the development of
theoretical models and has practical implications if foreign
exchange markets are inefficient.
Secondly, the advent of foreign currency options may have
interesting implications for the management of foreign exchange
risk. There is considerable scope for the development of both
normative techniques for the application and evaluation of
foreign currency options, and surveys of the actual use of
foreign currency options and Its implications for the internal
bank function.
Thirdly, the presence of the Internal bank function raises many
interesting issues and there are considerable opportunities to
test why the Internal bank has emerged and its likely fate.
Fourthly, the locus of' foreign exchange risk management is a
challenging Is sue, and the role of the HQ treasurer within the
process. There Is considerable scope for studies of the locus
of risk management and its implications, for example, the role of'
the treasurer in the education of' operating personnel.
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Fifth, an attempt has been made ii this study to classify
economic exposure and to suggest tactics for the management of
economic exposure.	 Further research is necessary to establish
if this classification is exhaustive, and the usefulness of the
techniques suggested.
Sixth, a model was developed of foreign exchange risk.
	 Further
research is needed to investigate the applicability of the model
in practice, and its shortcomings.
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APPENDIX 1
THE POPULATION
There are sixty seven UK MNCs in the Stopford [1982] directory of
MNCs. Seven companies were considered Inappropriate for
Inclusion in this study, and they are discussed in the following
paragraph.	 A list of the sixty companies included In this study
Is provided overleaf.
Bass and Whitbread were excluded because they both had
insignificant overseas involvement. Nationalised Industries
were also excluded since they were essentially government
controlled (British Leyland, British Steel and Rolls Royce).
The Wel].come Foundation was excluded because It was a charitable
trust in 1983 and Ultramar was excluded since It was managed from
outside the UK. Finally, Consolidated Gold Fields was excluded
due to the unique characteristics of Its activities (mining
finance).
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The companies included in the population were:
AE plc
Allied Lyons plo
Arthur Guiness and Sons pie
Associated British Foods ltd.
Babcock International plc
B.A.T. Industries plc
Beecham Group pie
BICC plc
Blue Circle Industries plc
BOC Group plc
The Bowater Corporation pie
British Aerospace pie
The British Petroleum Company
Brooke Bond Group plc
BTR plc
The Burmah Oil plc
Cadbury Shweppes pie
Coats Patons pie
Courtaulds pie
Dalgety plc
Delta Group plo
DRG plo
Dunlop Holdings Ltd.
FMC plo
The Genera]. Electric Company
Glaxo Holdings plo
Grand Metropolitan plc
Guest Keen Nettlef'old
Hanson Trust plc
Hawker Siddeley Group plc
ICL pie
1141 plo
Imperial Qiemical Industries pie
Imperial Group plc
John Brown and Company Ltd.
Johnson Mathey and Company Ltd.
Lucas Industries Ltd.
Metal Box pie
Northern Engineering Industries
Northern Foods plc
Pilkington Brothers plc
The Plessey Company plc
Ranks Hovis McDougall plc
Reckitt & Coleman plc
Reed International pie
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd.
RMC Group plc
Rothmans International Ltd.
Rowntree Mackintosh plc
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
S. Pearson & Son plo
Tate & Lyle plc
Thomas Borthwick & Sons plo
Thorn EMI pie
TI Group pie
Turner & Newali plc
Unigate plc
Unilever pie and Unilever NV
United Biscuits (Holdings) Ltd.
Vickers plc
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APPENDIX II
EXTERNAL VALIDITY: OTHER MNCs
Chapter 5 gives details of the sampling frame. 	 This appendix
explains the rationale for generalising from a random sample of
twenty to a population of' sixty.
It is assumed ultimately that all responses may be classified as
either positive or negative. The sampling process then becomes
analagous to randomly selecting twenty balls from a bag
containing sixty balls without replacement. Since it is assumed
that there are at most two types of balls, the sampling process
may be described using a hypergeometric distribution.
The aim of the generalisation process is to infer the proportion
of 'negative' balls in the population from the proportion of
'negative' balls in the sample. Inferring the exact proportion
is difficult, given the low sample size, however, this author
considers it useful to attempt to infer the following sevenfold
population classification.
1)	 All the balls are likely to be positive.
ii) Nearly all the balls are likely to be positive.
iii) About 75% of the balls are likely to be positive.
iv) About 50% of' the balls are likely to be positive.
v) About 25% of the balls are likely to be positive.
vi) Very few of the balls are likely to be positive.
vii) None of the balls are likely to be positive.
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In classical statistical hypothesis testing, two errors are
controlled for.
	 Firstly, the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is in fact true; for example the probability
of rejecting the hypothesis that the population proportion is
about fifty per cent when it is in fact true. 	 Secondly, there
is the probability of accepting the null hypothesis when it is in
fact false.	 Tables A2.1 and A2.2 provide estimates of these
probabilities for selected populations and observed frequencies.
Table A21 gives the probabilities of certain sample observations
of 'negative' balls given the number of 'negative' balls in the
population. Table A2.2 gives the probability of each possible
observation for four population states. Both tables allow some
interpretation of the external validity of the study.
Table A2..1 is based on the assumption that the real world
population is totally unknown but that only seven types of sample
observation are possible. It may be seen that in some instances
the sample observations will not be unique at a ten per cent
level.
If' it is assumed that the real world population may only occur in
seven possible states, then Table A2.2 illustrates that each
observed frequency will allow discrimination between these states
with an error of about ten per cent.
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lable A2.1
Probability 111. j samDle outcomes given Ji
Dooulation frequency.
Observed frequency in sample of twenty.
O	 2	 5	 10
Actual number
in population	 0
1
2
3
11
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
111
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
211
25
26
27
28
29
30
Hoo.00	 I	 I -	 I
I 66.70	 I	 I	 I
I 1111.00	 I 10.73
	
28.86	 I 22.20
	
18.711	 I 30.38
1 12.05	 1 314.36	 I 00.28	 1
	7.0 	 I 311.68	 1	 1.23	 1
I 11.82	 32.36	 1	 3.13
1	 3.00	 1 28.119	 5.99	 1
	
1.811	 23.95	 I 9.58	 1
	
1.12	 1 19.37	 1 13.52	 1
	
00.60	 15.16	 1 17.36
1 11.51	 1 20.65	 1
I 8.50	 23.07
	
6.12	 1 211.113
	
1
1	 11.30	 211.70	 00.20
	
2.95	 I 23.95	 00.117
I	 1	 1.97	 22.36	 1 00.89
I	 1.29	 I 20.16	 1.53
I	 1 00.80	 1 17.59	 2.117
I	 I	 1 111.87	 3.711
I	 12.20	 1	 5.311
	
1 9.72	 7.30
I	 1	 7.52	 I	 9.50
I	 I	 5.611	 1 11.88
	
11.12	 1 111.31
I	 I	 I	 2.91	 I 16.61
I	 I	 1	 2.00	 I 18.62
I	 1.33	 1 20.19
I	 I	 I 00.85	 I 21.18
I	 I	 I 00.52	 I 21.52
1 ____________________ I._.__...__	 I ____________________ I __________________
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Table A2.2
Probability L1	 observation in,	 sanmie.
given	 ooulation orpoortion.
population proportion (%):population=60
o	 I 10	 25	 I 50	 I
I______ I _____ I _____ I ____ I
number of	 0 1100.00	 I 7.66	 I 00.07	 1
observatIons	 1 1	 1 26.30	 00.87	 1
saniple=20	 2	 I 3t.70	 k.30	 I	 I
3	 1 22.50	 11.97
Z	 1	 7.55	 1 21.10	 00.09 I
5 1	 1	 1.2k	 I 2 1L70	 00.52
6 I	 I 00.07	 I 19.90	 I	 2.05 1
7 I	 I	 I 11.20	 1	 5.82 1
8 I	 I	 1 12.10 I
9 I	 I	 I	 1.21	 I 18.60 I
10 I	 I	 I 00.22	 I 21.50 I
I______ I _____ I _____ I ____ I
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APPENDIX 3
EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOUR: TEE PUNT
This appendix examines deviations from Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) for some major currencies vis a vis the Punt since 1975.
The implications for firms are also discussed.
I: The Data
The IMF "International Financial Statistics" were used as a
source of monthly exchange rate and consumer price index (CPI)
data. The Irish CPI series is only available quarterly, and
the author extrapolated monthly data under the assumption of a
constant rate of price change within quarters.
It was also assumed that PPP prevailed on January 1, 1975 for
Sterling and the Deutschmark , and that the parity rate for the
Dollar as of that date was 2.2 $/E.
	
This assumption is entirely
arbitrary, and the choice in this case was predicated by
computational convenience, and the fitted PPP line as a 'line of
best fit'. Their arbitrariness may be overcome by comparing the
slope of the actual exchange rate and the slope of the PPP
exchange rate in any time period.
II: The Sterling—Punt Exchange Rate (Ft gwe A3. 1)
Prior to Ireland joining the EMS, the PPP rate seems to cycle
around the parity exchange rate.	 In some respects, this is
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hardly surprising, given the geographical proximity of the
countries, the openess of the Irish economy, and the similarities
in tastes between both markets.
After March 1979, this cycle ceases, and there are deviations
from PPP ranging from +27.2% (May 1981) to -8% (February 1983).
These deviations are graphed in Figure A3.2. In addition, the
volatility of the nominal exchange rate is considerable, and it
might be expected that transaction exposures concerned firms,
given that fifty per cent of foreign trade is invoiced in
Sterling.
From the point of view of firms, exporting from the U.K. to
Ireland may be less profitable, and exporting to the U.K. from
Ireland may be more profitable. It might also be conjectured
that domestic firms which depend on government capital spending,
may be adversely affected by the March 1983 devaluation, due to
increased debt financing costs. 	 Finally, Figure A3.3
illustrates the differences in quarterly inflation rates between
Ireland and the U.K.. 	 It is clear that inflation rates were
broadly simi].iar until 1979 and diverged thereafter. 	 This in
turn, may make accounting statements more ambiguous.
III: The Deutscbark-Punt Exchange Rate (Figure 13.14)
The volatility of this exchange rate has decreased markedly since
1 979. Many of the significant changes occurred during March and
September, when EMS realignments took place, and otherwise, the
Appendix 3: Page 390
nominal exchange rate was relatively stable. 	 The most dramatic
change occured in March 1983, when dealings in the Punt were
suspended. This was also the point of the 8% negative PPP
deviation vis a vis sterling, and at the time, there were fears
that unless the Punt were devalued, Irish exports to the U.K.
would become uncompetitive.
In real terms, there has been a substantial deviation from PPP,
since 1979. This has been due to the enormous differential
between Irish and German inflation rates, unless the German CPI
is a totally inappropriate reflection of German inflation. From
the oint of view of the domestic firm, there were substantial
opportunities to switch sourcing from Britain to Germany, and to
export to the U.K. rather than Germany, in the short run.
IV: The Dollar-Punt Exchange Rate (Figure A3 .5)
The volatility of the Dollar exchange rate, does not seem to have
altered significantly since 1979. However, PPP deviations did
exist, and this might in turn suggest U.S. sourcing possibilities
(1978-1981) and U.S. export possibilities since 1983.
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Figure A3. 1: The Sterling-Punt Exchange Rate
KEY:
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Figure A3.3: UK vs. Irish Inflation Rates
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APPENDIX I;
DATA COLLECTION GUIDE
The following guide was used to guide the collection of both
archival and interview data in Ireland.
1 .Resondent details.
Date:	 Firm:
Parent:
Yrs in IRL.	 Address:
Phone:
Contact to date:
Interviewee:	 Title:
No. of Years in posn. 	 Remarks:
(i.e. pre 1979)
No. of yrs. with firm:
Experience in other subsidiaries:
2.Nature	 firm
{Stress changes in the firm since 1979 and reazons}
Status of subsidiary: profit centre
cost centre
investment centre
revenue centre
other
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-Reasons for Irish presence (probe: protectionism, serve local
market, tax relief, cheap labour etc.)
-Goals of local operation:
(how are they operationalised: seen as part of world firm or
as equivalent to a locally owned firm with outside
ownership: performance criteria- e.g. financial goals,
quality, market share, shareholder wealth, growth, etc.
trade offs between goals(if any), adhered to?; also punt
vs. sterling).
Size of firm	 : Sales	 gr.	 yr.
emp loyees 	gr.	 yr.
HQ employees	 gr.	 yr.
Main products/industry:
Manufacturing - export
	
-local
Distribution - direct to customer/retail/wholesale/other
Type of customer - consumer/ industrial
Subject to price controls?
Nature of competitors:
Domocile:
Mkt. share:
Irish involve.(manfg. vs. distn.):
{Obtain some inkling of the cost structure, and the degree of
tradabil ityl
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3.eDendenae , parent
Are final goods sourced abroad?
thoice in source, or just U.K.?
If manufacturing, why?
Source raw material abroad?
Signi ficant?
Depend on parent?
Source choice?
Source work in progress abroad?
Significant?
Depend on parent?
Source choice?
Other interdependencies?
- R+D
- Personnel
- Know how
- Planning
- Treasury management
- Economic info. etc.
Organisational structure & relation to U.K./Europe
-geog
-prods.
-matrix
-other
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organisational structure (formal ) in Ireland
-geog
-prods.
-matrix
-other
I1.Nature	 Irish org.
- Product
- Region
(discuss responsibility division btw. Irish profit centres, Irish
HQ and U.K. HQ}
Degree of discretion: Financial/control
credit terins&cash discounts
sell and lease assets
arrange external SR borr.
"	 LR	 "
transaction/translation exp.
administer subsidiary budget
determine methods of budgetary
control.
determine internal audit
procedure.
capital invest/disinvest
specify cap. budget annually
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Long range planning
Irelated to capital budget}
respon. for strategy
Forecast and interpret econ.
Make major organisational changes
Legal
tax
use HQ legal staff
secretarial
Personnel & industrial relations
remuneration policy
managers
1 obo Ui'
appoint local managers
training local managers
Operations Research
Marketing
segment decisions in In.
export
product line
new product intro.
pricing
promo, budget
promo. strategy
djstrjb. channels
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Production
manfg./indal. engineering
Plan and schedule 0/p
level of o/p
level of prodn.(export;local)
equip replacement/instalin.
local marifg. vs. import
quality control
Purchasing
choose suppliers
specify product/price
Engineering (other than industrial)
R+D
allowed to have local R&D
level of R&D
research
CClassity as:
1) Fully centralised control.
ii) Subject to specific directives.
iii) Subject to general guidelines.
iv) Largely autonomous.
v) Participative (truly consensual)
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Operating responsibility vs. policy from RQ
Try and find role for Irish head office (if applicable) i.e. a
mail box vs. a regional HQ:
(Try and find out the extent to which these relationships
have evolved since 1979 and why?)
5.Economic exDosure.
What have been the effects of 1979 break with sterling on your
firm? (use to get general Idea of his awareness, and
perception of the problem).
{Check In partic. for the PPP deviations in appendix as an
Infl uence}
Also, given the effects, what have you done about it? {attempt
to find out tactics which are now regretted}
Probe: -competitors
-pricing policy
-destination of sales (market segmentation and
selection)
-sourcing-raw materials
-Intermediate goods
-finished goods
-plant and machinery
-arms length/within the firm
- investment/disinvestment
-real income effects and govt.spending
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-other pre active-new prods (product strategy)
-promotional strategy
-working capital policy, credit policy
6 .Information F1ows
Examination of HQ-Subsid-local operators info, flows: Stress
changes in the content, detail and frequency of:
visits and memos
internal audit
accounting reports and budgeting
short range planning
other info?
If short range plan, do they incorporate economic info? If so,
how? cx ante vs. ex post
Stress changes since 1979
a) local subsid.> Irish HQ:
Budget
Market info
Transaction exposure
etc.
b) Irish HQ > local subsid.
Econ. info, for incorp. in budget etc.
c) Irish HQ > U.K.
Budget
Visits
Internal audit
Transaotion exposure
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7.Trasaction cxDosure
source of forecasts
definition of exposure
nature of exposure reports (frequency, detail)
dissemination of forecasts and exposw'e reports
integrated in working capita]., and potential/use of pre
active transaction exposure management.
Responsible for defensive strategies, and if so,
strategies used, frequency of use and choice between
alternative strategies.
.L Invest j disinvest Lj aoDlicableI
In partic., incorporation of exchange rate considerations,
influence of competitiveness and development of contingency
plans.
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No. of Firms.
5
3
6
22
APPENDIX 5
DETAILS OF IRISH FIRMS AND INmuVIEVEES
Details of the turnover (Table A5.1) and the number of employees
(Table A5.2) for the Irish subsidiaries are presented below. 	 In
two cases, the interviewee was the managing director.	 In all
other oases, it was the finance director or the chief accountant.
lable A5.1.
Turnover (Punts).
Greater than 100 mm.
Between 50 and 100 mm.
Between 10 and 50 mm.
Less than 10 mm.
Total
Table A5.2
No. of Employees.
Greater than 1000
Between 500 and 1000
Between 100 and 500
Less than 100
Total
No. of Firms.
2
11
5.
22
All of the firms with more than 100 employees had a manufacturing
facility, while the five firms with less than 100 employees were
marketing subsidiaries.
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APPENDIX 6
THE PUNT AND THE MEDIA
In this appendix, a summary of newspaper articles which were
relevant to either changes in the Punt exchange rate or attempts
to influence government exchange rate policy are summarised from
1980 to 198 1L This appendix is most useful if it is read in
conjunction with Appendix Three.
jish Times 01018O
Frantic dealing in gold yesterday - at close last night at 96.3p
a fall of .25 p but went up 1% against the dollar.	 The D1! went
up against the punt.	 Its due to the flight from the $ into
gold.
Irish Times 080180
IFA call to devalue - increase the competitiveness of exports:
inflation = 11% in 2/79: 16% in 11/79- first call for
devaluation.	 Also the Punt down to 95.8 due to the run from the
$ into gold.
Irish Times 100180
ITGWU oppose devaluation. 	 They maintain that a 5% drop led to
the increased Inflation in November. 	 A further 5% devaluation
would increase Inflation even more.
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Irish Times 150180
., The Punt fell below 95p yesterday for the first time since Sept.
91.75. Its a drop of •Z5, but small gains against the DL It
was due to an increase in London interbank rates and an easing of
Dublin interbank rates.	 Dublin 3 month is at 17.5 and London at
17% On one month money, the rates are 17.75 on Dublin and 17.25
in London.	 But above the Central Bank intervention limit
compared with last year.
Irish Times 160180
Lost ip against £ yesterday but stable in EMS
'1sh Timesl7Ol8O
Gained .35p
Irish Timesl7Ol8O
Strong performance: closed 93.5 p i.e. down against £. But did
well against other currencies.
kish. T1mes220180
£ Lost ground: .55p to 93.6: steady against other currencies.
kish T1mes230180
Tax marches halt Dublin currency dealing.
Irish Times25Ol8O
Central Bank announce a new policy to decrease intervention. 	 To
start off they kept things in a narrow band; by last Sept. the
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band was .8% either side: now it has been increased to 1.6 5% on
either side.	 At the moment the EMS permits 3.799 to 3.63 DM and
the Central Bank permits 3.776 to 3.66 11.	 If the Central Bank
hits either of' these limits, It will intervene.
David Kern spoke in Dublin yesterday to financial executives and
said that comparing inflation rates would imply Punt pound parity
but that due to M.Sea oil, would expect .925 or .93 by the end of'
1980.
Irish Press2SOl8O
Central Bank Winter bulletin says that Demand is greater than
Supply and that demand needs to' be decreased rather than
devaluation.	 1000 mln. borrowing in 1979 and a Balance of
Payments deficit of' 800 mm. (11% of national output). Warn
that the external deficit can only be kept if' we have reserves or
are creditworthy- otherwise 'very severe adjustments' will be
forced on us. An increase in borrowing'would involve such an
increase in external debt as to raise questions regarding our
capacity to sustain it'.
	
They estimate that every 100mm.
decrease In exchequer borrowing would decrease the Balance of
Payments by 8Omln. over 12 months.
Irish Times 2110180
Punt recovering.	 Increase .22p to 93.95 p.	 Lost ground in the
EMS.
Irish Times 250180
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Paul Tartsey comment on the Central Bank bulletin.
Need to decrease the current deficit and not the capital budget.
18% guideline to 2/80 had been exhausted at 11/79. they won't
issue a guideline until they see the budget and decide on credit
for the private sector. They rule out devaluation because It
will increase domestic prices and wage demands.	 Say must
combine pay, monetary and fiscal policy. 	 Reserves are down
200mln.
Irish TimesOlO28O
Decrease to 93.7 and decreased within the EMS.
Irish Times2gOl8O
Bad day in the EMS
Irish Times 020280
Punt still in decline against the EMS and £.
Irish TItnesO5O28O
£ up against all currencies, 	 down .73p to 93 p.	 Held steady in
the EMS:
Irish. TimesO6O28O
Sharp recovery - diipped to 92.6 overnight and then up to 92.75
Irish T1mes070280
Punt up against all currencies other than £. 	 Close at 92.Z.
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Irish Times08O280
Retreat to 92.28 and also decrease in the EMS.
Irish Time10280
Gained against the $ along with £ and EMS. Closed at 92.3
Irish T1mes160280
Up .5 at 93.05.
Irish Independentl30380
Lost tO pts. to £ yesterday: close at 91.2.
	
10 pts. to $.
Irish T1mes190380
IR< 90p, i.e. at 89.86. and down to 1.976$.
	
1.5p down since
Friday (today is Weds. and Mon. was a bank holiday). 	 Only 1.2p
above all time low against £ and greater than 10% since halycon
days of late last year when slightly above parity. 	 Perhaps the
decrease is due to devaluation fears.
Irish Times20038O
Back up to 90.18 but down on $ and EMS, cept DM.
irish T1ines250380
Punt recovers to 90.1L Turn around in the Snake.	 There is
evidence of leading and lagging.
Irish T1mes260380
Back down to <gOp but at close it was gOp: may have been Central
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Bank intervention. 	 The £ climbed strongly against all
currencies, and the Punt went with it to some extent. 	 Gone from
2nd. worst in EMS (20/3/80) to third best- its due to the
expectation that the punt will benefit from an increased £ due to
the ability of Irish exports to compete in the UK.
Irish TimesO2OlI8O
$ on the up 1.935 to 1.911.	 The rate has fallen from 2.10 in
early march implies greater than 10% qand this will have a
significant impact on Irish trade patterns. 	 Oil prices will be
up, but so will tourism.	 £ 89.2 Z .	 Ireland is at the top of
its band and it is thought that the Central Bank intervened to
deflate it.
Irish Times03018O
£089.12 but up to 1.92$: losses in Snake and around the middle
now.
Irish Times080180
Phillips and Drew forecast a depreciation in the second half of
the year.	 Expect the Balance of Payments to be 700 mitt. 	 They
say that the budget is high risk, since there is in creased VAT
etc. so this will be incorporated in the PI and therefore affect
wage negotiations and demands. 	 Inflation in the first quarter
=15.5% and expect 19.5% in the 2nd. quarter due to the budgetary
price increases.
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Irish Times1601480
Paul Tansey reviewing Colm McCarthy in the LBR.
Prior to the EMS, Irish inflation tracked British inflation in
the 70's and Irish interest rates were determined in the London
markets. This meant that monetary policy was impossible. The
impication is that since survived big changes over 50 years, it
is possible to have a single currency. The real resource
transfers 3% of GNP in 1979 and in present value terms, the
Central Bank could increase seignorage profits by 5mln. at 10%
discount rate.	 But there are new foreign currency transaction
costs which could add 5.5 mln. to the Irish costs of trading with
the UK.
Irish Times2 80580
Slipped to 88.58p: just above the lowest ever of 88.5p on 30/7/79
its due to our association with Europe and UK ener. The $ is
at its lowest level for 5 years and we are 3rd. strogest in the
EMS.
Irish T1mes130680
From today, the Central Bank bands will be +1- 2.25%.	 The idea
was to allow the orderly development of the Irish foreign
exchange market.
	 It led to a severe drain on the foreign
reserves but this year they stabilised at 920 mln. for the last 5
months.	 Still 3rd. in EMS.
Irish T1mes290780
Talks with ill banks will lead to the creation of a forward market
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but the Central Bank will reserve the right to intervene.
Irish T1mes280880
For the fourth day running that a new low has been reached
against the £.	 The rate now is 87.11 and it has lost 2.5 p since
1/8/80.	 The £ is going wild at 2.396$.
	
But the TWI at 9/79
was 78.25 and at 5/80 was 711.11.	 Current estimates imply that a
But our reserves are high because we're at the top of the snake
and there is SSB and private sector borrowing abroad.
Irish Press280880
Punt is not at Its worst ever. The previous break In the last
century when the Punt was at 811p sterling.	 Up until 1797 there
were 13 Punts for 12 pounds throughout the 18th. century.	 Then
there was the currency crisis of 1797 and there was a free float
until 1821.
	 In September 1803, one £ cost 1.19 punts. 	 It was
due to inflationary pressures at the time.
Irish Press260880
We're still at the top of' the EMS. 	 88.2 p due to sterling doing
well.
Irish TImeslOO98O
The £ is down from 2.112 to 2.110 due to expectations of a cut In
the MLR because of money supply figures. 	 The current
expectation is 2.35 and this could bring the Punt up to 90p.
The possibility of an decrease in interest rates in the UK led to
an increase in long dated gUts in Ireland.	 The associated
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banks are disturbed because the ICC and the ACC are being allowed
to borrow in Europe with the government taking on the exchange
risk and are currently lobbying both the Central Bank and the
Taoiseach.
Irish T1mes120980
The external reserves have increased 22Omln. due to State
borrowing.	 Disclosed in the September supplement to the Summer
Quarterly bulletin.	 Its due to foreign borrowing in DM and
other EMS currencies. The trade balance is deteriorating.
1250 mm. reserves in 3/1979, went down to 899mln. in 1 /80 and
now back up to 1199.7mln. which may lead to a 1.5 to 2% cut in
the Associated Banks' interest rates.	 But, the Balance of
Payments deficit is still 700 mln. The key policy variables in
Ireland are the private sector credit expansion and the external
reserves, and not the Money Supply.
Irish Indeendent0 1fl 080
Ray Douglas associate director of AIIB says that a 2% cut in the
MLR by the end of' the month could bring the Punt up to 91-2p.
An Irish oil find would bring us back to parity. N.B. Gilts are
not subject to exchange controls.
Irish Indeendent1 81080
Peter Barry has urged the government to shore up the sinking Punt
and said that it they didn't do so, inflation would be increased.
The Donegal by election is under way.
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Irish Timesl8lO8O
The Central Bank intervened yesterday and the Pu.mt was at a new
low against £.	 During the day it tell to 811.15 but by the close
it stood at 8l.37. Currently, 2.0 z110$. The Central Bank
argues that the interest rate cut and the strong $ led to
confusion among people buying and selling foreign exchange,
especially, companies doing business abroad.
Irish Times221080
Gains against all currencies except £. Gone up in the EMS, but
down to 82.55 against £. It is due to exporters selling $ and £
and importers putting off purchases according to the Central
Bank. But, the Punt closed at 82.97 and reached 83.05 in after
hours trading. The slide may be halted, but one operator says
that it will drift in the next few weeks due to the repatriation
of foreign borrowing.	 Also interest rates are very low due to
the fund injections from SSB borrowing abroad. 	 Interest rates
will increase in 2-3 months. The IFA are campaigning for
devaluation, because inflation here is higher than Germany etc.
and therefore the value of the Green pound is askew.
Irish T1mes231080
Down to 82.65; had fallen to 82.25.
	
Lost ground against all 6
EMS currencies. £ is strong due to high interest rates but the
prime rate in the US is now 111% and the $ is on the way up.
Irish Times011ll8O
Less than 80p for the first time.- 79.75 p.	 This rate led to
AppendIx 6: Page 1117
importers moving into the market in substantial numbers and
bidding up the price to 80.3 in late deals. 	 <Sop as a
psychological spur.	 This in turn led to gains in the EMS. 	 The
US$ is on the way up and this has led to fears of an increase in
Irish petrol prices.	 The Euro rose to 17.5% as traders reckon
that the cut in the MLR Is unlikely until after christmas. 	 The
Irish TWI is at a new low of 69.75 (base, 1971=100).
Irish TimesO7ll8O
Shoppers: cards etc are up 20% on last year and very expensive.
According to the merchandising director of Switzers, Hugo
Mitchell, buyers are being Inotrueted to go outside the £ area,
but £ purchases would be up 25% particularly, clothes, cosmetics,
etc. Irish manufacturers have been approached with an offer that
both the manufacturer and the retailer should cut margins.
Irish TimesO7ll8O
David Andrews, sales director in Weirs said that prices would be
lower. They persuaded English manufacturers to give discounts
because of the exchange rate (and the UK recession)- One company
gave a 20% reduction, and a 20% discount. 	 Also buying gold and
Jewellery outside the £ market and In the EMS.
Oil money etc. is going Into the $ and the £ which brought it
down to its lowest ever level of 79.05 and 78.8 in after hours
trading. Due to Reagan's victory, £ lost ground against $ and
Punt stood at 1.9285.
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Irish Times10118O
Turning point in sight.
	 Maybe the market thinks that Thatcher
is relenting: the CII is praying for lower rates to help exports:
but maybe it is a good thing now, because in a few months, it
will lead to inflationary pressure on imports. 	 Dearth of
research on the economic effects of a change in the exchange rate
in Ireland, but commentators reckon that there is no long run
competitive effect- it will be gone within 9-12 months which
implies a decrease in competitiveness by the end of 1981. But
it may have made the difference between survival and closure now.
There is a negative real interest rate in Ireland now of -5 to
6%.	 In Germany there is a real rate of 5/6%.	 PPPT is on its
head since the inflationary countries have strong currencies and
vice versa e.g. US and UK vs. Germeny and Switzerland.	 We can
do nothing except be opportunistic.
Irish Pressl1Ill8O
-Report on the Statistical and Social Enquiry Society meeting.
Worse off with Sterling- Farmers' margins being squeezed
according to O'Connor from the Central Bank due to the use of £
inputs.	 Brendan Dowling (J+E Davy) complains about the Central
Bank not revealing intervention and therefore cannot forecast the
effects of market factors.	 If we stayed with the £, could be
10% up against the DM etc.
Sunday Tribune.231 180
Discussion of £.
Positive effects are:
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Increased exports to the UK
Decreased UK imports and so Irish goods are more
competitive.
Increased Tourism.
Negative effects:
Increased raw material and Capital goods costs.
Increased import prices lead to increases in the CPI and
hence increases wage demands.
Increased wages and costs decrease competitiveness.
Probaly beneficial in the short run but when it filters into
wages, it is of no value.
Irish TimeslOOl8l
New low of' 78.68 but improved in the EMS. 	 There is a strong
commercial demand for foreign currency, and the Central Bank is
intervening.
Irish Timesl7Ol8l
Creeping weakness.	 All time low of 77.18p- also lost in the
EMS.	 The $ is weak because of the Teheran Hostages.	 $l2bln
ransom?
Irish Times200l8l: Financial Tiines2lOt81
The European Commission is concerned at the Punt not being
accepted in some European banks because it is so thinly traded.
Iri.sh T1mes270181
New low of' 75.6p and 1.82$- increased oil an petrol prices.	 The
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hostage saga has been satisfactorily concluded.
Irish Times2gOl8l
New low 7 11.lp:	 Still wondering if an MLR cut is likely.
Irish T1mes280181
Tansey: eve of budget and Its less than 75p.
	
D.J. Moore
(AIB) speaking to the CII conference says that the future looks
bleak for the Punt unless drastic corrective measures are taken.
Balance of Payments deficits In the last two years of l500mln.-
Foreign reserves would be wiped out were it not for massive
foreign borrowing.	 The bulk of trade is in $ and £.
Also report on Howe in Paris last night saying that Britain wants
to join the EMS but that this couln't be achieved without a more
stable currency and this could not be done at the moment.
Irish Times2 801 81
ATh	 Sell	 Buy
Dublin	 75.5	 77.2
Belfast	 1.31	 1.35
Irish TImes300l8l
Reports from Strabane and Derry that the shops there are being
hit by the £.	 This is due to too little business from the
Republic and people in Strabane purchasing in the South.
	 (there
is a 15% VAT on clothes In the North.)
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Irish flmes31018l
Pettigo (Donegal) and Tullyhammon (Tyrone) were both the same
town once, but now they're not and there is a boom in Pettigo.
Sunday
 Tribune22O28l
Report that UK property buyers are moving into the Republic.
Also purchasing Bars etc.
Irish Press230281
Complaints of lack of exchange facilities for tourists etc.
because of bank opening hours.
Irish Press310381
Punt performing badly In the EMS and hitting the lower band.
Irish Indeendentl70681
UK brokers complain that Irish people can't buy Guinness shares:
30% of the shares are held in Ireland.	 Also they had to get a
special dispensation from the Central Bank to allow Irish
employees hold the shares.
Irish T1mes180781
O'Donoghue says that Ireland's future belongs with the EMS.
jndav Tribune2lO68l
Petrol up lop because of the sliding Punt. 	 The Irish Refining
00.	 BP 16%, Texaco 20%, Shell 20% and Esso Z0%.	 BP has moved
because it is 5$ per tonne more costly here. 	 Also Latsis
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allegedly setting up a refinery in Ballylongford at a cost of
$500 bin.
Irish. 'imes 150881
Punt falls on speculation of a revaluation of the DM. Dealers
said that there was a lot of speculation yesterday with companies
and Banks taking up positions.
Sunday Tribune 160881
O'Grady Walsh (Deputy Gen. manager of the Central Bank) says that
the devaluation rumours are untrue. 	 He wouldn't comment on the
rumoured intervention of 15mm.
Ir1h T1mes030981
Punt at its highest level this year.
	 81.25p and 1.5$: stayed
constant in the EMS.
Sunday
 TribuneO6Og8l
Chartists (Portfolio Management) say that devaluation against the
OM is inevitable but there has been momentum gained to climb
against the £.
Irish T1me090981
Highest since October last at 83.39.
	
It will help ease
inflationary pressures because a lot of imports are in £.	 £ is
weak because of the glut in World oil markets. 	 The US rush to
sell £ is attributed to the chartists- a lot of "sell" signals.
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Sunday Tribune 270981
Article by Philip Bourke- UCD lecturer.
An increased exchange rate leads to:
Decreased import costs.
Exports are injured unless they are price inelastic.
Exchange controls limit the possibilities on transactions and
capita]. movements.
ish TimesO6lO8l
There has been intense speculation in the last few weeks of an
EMS currency realignment. 	 The punt has jumped from the bottom
to the middle of the snake. The banks and companies are dying
to offload foreign currencies and get Punts. 	 But down to
1.598$
	
Interest rates eased 0.5%.
	
The official close was
86.31 and the main effect is the lifting of realignment fears
every Friday since last Spring.	 The TWI Is down 0.75%.
Irish TImesO6lO8l
The farmers are bitter about the change in the Punt.	 They
maintain that it should have been devalued by between 6 and 10%.
Irish Press2llO8l
Punt moved forward again to 86.8'i. It was due to British trade
figures being poorer than expected, because the British Civil
Sevice strike since February had led to no trade figures being
published.	 In the EMS, the Punt lies at third last, and the TWI
stands at 70..
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irish T1mes211081
Reports that the Central Bank has been intervening in the Inter
Bank market.
Irish TimesO7 1081
Sadat's assasination; move into gold and $
Irish T1mes221081
Down to 1.55$ due to the increase in US interest rates. 	 We're
still third last in the EMS
Irish Press22lO8l
The increase in US interest rates and the increased inflation in
the US has led to the Punt decreasing against the dollar.
Irish Times2IIlC8l
Stockbrokers complaining that you can buy property horses and
yachts abroad but not shares.
Cork Examiner2l1181
Paul Dalsager (EEC Agriculture Minister) says that Ireland should
devalue in line with local inflation.
Irish Indeendent11 1081
Punt up again to 85.05
Irish Time171181
Punt down again at 82.66 due to high UK interest rates but
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showing strength against the EMS currencies
Iri.sh Press2011Sl
Lost ground against everything other than the $. The TWI stands
at 69.05.	 Overnight money in the Inter Bank market was up to
27% because of Guts.
Irish Press20118l
IFA claim that the Punt is 18.5% overvalued and claim that it is
costing the agriculture sector 250mm. anually- can't compete
with the EEC.
Irish Timeslll28l
Irish reserves up Z 00mln. to 1 1173m1n. in October and November
(started October at 1000mm.) because of foreign borrowing and
the ending of realignment fears.	 Closed l th. from the top in
the EMS- a new found strength.	 There are no figures available
on foreign borrowing. Also CAP payments to the exchequer helped
reserves. Importers were speeding up payments to Suppliers in
September because of the realignment - this led to a decrease in
the Money Supply in October and since then Guts have rallied.
Also the SSBs are taking up foreign credit.
Irish T1mes121281
Punt at the top of the EMS- boosted by expectations of a weak £
and $.
	
It reached 83.75p, but there is a possibility of an
increase in UK interest rates. 	 The Central Bank intervened in
order to stop it going above the limits. 	 The markets are
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expressing doubts about the origins of the 1 OOmln. reserves and
the foreign borrowing figures won't be available until January.
Irish Times3Ol28l
D.Cronin, Senior manager of ATh - Reckons punt rate of .85 to .89
for the year.
Irish Times21O1
John Bourke from Bof I reckons that the Punt will devalue by 5-10%
against the 3.	 80% of' trade is in $ and £, and therefore we
were helped by this.
	
Other speaker- Both Doomsday- paying
ourselves too much.
Irish Indeoenderit23Ol
Bottom of the EMS bands but unchanged on the £ at 81. 1 5. 	 Heavy
selling in Dublin.
Irish PresO2O182
Very small drop in the TWI over the Year. 	 The steep fall in
1980 of' the Punt may have added 5% to the CPI. But note that
the TWI is a 1971 base year and therefore may not reflect the oil
effect of' the $.
cork Examiner 1702
10% devaluation of the green pound sought.
Cork Examiner28Ol82
John Burke (B of' I) says that a 10% devaluation is likely as we
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forecasted last week: Ben Power (Chairman of the institute of
secretaries) also agrees with this forecast.
	 Alan Dukes (Mm.
for Agric.) refuses to do so.
Irish ixnes29O1
News of the fall of the government led to a downward pressure on
foreign exchange markets yesterday and there was some Central
Bank Intervention amounting to 10mm.
	 Closed at 1.35$ and
commercial operators were waiting for the election results In
three weeks - they are anti Fianna Fall.
Irish Time150282
Phillips and Drew forecast that the Punt may come under pressure
because of foreign indebtedness and political uncertainty.	 The
expected current account deficit is 1300mm.
ish Press2IO2
There Is speculation that there was 50-100mm. support for the
punt last Monday following the realignment at the week-end. The
TWI:6775.	 Interest rates hardened.
Irish Times2IO282
WSJ (yesterday): says that the Punt is next for devaluation.
Traders speculate that the Irish government did not have the
authority to devalue because the the elections last week were
inconci usive.
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Sunday Tribune2 80282
Devaluation is no use because:
Most trade is with the £ and the $ (70%) and therefore only
a small proportion of trade is affected.
It would increase debt service costs.
It would Increase imported inflation.
Farmers NESC commissioned study to boost farm incomes.
Irish TImesO'10382
Bankers forecast devaluation.
David Went (32, chief exec of UIB) says that need to do so within
EMS because of higher inflation and also the farmers.
David Kern (chief economist at the NatWest) sees the DM
strengthening in 82/83. It was a UIB seminar for financial
executives.
Irish Tinies050382
Joe Durkan of the ESRI says that a devaluation would be
desirable, in the quarterly economic commentary. Forecast a
decrease in GNP, employment etc. 	 He reckons that a pay
framework and a devaluation are necessary. Also, he questions
the increase In foreign debt, since it increases the revenues
from creditor countries with exports.
Balance of Payments in 1981 was 1310 and excpected to be 1200 in
1982.	 Exports are the only bright spot.
Sunday TribuneO8O382
Comment on Went.	 The £ and $ have maintained our
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competitiveness. Suggested that if they devalue, firms are more
likely to borrow abroad.
Irish Times090382
Interest rates could be eased by a devaluation.
	 Durkan's idea
that it would give us a competitive edge.
Cork Exaniiner11O3
Yet another appeal to devalue.
Irish T1mes190382
Top of EMS after Patrick's Day, but lost ip on £ to 81.15.
Basically due to the Franc. Haughey has been denying
categorically a devaluation recently.
Improved trade performance in February.
Irl.sh. Times190382
£ tumbles against the $: there are rumours of a Franc
deval uatlon.
undav Press26O3
EEC urges devaluation for farmers: It was Dalsager last night.
Irish Times29O3
Goodbody and Wilkinson say that Haughey's denial of devaluation
is unrealistic.
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Irish. flmes050l82
IFA pushing for a devaluation.
Irish Press070IS2
IFA stepping up the devaluation campaign.
Irish Press150182
Irish Banking Review says that devaluation is imminent - argued
in terms of different inflation rates- say that a devaluation and
a pay policy are necessary - otherwise, there will be serious
implications for the economy.
Cork Exaniiner22Ol82
(Farming Exarniner)Devaluation still on say the experts.
Punt to be devalued? Maintain that they have exclusive
information that it wil]. be devalued by 5%.
ish T1ines280152
Joe MeCartin urges a 10% devaluation.
Irish Press290152
Sank from 52.5 to 82.3- no movement in the EMS:
Irish Press28Ok82
Brokers expect an EMS realignment - Phillips and Drew (monthly
market review) say that the DM will revalue.
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undav Tribune2 5014 82
Condon (CTT) reckons that a devaluation will be of little help.
Beverage and Tobacco exports increased 50% due to Cream Liquers:
Qiemicals increased 514%: there is talk of attempts to establish a
trading company.
Irish Times26 01482
Phillips and Drew report suggests devaluation.
Irish TimeO8O5
Realignment of the EMS won't change the Punt according to the
Lloyds Bank 'International Financial Outlook'.
Irish T1mes290582
IFA will have a meeting on inflation and the exchange rate on the
10th. of June in Kill , Co. Kildare.
Irish Press0106
Problems In exchanging Punts.
Irish Times120682
Speculation on realignment is becoming stronger- the French
governemnt seems a likely candidate. It is unlikely that the
Punt will change.
Irish Timesi5O6
Franc was devalued at the week end.
	 The punt wasn't.	 The
Farmers are bitter.
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Irish T1mes160682
Recovered from an all time low against the $ yesterday. The £
was up because the Falkiands is over. Went from 80p to 79.95.
Ireland is still high in the EMS.
irish T1mes190682
New low against the $: 1.398.
Irish TimeaO9O982
MacSharry scotches devaluation rumours.
	
He considered the
Economist (3/9/82) a devious act.
Irish. T1mes270982
Another report from Pettigo: the place is still booming.
rish Indeoendentl 51082
O'Malley suggests a dual exchange rate for imports which
differentiates between luxuries and productive goods.
Irish T1mes181082
Coim McCarthy at the CII conference suggests that there is a case
for a less ambitious exchange rate policy, and that the current
one is decreasing competitiveness.
Irish Times291082
The Punt is doing well in the EMS-. Puzzling- but the Central Bank
Quarterly Bulletin just out suggests:
Turnaround in the Balance of Payments in the Summer. 	 It was
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85mln. in that quarter and so the supply of foreign currency
exceeded the demand. There was an inflow of' government borrowing
in mid August of' lZ0mln.	 There was a change in the tendency to
lead and lag.
	
It has been reversed from being against the
pound.
Irish Times1111
IFA wants the parties to pledge a devaluation of about 10%
Irish Times1611
The Punt is seen as overvalued in the EMS according to Panmure
Gordon (London S-broker).
Current foreign debt = $2000 per capita.
Foreign borrowing in 1981 was 13% of' GDP. (3% in 1978).
Irish TirnesC6l282
No devaluation since 1979.
	
A lot of it is due to the Mark
being out of fashion, but now the $ and £ being. reassessed - if
it does, there will be pressure on the Punt to devalue. 	 Last
Friday, the Punt began to fall in the EMS and heavy selling
pressure was reported. 	 £=83.6- cheap rate and $=1.375
Irish Press291282
The Irish Exporters association would like a devaluation.
	 They
also claim that the recent increase in PRSI has hit exporters.
Irish TJ.mes291282
Patrick McEvoy, (M.D., Irish Intercontinental Bank) attributes
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the tightness in the Dublin market to the low £ and $ and due to
importers speeding up payments and export receipts being delayed.
Also the realignment rumours are leading to refinancing in Irish
pounds. There is a correlation between a weak £ and short run
Irish Interest rates.
Irish T1mes080183
The bulk of finance to date has been In Europe and now they are
moving to the US and Japan: got a AA rating in Japan, the same as
Denmark. Issued a Samurai Bond, but the difference between a AA
and a AAA rating is only .1%. This Is a shame since Irish
borrowing decreased by 20% in real terms last year and should
fall further this year.	 In recent months some Irish deals not
taken up.	 But, the Japs were In Ireland last October, an
unfavourable time.
Foreign borrowing=10% of GNP in 1982:11l8m1n. (12.8% in 1981)
The Balance of' Payments deficit is expected to be 800mm.
Expect 6.5% foreign borrowing this year i.e. 800 mm. and of this
330mm. has already been raised.
Irl.sh PressOI0183
In 1979, there was a .6% fall in the value of the £, in 1980
there was a 1% fall In value and in 1981 a 8.5% fall. Last year
was the best year yet, with a .08% increase and it was 86.63 p at
the weekend. But now the focus is on the Punt within the EMS
but most of our trade is in $ or £.
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Irish T1mes070183
Up to 87.88p yesterday. 	 £ was down because OPEC can't agree on
oil prices: this will decrease our exports, but make imports
cheaper.	 It will also lead to more people going shopping in the
North.
Irish Timesl10183
The Punt is up to 89.13 p and the £ fell to 1.6$. 	 The punt
weakened against all the EMS currencies except the DM.
Ir1h T1mes030183
Cashman resigned yesterday from the board of the Central Bank.
Bruton is against devaluation because it will increase inflation.
Conellan would prefer to contain inflation, than see devaluation.
Condon is anti devaluation because he says that it had the
opposite effect when we entered the EMS: there was less export
growth in GB and UK exports to Ireland increased at a faster
rate.
Meanwhile, in a statement attacking a number of British Food
exporters who were trying to put up their prices on top of'
profits gained from the punt's rise against sterling, Quinnsworth
the supermarket chain said that Irish consumers were not getting
the benefits of the rise at a time when they needed it most.
Irish Indeoendentl5Ol 83
The IR is precariously close to the EMS bands limit; just inside
the 1.125 band.	 The Central Bank Is intervening and says that
demand for the Punt has decreased. 	 Also forward cover has been
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reduced from 30 to 15 days ahead.	 There is selling in DM
because of election fears. 	 There are also election fears with
the UK £.
Irish Timesl7Ol83
ATh like government policy in their latest economic review and
say that the key is the £-$ rate which is a function of oil
prices and US interest rates.
Irish PresslgOl83
There are realignment fears after the punt slump. The Central
Bank is lending substantial support. 	 88.19p.
	
Expectations of
a devaluation by the end of February.
Irish T1mes210183
Fears of a devaluation have been allayed by the increase in
reserves of 167 mm. It is possible that the Central Bank is
intervening and pursuing a tactic of keeping the punt lowest in
the EMS (the Belgians do this regularly): also the Cabinet, the
CII and CTT are opposed to a devaluation. The only possibility
may be a CDU victory in Germany. The last realignment was on
11/6/82. There was a 80mm. Balance of Payments deficit in the
last quarter.
Goverment foreign borrowing has decreased but SSB borrowing has
increased.
Irish Times20183
Farmers should be pleased that input prices have decreased but
AppendIx 6: Page 37
that output prices have remained the same, but they want a
deva]. uation.
A devaluation will lead to a once and for all change in relative
prices if and only if Ireland were a relatively closed economy.
But Ireland is extremely open, (35% of expenditure is on imports)
and this makes us susceptible to foreign inflation.
The Irish experience in the last four years suggests that it is
only a short run solution. CTT stresses design, marketing,
efficiency and ability to meet delivery dates as well as price.
The only solution is a prices and incomes policy. 	 The NPC
should check that import savings are passed on and there should
be minor indirect taxes. 	 However the ICTU are anti incomes
policy.
Irish T1mes270183
E. Regan (chief exec of the Irish Meat exporters association )
says that the fall in £ is affecting Irelands 35mm. sheepmeat
trade - UK lamb is displacing Irish lamb in France.
Irish Press280183
There was a 250mm. outflow last year (it's unexplained, and
amounted to 1100 mm. at one stage) according to s-brokers Maguire
McCann Morrison - they maintain that it is due to short run
speculation against the punt devaluing and attempts by businees
to cover the exchange risk. They point out that:
The Irish German Inflation differential, since 1979 has been
118% but the punt has only devalued 111% against the DM in
that period.
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Foreign borrowing =51% of GNP
There is leading and lagging speculation of 250mm. and
forward cover.
.IiI1 Times280183
Maguire and co. predict decreasing interest rates if the punt
devalues.
iib. Indeendent2 801 83
Maguire and co. see the use of leading and lagging as an
explanation of the restriction of forward cover from 30 to 15
days.
Irish Press190283
Devalue to compete says Prof. Walsh.
	
(Marketing Society
yesterday)
Irish T1mes220283
Yesterday it was at 90.19.
	
Up further next week?- given the
uncertainty on oil prices.
Irish T1mes230283
9O.7 1 p. Oil price uncertainty. Lying 6th. in the EMS.
Pressure on Gold because if oil prices go down it will lead to
Arab gold sales.
Irish T1mes010383
Central Bank forecasts a 500mln. Balance of Payments deficit for
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the year and good news on oil and interest rates and gold is
down. The punt was stronger in the EMS.
Irish T1mes050383
£ weak and the punt at a new high of 91.5p due to the general
election and the OPEC meeting.
Irish Times020383
The rush out of gold is easing. 	 It was a 100$ down last week.
Sterling is at a new low against the $.
	
90.16p
Irish T1mes110383
EMS realignment rumour.	 Dealers agree that there will be a
realignment but the question is when.
Also the trench elections mean it might happen by mid April.
Business men are concerned about the high £ rate but the Punt is
sustainable at the moment.
Irish IndeDendentllO383
Brendan Walsh says that the government must consider devaluation.
Irish Times 120383
The Central Bank is supporting the Punt in the EMS but the Punt
is at 92p.	 Irish businesses are making moves Into the stronger
EMS currencies.	 Also the Central Bank are not doing anymore
Euro2 authorisations by phone, and only by post.
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irish T1mes150383
Davy Kelleher McCarthy recommend a 10% devaluation - the report
was commissioned by some (un named) business and agricultural
interests.
10% devaluation would increase employment by 16000 in 2 years and
increase industrial exports by 3.5% in 2 years.	 But, they
stressed that there was very little empirical research in this
area in Ireland.
CII made a statement on the DKM report - they are concerned that
1 0% of trade is with the UK and outside the US. Really need
control and the elimination of self imposed inflationary
pressures.
Irish Timesl 80383
Brendan Lynch- economist with CRH- argues that the government
should go for the 6% rather than the 2.25% band and that this
would allow more flexibility against £.
Irish Times190383
The IFA makes a devaluation appeal. Bord Bainne (Brian Joyce,
MD) mentions the effects of the Punt on sales in GB and this has
led to a decrease in Creamery prices.
	 But also mentions that
there is a lot of overseas competition.
Irish T1mes210383
Garret announces a 1I_5% devaluation against the £ yesterday.
All foreign exchange is suspended today in Ireland because the
French government is in turmoil. All the other EMS exchanges
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are closed too.	 Likely effects.
The increase In oil prices due to devaluation may affect
Dukes' hopes of raising l5mlri. in increased excise duties
due to the OPEC cut.
It will increase debt service costs. 80% of debt Is In $
or DM. and the debt will increase by about kOOmln. and the
debt service costs by about 1O mm.
Manufacturing companies, agriculture and tourism should
benefit.
60% of imports are for further production and the cost of
these imports will increase by about 5%.
Inflation will be increased to about 12% whereas previously
It was In single figures (9%?).
This In turn will make a moderate pay round all the more
difficult.
It will Increase the budget deficit and lead to a tightening
of the central bank guidelines.
There should be a big gain in the German and UK export
markets. [19-3-85: this presupposes that exports are to
unrelated firms.]
DI4 estimate an increase in employment.
DKM estimate that it should Increase farm incomes by 3.25%
Interest rates will decrease because of a decrease in
speculative pressure.
Irish flmes22O383
Fell yesterday to 88.9 and $ 1.3095.	 Farmers say that it is too
small. The TWI is down k.1% (3.8% against the EMS). The DM
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went up 5.5% therefore the Punt has gone down 9% against the DM.
But, now the punt is trading at the top of its band and it is
therefore only IL6% down against the DM.	 The devaluation will
add 2% to the CPI over the next 6 months.
Irish T1rnes230383
Dukes (in the Dail yesterday hinted at a tax rise to cover the
devaluation becuase it will increase the interest portion of debt
servise by l7mln. in the current year. Irish holders are
converting DMs to Punts and this has led to the DM-Punt rate
being above the band. Because of this repatriation, dealers
maintain that it may be a month before the exchange rate finds
its correct level.
Haughey claims that the devaluation was forced by the
international financial community and it displays the lack of
confidence by them in Fine Gael. He said that it was unlikely
to be of any benefit to anybody other than the farmers, and there
were plenty of other ways of helping the farmers. (speaking on
'Day by Day' yesterday).
Irish Times220383
CII say that 60% of imports are materials and therefore
moderation will be necessary. It will also increase the price
of consumption goods from abroad, and therefore Irish goods will
be more competitive.	 Need a fiscal, monetary and incomes
policy.
CTT see the devaluation as a breathing space and the benefit
would vary from company to company depending on the export
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markets in which firms were operating, the proportion of
production costs spent on raw materials, the source of raw
materials and the foreign borrowing of companies. 	 Also there
are other factors in competitiveness such as quality and delivery
dates.
IDA say that it removed the uncertainty.
McCarthy: it wasn't big enough, but at least they devalued.
AIIB (Breda McCarthy)- it was needed to restore competitiveness.
There was a calm reaction in the stock market. There was a drop
in GB of Irish shares because they involve Punt earnings, but a
very low volume was traded. The move was too small for either
Jacobs, or Irish Ropes.
Friday 25th, Punt at 89.19.
Irish T1tnes280883
A more coordinated monetary policy is necessary in the EMS.
Irish Time300383
The IR is still high.
Irish Time31O383
Nicholas Robinson (Vice President of Chase Manhattan) predicts
that the Punt is likely to devalue further.
irish T1mes270583
Punt at a two year low against £. Its due to the expectation of
a Thatcher Victory. Punt = 78.8p. The Punt is resilient in
the EMS.	 9.k% decrease in the Punt since 210383 using the TWI.
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Exporters will benefit but importers will lose out.
Irish Times12O483
Mr. G. Byrne (chairman of Dublin Tourism) wants a special
exchange rate for tourists- MacNulty (the manager) supports this
idea.
Irish Times1901483
Punt at 82.25p
Irish Indeoendent2llO583
Sharp losses for the Punt to 81.58
Irish IndeoendentlOO883
ZtO% devaluation against the dollar since 1979, and this has
increased both the costs of debt service, and import bills.
Irish T1mes230284
Punt at 79.1
Irish T1mes060381$
ECU travellers cheques are likely- it is the most stable currency
in Europe- used in commercial banking and EEC transactions- it is
now the third most widely used currency for bond issues after the
DM and $.
Irish TimesO6O3 81$
Because of the EMS realignment, the punt is now at 80.8p
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Irish Indeendent1 1 Ok 8k
Punt has devalued by 12% in the last year and has given a big
boost to competitiveness. It is possible that one option for
the national planning board is devaluation.
Irish IndeoendentO9O58
Down to 1.05$ at one stage.
Irish Indeendent09O58
Decrease in the dollar will increase the cost of oil supplies.
Irish IndependentlO058k
Recovered to 1.105
Irish IndependentOk078k
Rate now at 1.085
Irish Times1307811
New low of 1.076
irish Timealk078k
Closed at 1.0825
ish Iime19078k
New low of' 1.0705
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APPENDIX 7
LISTING OF ThE BASIC MODEL
In this appendix, a complete listing of the basic model is
provided.	 The numbers on the left hand side of the listing are
the row numbers.	 Ten currencies are assumed.
	 Global
information is Input in lines 1 to 77.
	
Subsidiary information
is input In lines 77 to 280.	 The remainder of the programme
performs the calculations.
1 'Pounds'
2 'Dollars/Pound'
3 'Francs/Pound'
1 'DM/Pound'
5 'Rand/pound'
6 'Punt/Pound'
7 'Aus$/Pound'
8 'Peso/Pound'
9 'Sing$/Pound'
10 'Peseta/Pound'
11 'UK mt Rate'
12 '$ mt Rate'
13 'Fr. mt Rate'
11 'DM mt Rate'
15 'Rand mt Rate'
16 'Punt mt Rate'
17 'Aus mt Rate'
18 'Peso mt Rate'
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19 'Sing mt Rate'
20 'Peseta mt Rate'
22 'Transfer Volume'
77;
78 'Transfer Status'
80 'Cover Sales UK'
81 'Cover Sales US'
82 'Cover Sales Fr'
83 'Cover Sales Ge'
8k 'Cover Sales SA'
85 'Cover Sales Ii"
86 'Cover Sales Au'
87 'Cover Sales Me'
88 'Cover Sales Si'
89 'Cover Sales Sp'
90 'Cover Costs UK'
91 'Cover Costs US'
92 'Cover Costs Fr'
93 'Cover Costs Ger'
9k 'Cover Costs SA'
95 'Cover Costs In'
96 'Cover Costs Aus'
97 'Cover Costs Mex'
98 'Cover Costs Sing'
99 'Cover Costs Sp'
100 'Currency Number'
101 'Intrate Number'
102 'Export UK'
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103 'Export US'
10k 'Export FR'
105 'Export Ger'
106 'Export SA'
107 'Export In'
108 'Export Aus'
109 'export Mex'
110 'Export Sing'
111 'Export Sp'
120 'Unitvc UK'
121 'Unitvc US'
122 'Unitvc Fr'
123 'Unitve Ger'
12k 'Unitvc SA'
125 'Unitvc Ir].'
126 'Unitve Aus'
127 'Unitve Mex'
128 'Unitve Sing'
129 'Unitve Sp'
130 'Fe UK'
131 'Fe US'
132 'fo Fr'
133 'Fe Ger'
13k 'Fe SA'
135 'Fe Ir'
136 'Fe Au'
137 'Fe Me'
138 'Fe Si'
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139 'Fe Sp'
18 'Budvol'
119 'unitvo'
150 'to'
151 'orderlead'
152 'purchlag'
153 'pay lag'
15k 'debtorlag'
155 'FC Lag'
160 'Price'
170 'Expcurr UK'
171 'Expcurr US'
172 'Expcurr Fr'
173 'Expcurr Ger'
17k 'Expcurr' SA'
175 'Expeurr Irl'
176 'Expcurr Aus'
177 'Expcurr Mex'
178 'Expcurr Sing'
179 Expcurr Sp'
180 'Impcurr UK'
181 'Impcurr US'
182 'Impcurr Fr'
183 'Impourr Ger'
18k 'Impourr SA'
i8 'Impourr Iz'l'
186 Impcurr Aus'
187 'Impcurr Mex'
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188 'Iinpcurr Sing'
189 'Impcurr Sp'
190 'Fe curr UK'
191 'Fe eurr US'
192 'Fe curr Fr'
193 'Fe curr Ge'
19k 'Fe curr SA'
195 'Fe eurr Iz'l'
196 'Fe curr Aus'
197 'Fe eurr Mex'
198 'Fe curr Sing'
199 'Fe curr Sp'
200 'Senpri UK'
201 'Senpri US'
202 'Senpri Fr'
203 'Senpri Ger'
20k 'Senprl SA'
205 'Senpri In'
206 'Senpni Aus'
207 'Senpni Mex'
208 'Senpni Sing'
209 'Senpni Sp'
210 '5envo UK'
211 'Senvc US'
212 'Senvo Fr'
213 'Senve Ger'
21k 'Senve SA'
215 'Senve In'
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216 'Serivo Au3'
217 'Senvc Mex'
218 'Senvo Sing'
219 'Senvo Sp'
220 'Senfo UK'
221 'Senfo US'
222 'Senfo Fr'
223 'Senfe Ger'
22k 'Senfc SA'
225 'Senf'o In'
226 'Senfo Aus'
227 'Sent o Max'
228 'Senfe Sing'
229 'Senfo Sp'
230 'senvol UK'
231 'Senvol US'
232 'Senvol Fr'
233 'Senvol Ger'
23k 'Senvo]. SA'
235 'Senvol In'
236 'Sevol Aus'
237 'Senvol Mex'
238 'Serivol Sing'
239 'Senvol Sp'
2k0 'We UK'
2k1 'We US'
2k2 'We Fr'
2k3 'We Get"
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2Ik 'We SA'
2115 'We In'
2116 'We Aus'
2117 'We Hex'
2118 'We Sing'
2119 'We Sp'
250 'Debt UK'
251 'Debt US'
252 'Debt Fr'
253 'Debt Ger'
25k 'Debt SA'
255 'Debt In'
256 'Debt Aus'
257 'Debt Hex'
258 'Debt Sing'
259 'Debt Sp'
260 'FA UK'
261 'FA US'
262 'FA Fr'
263 'FA Ger'
26k 'FA SA'
265 'FA In].'
266 'FA Aus'
267 'FA Hex'
268 'FA Sing'
269 'Fa Sp'
270 'Stock (units)'
271 'Debtor'
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272 'Creditor'
278;
279 'currency' = "Currency Number"
280 groupdiv ('Pounds' ,'Peseta/Pound' ,currency',281)
291 ' pound Change' = 281/28llagl.
292 'Dollar Change'	 282/282 lag 1.
293 'Franc Change'	 283/2 83 lag 1.
29k 'Din Change' = 28k/28k lag 1.
295 'Rand Change' = 285/285 lag 1.
296 'Punt Change'	 286/286 lag 1.
297 'Aus$ Change' = 287/287 lag 1.
298 'Peso Change' = 288/288 la g 1.
299 'Sing$ Change' = 289/289 lag 1.
300 'Peseta Change' = 290/290 lag 1.
301 groupsub('Pound Change' ,'Peseta Change' ,1.,'Pound Change')
302 'Cum Pound Change' = ((281oo11 ./281)-i.) for 2. to 25.
303 'Cum Dollar Change' =((28200l1./282)-i.) for 2. to 25.
30k 'Cuni Franc Change' = ((283co11./283)-i.) for 2. to 25.
305 'Cizi DMark Change' = ((2Bl4coll.128'4)-1.) for 2. to 25.
306 'Cum Rand Change'	 ((285oo11./285)-1 . ) for 2. to 25.
307 'Cum Punt Change '	 ((286co11.1286)-1.) for 2. to 25.
308 'Cum Aus$ Change'	 ((287co11./287)-1 . ) for 2. to 25.
309 'Cuni Peso Change ' = ((288col1./288)-1.) for 2. to 25.
310 'Cuni Sing$ Change' 	 ((289eo11./289)- 1. ) for 2. to 25.
311 'Ciin Peseta Change'= ((2gOcoli./290)-1.) for 2. to 25.
312 groupmult('Cwn Pound Change','Cum Peseta Change','senvol
UK' ,333,'Pounds')
313 groupadd(333,3k2,1,,333)
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31 11 groupmult(333,3 1 2,'Budvol' ,333)
315 groupmult(333,3 112,'Export UK',333,'Pounds')
3l6groupmult('Impcurr UK','Impcurr Sp','Cum Pound
Change' ,323, 'Pounds')
317 'Translated VC'	 'unjtvc"('Pounds'+(323sum332))
318 groupmult('Fc curt' UK','Fc curr Sp','Cum Pound Change',323,
'Pounds')
319 'Translated FC' = 'fc"('Pounds'+(323sum332))
320 groupmult('ExPourr' UK','Expcurr Sp','Cum Pound Change',323,
'Pounds')
322;if('Transfer Status'eq2.)'Volume'='Transfer Volume'
3111 'Volume' = 'Volume' + (333 sum 3112)
3115 'Order Vol.'	 ('Budvol'lead'orderlead')+('Vo].urne'_'Budvol')
3216 'Purchase Vol.'=('Budvol'lead('orderlead'-'p urchlag'))+
('Vol ume'lag'purehlag '-'Budvol'lag'purchlag')
31$7 if('Transf'er Status'eq2.) clear ('Transfer Volume')
3118 if'('Transfer Status'eql.) 'Transfer Volume''Transfer
Volunie'+'Order Vol.'
3 1 9 'TPrjce' = 'Price"('Pounds'+(323sum332))
350 groupmult('Cum Pound Change','Cum Peseta Change','Senprl
UK' ,353,'Pounds')
351 groupadd(353,362,1. ,353)
352 groupmult(353,362,'ExportUK',353,'Pounds');
groupmult(353,362,'Volume' ,353)
363 groupmult(353,362,'TPrice',353)
36 'Sales' = 353 sum 362
365 groupmult ('Cunt Pound Change','Cum Peseta Change','Senvc
UK' ,368,'Pounda')
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366 groupadd(368,377,1. ,368)
367 groupmult(368,377,'Unitvc UK',368,'Pounds')
378 groupmult(368,377,'Translated VC',368)
379 'Unit Var. Cost' = 368 sum 377
380 groupmult('Cum Pound Change','Cum Peseta Change','Senf'c UK',
383, 'Pounds')
381 groupadd(383,392,1.,383)
382 groupmult(383,392,'Fo UK' ,383,'Pounds')
393 groupmult(383,392,'Translated FC' ,383)
394 'Total Fixed Costs' 	 383 sum 392
395 'Total Costs'='Totai. Fixed Costs'+('tinit Var. Cost'*'Volume')
396 groupmult('Debt UK','Debt Sp','UK mt Rate' ,lO3,'Pourids')
397 groupdiv(l03,k12,281,l$13,'Pounds')
398 'interest' = 1 13 sum 22
399 olear(Z03,lI12)
01 'Interest Rate' = 'Pounds'+"Intpate Number"
t02 groupadd('UK mt Rate','Peseta mt Rate',1.,k03)
groupdiv( l 03, l 12,'Interest Rate' ,103,'Pounds')
2k 'CF UK' = ('Sales' lag'debtorlag"Expcurr UK')-('Purohase
Vol.'lag'pay lag' "Unit Var. Cost'*'Impourr UK')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curr UK')- I 1 3
I25 'CF US' = ('Sales' lag'debtorlag"Expcurr US')-('Purchase
Vol.'lag'pay lag' "Unit Var. Cost'*'Impcurr US')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC La'*'Fo ourr US')11 11
1 26 'CF FR' = ('Sales' lag t debtorlag'*'Expeurr Fr')-('Purcbase
Vol.'lag'pay lag' "Unit Var. Cost'*'Im p ourr Fr')-('Totai.
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag"Fc curt' Fr')_IIl 5
I27 'CF GE'
	
('Sales' labtorlag?*?Expourr Ger')-('Purchase
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Vol.'lag'pay lag "Unit Var. Cost'*'Impcurr Ger')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fe curx' Ge')- 1116
1428 'CF SA' = ('Sales' lag'debtorlag'*'Expcurr SA')-('Purohase
Vol.'lag'pay lag' "Unit Var. Cost"Impcurr SA')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag"Fc curr SA')_lll
1429 'CF Ir' = ('Sales' lagPdebtorlag*?Expcurr Irl')-('Purchase
Vo].'lag'pay lag "Unit Var. Cost"Impcurr Irl')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag"Fe eurr Irl') -1118
1130 'CF Au' = ('Sales' lag'debtorlag"Expcurr Aus')-('Purohase
Vol.'lag'pay lag "Unit Var. Cot*tImpourr Aus')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag"Fc curr Aus') -ii9
1131 'CF Me' = ('Sales' lag?debtorlag*Expcurr Mex')-('Purehase
Vol.'lag'pay lag "Unit Var. Cost"Impcurr Mex')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fo ourr Hex') _1120
1 32 'CF Si' = ('Sales' lag'debtorlag"Expourr Sing')-('Purchase
Vol.'lag'pay la g"Un Var. Cost"Impcurr SIng')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curr Sin g')-112l
1433 'CF Sp' = ('Sales' lag'debtorlag"Expcurr Sp')-('Purchase
Vol.'lag'pay lag' "Unit Var. Cost"Impcurr Sp')-('Total
Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag"Fo ourr S p ')- 112 2
1 311 'fxsaUK':'Sales'lag'debtorlag"Expcurr UIC'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((T.-'Cover Sales UK')'((2811ag'debtorlag'/281)))+
('Cover Sales UK" llO3lag' debtorlag' power-' de btorlag'))
1135 'f'xsaUs''sales'lag'debtorlag"Expourr US'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((l.-'Cover Sa les US')*((2821ag'debtorlag'/282)))+
('Cover Sales US'll0lllag'debto].ag'power-'de btorlag'))
1136 'f'xsaFR':'Sales'lag'debtorlag"Expcurr Fr'].ag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((l.-'Cover Sales Fr')'((2S3lag'debtorlag'1283)))+
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('Cover Sales Fr?EIO5lag?debtoagtpower_?de btorlag'))
1137 'fxsaGE':'Sales'lag'debtorlag"Expeurr Ger'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((i,-'Cover Sales Get)*((2Bklag'debtorlag'/2814)))+
('Cover Sales G&'4O6lag'debtor].ag 'power'd ebtorlag'))
113 8 'f'ssaSA''Sales'lag'debtorlag"Expourr SA'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((i.-'Cover Sales SA')'((2851ag'debtorlag'/285)))+
('Cover Sales
	
btorlag'))
1139 'fxsalR''Sales'lag'debtorlag'*'Expcurr Irl'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((t.-'Cover Sales Ir')'((286lag'debtorlag'/286)))+
('Cover Sales Ir'*kO8lag'debtor].ag'power-'debtorlag'))
11110 'f'xsaAU'='Sales'lag'debtorlag'*'Expcurr Aus'lag'debtorlag'
'(1.((1.'Cover Sales Au')'((2S7lag'debtorlag'/287)))+
('Cover Sales Au"l4O9lag'debtorlag'power-'debtorlag'))
11111 'fxsaNE'='Sales'lag'debtorlag'* t Expcurr Mex'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((l.-'Cover Sales Me')((2881ag'debtorlag'/288)))+
('Cover Sales Me"11101ag'debtor'].ag'power-'debtorlag'))
11112 'fxsasl ? :'Sales'lag'debtorlag t *'Expcurr Sing'lag'debtorlag'
'(1.-((1.'Cover Sales S1')'((2891ag'debtorlag'/289)))+
('Cover Sales S1"1111lag'debtor].ag 'power' debtorlag'))
11113 'f'xsaSP f Sales'lag'debtorlag'*'Expcurr Sp'lag'debtorlag'
'(l.-((i...'Cover Sales Sp')'((2901ag'debtorlag'/290)))+
('Cover 9les Sp'*11l2lag'debtorlag'power-'debtorlag'))
1111 11 'txvcUR''Purchase Vol.'lag'pay lag'*'Unit Var. Cost'
"ImPotarp UK'lag'pay la g"(l.-((l.-'Cover Costs UK')'
((2811ag'pay lag'/281)))+('Cover Co5t UK'
'11O3la, pay lag'power-'pay lag'))
11115 'txvoUS''Purcbase Vol.'lag'pay lag'*'Uriit Var. Cost'
"Imp eurr US'lag'pay la g"(l.-((l...'Cover Costs US')'
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((282lag'pay lag'/282)))+('Cover COt5 US'*ZOlUag'
pay lag'power-'pay lag'))
ZU6 'fxvcFR''Purehase Vol.'lag'pay la'*cUnit Var. Cost'
"Impourr Fr'lag'pay la g"(1.((1...,ver Costs Fr')*
((2831ag'pay lag'/283)))+('Cover Co 5	Fr''ltO5lag'
pay lag'p0wer-'pay lag'))
ZU7 'fxvcGE''Purohase Vol.'lag'pay lag'*tunit Var. Cost'
Ger'lag'pay 1 ag*(1._((1._,Coveri Costs Ger')*
((281Uag'pay lag'/28l )))+('Cover Co5 	 Ger'' Z O6l ag'
pay lag'p0wer-'pay lag'))
1118 'f'xvosA'vPurchase Vo]..'lag'pay lag'*'Urdt Var. Cost'
• 'Inipcu. Sk'lag'pay la g"(1.-((1....' cover Costs SA')'
((2851ag'pay lag'/285)))+('Cover Co 5
	SA'IO7lag'
pay lag' 0wer-'pay lag'))
1U9 'fxvoIRe' purchage Vol.'lag'pay lag'a'Unit Var. Cost'
"ImpOQ1 r Irl'lag'pay 1 ag"(l.-((l._'Cover Costs In')'
((286lag'pay lag'/286)))+('Cover Co5t5 Inl"Z O8l ag'
pay la' 0wer.-'pay lag'))
15O 'fxvcAU''Purchase Vol.'lag'pay lag"TJriit Var. Cost'
"ImPOUr Aus'lag'pay 1 ag"(1.((1._'Cover Costs Aus')'
((2871ag'pay lag'/287)))+('Cover Co t5 Aus' ZIO9l ag'
pay lag'p0wer-'pay lag'))
I$51 'fxvcME''Purchase Vol.'lag'pay lag"Unit Var. Cost'
"Impcunr Mex'lag'pay 1 ag"(l.-((l,_'Cover Costs Mex')'
((2881ag'pay lag'/288)))+('Cover COt3 Mex"k101ag'
pay lag'power-'pay lag'))
1 52 'f'xvcSl''Purchase Vol.'lag'pay lag"Unit Var. Cost'
"LflpoUrr Slng'lag'pay lag"(l.-((l._'Cover Costs Sing')
AppendIx 7: Page 59
((289lag'pay l ag '/289)))+('Cover Costs Sing"k lilag'
Pay lag'power_'pay lag'))
53 'fxvcSP':'Purchase Vol.'lag'pay lag"Unjt Var. Cost'
"Impcur Sp'lag'pay la g"(l.-((l.-'Cover Costs 5p)*
((2gOlag'pay lag'/290)))+('Cover Costs Sp"112lag'
Pay lag'power-'pay lag'))
'5 'fxfcU!''Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC La,*'Fo curr UK
'lag'FC	 g*(1._((1._?Co ver Costs UK')'((2811ag'FC Lag'
/281)))+(vCover Costs UK"O3lag'FC Lag'power-'FC Lag'))
55 'fxfctJS?'Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curt' US
'lag'FC Lag'*(l.-((l.-'Co vet' Costs U3')((282lag'FC Lag'
/282)))+(f Cover Costs US'' 1IO lUag'FC Lag'power-'FC Lag'))
156 'f'xfcFR''Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC La'*'Fc curt' Fr
'lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l.-'Co ver Costs Ft")ø((2831ag'FC Lag'
/ 283)))+('Cover Costs Fr ? *4O5lag ? FC Lag'power-'FC Lag'))
57 'f'xfccE':'Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC La'*'Fc curr Ge
'lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l.-'Co vet' Costs Ger")'((28'Ilag'FC Lag'
/281 )))+('Cover Costs Ger" 1 061ag'FC Lag'power... ' FC Lag'))
1158 'fxfcSA''Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curr SA
'lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l.-'Co vet' Costs SA')*((2851ag'FC Lag'
/285)))+('Cover Costs SA*kO7lag ? FC Lag'power-'FC Lag'))
1159 'fxfclR'='Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curt' In
'lag'FC Lag?*(1._((1._' Cover Costs Ir].')*((2861ag'FC Lag'
/286)))+('Cover Costs Irl"21081ag'FC Lag'power- 'FC Lag'))
1160 'fxtcAU' 'Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc ourr Aus
'lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l,-' Cover Costs Aus')*((2871ag'FC Lag'
/287)))+('Cover Costs Aus t *11091ag ? FC Lag'power -'FC Lag'))
1161 'fxfcME' :'Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'a'Fc curt' Mex
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'lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l.-' Cover Costs Mex')'((2881ag'FC Lag'
1288)))+('Cover Costs Mex' 1 10lag'FC Lag'power -'FC Lag'))
62 'f'xf'cSI' ='Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curr Sing
'lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l.- 'Cover Costs Slng')*((289lag'FC Lag'
/289)))+('Cover Costs Slng"klllag'FC Lag'po wer-'FC Lag'))
1 63 'f'xf aSP' :'Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'*'Fc curr Sp'
lag'FC Lag"(l.-((l.-'C over Costs Sp')'((2901ag'FC Lag'
/290)))+('Cover Costs Sp t *11l2lag ? FC Lag'power-'F C Lag'))
116 1  groupsub ('fxsaUK' , 'fxsaSP' , 'f'xveUK' ,510,'Pounds')
1165 groupsub ('fXfQUK','fxfcSP',510,1166,'Pounds')
1177 'FX GIL trading' = 1166sum1175
1178 groupdiv('Debt UK','Debt Sp',281,523,'Pounds')
1179 groupmult(523,532,'Pound Change' ,1180,'Pounds')
501 'FX GIL Debt'	 for 2. to 25. 1180	 1189
503 groupmult('Price' ,169,'Export tlK',504,'Pounds')
515 'Cash Flow' = 'F]C G/L trading'+('CF UK's.n'CF Sp')
516 'cum Cash Flow':'Cash Flow'thru25.
517 'cuin Purch Vol''Purchase Vol.'thru25.
518 'cum Sales Vol''Volume'thru25.
519 'purch-sales vo].' = 'cum Purch Vol'-'oum Sales Vol'
520 'opening WC'='Wc UK'sum'Wc Sp'
521 'closing WC':'opening WC'+' closing Wc'lagl.+'Cash Flow'
+'Interest on WC'
522 'Interest on WC'
	
"Intrate Numbet*olosing wC'
605 'Unit VC (B)' = 'unitvc'
606 'Unit VC (A)'
	
'Unit Var. Cost'
607 'Volunie(B)''Budvol'
608 'Volume(A)'='Voluxne'
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609 'Stock Units'	 'Stock (unjts)'+'Stook Units'lagl.
+'Purchase Vol.'-'Volume'
611 'Sales(B)'=(5Oksum5l3)''Volume(B)'
612 'Variable Cost(B)':'Budvol?*'unjtvc'
613 'Fixed Cost(B)':'fc'
61k 'Prof'it(B)'='Sales(B)'-'Varlable Cost(B)'-'Fixed Cost(B)'
615 'Sales(A)':'Sales'
616 'Variable Costs(A)' = 'Unit Var. Cost"Volume'
617 'Fixed Cost(A)'='Total Fixed Costs'
618 'Profit (A)'='Sales(A)'-'Variable Costs(A)'-'FiXed Cost(A)'
619 'Fx G/L - trad trade' = 'FX GIL trading'
620 'Profit less FX' = 'Profit (A)'+'FX G/L trading'
621 'Debt Interest' = 'interest'
622 'Interest on WC' = 'Interest on WC'
62k 'Net Profit'
	
'Profit less FX'-'Debt Interest'
+'Interest on WC'
625 'Fixed Assets' 	 'FA tJK's'Fa Sp'
626 'Stook':'Stock Units ? * ? Uflit VC (A)'
627 'Debtors':'Debtor'+'Debtors'lagl.+'Sales'
- 'Sales' lag'debtorlag'
628 'Liquid Assets'='closing WC'
629 'Total Assets''Fixed Assets'surn'Liquid Assets'
630 'Creditors':' Creditor'+'Creditors'lagl.+60k+'Total Fixed
costs'-6oUlag'pay 1 ag'-'Total Fixed Costs'lag'FC Lag'
631 'Debt'=523sum532
632 'Liabilities''creditors'+'Debt'
633 'Revenue Reserve''Net Profit'+'Revenue Reserve'lagl.
63k 'G/L - Debt''FX G/L Debt'
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635 'GIL - Stock'='Stock Units'lagl.
'('Unit VC (A)'-'Unit VC (A)'lagl.)
636 'Equity'='Total Assets'-('Debt'suin'G/L - Stock')
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APPENDIX 8
TTS OF THE DECISION SUPPORT MODEL
In this appendix some tests and results from the decision support
model are summarised and reported. The aim of these tests is
to demonstrate the integrity of the model.
Test 1: The Base Case
This test examines the integrity of the model, when exchange
rates are constant. 	 Data is as follows:
Currencies constant: 1,u,xl: 2,u,x2
Interest rates constant : 11,u,x.01: 12,u,x.011
No transfers or forward cover.
Currency Number: 100,u,x2
Interest Number: 1O1,u,x12
Export 50%	 : 102,u,x.5
Unit Var. Cost : 120,u,x.5: 121,u,x.5
Fixed Cost : 130,u,x.2: 131,u,x.8
Budget Volume : 1118,u,xlOO
Unit Var Cost : 119,u,x10
Fixed Cost	 : 150,u,x2000
All leads and lags set to zero.
Prices : 160,u,x70: 161,u,x70
Export Currency: 170,u,x.5: 171,u,x.5
Import Currency: 180,u,x.5: 181,u,x.5
F.Cost Currency: 190,u,x.2: 191,u,x.8
Appendix 8: Page 11611
All sensitivity variables are assumed to be zero.
Working Capital and opening stocks are assumed to be zero.
Debt	 : 251,u,x5000
Fixed Assets	 : 261,u,x8000
Test
To demonstrate that monthly cash flows and profits are constant
when sales and costs are constant, there are no time lags, and
exchange rate changes are zero.
Result	 Test
It may be seen in Table A8.1 that if exchange rates do not
change, none of the figures are effected.
Test 2: Effect of Variable Exchange Rates
Data were as follows.
Currencies variable: 1,u,xl: 2,u,(series of values see Table
A8.2)
mt rates constant : 11,u,x.O1: 12,u,x.O11
No transfers or forward cover.
Currency Number: 100,u,x2
Interest Number: 1O1,u,x12
Export 50%
	
: 102,u,x.5
Unit Var. Cost : 120,u,x.5: 121,u,x.5
Fixed Cost	 : 130,u,x.2: 131,u,x.8
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Budget Volume : 148,u,xlOO
Unit Var Cost : 119,u,x10
Fixed Cost	 : 150,u,x2000
All leads and lags set to zero.
Prices	 : 160,u,x70: 161,u,x70
Export Currency: 170,u,x.5: 171,u,x.5
Import Currency: 180,u,x.5: 181,u,x.5
F.Cost Currency: 190,u,x.2: 191,u,x.8
All sensitivity variables are assumed to be zero.
Working Capital and opening stocks are assumed to be zero.
Debt	 : 251,u,x5000
Fixed Assets	 : 261,u,x8000
2 Test
To demonstrate that the calculation of the translated costs and
sales is correct. 	 For example in April.	 -
Budget Sales = $7000 and Sterling Invoices = 50%
Therefore,
Actual Sales = $3500 + (50 units * $70/2*1.14)
$5950
Msult	 Tea.t
It may be seen in Table A8.2 that when exchange rates fluctuate,
both costs and revenues are affected by exchange rate changes.
There are no foreign exchange gains and losses. 	 Finally, costs
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revenues and sales correctly reflect the exchange rate change.
Test 3: Effects of Time Lags
In this test, the effects of a time lag of one month on foreign
exchange gains and losses are examined. Data is similar to the
previous test, except that a debtor lag exists.
Currencies variable: 1,u,xl: 2,u,(series of values see Table 2)
mt rates constant : 11,u,x.01: 12,u,x.011
No transfers or forward cover.
Currency Number: 100,u,x2
Interest Number: 101,u,x12
Export 50%
	
: 102,u,x.5
Unit Var. Cost : 120,u,x.5: 121,u,x.5
Fixed Cost : 130,u,x.2: 131,u,x.8
Budget Volume : V18,u,xlOO
Unit Var Cost : 1l9,u,x10
Fixed Cost	 : 150,u,x2000
All leads and lags set to zero, except debtorlag: 151,u,x1
Prices : 160,u,x70: 161,u,x70
Export Currency: 170,u,x.5: 171,u,x.5
Import Currency: 180,u,x.5: 181,u,x.5
F.Cost Currency: 190,u,x.2: 191,u,x.8
All sensitivity variables are assumed to be zero.
Working Capital and opening stocks are assumed to be zero.
Debt	 : 251,u,x5000
Appendix 8: Page 167
Fixed Assets	 : 261,u,x8000
M Q1 Test
To show that foreign exchange gains and losses are correctly
calculated, and that the debtors are correctly reflected in the
balance sheet.
	 In April, the foreign exchange gain or loss
will equal:
Sales invoiced to UK in March = £1,750, or $3,150.
In April, £1,750 a $ • i; = $2 l 50 is received, representing a
loss of $700.
	
Moreover, there will be debtors equal to the
current month's sales.
.Result	 Test
The loss reported in Table A8.3 is $739.
	
The inaccuracy arises
from the way in which the exchange loss is approximated, in order
to increase computational speed.
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rABLE A8.1
A UK MNC PLC
A Subsidiary Inc.
Results Expressed in $
Operating Summary: 1986
Dollars/Pound
Unit VC (B)
Unit VC (A)
Volume(B)
Volume(A)
Stock Units
Sales(B)
Variable Cost(B)
Fixed Cost(B)
Proflt(B)
Sales(A)
Variable Costs(A)
Fixed Cost(A)
Profit (A)
Fx GIL - trade items
Profit less FX
Debt Interest
Interest on WC
Net Profit
Fixed Assets
Stock
Debtors
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
creditors
Debt
Liabilities
Revenue Reserve
GIL - Debt
GIL - Stock
Equity
Jan
2.00
110
110
100
100
0
7000
14000
2000
1000
7000
11000
2000
1000
0
1000
55
87
1032
8000
0
0
79148
159118
0
5000
5000
79118
0
0
-2000
Feb
2.00
140
140
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
7000
11000
2000
1000
0
1000
55
99
101411
8000
0
0
8992
16992
0
5000
5000
8992
0
0
-2000
Mar
2.00
140
110
100
100
0
7000
14000
2000
1000
7000
11000
2000
1000
0
1000
55
111
1056
8000
0
0
100148
180118
0
5000
5000
100118
0
0
-2000
Apr
2.00
110
110
100
100
0
7000
14000
2000
1000
7000
4000
2000
1000
0
1000
55
122
1067
8000
0
0
11115
19115
0
5000
5000
11115
0
0
-2000
May
2.00
110
140
100
100
0
7000
14000
2000
1000
7000
14000
2000
1000
0
1000
55
1314
1079
8000
0
0
121911
20194
0
5000
5000
12194
0
0
-2000
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TABLE A8.2
A UK MNC PLC
A Subsidiary Inc.
Results Expressed in $
Operating Summary: 1986
Dollars/Pound
Unit VC (B)
Unit VC (A)
Vol ume (B)
Volume(A)
Stock Units
Sales (B)
Variable Cost(B)
Fixed Cost(B)
Prof it ( B)
Sales (A)
Variable Costs(A)
Fixed Cost(A)
Profit (A)
Fx GIL - trading
Profit less FX
Debt Interest
Interest on WC
Net Profit
Fixed Assets
Stock
Debtors
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
Creditors
Debt
Liabilities
Revenue Reserve
GIL - Debt
G/L - Stock
Equity
Jan
1 . 80
38
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
6650
3800
1 960
890
0
890
55
911
929
8000
0
0
8589
16589
0
5000
5000
8589
0
0
-2000
Feb
1 .70
110
37
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
61175
3700
19110
835
0
835
55
10k
8811
8000
0
0
91173
171173
0
5000
5000
91173
0
0
-2000
Mar
1.80
110
38
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
6650
3800
1 g6 0
890
0
890
55
115
950
8000
0
0
101123
181123
0
5000
5000
101123
0
0
-2000
Apr
1.110
110
311
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
5950
31100
1880
670
0
670
55
123
738
8000
0
0
11161
19161
0
5000
5000
11161
0
0
-2000
May
1.30
110
33
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
5775
3300
1860
615
0
615
55
130
690
8000
0
0
11851
19851
0
5000
5000
11851
0
0
-2000
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1!AL A8.
A UK MNC PLC
A Subsidiary Inc.
Results Expressed in $
Operating Summary
Dollars/Pound
Unit VC (B)
Unit VC (A)
Vol ume (B)
Volume(A)
Stock Units
S ales (B)
Variable Cost(B)
Fixed Cost(B)
Prof it(B)
Sales (A)
Variable Costs(A)
Fixed Cost(A)
Profit (A)
Fx GIL - trad tra
Profit less FX
Debt Interest
Interest on WC
Net Profit
Fixed Assets
Stock
Debtors
Liquid Assets
Total Assets
Creditors
Debt
Liabilities
Revenue Reserve
GIL - Debt
G/L - Stock
Equity
Jan
1 . 80
lb
38
100
100
0
7000
b000
2000
1000
6650
3800
1960
890
-350
5140
55
11
1496
8000
0
6650
967
15617
0
5000
5000
7617
0
0
-2000
Feb
1.70
110
37
100
100
0
7000
14000
2000
1000
61175
3700
1940
835
—185
650
55
19
615
8000
0
6b75
1756
16231
0
5000
5000
31
0
0
-2000
Mar
1 • 80
140
38
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
6650
3800
1960
890
190
1080
55
29
10514
8000
0
6650
2636
17286
0
5000
5000
9286
0
0
-2000
Apr
1 .140
110
314
100
100
0
7000
14000
2000
1000
5950
31100
1880
670
—739
—69
55
36
—88
8000
0
5950
32148
17198
0
5000
5000
9198
0
0
-2000
May
1.30
140
33
100
100
0
7000
11000
2000
1000
5775
3300
1 860
615
-212
1103
55
112
389
8000
0
5775
3812
17587
0
5000
5000
9587
0
0
-2000
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